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ABSTRACT
This dissertation seeks to understand the causes of racial liberalism among white
Americans, including overtime shifts therein. Drawing on intergroup emotions theory from
social psychology, I propose that negative ingroup-focused moral emotions—namely white
shame and guilt—are important factors in the formation of racially liberal attitudes, such as
white support for race-based affirmative action and government assistance. I further argue that
not all whites are equally susceptible to such emotions; that those inclined towards structural
attributions for inequality (e.g. white liberals) are more likely to experience them; and that the
racial attitudes of such whites are thus more elastic than those of others. Finally, I contend that
the salience of these emotions varies as a function of the availability of racial equalitarian media
messaging that speaks to black-white status differences in terms of past and/or present white
racism. Using cross-sectional, time series, panel, and experimental data, I test these propositions
across multiple empirical chapters. I find general support for the theory across multiple
methodologies. In the main, the findings suggest that, net of other attitudinally important
variables (e.g. racial resentment, social dominance orientation), white racial attitudes would be
far more conservative in the absence of collective shame and guilt; that overtime increases in
white racial liberalism temporally follow increases in the availability of racial equalitarian media
messaging, particularly among white liberals and Democrats; and that racial equalitarian media
messaging elicits white shame and guilt, which, in turn, increase the expression of racially liberal
attitudes and policy preferences. Taken as a whole, the findings have important implications for
the existing literature on white racial attitudes, which remains overwhelmingly focused on
negative or prejudicial intergroup orientations.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Just over two decades ago, Kuklinski et al. (1997) concluded their study of white
attitudes towards affirmative action with the following prediction:
“As more time passes, as memories of legalized segregation and overt exploitation fade, we can
expect a growth in the number of whites who believe African-Americans share at least partial
responsibility for their circumstances and, going a step further, who believe that continuing
problems African-Americans face are a consequence not merely of their circumstances but of
their own motivations and desires. If so, anger and resentment over affirmative action will
increase, not decrease” (p.416).
Decades later, the opposite has transpired. In what some have called the ‘Great Awokening’, the
racial attitudes of white Americans overall have become more liberal and supportive of pro-black
policies, like affirmative action, over the past decade than at any previous point on record. In
particular, and in a trend that predates the Trump presidency, overwhelming majorities of white
Democrats and liberals now attribute the persistence of black disadvantage primarily to historical
and/or contemporary discrimination and perceive their own racial group as uniquely and
illegitimately advantaged. Coincidentally, support for race-conscious policies, such as
affirmative action, financial reparations for slavery, and race-based government assistance, have
reached record highs. In fact, by some measures, the racial liberalism of white Democrats and
liberals has even surpassed that of their non-white counterparts. What is more, the former has
since become the only demographic to exhibit at once favoritism towards other racial/ethnic
groups and a bias against their own 1.
Against the backdrop of these seismic attitudinal shifts, white Democratic politicians and
political candidates have increasingly adopted racially liberal or ‘woke’ rhetoric that would have
been electorally risky in campaigns past. Speeches of white candidates during the 2019-2020
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These data are reviewed in Chapter 4.

2
Democratic presidential primaries projected this paradigm shift. At a Democratic presidential
debate in 2019, senator Kirsten Gillibrand marketed herself as one who could “explain to white
women in the suburbs that when their son is walking down the street with a bag of M&Ms in his
pocket, wearing a hoodie, his whiteness is what protects him from being shot”. Even moderate
Democratic candidates, such as the now president Joseph Biden, followed suit. Speaking at a
recent event hosted by Al Sharpton, the now President Biden said: “we have a lot to root out, but
most of all the systemic racism that most of us whites don’t like to acknowledge even exists.
There’s something we have to admit—not you, me, white America—has to admit there’s still
systemic racism.”
What accounts for this apparent attitudinal transformation? Why are some whites increasingly
supportive of policies that exclusively benefit members of other ethnic/racial groups and for
which they conceivably bear much of the costs? In truth, answering these questions requires first
accounting for white racial liberalism in general. Specifically, what explains such ‘woke’ or prooutgroup orientations among white Americans? And if the extent of these orientations varies
across time, what drives this variation?

1.1

Statement of Problem
1.1.1

Explaining White Racial Liberalism

The existing political science literature on racial attitudes provides informative but
ultimately incomplete answers to the preceding questions. First, with occasional exceptions, this
literature is overwhelmingly focused on explaining the negative, prejudicial, or conservative
intergroup attitudes of white Americans. Indeed, Chudy, Piston and Shipper (2019) note that
the “lion’s share of existing research focuses on untangling the harmful effects of prejudice; as
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such, it has offered us insufficient guidance on the consequences of racial attitudes beyond
prejudice.” (p.2). Newman et al. (2013) echo this assessment in the context of research on
immigration attitudes: “Within all of this work there is little to no research examining the factors
that lead people to be supportive of immigrants. Few published studies explicitly seek to explain
pro-immigrant sentiment, and one of the only individual-level factors consistently identified
throughout the opinion literature to weaken opposition to immigration is education” (p.583-584).
A consequence of this tendency is that we know far more about the antecedents of
racially conservative orientations among white Americans than we do about the factors that
promote racially liberal or pro-outgroup orientations. As Newman et al. lament, the latter
questions are often “left to be answered primarily by implication through inverting known
findings” (ibid.). In other words, if the harboring of racial resentment and negative racial
stereotypes explains whites’ opposition to equity-oriented racial policies, whites’ support must
be a function of low-racial resentment and/or the non-holding of negative racial stereotypes. Of
course, these inferences raise more questions than they answer. For instance, if ‘low’ racial
resentment merely signifies the absence of anti-black prejudice, why does it predict pro-minority
favoritism? Why do ‘low resentment’ whites discriminate against members of their own racial
group in favor members of racial/ethnic out-groups? What other (moral) constructs and emotions
reside at the ‘low’ level of the scale? Is it possible that attitudes towards blacks and other
disadvantaged racial/ethnic minority groups are at least partially a function of whites’ attitudes
towards other whites? Existing theories of symbolic and modern racism and racial resentment are
largely silent on these questions. While recent research has sought to challenge and revise
prevailing scholarly conceptions of white racial resentment in favor of a moral or justice-oriented
framework (e.g. Davis and Wilson, 2021), it nonetheless gives little attention to ‘woke’ or
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racially liberal whites —i.e., whites who are sympathetic towards non-whites and negative if not
discriminatory towards other whites.
Other major theories of group attitudes are perhaps more explanatory but still
insufficient. For instance, social dominance theory would attribute such pro-outgroup tendencies
to a more basic and relatively stable anti-hierarchy orientation. By this account, white racial
liberalism thus reflects an individually differing sensitivity to existing inequities and concomitant
desires for their elimination. While a useful as a general theoretical starting point, this
understanding has not sufficiently elaborated on why, for instance, ‘low resentment’ whites are
might be more favorable to wealthy blacks than poor whites (Wright et al.). Nor is it sufficiently
clear why concerns for inequities between certain racial/ethnic groups (e.g. white vs. black) or
social categories (e.g. race) are prioritized over those between others (e.g. Asian vs. white; class).
Finally and perhaps most importantly, if white racial liberalism is an expression of a more basic
and relatively stable anti-hierarchy orientation, how are we to understand the fact that levels of
the former appear to vary—in some period, quite dramatically--overtime? Why doesn’t white
racial liberalism remain relatively constant? What time-dependent, contextual, or affective
variables might mediate or heighten the influence of this orientation on white racial attitudes?
1.1.2

Explaining Overtime Variation in White Racial Liberalism

The foregoing two questions similarly push against traditional assumptions regarding the
stability of racial attitudes. In the accounts of some scholars, racial attitudes are unique in their
degree of ‘crystalization’; i.e. they develop early, remain relatively stable across the lifespan, and
relate to ‘easy issues’ that even politically uninformed Americans can form strong opinions on.
As such, large shifts in racial attitudes are either unexpected or limited to more malleable periods
of a person’s development. And yet that large and rapid shifts have occurred raises the possibility

5
that white racial attitudes are more elastic than previously recognized. To be sure, while
generational replacement —such as the rise of Millenial and Gen-Z white Americans—higher
rates of education, and greater exposure to racial diversity or contact with racial minorities may
contribute to shifts in racial attitudes in the long-run, such trends tend to be much too gradual and
steady to account for the pattern, pace, and magnitude of recent change observed in the data.
Party-centric models of racial attitude change would appear to offer a better and
parsimonious explanation. For instance, Carmines and Zeller’s (1989) ‘issue evolution’ model
(see also Levendusky 2009) largely attributes partisan changes in racial attitudes to the partisan
sorting that follows from salient and divergent elite position-taking on new political issues. In
this account, shifts in white racial liberalism are a product of shifts in the racial policy positions
and rhetoric of party elites. Stated plainly, if Democratic Party leaders have gone ‘woke’ on race,
rank-and-file Democrats will either follow suit—thereby adopting racially liberal policy attitudes
as their own—or jump ship, perhaps to the Republican Party. In other words, increases in white
racial liberalism among may be entirely a function of elite cue-taking among rank-and-file white
Democrats and liberals as well as influxes of racial liberals into—and the exit of racial
conservatives from-- the Democratic party. Meanwhile, increases in racially liberal positiontaking among party elites may simply reflect efforts at appealing to racial identities and issues
that resonate with non-white constituencies that will soon constitute a majority of Democrats.
Add to this the divisive—some would say racist—rhetoric and immigration policies of former
President Donald Trump, and it’s no mystery why Democratic politicians have shifted in a
‘woke’ direction.
But while cogent, such party-centric models ultimately rest on the reasonable but
nonetheless questionable assumption that party elites invariably engineer rather than respond to
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shifts in public racial liberalism. As Lee (2002) argues in greater depth, these models either
downplay or ignore the role of social movements and activist groups, including their effects on
issue salience and public awareness. And yet, as Lee documents with respect to shifts in racial
attitudes during the civil rights period, political scientists have increasingly noted the growing
influence of activist groups over party agendas and rhetoric (e.g. Layman et al. 2010; Brawn et
al. 2012). One recent study finds that political discourse and activism on social media causally
influences the issues that politicians speak to (Barbera et al., 2019). That white Democrats and
liberals engage in significantly higher rates of political participation and activism than their nonwhite counterparts thus has important implications for understanding the overtime dynamics of
racial attitudes 2. For it suggests that party position-taking is not an unmoved mover of racial
attitudes; that it is also affected by rather than merely effects changes in the racial attitudes of the
politically engaged, who are disproportionately white. As it happens, some of the 2020
Democratic primary candidates (e.g. Elizabeth Warren, Kirstin Gillibrand) that were or are most
outwardly progressive on racial issues and immigration were more popular among white than
non-white Democrats (Su & Hickey, 2019). Furthermore, and as this dissertation will document,
increases in racial liberalism among white Democrats and liberals at times precede those
observed among their black and non-white counterparts. All of this raises the possibility that
Democratic politicians are just as much, if not more so, appealing to racially liberal or ‘woke’
white Democrats as they are to their non-white counterparts.
Thermostatic models of public opinion are also limited in their ability to explain overtime
and recent movement in racial attitudes. For they would predict that the latter swing against the

2

Racial/ethnic disparities in political participation have long been documented (e.g. Verba et al. 1993). Appendix A
presents a graph of time series data from the Cooperative Election Study, which shows that these disparities are also
manifest among Democrats of different racial/ethnic backgrounds.
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political and policy status-quo—in the racially liberal direction under a racially conservative
administration or policy regime and vice versa. However, and as this dissertation will
demonstrate, overtime variation in racial attitudes generally do not adhere to such an up-anddown pattern. Moreover, the emergence of the ‘Great Awokening’, a period corresponding to
some of the sharpest increases in white racial liberalism on record, can be traced to the second
term of the Obama administration and the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement—not the
reign of Trump or a racially conservative Republican president that one would otherwise expect.
Unsatisfied with prevailing macro-level accounts of racial attitudes, Kellstedt (2000;
2003) proposed and offered support for a theory in which increases in public racial liberalism are
a function of the salience of egalitarian value cues in race-related media coverage. This research
was important not only in documenting significant overtime variation in racial attitudes, which
suggests the existence of racial policy ‘moods’, but also in calling into question the assumption
that the media plays a limited to no role in their formation. At the same time, Kellstedt’s work
either leaves open or raises a number of important questions that subsequent research has
generally neglected to investigate. One of them is that Kellstedt’s theory is group-general and
fails to consider the possibility of heterogenous media effects--that different demographics and
political subgroups (e.g. white liberals) respond differently than others (e.g. white conservatives)
to the same race-related media stimuli. More specifically, it doesn’t consider how people’s racial
group memberships (e.g. belonging to a historically advantaged or disadvantaged racial group),
orientations to inequality (e.g. social dominance), and other background traits inform and
mediate their interpretation of and respond to race-related news media. Instead, it effectively
treats the public as a homogenous bloc that responds to egalitarian media cues in a uniform or
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unidirectional fashion. Addressing these blind spots is key to elaborating the causal process
through which these cues impact (or don’t impact) the expression of racial attitudes.
1.2

Research Questions
The broader questions this dissertation seeks to answer is why and when do members of

advantaged or dominant social groups become political champions of and exhibit favoritism
towards members of disadvantaged outgroups. More specifically, though, this dissertation is
interested in understanding this phenomenon as it obtains among white Americans. Accordingly,
it attempts to explain: a) why some white Americans support affirmative action and other raceconscious policies that afford preferential treatment or assistance to blacks and other racial/ethnic
minorities, and b) why some white Americans are at once critical or negative towards other
whites and sympathetic or positive towards racial/ethnic outgroups.
This dissertation believes that answering the preceding questions is essential for the
answering of another; namely, what explains variation in white racial attitudes across time? Why
are increases in white racial liberalism observed in some periods, but not others? By identifying
the variables that contribute to white racial liberalism cross-sectionally, this dissertation hopes to
also uncover the variables that influence it longitudinally.
1.3

Theoretical Contributions
This thesis aspires to address a number of glaring gaps in the political science literature’s

understanding of racial attitudes. As was noted already, the overwhelming majority of existing
topical research is limited to explaining whites’ opposition to equity-oriented policies that benefit
blacks and other racial/ethnic minorities, liberal immigration laws, and prejudicial outgroupfocused attitudes and behavior in general. A consequence of this parochialism is the relative
paucity if not absence of theories that make sense of racially liberal or pro-racial- outgroup-
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oriented whites. Absent such a theory, existing theories can provide only an incomplete account
of white racial attitudes. But not only is such a theoretical framework critical for understanding
white racial liberalism or ‘wokeness’ at the individual-level, but it is also crucial for
understanding why and how these attitudes vary or grow across time.
This dissertation promises to correct for this theoretical deficit by formulating,
elaborating, and ultimately testing a group-based moral emotions account in which white
Americans’ moral appraisals of and attitudes towards racial/ethnic outgroups are considerably
influenced by those of and towards fellow whites. More specifically, it proposes that, to a
significant degree, white racial liberalism reflects appraisals of the (ill)legitimacy of whites’
advantaged social position, their ingroup’s complicity in the persistence of racial inequality, and
concomitant feelings of shame, guilt, and anger over their ingroup’s immoral past and present.
Overtime variation in white racial liberalism thus reflects variation in the salience of these
negative ingroup-focused moral appraisals and emotions. And the latter, in turn, is argued to be a
function of the salience of race-related media messaging that explicitly or implicitly speaks to
white-black status differences in terms of past and/or present white racism.
While furthering political scientists’ understanding of white racial liberalism, the groupbased moral emotions theory offered and tested in this dissertation additionally contributes to
both proximately and distally related lines of research. In the first case, the few existing political
science studies of the effects of group-based moral emotions on white racial liberalism (e.g.
Chudy, Piston, & Shipper, 2019) consider only the effects of collective guilt on support for black
political candidates and pro-black policies. However, collective guilt is but one of a family of
negative ingroup-focused emotions, and it may not even be the most important for explaining
these and other attitudinal outcomes. This dissertation addresses this oversight by additionally
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considering the highly related but nonetheless distinct emotion of collective shame. On top of
this, it also examines whether white guilt and shame over white America’s mistreatment of
blacks have ‘spill-over’ effects on attitudes towards other racial/ethnic outgroups, including
policies (e.g. immigration) that implicate them.
This dissertation also contributes to enduring scholarly debates over the meaning and
validity of what is arguably the most widely used measure of white racial attitudes in the social
sciences—the ‘racial resentment’ battery. Specifically, it tests of the proposition that racial
resentment and related measures (e.g. modern racism) essentially capture whites’ endorsement of
structural vs. individual-level attributions for the persistence of black disadvantage. These
attributions, in turn, are theorized to inform whites’ group-based appraisals of responsibility for
the conditions of blacks. Finally, it is argued that the strong relationships between racial
resentment, on one hand, and white collective shame and guilt on another reflect the fact that the
expression of the latter is conditional on appraisals of ingroup moral responsibility. Crucially,
this interpretation has the potential to explain previously documented relationships between
‘low’ white racial resentment and, inter alia, pro-black favoritism and policy support.
In demonstrating the importance of negative ingroup-focused moral appraisals and
emotions for white racial liberalism, and the media’s role in their activation, this dissertation
contributes to theories of social movement influence as well as existing debates regarding the
stability of racial attitudes and the scope of the media’s attitudinal influence. For one of the
implications of this dissertation’s theory is that an avenue through which civil rights, racial
justice activists, and news media effect changes in white racial attitudes is via the elicitation of
negative white-focused moral appraisals and emotions. If so, an additional implication is that the
stability of white racial attitudes is overstated (or is the product of protracted lulls in the
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availability of appraisal-triggering stimuli) and/or that stability is more characteristic of white
subgroups (e.g. conservatives) that either resist, avoid, or tune-out appraisal-triggering media
messaging. This dissertation thus helps to reconcile earlier studies’ findings of attitudinal
stability with recent research that attests to the racially liberalizing influence of the Black Lives
Matter movement.
1.4

Clarifications, Definitions, and Provisos
Before presenting the layout out of this dissertation, a few terminological and normative

clarifications are in order. First, as the reader has likely noticed, I use the terms ‘racial
liberalism’, ‘woke’, and ‘pro-outgroupness’ more or less interchangeably. As I define them, the
first two of these terms are synonymous with one another. Specifically, I conceive of ‘racial
liberalism’ and ‘wokeness’ as consisting of the following core beliefs:
1. Outcome disparities between white and black Americans are largely if not entirely
attributable to the effects of past and present white racism.
2. White Americans are illegitimately advantaged on account of their racial group
memberships.
3. White Americans have a moral obligation to eliminate these disparities and counteract
their illegitimate racial advantages via the enactment of race-conscious policies that
afford special treatment or assistance to blacks and other disadvantaged racial/ethnic
minority groups.
A ‘pro-outgroup’ orientation, then, represents the culmination of this belief set and refers
to the tendency of favoring disadvantaged racial/ethnic groups over whites in terms of, inter alia,
social policy, allocations of resources, assignments of reward and punishment, and in the
expression of compassions and resentments.
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As will be stated on other occasions in the chapters that follow, this dissertation is and
will remain entirely agnostic as to the normative propriety of these moral-political orientations.
For whether ‘wokeness’ or ‘pro-outgroupness’ among whites is morally desirable entails a
subjective value-based assessment that is ultimately irrelevant to the research questions under
study. The same is true of this dissertation’s treatment of negative ingroup-focused emotions,
such as ‘white shame’ and ‘guilt’. While these terms have at times been used to deride, dismiss
or discredit left-wing or progressive racial justice activism, this dissertation recognizes the
emotions in question as universal human phenomena of evolutionary significance. Their use in
this dissertation thus remains wholly academic and descriptive. Whether or not white Americans
should feel guilt or shame for their racial group memberships is of no interest to the current
research.
In a similar vein, this dissertation takes no position as to the cause or nature of disparities
between racial/ethnic groups. It does not assume or even comment on the truth of different causal
narratives (discrimination, culture, biology etc.) for the theory it advances does not depend on
the validity of any. This dissertation is thus also silent on the question of both the existence or
extent of white privilege as well as the desirability of its recognition among whites. What’s
relevant is only that some whites do perceive themselves as benefiting from illegitimate racial
advantages; and that this perception has consequences for their racial attitudes, including how
they feel about their own racial ingroup.
A final point of clarification relates to the objects of this dissertation’s theory and
analysis. Specifically, this dissertation is primarily concerned with explaining racial liberalism as
it manifests among white Americans; and, therefore, white Americans are at the foreground of its
theory and empirical hypotheses. To be clear, though, this is not because understanding the racial
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attitudes of other groups is uninteresting or unimportant. Rather, it is largely because the
theoretical drivers of racial liberalism among members of majority or high-status racial groups
are unique in important ways from those of their minority or low-status counterparts. In a word,
the group-based moral appraisals (e.g. unfairly privileged, racist) and emotions (e.g. shame,
guilt) that promote ‘woke’ attitudes among white Americans are qualitatively different from
those (e.g. indignance, white-focused anger, ingroup-focused empathy) expected to encourage
them among blacks and other racial/ethnic groups. Widening the ambit of study to include the
racial attitudes of non-white racial/ethnic groups would thus result in a dissertation that is not
only longer than the current document, but one that risks being thematically incoherent and
desultory. This being said, the intergroup moral emotions theory on which this dissertation rests
is broad enough to accommodate and cogently account for the racial attitudes of other groups.
But I nonetheless opt to leave this undertaking to future research and researchers.
1.5

Outline and Structure of Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into 8 subsequent chapters, each of which are outlined and

described below.
1.5.1

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Chapter 2 begins with a review and discussion of both group-level and individual
differences accounts of racial attitudes. Appraising these theoretical frameworks to be lacking for
explaining racial ‘wokeness’ or pro-outgroup attitudes and behaviors among white Americans, it
proceeds to introduce intergroup emotions theory as a means of addressing these questions. In
particular, this section presents research on the importance of negative ingroup-focused moral
appraisals and emotions—specifically, collective shame and guilt--for the expression of prooutgroup/anti-ingroup orientations. It also reviews and discusses the differences between these
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emotions, including their unique but often overlapping effects on intergroup attitudes and
behaviors.
1.5.2

Chapter 3: Theory and Hypotheses

On the basis of the insights from intergroup emotions theory, Chapter 3 derives and
presents a series of preliminary hypotheses that are designed to test the relative importance of
white shame and guilt for white Americans’ support for equity-oriented pro-black policies (e.g.
affirmative action, financial reparations) and expressions of outgroup favoritism. Thereafter, the
chapter shifts its focus towards identifying the individual-level predispositions that condition
whites’ expression of ingroup-critical emotions and, consequently, pro-outgroup/ingroup-critical
racial attitudes. To this end, it surveys and discusses research on individual and ideological
differences in orientations to and beliefs about the nature of group inequality. In the main, this
discussion links differences in whites’ susceptibility to collective guilt and shame to the
differential endorsement of structural vs. individual-level attributions for racial inequality. These
attributions, in turn, inform both the perceived legitimacy of whites’ advantaged social position
as well as their racial group’s perceived responsibility for the persistent disadvantages of blacks
and other groups of color. This chapter subsection concludes with the prediction that, owing to
their greater embrace of bias-centric accounts of group inequality, white collective guilt and
shame will be greater among white liberals than conservatives.
Subsequent subsections of chapter 3 consider the implications of intergroup moral
emotions theory for overtime variation in white racial liberalism. After reviewing literature on
the attitudinal effects (and lack thereof) of news media both historically and in the digital age, I
develop and forward an ingroup-critical emotions model of media-driven changes in white racial
attitudes. Essentially, this model posits that overtime variation in white racial liberalism at least
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partly reflects variation in the salience of ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions; and
that the in, in turn, reflects variation in the salience of media messaging that speaks to whiteblack status differences in terms of past and/or persistent white racism. However, and
integrating the theoretical insights of earlier sections with the work of Zaller (1992), this model
also asserts that this media messaging’s positive effects on white racial liberalism are moderated
by several important ideological and cognitive predispositions that influence not only an the
likelihood of receiving and engaging with such messaging, but also whether an individual reacts
to it in a white-critical and pro-minority fashion.
This chapter concludes with a series of observational and experimental predictions that
follow from this theoretical model, which are then put to the test in the remaining chapters.
1.5.3

Chapter 4: Racial Equalitarian Media and Racial Awokenings

Chapter 4 is this dissertation’s first empirical chapter—one that sets the stage for the
others that follow. It is guided by two research objectives whose attainment is crucial for
affirming the plausibility of this dissertation’s theory: 1) demonstrating variation in white racial
attitudes across time, and 2) testing whether overtime variation in white racial attitudes
temporally proceeds variation in the availability of specific media messaging that is theoretically
implicated in the expression of ingroup-critical emotions. It begins by showcasing various
nationally representative time series of white racial attitudes to illustrate the ‘Great Awokening’
and the magnitude of recent variation therein. It then pivots to the question of what drives
overtime variation in white racial liberalism in general. Towards answering this question, this
chapter introduces a novel times series measure of white racial liberalism as well as a measure of
‘racial equalitarian’ media messaging. These two variables are then subjected to granger
causality tests so as to determine the direction of any possible causal relationship. The analysis
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concludes with a series of lagged dependent models, which test the robustness of the mediaattitudes relationship in the presence of plausible confounding variables.
1.5.4

Chapter 5: The ‘Floyd Effect’ on White Racial Liberalism

This chapter addresses several limitations of the previous by quasi-experimentally testing
the effects of the May 25, 2020 killing of George Floyd on white racial attitudes, including those
previously linked to measures of collective shame and guilt. Specifically, differences in means
tests and both bivariate and multivariate regression models are used to assess whether the Floyd
incident occasioned significant increases in whites’ perceptions of anti-black discrimination, in
the extent that whites’ attribute black disadvantage to racism and discrimination, in whites’
support for granting blacks monetary reparations, and in the share of whites’ that have
unfavorable views of whites vs. blacks. A causal mediation model is then used to test whether or
to what extent such increases were mediated by increases in media messaging that is
theoretically expected to elicit white shame and guilt.
1.5.5

Chapter 6: The Importance of Collective Shame and Guilt for White Racial
Liberalism

This chapter leverages both novel and pre-existing cross-sectional survey data to examine
the predictive effects of white shame and guilt on various racial attitudes, including support for
pro-black and liberal immigration policies, racial ingroup vs. outgroup warmth, and anti-white
sentiment. Importantly, it makes the case that the predictive effects of shame and guilt on these
outcomes are as strong if not stronger than those of some of the most widely used attitudinal
measures in the literature, namely ‘racial resentment’ and ‘social dominance orientation’. In
addition to conventional linear and logistic regression models, this chapter features a number of
factor analyses to examine the shared variation and assess the statistical distinguishability of
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shame, guilt, and racial resentment. It later leverages these methods to test whether, as predicted,
racial resentment is statistically indistinguishable from measures of structural/bias-centric vs.
individual-level attributions for black disadvantage. Subsequent tests examine whether this
general ‘attributions’ factor accounts for ideological differences in the expression of shame and
guilt. This chapter concludes with attempted replications of results on a nationally representative
sample of white respondents.
1.5.6

Chapter 7: White Shame, Guilt, and Racial Liberalism in the Laboratory

This chapter uses a large-sample experimental design to test whether a) media messaging
that is theoretically expected to increase feelings of white shame and guilt actually does so, and
whether b) such messaging has a liberalizing effect on racial attitudes via its influence on shame
and guilt. It begins with analyses of treatment effects on expected mediators (i.e., shame and
guilt) and primary outcome variables, including pro-black policy support and ingroup vs.
outgroup warmth. Expected heterogenous effects are also tested and examined by interacting the
treatment with baseline measures of political ideology and party affiliation. Finally, causal
mediation models are fitted to examine whether or to what extent main treatment effects are
indirectly conveyed via increases in shame and guilt.
1.5.7

Chapter 8: The (Not-)Guilty and (Un)Ashamed in Their Own Words

To what extent are ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions actually manifest in the
thoughts and sentiments of white respondents? Addressing this question is the object of this
dissertation’s final empirical chapter. To this end, it shifts to a qualitative approach and reviews
the voluntary open-ended responses submitted by experimental study participants from the
previous chapter. It identifies and surveys examples from two thematic response categories:
‘ingroup-critical’ and ‘defensive’ respondents. It concludes with a mixed-methods analysis that
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examines whether the frequency of each response type systematically varies across the
experimental conditions; and, further, whether response types meaningfully correlate with
quantitative measures of shame and guilt.
1.5.8

Chapter 9: Conclusion

This closing chapter provides brief chapter-by-chapter summaries of this dissertation’s
main empirical findings. Their limitations and theoretical implications are also discussed,
including suggestions for future research.
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2
2.1

LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter Overview
Existing research on racial attitudes can be generally categorized into to two dominant

theoretical paradigms. Headlined by realistic conflict theory and social identity theory, the first
set of theories understands racial attitudes in terms of intergroup processes or as the product of
group-level phenomena. The second set of theories, which encompasses, inter alia, theories of
authoritarianism and social dominance, posits that individual differences in core psychological
predispositions mediate the influence of intergroup processes on racial attitudes 3. Despite their
differing approaches to the study of racial attitudes, the research emanating from these paradigms
has mostly sought to explain negative or derogatory outgroup orientations. This limited focus is a
problem for theorizing about the ‘Great Awokening’, where the object of analysis is precisely the
‘positive’ or pro-outgroup end of the attitudinal spectrum.
Accordingly, while this literature review covers several important findings relating to
pro-ingroup and anti-outgroup orientations, it largely focuses on those that shed light on their
less-explored pro-outgroup and anti-ingroup antipodes. It begins with a brief survey of several
seminal theories from the ‘intergroup processes’ school of racial attitudes, namely realistic
conflict and social identity theory. It then introduces a relatively newer theory within this
tradition, intergroup emotions theory (IET), and reviews related research whose findings form
the theoretical backdrop of this dissertation’s central hypotheses (which are then formulated and
presented in the proceeding chapter). In particular, these sections explain why IET is the
theoretical framework that is best equipped to account for the racially liberal sentiments of some

3

In other words, these theories contend that not all ingroup members respond (be it positively or negatively)
similarly to outgroups in the same social context or under the same circumstances. They purport to explain why and
how these reactions differ as a function of different psychological orientations and personality tendencies.
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white Americans. As will become clear, a key insight of these sections is that whites’ racial and
immigration policy preferences are not just informed by their appraisals of and feelings towards
other racial groups but are equally shaped by those of and towards their own.
2.2

Explaining Racial Attitudes
2.2.1

Realistic Conflict Theory (SIT)

Like many theories of intergroup attitudes, realistic conflict theory (RCT) attempts to
explain why members of a social group are often hostile or uncooperative towards members of
other outgroups. To this end, RCT attributes such anti-outgroup tendencies to competition over
finite material resources or mutually incompatible interests (Blumber, 1958; Campbell, 1965;
Sherif, 1966; see Jackson 1993 for a review). Thus, in explaining why whites hold prejudicial
attitudes against racial out-groups—including why they tend to resist or oppose remedial groupconscious policies, such as affirmative action—this framework stresses the ‘realistic’ threats the
latter are perceived to pose to the material resources and/or advantaged social position of the
former (Blumer, 1958). For instance, to the extent that living in close proximity to non-white
populations entails greater competition for local resources (e.g. jobs, public services) and
unequal burden-sharing, one hypothesis predicts that white racial animus increases with the
percent of non-whites residing in the local environment (Key, 1949). This line of reasoning has
been extended to the context of immigration, where the size (or growth thereof) of local
immigrant populations is predicted to negatively affect white immigration attitudes (Ha, 2010;
Newman, 2013). While not explicit in most formulations of RCT, one can invert the theory to
explain positive outgroup attitudes or intergroup harmony; i.e. group members that are positive
towards outgroups are those whose material wellbeing or interests are secure from outgroup
threats. In the context of immigration, for instance, one study found that blue-collar (who are
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more likely to compete with cheap labor) and white-collar (who are more likely to benefit from)
workers were less and more likely to support increasing immigration levels, respectively (Betts,
2005; See also Facchini & Mayda, 2006).
And yet evidence supporting such RCT-derived hypotheses has been mixed and
inconclusive. Oliver and Mendelberg (2000), for instance, failed to uncover any consistent
relationships between black population size and racial antagonism among whites. Instead, they
found that whites residing in low-status zip-codes (i.e. those with lower average educational
attainment and income) were more hostile towards blacks irrespective of the local black
population size. Rather than perceiving objective threats to material resources, these authors
speculate that racial animus among less-educated white residents may be a means of achieving or
maintaining ingroup esteem (which accords with a theory I review below). Abrajano and Hajnal
(2015) similarly note that only state-level Latino population size, rather than neighborhood racial
context, had a significant negative impact on white immigration attitudes. However, as in Oliver
and Mendelberg (2000), they found that this effect was often conditional on education, with lesseducated and better-educated white respondents exhibiting conservative and liberal immigration
attitudes, respectively, in states with large Latino populations. Whereas RCT would suggest that
these relationships are due to the link between education and income—with financially insecure
whites perceiving greater realistic threats from Hispanic immigration—Kaufman (2018) notes
that controlling for education renders income an insignificant predictor of voting for restrictionist
immigration candidates (e.g. Trump) and policies (e.g., Brexit). This coheres with Hainmueller
and Hopkins (2014) comprehensive review of the immigration attitudes literature, which
generally shows that personal income and economic circumstances do not meaningfully explain
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anti-immigration attitudes. Instead, the weight of the evidence shows symbolic and socio-tropic
concerns to be far more predictive (though see Malhotra et al. 2013).
2.2.2

Social Identity Theory (SIT)

While incorporating some of the insights of RCT, social identity theory (SIT) argues that
intergroup attitudes are more than just a reflection of the presence or absence of threats to
material resources (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 1986). Rather, they are the sum of a more general
psychological need for sustaining or achieving social self-esteem through positive social
comparisons of one’s ingroup vs. other outgroups. This need for positive group distinction can
manifest in social competition whereby group members work to ensure that their ingroup is more
favorably evaluated than others on important social attributes and outcomes. Such competition is
theorized as being most likely to occur when an intergroup consensus obtains over the value of
status-conferring attributes (e.g. wealth), when group boundaries are impermeable (i.e. upward
mobility is denied to members of lower-status groups) and social hierarchies are perceived to be
unstable and illegitimate. Under these conditions, social competition can manifest in in-group
favoritism (i.e. behaviors that preserve or enhance the social standing of one’s in-group relative
to an out-group) and/or out-group derogation (i.e. behaviors that weaken or maintain the inferior
social standing of an out-group relative to one’s in-group). On the other hand, when a dominant
group’s standing is perceived by all to be legitimate and stable—i.e. as the outcome of its
superior performance on a valued social dimension—group hierarchies are seen to reflect the
‘social reality’ and go uncontested.
SIT further contends that whether one’s ingroup is advantaged or disadvantaged under
existing social structures influences his/her attitudes towards inequality (Oakes, Haslam, &
Turner, 1994; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003). For members of advantaged groups, the
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notion of group equality threatens the maintenance of a positive group identity in that it entails a
loss of status and influence. Thus, such individuals are expected to adopt or promote beliefs that
affirm the legitimacy or deservingness of their ingroup’s dominant social position. In contrast,
for members of disadvantaged groups, equality serves the goal of maintaining a positive group
identity to the extent that it entails relative gains in status and influence. Members of
disadvantaged or lower-status groups are thus expected to adopt or promote beliefs that
(de)legitimize group (in)equality. But unlike individual differences theories that view such
beliefs as reflecting a more general and stable orientation to inequality, SIT holds them to be
both context and group-dependent (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996).
This because people typically belong to different groups (e.g. black and male) that variably
benefit from (or are disadvantaged by) inequality in different social environments (Reynolds et
al. 2001). Whether a person views himself as privileged or disadvantaged thus depends on which
social categorization or group membership is salient.
Applied to the American racial context, SIT holds that whites engage in ingroup
favoritism and/or act prejudiced towards racial outgroups when a) racial group memberships are
salient, and b) their advantaged social position is insecure or is challenged by racial outgroups
who contest the legitimacy of the status quo. While acknowledging that members of privileged
groups do not always exhibit these pro-ingroup and/or anti-ingroup behavioral tendencies, earlier
versions of the theory say little about ingroup members who sympathize with outgroups,
including those who oppose or actively challenge their ingroup’s position on the latter’s behalf.
(Subasic, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008). Ultimately emerging to fill this gap is intergroup emotions
theory (IET), which serves as this dissertation’s primary theoretical framework.
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2.2.3

Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET)

Missing from earlier formulations of SIT is an explicit consideration of the importance of
group moral reputations for positive group evaluations. More specifically, in addition to
competence, warmth, and other dimensions, people evaluate ingroups and outgroups in terms of
their moral character. In fact, some recent research even suggests that moral appraisals are more
important for positive group evaluations and ingroup esteem than are appraisals of competence
and sociability (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; Soral & Kofta, 2020; Hitlin, Kwon, & Firat,
2021; Brambilla et al. 2021). IET thus expands on SIT by underscoring how group members are
sensitive to and seek to preserve or enhance their ingroup’s moral reputation. Specifically, it
holds that when group-memberships are salient, people appraise social events and outcomes not
solely in terms of their effects on personal interest, but also in terms of their implications for
both their ingroup’s and their own moral reputations (Smith, 1993; Mackie et al. 2000).
For members of advantaged groups, the moral reputation of their ingroup is of both
personal and systemic significance. In the first case, they are a source of personal esteem, and
thus individuals desire to feel proud, not ashamed, of their group memberships. Moral
reputations can also influence relations with other outgroups. If one’s ingroup is appraised as
morally corrupt or dubious by members of other outgroups, the prospect of intergroup harmony
and cooperation diminishes while the prospect of rejection and conflict increases. Further, at the
interpersonal level, how one’s ingroup is morally appraised by other outgroup members can
affect how the latter view and act towards individual members of the former. This is especially
the case when groups are distinguishable on the basis of visible characteristics. Individual
ingroup members, in other words, can benefit from or be burdened by their ingroup’s moral
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reputation. In the second (i.e. systemic) case, ascriptions of immorality to advantaged groups
undercuts the legitimacy (and thus stability) of its relative social position.
Although bolstering or glorifying the ingroup and/or derogating outgroups is one possible
(and perhaps the most common) means by which group members respond to threats to their
moral identity—such as when an advantaged ingroup’s social position is attributed to its
mistreatment or persecution of an outgroup(s)--the IET literature importantly acknowledges and
offers an account of those that respond in a pro-outgroup and/or anti-ingroup fashion. As will be
elaborated on below, it shows that, for some group members, moral identity threats actually
trigger self and/or ingroup-critical emotions that motivate the adoption of pro-outgroup attitudes
and behaviors as a means of moral atonement, self-affirmation, and/or self-distancing. Of these
emotions, the two that have attracted the lion’s share of scholarly attention are collective guilt
and shame.
2.2.3.1

Collective Guilt

Until relatively recently, collective guilt was thought to be the most pro-social negative
ingroup-focused moral emotion. Indeed, a large number of studies show feelings of collective
guilt to be an important predictor of advantaged ingroup members’ support for policies that
compensate historically victimized outgroups (see Ferguson & Branscombe 2014 for a general
overview review of these findings; see Leach & Cidam 2015 and Hakim, Branscombe, &
Schoemann 2021 for meta-analyses). Before reviewing some of these findings, it’s important to
clarify the psychological mechanism (namely, cognitive dissonance) through which guilt is
thought to motivate pro-outgroup behavioral and attitudinal tendencies.
Recall that group members are sensitive to their ingroup’s moral reputation, as it is a
source of pride that also bears on their own individual moral reputations and self-concepts. They
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thus aspire to regard—as well as aspire for other groups to regard--themselves and their ingroup
as virtuous. However, when group members perceive that their ingroup is responsible for
injustices against other groups, these aspirations are compromised. The discrepancy (i.e.,
dissonance) that emerges between group members’ desired and actual moral selves can generate
both negative self-focused and ingroup-focused negative emotions, which, in this case, manifests
as collective guilt. Importantly, the experience of this emotion is not dependent on individual
group members being directly involved in their ingroup’s misdeeds. In fact, the perception that
oneself and one’s fellow group members unjustly benefit from their group’s mistreatment of
other outgroups, or that one is doing nothing to rectify an ingroup’s past and/or continued
wrongdoings against an outgroup(s), is sufficient to elicit it (Hoffman, 1998).
Most relevant to the current discussion, though, is that guilt is a psychologically aversive
and stressful emotion, and thus group members are motivated to resolve or assuage it. This
entails closing the perceived gap between one’s actual and desired moral self. Engaging in
behaviors (e.g. voting for a political candidate from a disadvantaged outgroup) and/or supporting
compensatory policies (affirmative action, reparations) intended to elevate an afflicted
outgroup(s) and atone for an ingroup’s immoral actions, is thus a means to this end. At one level,
it communicates remorse to and a desire to make amends with a victimized outgroup(s), thus
beginning the process of repairing an ingroup’s tainted moral status in the eyes of others. At
another, it restores a sense of virtue in individual group members, which moderates the
discomfort they feel over their membership in a morally tainted group and/or the privileges it
affords them (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Rothschild & Keefer, 2017).
Consistent with this logic, in one of the first studies of guilt in the American racial
context, Swim and Miller (1999) found that feelings of 'white guilt' uniquely predicted support
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for affirmative action for African Americans. More recently—and in one of the only political
science papers on the topic—Chudy, Piston & Shipper (2019) showed that, net of racial
resentment and other background variables, feelings of white guilt were a statistically and
substantively significant predictor of support for affirmative action and warmth towards
President Barack Obama. In a separate experimental study, the authors found that white guilt
moderated the depressive effects of a race-conscious (vs. universal/race-blind) policy frame on
support for targeting job training programs towards black Americans. In another, they found that
‘guilty’ participants were significantly more likely to favor a black vs. an otherwise identical
white political candidate.
Similar findings have been reported in other national contexts (e.g. Yugoslavia: Brown
& Cehajic, 2008; Germany: Imhoff, Bilewicz, & Erb, 2012; Chile: Brown et al., 2008; Norway:
Gausel & Brown, 2012; Israel: Solak et al. 2016). For instance, Leach, Iyer and Pedersen (2006)
found that non-Aboriginal Australians who considered their group to be advantaged over
Aboriginal people expressed greater collective guilt over their country's historical mistreatment
and the persisting disadvantages of the latter. Guilt, in turn, predicted both willingness to engage
in political action (e.g. sending a letter of protest to the Australian government, helping to
organize pro-Aboriginal demonstrations on behalf) of Aboriginal people and general support for
compensation (e.g. ‘Australian society has a responsibility to compensate Aborigines with jobs
and education through government programs’). Likewise, Fourie and Verwoerd’s (2021) recent
study of a nationally representative sample of white South Africans found that expressions of
guilt over the COVID-related hardships of black South Africans were the strongest predictor of
signing petitions (vs. not signing or signing counter-petitions) that urged the government to enact
various equity-oriented policies (e.g. affirmative action, expropriation of white-owned land
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without compensation, free college for black students). In contrast, and perhaps speaking to the
suggested limits of empathic concern as a motivator of prosocial change in contexts of group
power differentials 4, expressions compassion were not significantly associated with this
outcome.
While many of the findings noted above are cross-sectional, a number of experimental
studies that manipulate feelings of collective guilt attest to its causal influence on pro-sociality
(Doosje et al. 1998; Harvey & Oswald, 2000; Mallet & Swim, 2007; Stewart, Latu, &
Branscombe, 2010; Zimmermann et al. 2011; Imhoff, Bilewicz, & Erb, 2012; Faulker, 2017) .
For instance, one of the first experimental studies of collective guilt in the American racial
context was conducted by Iyer, Leach, and Crosby (2003), who varied the wording of items
measuring perceptions of anti-black discrimination to either exclusively focus on blacks (e.g.
‘Many Black employees face racial bias when they apply for jobs or are up for a promotion’) or
whites (‘Many white employers are racially biased in their hiring and promotion practices’). The
authors found that whites receiving the ‘white-focused’ version expressed greater levels of
group-based guilt, which, in turn, predicted support for pro-black affirmative action policies. A
subsequent study by Powell, Branscombe, and Schmitt (2005) framed inequality in terms of
either white privilege (‘White Americans enjoy many privileges that Black Americans do not’)
or black disadvantage (‘Black Americans face many disadvantages that White Americans do
not’) and presented subjects with either a list of different domains in which White Americans are
relatively privileged (‘White Americans can easily rent or purchase housing in any area where
they can afford to live’) or in which Black Americans are relatively disadvantaged (‘Black

4

Some researchers argue that, absent commitments to norms and goals of group equity, empathic concern is likely
to manifest as a kind of fleeting pity that is less focused on the causes of an outgroup’s disadvantage (Zaki & Cikara,
2015; Malbois & Clavien, 2019).
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Americans often have difficulty renting or purchasing housing, even in areas where they can
afford to live’). They found that white subjects assigned to the ‘inequality as white privilege’
condition expressed greater collective guilt and lower white identification than those in the
‘inequality as black disadvantage’ condition. Collective guilt, in turn, fully mediated the negative
effects of the white privilege condition on ‘modern racism’.
Despite these findings, a number of scholars have questioned the pro-social potential of
collective guilt. Some (e.g. Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Iyer, Leach, & Pedersen, 2004) contend
that, because it is a distressing self-focused emotion, the pro-sociality it motivates only goes as
far as needed for resolving or soothing psychological discomfort. By this account, and as Steele
(2006) similarly argues, supporting policies like affirmative action for blacks is a low-cost means
by which white people can feel good about themselves and their racial group membership.
Concerns for black disadvantage are thus secondary to achieving psychological equanimity. And
yet still others argue that the relationship between collective guilt and pro-sociality is, in fact,
mostly capturing the more potent and further-reaching effects of collective shame (Allpress et al.
2014), an emotion I turn to next.
2.2.3.2

Collective Shame

If collective guilt was initially conceived as the most pro-social ingroup-critical emotion,
the opposite was thought to be true for collective shame. Indeed, in early research, collective
shame was often linked to self-defensive or anti-social behavior, such as avoiding contact with or
conversations about the outgroup’s victimization and/or a desire to ‘cover-up’ an ingroup’s
wrongdoing or decrease its public salience (Tangney, 1995; Lickel et al. 2005). This is because
collective shame, in contrast to guilt, is tied to a more global and thus psychologically
threatening appraisal in which the moral essence of the self and one’s ingroup is deemed to be
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defective. Such appraisals, in turn, were theorized to motivate the desire to hide from or avoid
shame-eliciting stimuli, such as the potential condemnation of others. Rees, Klug, and Bamberg
(2015) summarize the traditional distinction between guilt and shame as follows: “…when one
has behaved badly (guilt), one can apologize or repair the damage done. But if one is a bad
person (shame), the only possible ways of avoiding the negative emotion would be to hide or
avoid the issue” (p.441).
More recent research, however, suggests that the relationship between shame and antisocial behavior is an artifact of treating feelings of rejection and inferiority as constituents of
shame (Gausel and Leach, 2011; Gausel, Leach, and Brown, 2012), or of not partialing ‘image
shame’ from ‘moral shame’ (Allpress et al. 2014). Specifically, while generally correlated, these
studies find that ingroup members’ concerns and motives vary in response to perceptions of
ingroup immorality. Members that primarily concern themselves with the reputational (or social
image-related) costs and social rejection that attend public revelation of their ingroup’s misdeeds
are likely to engage in self-defensive avoidance. Allpress et al. (Ibid.) thus classifies these
image-related concerns (or ‘image shame’) as ‘non-moral’ to the extent that they are primarily
occupied with the social fallout of the immorality’s publicization rather than with the immorality
itself. This is contrasted with those whose central concern is their ingroup’s general failure to
live up to personally important moral values. The (moral) shame resulting from such appraisals
encourages group members to adopt attitudes and behaviors that morally distance themselves
from their ingroup while communicating their alignment with or desire to uplift members of
victimized outgroups. Consistent with this, and similar to the findings of Gausel, Leach, and
Brown (2012), Allpress and colleagues found that image-related shame (e.g. ‘I feel disgraced
because the behavior of British people toward Iraqi people has created a bad image of Britain in
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the eyes of the world’) uniquely predicted self-defensive orientations (e.g. ‘I wish that people
would stop going on about the invasion of Iraq’) after controlling for moral shame (e.g. ‘Our
treatment of Iraqi people makes me feel somewhat ashamed about what it means to be British’).
Further, once partialing out the effects of image shame, moral shame uniquely predicted prooutgroup orientations (e.g. ‘I think that the British government should compensate Iraqis
financially for injustices that have occurred during the invasion’).
2.2.3.3

Shame vs. Guilt

In addition to clarifying the pro-social effects of collective moral shame, recent research
also suggests that these effects are stronger or further reaching than those of collective guilt.
Because the two tend to be moderately to highly correlated, the question of whether they are
distinct emotions has long been an object of scholarly debate (Iyer, Leach, & Pedersen, 2004).
Resolution of this question was hampered by the fact that many studies either only examined the
effects of these emotions in isolation of each other or featured measures of guilt that were
confounded with items asking about shame (e.g. Leach, Iyer, and Pedersen, 2006). This raised
the possibility that the previously documented relationships between collective guilt and prosociality were, in fact, evidencing the influence of shame. Recent studies that have measured
both shame and guilt together point in this direction (Allpress et al. 2010; Allpress et al. 2014;
Berndsen & Gausel, 2015; cf. Imhoff, Bilewicz, & Erb 2012). For instance, the aforementioned
Allpress et al. (2014) found that, when entered together, moral shame, but not guilt, predicted
support for apologizing to and compensating Iraqi victims of British military operations (study
1). And while guilt remained a significant predictor of these outcomes in a subsequent study
(study 2), its effect size was much lower than that of moral shame. McConnell (2015) similarly
found that, when entered separately into the model, both white shame and guilt significantly
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predicted support for affirmative action, modern racism, and racial justice engagement.
However, when modeled together, only white shame significantly predicted these outcomes.
In addition to predicting pro-sociality towards specific victimized outgroups, the effects
of shame have also been found to carry over to attitudes towards unrelated but similarly
perceived outgroups. For instance, Rees, Allpress, and Brown (2013) found that German
respondent’s collective shame (but not guilt) over the country’s Nazi past expressed increased
support for ethnic Turks living in Germany (Study 1). In a second study, collective shame (but
not guilt) over the UK’s actions during the Iraq war predicted more positive attitudes towards
Pakistani immigrants—a relationship that was mediated by a perceived moral responsibility to
atone for British actions as well as a perceived similarity between Iraqis and Pakistanis. The
authors interpret these findings in terms of a shame-related sense that one’s ingroup has “an
outstanding moral dept to repay as a result of the in-group’s original transgression” (p. 398).
While far more suggestive, the findings of other studies are consistent with shame having
an effect on immigration attitudes. For instance, Green et al. (2011) observed that Swiss
respondents who were more critical of their country were significantly less likely to express
restrictionist immigration attitudes. In the American context, Casellas and Wallace (2018) found
that white privilege awareness—a strong correlate of white guilt (Swim & Miller, 1999) and
shame (McConnell, 2015)—explained unique variance in support for collaboration between local
and federal authorities in the enforcement of US immigration laws. This could be because the
public largely associates ‘immigrants’ with Hispanics and other non-white ethnic/racial groups
(Perez, 2010; Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015). And, consistent with the reasoning of Rees, Allpress,
and Brown (2013), to the extent that they are perceived to suffer high degrees of racial
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discrimination 5, whites who are ashamed of their ingroup’s historical mistreatment of blacks are
likely to feel that their ingroup has a special moral obligation to help and protect other
racial/ethnic minority groups, including non-white immigrants 6 (Skentny, 2009 7).
Collective shame in response to ingroup immorality has also been shown to uniquely
predict anger towards as well as desire to distance oneself from one’s ingroup (Johns, Schmader,
& Lickel, 2005; Lickel et al., 2005; Iyer et al., 2007). This ‘distancing’ behavior has been
interpreted as reflecting a “pro-social desire to object to immorality” or a “supportive strategy
toward the harmed group in response to immorality” (Berndsen & Gausel, 2015, p.730). For
example, Piff, Martinez, and Keltner (2012) assigned American participants to read a passage
describing human rights abuses committed by the US (North Korean) military (study 1) and
write about a time they felt that the US (a foreign nation) transgressed against another group of
people. The authors found that those assigned to read or write about US-perpetrated (i.e.
ingroup) harms expressed significantly greater feelings of collective shame and guilt than those
assigned to read and write about harms perpetrated by a foreign country. Shame, but not guilt,
predicted subsequent hostility towards the US, a desire for it to be punished, and willingness to
volunteer for an anti-American student organization. Berndsen and Gausel (2015) reported

5

Given America’s history of racist immigration policies (Tichenor, 2009), it’s also likely that some (likely welleducated) whites have come to view immigration restrictionism as racially motivated or as a means of upholding
white majority status. Suggestive of this, in a March 2021 YouGov survey commissioned by the Cato Institute, 39%
of white respondents (including 75% of Democrats vs. 11% of Republicans) thought that those supportive of
decreasing immigration into the US were motivated by racist beliefs as opposed to a sincere interest in controlling
America’s borders.
6
Data from a February 2018 AP-NORC survey shows that white liberals and moderates (but not conservatives)
assess ‘immigrants’ to be just as disadvantaged as blacks in terms of ‘getting ahead in the US’. A September 2019
CNN poll further shows 50% of respondents felt that immigrants face ‘a lot of discrimination’ as compared to 44%
who said the same with respect to African Americans. While one might attribute these attitudes to the Trump
presidency, Goldberg (2019) notes that perceptions of discrimination against immigrants have been on the rise since
at least the early 2000s.
7
Skentny (2009) speaks of the ‘black analogy’ or the extent that non-black ethnic/racial groups can plausibly draw
parallels between their own disadvantages and those of blacks. The author argues that groups that successfully make
this analogy are more likely to be included in affirmative action efforts.
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similar findings in the Australian context. After being informed of a protest in which European
Australians expressed negative sentiment towards Australians of Middle-Eastern descent, the
authors found that European Australians’ subsequent reporting of shame, but not guilt, predicted
anger towards (e.g. “I feel angry at Australians who are against Middle-Eastern Australians”)
and wanting to self-distance from other Australians (e.g. “When Australians express negative
opinions about Middle-Eastern Australians, I want to distance myself from them”), with anger
partially mediating the effects of shame on distancing. More recently, Dai (2020) found that,
after viewing the results of a survey in which a majority of whites indicated that President
Donald Trump’s views accurately reflect (vs. don’t reflect) their own beliefs, white liberals
showed increases in shame-related racial disidentification (e.g. ‘Being a white American gives
me a bad feeling’) and support for racial equity policies.
The theoretical reasons as to why collective shame might be a stronger motivator of more
general pro-outgroup attitudes and behaviors than guilt relate to the differing natures and scope
of the appraisals that trigger each emotion. Allpress et al. (2014) argue that guilt arises from
one’s personal or fellow ingroup members’ violation of specific normative prohibitions (e.g. ‘it
is bad to steal, but I stole’). However, a specific norm violation does not necessarily implicate or
threaten one’s general sense of his/her own and/or his/her ingroup’s moral worth. Rather, one
can maintain the perception of the self or of the ingroup as generally moral but still feel guilty
that he/she or fellow group members engaged in normatively proscribed behavior (e.g. stealing) 8.
In this case, the pro-outgroup effects of guilt are limited to compensating (e.g. via financial
reparations) specific outgroups for the specific damages resulting from one’s own or one’s
ingroup’s counter-normative behavior. Shame, in contrast, arises when an ingroup’s behavior is

8

Further clarifying this point, and distinguishing between norms and values, Teroni and Deonna (2008) note that the
violated norm in question need not be linked to a self-relevant or internalized moral value.
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perceived to seriously violate and undermine values that are central to a person’s moral selfconcept. Unlike guilt, it invites greater soul-searching and questioning of the self’s and
ingroup’s moral essence. Rather than an isolated instance of counter-normative behavior, the
moral violation is seen as revealing something fundamentally defective about one’s own moral
character and/or that of his/her ingroup. Because of this, shame encourages pro-outgroup
attitudes and behaviors whose scope includes but is not limited to correcting the specific damage
inflicted on any specific outgroup, as in the case of guilt. Instead, it motivates the expression of a
more general pro-outgroup orientation whose function is additionally to a) morally distance or
distinguish a person from a morally tainted ingroup, such that one’s social ingroup is effectively
recast as a moral outgroup, b) signal a person’s moral objections to ingroup behavior, with the
hope of rehabilitating or pressuring it to reform, and c) challenge or undermine the power and
influence of an ingroup so that it ceases to be a source of social injustice and outgroup suffering
(Knowles et al. 2014).
Of course, the moderate to strong correlation between collective guilt and shame entails
that they are not mutually exclusive and often co-occur. So how do we then reconcile this with
the notion that they correspond to different appraisals? What are the attitudinal and behavioral
consequences when both emotions are active? While there is no single definitive answer to these
questions, several accounts have been proposed. First, in line with the reasoning above, it’s
possible for one to feel guilty about an ingroup’s immoral behavior while also feeling ashamed
to the extent that the behavior is perceived to reflect a flawed moral essence. In this case, though
both guilt and shame are operative, the need to repair a globally defective moral character is a
more powerful motivator of pro-outgroup behavior than is the need to repair the consequences of
a specific immoral act. As Lickel et al. (2014) suggest at the intrapersonal level, “guilt’s strong
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link to apology and reparation might, in some circumstances, moderate the extent to which
people feel they need to change” (p.1058). By this account, when guilt is accompanied by shame,
the effects of the former are secondary and become subsumed under those of the latter. The
effects of guilt, in other words, become largely redundant or irrelevant when combined with
shame.
Gausel and Brown (2012) advance and test an alternative account in which guilt and
shame differ less in terms of the behavior vs. character foci of their underlying moral appraisals,
and more in terms of the levels at which they motivate prosocial attitudes and behaviors.
Specifically, these authors distinguish between group members’ personal (i.e. individual) and
ingroup selves (i.e. their existence as group members), which they contend are differentially
associated with guilt and shame. By their model, in the face of ingroup moral failure, guilt is
expected to promote anger towards and a desire to reform the personal self, whereas shame
inspires anger towards and a desire to reform the ingroup self. As the authors explain, the reason
for this is that “shame is often experienced as more intensely disturbing than guilt” as “people
normally appraise shame as having more serious implications for the personal self, than does
guilt” (p.552). Thus, group members are inclined to avoid the more psychologically threatening
feelings of shame by shifting the focus of negative global appraisals away from the personal-self
and towards the ingroup-self. On the other hand, because guilt is less psychologically threatening
than shame, group members who feel guilty are more willing to accept its personal implications
(as they don’t include an indictment of one’s moral being). Consistent with this logic, Gausel and
Brown (2012) found that Norwegian participants’ guilt--but not shame—with respect to their
ingroup’s historical mistreatment of Tater minorities predicted anger towards (e.g. ‘I feel angry
at myself’) and a desire to change the personal self (e.g. ‘Right now I feel like changing the way
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I behave’)—with the former partly mediating the latter outcome. In contrast, shame—but not
guilt-- predicted anger towards (e.g. ‘I feel angry at Norweigans’) and a desire to reform the
ingroup self (e.g. “At this moment I feel like changing the way Norwegians behave”)—with the
former once again partly mediating the effects of latter. While the authors do not explicitly
address the simultaneous operation of the two emotions, their model implies that those who feel
both guilt and shame will express anger towards and a desire to reform both their personal and
their ingroup-selves. It also implies that shame is a further-reaching predictor of pro-outgroup
orientations because it is the more group-oriented of the two emotions. However, whereas
theories that distinguish guilt and shame in terms of behavior vs. character-focused appraisals
expect the effects of shame to be largely absorbed by those effects of guilt when both emotions
are active, Gausel and Brown’s (2012) model suggests that their combined effects on prooutgroup attitudes and behaviors may be greater than those of either emotion alone 9. And this is
due to the fact that such outcomes would be subject to both personal and ingroup motivations,
each of which push them in the same direction (though not necessarily with the same force).
To ensure the reader has a clearer understanding, the diagram below offers a visual
summary of the main theoretical claims and relationships discussed above. Using the work of
Rees, Allpress, and Brown (2013) and Allpress et al. (2014) as a guide, the bottom and top
portions of the diagram depict the popular local vs. global distinction of guilt and shame along
with each emotion’s relationship with differing scopes of pro-outgroup response. The middle
portion of the diagram adds the theoretical model of Gausel and Brown (2012), which
distinguishes guilt and shame in terms of the motivational focus of moral reform.

9

I am generally agnostic as to which of these accounts is more correct (scholarly debate on this question continues
to this day). I include this discussion only to pre-emptively address potential questions regarding the simultaneous
operation of guilt and shame.
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Figure 2.1 Illustrative summary of relevant theoretical processes

2.3

Theoretical Implications
All told, IET is critical to understanding white racial attitudes because, particularly when

racial identity is salient, race-related phenomena and policies are often interpreted in groupbased terms. To be sure, this assertion is not necessarily novel. Political scientists have
previously noted that group-based appraisals of deservingness and concomitant feelings of
resentment and anger strongly influence whites’ support for pro-black social policies (Kinder &
Sanders, 1996; Banks & Valentino, 2012). However, in their near exclusive focus on negative or
prejudicial racial attitudes, they’ve largely failed to recognize that group-based appraisals and
emotions vary in tenor and are not always out-group focused. Specifically, whereas some whites
appraise blacks as undeserving of government assistance, others appraise whites as being
illegitimately advantaged, responsible for black disadvantage, and as thus receiving ‘more than

39
they deserve’. And whereas the former appraisal can be expected to seed anger or resentment
towards blacks and thus opposition towards their political demands, the latter is expected to
generate ingroup-critical feelings of shame, guilt, and anger towards other whites, which, in turn,
should inspire support for pro-black policies. Thus, an important contribution of IET is the
illumination of a wider but generally overlooked universe of group-based appraisals and
emotions that are just as relevant to explaining positive as they are to explaining negative racial
attitudes. In practical terms, it teaches us that measures of negative racial attitudes, such as
‘racial resentment’, don’t simply indicate the presence or absence of anti-black affect, but also
the presence or absence of moral considerations and emotions that are critical of whites.
2.4

Chapter Summary
What explains ‘woke’ or racially liberal attitudes among whites? Why do some whites

support social policies that exclusively benefit blacks and/or members of other racial/ethnic
outgroups? Why do some support increasing immigration to US whereas others do not? The
current chapter reviewed literature that addresses these questions in terms of intergroup
processes, including the presence of group competition for resources and threats to social and
moral identities. According to realistic conflict theory (RCT), the answer to these questions is to
be found in the existence or absence of outgroup threats to material resources and interests. More
specifically, this account holds that whites support policies like affirmative action and higher
immigration when these policies are not perceived as compromising or negatively impacting
their personal material wellbeing.
However, this chapter reviewed research suggesting that neither perceptions of realistic
threat nor objective factors that should occasion them (e.g. local black population size,
residential proximity) are important determinants of racial attitudes. From the perspective of
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social identity theory (SIT), this is because material threats are only one possible driver of
intergroup attitudes. Moreover, when material threats are relevant, they are more likely to be so
at the ingroup rather than individual-level. In other words, whites oppose racially liberal policies
less because they threaten their personal standings and more because they threaten that of their
ingroup as a whole. But, crucially, SIT also maintains that a group’s ‘standing’ isn’t reducible to
its material wellbeing. Rather, it more broadly consists of a group’s relative social status, which
itself is determined by the summed evaluations of a group’s relative performance on socially
valued attributes and outcomes (some of which may be economic). And because people derive
personal esteem and meaning from their group memberships, they are naturally inclined to
evaluate their ingroups positively in comparison to outgroups. When an ingroup’s dominant
social position is secure or not contested by lower-status outgroups, intergroup harmony is
expected to prevail. But when perceived as illegitimate and/or challenged by other groups,
ingroup members can be expected to defend their group’s social position by engaging in proingroup and/or anti-outgroup behaviors.
And yet some ingroup members respond to charges of status illegitimacy by allying or
showing solidarity with lower-status outgroups and condemning or opposing their own ingroup.
The current chapter introduced intergroup emotions theory (IET) to help explain this
phenomenon. Its review of this literature underscored the fact that ingroup members are sensitive
to and seek to defend or enhance their group’s moral reputation. This moral reputation is
threatened when, inter alia, a) an ingroup is appraised as responsible for serious harms against
outgroups, b) an ingroup’s advantaged social position is appraised as having been unjustly
achieved and maintained via the mistreatment of outgroups, and/or c) an ingroup is appraised as
indifferent or unresponsive to the plight of outgroups.
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Even if not directly complicit in their group’s wrongdoing, these ingroup-critical moral
appraisals can trigger psychologically discomforting feelings of collective guilt and/or shame on
the part of individual members. In some of the more recent theoretical accounts, collective guilt
is said to arise when one’s own and/or fellow group members’ specific behaviors or actions are
seen to violate a widely accepted normative prohibition(s)—regardless of whether the violated
norm is important to one’s moral self-concept. Collective shame, a more distressing emotion,
follows from globally appraising an ingroup as morally corrupt or as embodying moral values
that are fundamentally at odds with one’s own cherished moral commitments. Both of these
emotions are distinct but can overlap when ingroup behavior is seen to violate a normative
prohibition that is also central to a person’s moral orientation. In this case, one feels guilty that
his/her ingroup acted immorally. But rather than viewing it as an isolated lapse in virtue, the
immoral act(s) in question are seen to exemplify an ingroup’s globally defective morality. In
other words, a white person can feel guilty when fellow ingroup members are racist towards
blacks to the extent he/she sees himself/herself and others as either personally benefiting from
and/or doing nothing to stop such behavior. And he/she may feel ashamed to the extent that such
behavior is viewed as emblematic of the ingroup’s general moral disposition.. Likewise, a white
person can feel guilty when perceiving that his/her racial group enjoy advantages that were
obtained through the oppression and exploitation of others. And he/she may also feel ashamed to
the extent that the ingroup’s casual enjoyment of these privileges is seen as speaking to its
defective moral character.
Most importantly, this chapter reviewed research suggesting that feelings of collective
guilt and shame among members of advantaged groups motivates the adoption of pro-outgroup
attitudes and behaviors. While debate persists on this question, the popular account holds that

42
because it’s focus is limited to a harmful ingroup action(s) as opposed to the ingroup’s moral
character as a whole; and because the harmful action(s) may merely constitute a violation of a
normative prohibition as opposed to a personally important moral value, the pro-social effects of
collective guilt are believed to be limited to general support for policies that compensate specific
outgroups for specific ingroup transgressions. The pro-social effects of collective shame, in
contrast, are believed to be more outgroup-general and further-reaching. As was discussed, this is
because shame is believed to uniquely correspond to negative appraisals of an ingroup’s morality
as a whole. Accordingly, the adoption of pro-outgroup orientations serves not just to improve the
wellbeing of a victimized outgroup(s), but to also morally distance a person (both socially and
psychologically) from while attempting to reform or challenge his/her immoral ingroup.
The chapter that follows will discuss some of the implications of these findings for the
political science study of white racial attitudes. It will also outline a theory that identifies
collective moral emotions as a central mover of white racial liberalism across time. In the course
of formulating hypotheses that test this and related propositions, the chapter will turn to literature
from the ‘individual differences’ school of racial attitudes for greater theoretical elaboration. The
goal here is to attain insight into an important but outstanding question: what distinguishes
whites who experience ingroup-critical emotions from those that don’t? The answers to this
question will not only underscore individual differences in the susceptibility to these emotions,
but, in doing so, they will also explain why increases in racial liberalism are more likely for
some subgroups of whites than others. This discussion will set the stage for another that
considers the role of the media in the activation of ingroup-critical emotions and, thereby, in
effecting increases in racial liberalism.
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3
3.1

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Introduction
In Chapter 2, I showed that intergroup emotions theory (IET) has several important

implications for research on white racial attitudes. First, it shows that morality is a critical
dimension on which people evaluate groups. Social identity theory (SIT) holds that people
naturally compare their ingroups against outgroups on valued attributes, and want to see their
ingroups come out ahead. As positive comparisons or those that favor the ingroup are crucial for
members’ realization of proud and stable social identities. SIT views ingroup favoritism and
outgroup derogation as a means by which group members compete with outgroups for positive
social comparisons. IET thus extends these insights by underscoring how group members are
sensitive to and seek to protect, enhance or repair their ingroup’s moral reputation. Although
bolstering the ingroup and derogating outgroups 10 is one possible means by which group
members respond to threats to their moral identity—such as when their ingroup is accused of
discriminating against or persecuting an outgroup(s)--the IET literature demonstrates that some
respond in an opposite or pro-outgroup fashion.
Second, the findings from the IET literature show how ingroup-critical moral appraisals
and emotions can be powerful shapers of racial attitudes, in general, and liberal racial attitudes,
specifically. Although political scientists have previously noted how public policy preferences
are “shaped in powerful ways by the attitudes citizens possess toward the social groups they see
at the principal beneficiaries (or victims) of the policy”, little attention has been given to the role

10

Admittedly, the review of the IET literature has hitherto largely focused on pro-outgroup responses to moral
identity threats. Proceeding sections will highlight the predispositions that influence whether ingroup members
respond in this fashion or, as is more often the case, become defensive and resentful.
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of group-based moral emotions 11 in the formation of these attitudes (Nelson & Kinder, 1996,
p.1055-56). In particular, scholars have largely neglected to consider that how whites feel about
their own racial group can be just influential for their racial policy preferences as how they feel
towards other racial groups. What is more, the IET literature suggests that how whites feel
towards other racial groups is, at least in part, a function of how they feel towards other whites.
While it’s been acknowledged that attachment or love for one’s ingroup does not necessarily
translate to animosity towards other outgroups (e.g. Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1999), the IET
literature suggests that the inverse of this relationship (i.e. negative orientations towards one’s
ingroup, positive orientations towards outgroups) is a real phenomenon 12.
On the basis of these theoretical insights, the current chapter begins by forwarding three
primary hypotheses as to the effects of collective guilt and shame on different white racial
attitudes. It then proceeds to consult several individual differences accounts of racial attitudes for
the purpose of identifying variables that condition group members’ susceptibility to ingroupcritical appraisals, emotions, and the resulting adoption of pro-outgroup attitudes. These insights
are then formulated and added as secondary hypotheses that elaborate the antecedents and causal
nature of primary predictors while explaining their connection to one of the most widely
employed measures of racial attitudes in the political science literature (namely, ‘racial

11
To be sure, political scientists have noted that pro-social emotions like ‘empathy’ are important predictors of
support for social welfare (e.g. Feldman et al., 2020) and humanitarian immigration policies (e.g. Pagano & Huo,
2007; Newman et al. 2013). However, with a few exceptions (Sirin, Valentino, & Villalobos, 2016; 2017), the
effects of empathy are typically assumed to be group-neutral. Perhaps on account of this, scholars typically examine
empathy in isolation of other pro-social emotions. And yet other research has shown that empathy often coincides
with feelings of guilt and/or shame. In fact, some find evidence that empathy mediates the effects of collective guilt
and shame on reparation attitudes (Brown & Cehajic, 2008), while others find evidence that guilt mediates the
effects of empathy on charitable donations (Basil, Ridgeway, & Basil, 2007) and pro-outgroup political activism
(Mallet et al., 2008). The point here is that, when studying pro-social political attitudes and behaviors, political
scientists often fail to recognize the group-based dimensions of emotions that are assumed to be group-neutral.
12
Kinder and Cam’s (2009) seminal work on ethnocentrism includes but a single mention of this phenomenon,
referring to those with greater ingroup than outgroup prejudice a “topsy-turvy world in which out-groups are seen as
virtuous and in-groups as utterly without virtue” (p.56).
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resentment’ and ‘social dominance’). Finally, I review literature and derive testable hypotheses
as to when, how and why white racial liberalism increases across time. I make the case that the
presumed stability of racial attitudes and their unresponsiveness to media input is overstated and
holds for some segments of the public more than others. While doing so, I explain how the
media, and particularly new media, influences white racial attitudes via its activation of ingroupcritical moral appraisals and emotions.
3.2

Primary Hypotheses (1-3)
Though their underlying motivations may differ, group-based guilt and shame have both

been implicated in support for policies that compensate outgroup victims of specific ingroup
wrongdoings. Accordingly, it follows that feelings of collective guilt and shame are both
important but varying determinants of racial liberalism among whites 13. We would thus expect
that, when entered together, both guilt and shame will independently predict variance in support
for pro-black policies, such as affirmative action, group-based government assistance, and
financial reparations. This proposition is operationalized with the following hypothesis:
H1. Whites’ feelings of collective shame and guilt for their ingroup’s past and present
mistreatment of blacks will independently predict support for pro-black policies.
Given that a number of previous studies have previously documented such relationships,
to find that both white guilt and shame predict support for outgroup-specific restitution would be
empirically unsurprising. However, recall that a subset of these studies indicate that shame
encourages more general ‘pro-outgroup’ orientations (e.g. Rees, Allpress, & Brown 2013).
Others do not directly establish this relationship, but are nonetheless suggestive of it (e.g.

13

Note that the hypotheses that follow from this premise assume that guilt and shame are statistically
distinguishable. While recent research suggests they will be, this assumption needs to be validated for the
hypotheses to be tested in their current form.
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Casellas and Wallace, 2018). Based on these findings, we would expect that whites’ feelings of
collective shame, but less so guilt, over anti-black racism and racial inequality would motivate
the expression of liberal immigration attitudes. To recall, this is because the focus of guilt may
be limited to the ingroup’s perceived responsibility for specific normative violations (committed
by an otherwise moral ingroup), whereas the focus of shame is on the ingroup’s (im)moral nature
as a whole. Thus, the pro-outgroup effects of shame are further-reaching to the extent that the
ingroup’s immoral essence and legacy, rather than a specific or isolated wrong, requires redress.
In the specific racial context of the United States, appraising the moral character of white
Americans as essentially defective (or racist) is expected to encourage ‘ashamed’ whites to adopt
socio-political attitudes (e.g. support for lax immigration policies) that serve to morally
distinguish or distance themselves from other white Americans 14, communicate solidarity with
‘outgroups of color’ or the perceived victims of white supremacy and racism, and challenge their
ingroup’s perceived illegitimate and pernicious socio-political influence. Accordingly, a second
main hypothesis predicts that:
H2. Whites’ feelings of collective shame for their ingroup’s past and present
mistreatment of blacks will predict support for increasing the number of immigrants
admitted into the US.
To the extent that white shame centers around their ingroup’s mistreatment of non-white
outgroups, one wouldn’t expect pro-immigration sentiment among whites to be entirely raceneutral. In other words, it’s likely that whites who are ashamed of their ingroup’s moral legacy
will be biased in favor of non-European vs. European immigrants. Beyond reflecting a sense of
white Americans’ moral obligation to protect and improve the lives of those their ingroup had

14

The idea is to adopt and express support for policies that white Americans as a whole are perceived to oppose for
racist reasons.
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historically excluded, a pro-non-European/anti-European bias can also be a means of moral
distancing or self-distinction; i.e. taking a position that is perceived to be at odds with ingroup
interests communicates one’s moral uniqueness and solidarity with other outgroups (Berndsen &
Gausel, 2015). Additionally, insofar as white Americans are essentialized as ‘racist’ or are
perceived to be complicit in the maintenance of a racist social order, some ‘ashamed’ whites may
even regard favoring non-European over European immigrants as a means of eroding their
ingroup’s socio-political dominance 15. An auxiliary hypothesis thus predicts that:
H2A. Whites’ feelings of collective shame for their ingroup’s past and/or present
mistreatment of blacks will predict a preference for immigrants from non-European vs.
European countries.
As will be noted in a subsequent chapter, an examination of feeling thermometer
differentials reveals that, over the past few years, white liberals and democrats have increasingly
rated non-white racial/ethnic groups significantly more warmly than they do other whites. To the
best of this author’s knowledge, no previous study has probed and sought to explain this pattern.
However, some of the research reviewed earlier shows that feelings of collective shame can elicit
ingroup-directed anger and a desire to distance oneself from one’s ingroup. It’s thus reasonable
to predict that these affective responses will manifest in how whites rate racial outgroups relative
to other whites:

15
While this may seem far-fetched, data from a nationally representative 2021 Cato Institute/YouGov survey show
that 16.5% of whites (including roughly 33.5% of white liberals and 7.2% of white conservatives) selected ‘reduces
the power of the white majority’ as one of the benefits of immigration into the US. To put this into perspective, this
is significantly higher than the share (9.7%) that selected ‘increases American wages’, though significantly lower
than the share (51%) that selected ‘increases diversity of thought’. These data are available upon request.
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H3. The more that whites feel ashamed of their ingroup’s past and present
mistreatment of blacks, the warmer they will be towards non-white racial/ethnic groups
(e.g. blacks, Hispanics) relative to other whites.
One limitation of H1-3 is that talk is cheap. And those who give racially liberal responses
in the context of a survey about race may be doing so not on account of genuine moral
commitments but out of a desire to not come across as racist. This possibility raises an important
question: will ‘ashamed’ or ‘guilty’ respondents who support pro-black policies and/or
increasing [non-white] immigration be willing to sacrifice their time and/or money to assist
members of other outgroups? Some studies point in the affirmative direction. For instance,
Stewart, Latu, and Branscombe (2010) had an experimenter offer participants antidiscrimination
flyers that they could then distribute on their college campus. The authors found that white guilt
predicted the number of antidiscrimination flyers that were taken from a folder of 50. More
recently, Solak et al. (2016; study 2) found that white guilt predicted agreeing to make a
monetary donation to Amnesty International to “further their campaign to promote racial equality
and prevent police mistreatment”. If these findings are valid, we might similarly expect to find
that:
H4. Whites’ feelings of collective shame and guilt for their ingroup’s past and present
victimization of blacks and the persistence of racial inequality will independently predict
the size of monetary contributions to a non-profit pro-black advocacy group.
Further, and for the same reasons given for hypotheses 2 and 3, we would expect
collective shame, but not guilt, to predict monetary contributions to a non-profit pro-immigrant
advocacy group:
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H5. Whites’ feelings of collective shame for their ingroup’s past and present
victimization of blacks and the persistence of racial inequality will predict the size of
monetary contributions to a non-profit pro-immigrant advocacy group.

Figure 3.1 Illustrative summary of H1-H5
Note. Solid arrowed lines represent direct effects

3.3

Predicting the Expression of Collective Guilt and Shame
Of course, not all (and likely not even most) ingroup members react to charges of ingroup

immorality or illegitimacy with feelings of guilt, shame, and pro-outgroup behavior. In fact,
previous studies indicate that the expression of ingroup-critical emotions among members of
advantaged groups are conditional on perceiving an ingroup to be responsible for the suffering or
inferior conditions of other outgroups (Zimmermann et al. 2011); and, relatedly, on perceiving an
ingroup’s superior social position vis-à-vis other groups to be illegitimate (Bahns &
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Branscombe, 2011; Tabea et al. 2019; Kende et al. 2020). Naturally, those that perceive that their
ingroup is not responsible for the suffering of others and/or perceive that their ingroup’s
relatively advantaged social position is justly deserved are unlikely to feel ‘guilty’ or ‘ashamed’
because of it. To the contrary, they are likely to take umbrage at the idea that they and their
ingroup are advantaged on account of the mistreatment or exploitation of others. But what
determines or influences perceptions of ingroup responsibility and status illegitimacy? In what
follows, I make the theoretical case that these perceptions are largely governed by group
members’ orientations towards or understandings of between-group inequality, which, in turn, is
closely associated with their political ideologies. Very briefly, I argue that collective guilt and
shame among white Americans is conditional on attributing disparate racial group outcomes to
past and/or present racial discrimination. And because white liberals are more inclined towards
such structuralist attributions than conservatives, they are also more likely to engage in ingroupcritical moral appraisals and express associated emotions. Finally, I also review and discuss
several theoretical accounts of these differing attributional tendencies, which ultimately inform
this dissertation’s theory of how and among whom white racial attitudes become more liberal
across time.
3.3.1

Individual Differences in Orientations to Inequality

People differ in the extent that they believe that human outcomes reflect just deserts; i.e.
that people generally get what they deserve (see Rothmund, Becker, & Jost 2016 for a review).
And these differences generally fall along ideological lines. Conservative are more likely to
believe that individual success and failure is the product of individual choice or merit, such as
the dedication or effort one invests in a given domain of activity (Tetlock & Mitchell, 1993).
They are more likely to feel that individuals have agency or control over their lives, regardless of
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the environment they’re born into (Ekins, 2019). Liberals, in contrast, are more likely to believe
that individual outcomes reflect the positive or negative influence of variables outside of one’s
control, such as whether one was born into poverty or the access one has to a quality education
or healthcare (Furnham, 1982; Sniderman et al. 1986; Skitka & Tetlock, 1992; Christiansen &
Lavine, 1997; Napier et al. 2006; Weiner, Osborne, & Rudolph, 2011; Schlenker, Chambers, &
Le, 2012). While these findings concern attributions of social inequality in general, they are
applicable to racial inequality as well. Much as white liberals are more likely than white
conservatives to attribute poverty to external or societal-level factors, they are also more likely to
attribute black disadvantage to discrimination and bias. White conservatives, in contrast, are
more likely to attribute it to endogenous or dispositional factors, such as high rates of
illegitimacy, fatherless homes, lack of motivation, welfare dependence, and, though much less
common, genetic differences (Iyengar, 1991; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991; Kluegel &
Smith, 1986; Hughes & Tuch, 2000; Skitka et al. 2002; Hunt, 2007; Morgan, Mullen, & Skitka,
2010; Suhay & Jayaratne, 2013).
While liberals and conservatives differ in the extent that they think that past and/or
present discrimination is important for explaining the persistence of racial inequality, the reasons
for these differences are the object of an enduring scholarly debate. There at least three main
theoretical schools of thought this question, each of which are identified and discussed below.
3.3.2

Symbolic/Modern Racism Theory

As the proponents of theories of ‘symbolic’ or ‘modern racism’ see it, individual or
endogenous attributions of racial inequality generally reflect anti-black prejudice. Specifically,
these scholars contend that the old-fashioned or blatant biological racism of the past has either
been superseded by or became cloaked in less controversial assessments of outgroup value
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deficits (McConahay & Hough, 1976; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears & Henry, 2005). This ‘new’
form of racism is generally characterized by the belief that a) racial discrimination is no longer a
barrier to black advancement; and b) blacks reject the traditional family structure and the
Protestant work ethic (e.g. self-reliance and individualism) in favor of welfare dependence, outof-wedlock births, and/or criminality. These perceptions and stereotypes then give rise to the
beliefs that blacks have only themselves to blame for their poor socio-economic condition and,
relatedly, that they are ‘too demanding’ or have ‘gotten more than they deserve’ from
government. Thus, by this account, conservatives resist attributing black disadvantage to
discrimination both because they deny the persistence of anti-black discrimination and also
because they endorse stereotypes of blacks as lazy and unwilling to take responsibility for their
own conditions.
3.3.3

The Principled Politics Approach

In stark contrast to the above, those who subscribe to the ‘principled politics’ approach
contend that differences in whites’ attributions of racial inequality generally reflect the
application of differing nonracial ideological principles and values, at least among the better
educated 16 (Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986; Sniderman et al., 1986; 1991). For instance, liberals and
those who think people have less control over life outcomes are more likely subscribe to the
‘equality’ and ‘need’ principles of distributive justice (Schlenker, Chambers, & Le, 2012).
Though similar, the former principle calls for an equal distribution of resources regardless of
individual contribution, while the latter prescribes that they be apportioned on the basis of
individual needs. On the other hand, conservatives and those inclined to attribute individual
outcomes to individual agency are more likely to subscribe to the ‘equity’ or ‘merit’ principle,

16

That is, those with the cognitive sophistication to reason in an ideologically consistent fashion.
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which holds that resources should be allocated on the basis of one’s contribution to a given
activity or public good (Lerner, 1980; Faccenda & Pantaleon, 2011). Research indicates that
liberals are more likely to judge public policies as more fair when they based on the equality
principle, while conservatives are more likely to judge as more fairly those based on the merit
principle (Rasinkski, 1987; Mitchell et al., 2003). Indeed, Mitchell et al. (2003) found that
liberals were much less sensitive than conservatives to considerations of economic efficiency and
deservingness when it comes to redistributions of wealth. Liberals tended to be far more
supportive of transfers of income from the wealthy to the poor even when these transfers had low
efficiency and were not tied to work requirements. More generally, liberals prioritized reducing
class differences even when doing so was relatively wasteful.
Thus, owing to their differing principles of distributive justice, liberals and conservatives
differ in their beliefs about the proper role and size of government, with the former preferring a
larger welfare state and greater regulation of inequality and the latter preferring a smaller welfare
state and less if any regulation. Accordingly, by the ‘principled politics’ account, conservatives
might be reluctant to attribute black disadvantage to discrimination to the extent that this
attribution will be used as the basis for greater government control over private affairs and the
enactment of inefficient or counter-productive policies that reward the undeserving and undercut
norms of self-reliance (Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). Conversely, liberals might be motivated to
endorse this attribution to the extent that it justifies greater government oversight and policies
that mitigate inequality.
3.3.4

Cognitive Accounts

A third school of thought holds that differing attributions of black disadvantage at least
partially reflect differing levels of cognitive and political sophistication. For instance, Gomez
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and Wilson (2006) argue that people of lower cognitive ability are less capable of making causal
associations between individual conditions and broad societal forces. As such, they cognitively
default to causally linking individual conditions to “the most obvious proximal factors (which in
the case of racial disparities would be African Americans themselves) or events” (p. 615). The
opposite is true of the cognitively sophisticated, who have both the ability and the requisite
knowledge to make causal linkages between blacks’ socioeconomic conditions and structural
factors. Skitka et al. (2002) similarly hold that individualist attributions for social problems are
intuitive and, consequently, overriding them in favor of structuralist attributions is cognitively
taxing and thus requires sufficient cognitive resources and motivation (e.g. such as when
individualist attributions are in conflict with one’s moral values).
Elsewhere, Feldman and Huddy (2010) suggest that non-structuralist attributions of black
disadvantage may have less to do with ‘denying’ the reality of racial discrimination than with the
difficulty in both observing and linking it to unequal outcomes:
“Discrimination is difficult for experts to conclusively demonstrate; the same
undoubtedly holds true for ordinary people. It is therefore possible that the denial of
discrimination is linked to an inherent difficulty in attributing unequal racial outcomes to
differential treatment, especially for individuals unschooled in scientific research
methods. Some whites may feel they have never witnessed or seen direct evidence of
such categorical discrimination” (p.28).

Thus, by these accounts, that white conservatives are less likely than liberals to attribute
black disadvantage to discrimination is at least partly due to their lower cognitive capacity for
making proximal-distal connections in general. This could also explain why white liberals and
conservatives often diverge in their definitions and interpretations of racism and discrimination.
As Grady (2015) found, among conservatives, the latter generally encompass overt individual-
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level prejudice and deliberate discrimination. Liberals, in contrast, are more likely to espouse
both these and systemic/structural definitions.
3.3.5

Motivated and Group-Based Accounts

In the ‘motivated social cognition’ account, people adopt ideologies that serve their
deeper psychological and epistemic needs and/or which justify their preferred societal
arrangements. In the first case, system justification theory (SJT) contend that people fear the
uncertainty and threats to stability that attend alterations to the societal systems they inhabit (Jost
& Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2005). Owing to this, they are motivated to evaluate the social
systems they live under in positive terms. For to evaluate them negatively or as unjust would
entail they need reform, which would threaten the continuity of the status quo and, thereby,
social stability. Accordingly, people sensitive to these threats are inclined to ‘rationalize’ unjust
or unequal social structures. And, conservatism, a status-quo-defending ideology, is argued to be
a natural fit for such individuals (Jost et al. 2003; Jost, Nosek, & Grosling, 2008). SJT accounts
thus hold that conservatives tend to perceive less racial discrimination and/or attribute racial
inequality to endogenous factors (e.g. lack of motivation, family instability) out of a need to
construe the status-quo as legitimate and not requiring systemic reforms 17 (Major et al. 2007;
Blodorn et al. 2016).

17

A major limitation of the SJT account of racial attitudes is that it says a lot more about conservative than liberal
motives. Some have even charged that it operates on the assumption that conservatives are more biased or more in
denial of social reality than are liberals (Duerte et al. 2015; Crawford & Jussim, 2017); or that liberalism is ‘more
correct’ or preferable to conservatism (Tetlock, 1994; Haidt, 2013). For instance, SJT contends that conservatism is
a means of ‘rationalizing away’ inequality in defense of an otherwise unjust status quo. However, such rests on the
(liberal) assumption that the status quo is devoid of justice and merit-based outcomes; and that inequality is largely a
function of bias. More plausible, in my view, is that American society is neither perfectly just nor unjust, but that
when it comes to perceiving social reality, some individuals are inclined to see the justice and fairness therein while
others are motivated to see the opposite.
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A second but not necessarily conflicting theory, social dominance theory (SDT), holds
that differing attributions of inequality are the corollaries of individual differences in a more
basic orientation towards the desirability or tolerance of social hierarchies and competition (see
Sidanius & Pratto 2012 for a review). The preferences that follow from this orientation, in turn,
are said motivate the adoption of belief systems that serve to either justify or de-legitimize
existing social structures. For instance, ‘hierarchy enhancers’-- those preferring hierarchical or
inegalitarian social structures --see a world that is a competitive ‘dog eat dog’ jungle in which
the strongest or most competent group(s) dominate the weak. To protect or legitimize existing
group hierarchies, such individuals are inclined to view between-group inequality as the
legitimate or natural outcome of a group’s superior competitive abilities. The idea that their
ingroup’s social position was unjustly obtained at the expense of other groups is thus seen as
threatening insofar as it justifies the expropriation of status and influence from the former to the
latter. On the other hand, ‘hierarchy attenuators’ are those inclined towards intergroup
cooperation (vs. competition), and egalitarian social structures and outcomes. Towards justifying
the reduction or elimination of existing group hierarchies, such individuals are likely to view
group inequalities as both unnatural and as generally resulting from oppressive social institutions
and practices, rather than from fair and open competition. For them, the notion that group
disparities are mostly or at least partially ‘natural’ is threatening insofar as it entails that social
interventions aimed at addressing them are doomed to fail (Winegard et al. 2018). Even worse, it
can be used to justify treating groups unequally or to slash programs that aid low-status groups.
Thus, in the American racial context, SDT would regard non-structuralist attributions of
inequality to be ‘hierarchy legitimizing myths’—beliefs that whites 18 adopt to rationalize racial

18

The mention of ‘whites’ here shouldn’t be taken to mean that non-whites cannot or don’t adopt hierarchylegitimizing myths. Indeed, Sidanius et al. (2017) clarify that the theory has been refined to “reflect the general
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inequality and protect their ingroup privilege from attempts at hierarchy-attenuation. On the
other hand, the view that discrimination is the cause of black disadvantage constitute ‘hierarchydelegitimizing myths’ 19 that egalitarian or hierarchy-averse whites adopt to justify the enactment
of hierarchy-attenuating policies (e.g. affirmative action). Accordingly, to the extent that it
reflects the endorsement of endogenous vs. structuralist attributions of black disadvantage,
proponents of SDT contend that ‘symbolic racism’ constitutes a hierarchy-legitimizing ideology,
rather than a new value-based form of anti-black prejudice (though see Brandt & Reyna 2012 for
a hybrid interpretation). In support of this, measures of social dominance orientation (SDO) have
shown to be a unique and strong predictor of MR/SR (Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Monteith &
Spicer, 2000; Sidanius et al., 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996; Sidanius, Devereux, &
Pratto, 1992). Sidanius et al. (1992, 1999) have also shown that SR mediates the relationship
between SDO and hierarchy-enhancing racial policy preferences
As it happens, the subgroup of white Americans most inclined towards endogenous or
non-structural attributions of racial inequality—namely, white conservatives--tend to score
highest on measures of ‘social dominance orientation’ (SDO), the scale used to capture
differences along the pro- vs. anti-hierarchy spectrum. In contrast, the subgroup most inclined to
towards structural or discrimination-based attributions of racial inequality—white liberals—tend

desire to establish and maintain structured intergroup relations regardless of the position of one’s own group(s)
within this hierarchy” (p.152).
19
My criticism of the SDT literature is that it tends to pay outsized attention to the ‘pro-hierarchy’ end of the
spectrum. Though proponents of SDT do acknowledge the concept of ‘hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths’ (or
‘delegitimizing myths’) and related orientations in theory (e.g. Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006), research placing
them as the center of analysis remains few and far between. This is somewhat surprising given that, with few
exceptions, most people in most countries tend to score on the ‘anti-hierarchy’ and ‘anti-dominance’ ends of the
SDO scales (Pratto et al. 2013). In fact, while scoring higher than liberals, data from The American Panel Survey
(TAPs) show that the average white conservative scores below the midpoints on both SDO dimensions. Thus, it
could be the case that liberals are more anti-hierarchy than are conservatives ‘pro-hierarchy’. As Reyna (2017)
argues, this raises the possibility that many of relationships between SDO and race-related outcome variables are
driven by those at the anti-hierarchy end of these scales.
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to score the lowest (Chambers, Swan, & Heesacker, 2015). Of course, this is no coincidence—as
SDT holds that people gravitate towards differing ideologies as a function of their utility in
justifying (conservatism) or de-legitimizing (liberal egalitarianism) prevailing social hierarchies.
Importantly, research suggests that orientations towards social hierarchies may
additionally influence whites’ attributions of racial inequality via their effects on attention and
information processing tendencies. For instance, SDO is negatively associated with otheroriented dimensions of (in)justice sensitivity, a narrow and relatively stable personality trait,
which influences the centrality of justice-related concerns in one’s processing of and response to
social events and outcomes (Reese, Proch, & Cohrs, 2014; Eftedal et al. 2020). Research shows
that other-oriented ‘justice sensitive’ individuals tend to recall more (in)justice-related stimuli
and interpret ambiguous or neutral incidents as instances of injustice (Baumert et al. 2011), react
with greater emotional intensity to incidents of injustice (Baumert, Gollwitzer, & Schmitt, 2007),
spend more time ruminating about the unjust treatment of others (Schmitt, Neumann, &
Montada, 1995), exhibit a lower threshold for the conceptualization of injustice (Mcgrath et al.
2019), and, importantly, are more likely to feel guilt and shame in response to perceiving
themselves responsible for or as benefiting from injustice against others (Montada, Schmitt &
Dalbert, 1986; Gollwitzer et al. 2005). Waldfogel et al. (2021) further find that social egalitarians
(those scoring low on SDO) are more attentive to inequality-related visual cues and are more
accurate at identifying evidence of bias against disadvantaged (but not advantaged) social
groups.
In addition to affecting the processing of inequality-related information, some research
indicates that (anti-)egalitarian orientations may also influence the perceived magnitude of
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inequalities 20. For instance, Kteily, Sheehy-Skeffington, and Ho (2017) found that ‘hierarchyattenuators’ (low SDO) and ‘hierarchy-enhancers’ (high SDO) tended to perceive larger and
smaller power gaps, respectively, between different ethnic/racial groups, genders, economic
classes. In a subsequent study (5), the authors asked respondents to recall the degree of
inequality they saw in images that variably depicted different degrees of inequality. They found
that those low (high) on SDO tended to report seeing greater (lesser) degrees of inequality than
what was actually featured in the images assigned to them. Additional evidence was given by
Chambers, Swan, and Heesacker (2014; 2015), who used objective income and economic
mobility statistics to test the accuracy of respondents’ estimates of the degree of inequality. They
consistently found that liberals and those low on SDO tended to overestimate the longitudinal
growth in the earnings gap between higher and lower income categories (2014) while tending to
underestimate the proportion of those who advance from the latter to the former (2015). In
contrast, conservatives and those high on SDO, on average, underestimated the degree of
downward mobility but were more accurate in their estimates of income gaps and upward
mobility.

20

While neither study directly measured SDO, data from Haaland and Roth (2017) as well as McCaffree and Saide
(2021) suggest that liberals (i.e., those who tend to score highest on SDO) might even overestimate the extent of
anti-black discrimination in certain contexts. Specifically, the former show that white liberals (M=31:1) and
conservatives (M=18:1) were the least and most accurate, respectively, in estimating the number of resumes that
blacks would have to submit for each job callback (the ‘real’ ratio, 15:1, was derived from the widely cited
correspondence study of Bertrand & Mullainathan 2004). More recently, McCaffree and Saide (2021) showed that
liberals vastly overestimated both the number of unarmed black men killed by police in 2019 as well as the percent
of those killed by police that were black. In the first case, around 44% of liberals (vs. 20% of conservatives)
estimated that 1,000 or more unarmed black men were killed by police in 2019. According to the Mapping Police
Violence database, the overall number of blacks killed by police in that year was 27. Similarly, the average liberal
(conservative) estimated that 58% (40%) of those killed by police in 2019 were black, which is more than double the
actual base rate (roughly 25%). My interpretation here is that the relative accuracy of conservatives in both cases
was incidental: i.e. it’s not that conservatives are more ‘informed’ about the degree of discrimination or police
homicides, but rather that the actual estimate happened to converge with their ideological biases.

60
3.3.6

Orientations to Inequality and Ingroup-Critical Emotions

The current dissertation does not intend to resolve the question of which of the
proceeding accounts best explains why white liberals and conservatives differ in their
attributions of racial inequality. The point, for now, is only that these attributional differences,
regardless of their underlying motives, affect the perceived legitimacy of whites’ social position
relative to blacks and other low-status racial/ethnic minority groups. Simply put, whites that
don’t perceive there to be a great deal of discrimination against blacks and/or attribute black
disadvantage to factors that don’t implicate their ingroup’s past or present victimization of blacks
are unlikely to perceive whites to be collectively responsible for racial inequality. On account of
this, they will be less likely to think their racial group’s relative social position is illegitimate and
will thus be less likely to experience the ingroup-critical moral emotions that motivate prooutgroup behavior.
Supporting the foregoing proposition, Puryear et al. (2019) found that a white privilege
exercise—in which subjects were instructed to consider the unique racial advantages they enjoy
over blacks—increased feelings of group-based guilt among those who scored low but not high
on a pre-treatment measure of symbolic racism (SR); which, to recall, is an attitudinal measure
that some contend 21 captures inequality-legitimizing beliefs (Sidanious et al. 1992, 1999) or
systemic vs. endogenous attributions of racial inequality 22 (Gomez & Wilson, 2006; Kam &
Burge, 2017; Simmons & Bobo, 2018). These results align with an earlier study by Leach,
Wayne, and Iyer (2006) in the Australian context, where ethnic European subjects’ symbolic
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In fact, Tarman and Sears (2005) concede that, statistically speaking, SR is best represented by a two-factor model
consisting of latent variables for ‘individualistic’ and ‘structuralist’ attributions for black disadvantage.
22
Banks and Valentino (2012) similarly suggest that SR is “rooted in blame appraisals” (p. 287), which have
downstream effects on group-based emotions. However, their focus is limited to negative outgroup-focused
emotions, whereas the object here are negative ingroup-focused emotions.

61
prejudice against Aboriginal people predicted lower levels of group-based guilt 23. Likewise, an
experiment by Solak et al. (2016) found that white Americans’ expressions of collective guilt for
the state of race relations between whites and blacks was conditional on legitimacy perceptions
(e.g. ‘Discrimination against Black Americans is no longer a problem in the US’). Similar
findings have been reported with respect to moral shame. Tabea et al. (2019; see Kende et al.
2020 for similar findings) found that participants who scored higher on system justification—i.e.
those who felt that LGBT individuals (study 1) and women (study 2) weren’t discriminated
against--were less likely to express feelings of shame in response to information attesting to the
existence of sexual and gender discrimination. Rather than desire that their ingroup act more
morally towards the outgroups in question, such individuals were more likely to demand that the
latter acknowledge that they are treated fairly.
3.4

Secondary Hypotheses (H6-6A)
Because white liberals are more likely than conservatives to attribute white-black status

differences to the depressive effects of slavery and past and/or present racial discrimination, they
are also more likely to think that white Americans are responsible for causing and maintaining
black disadvantage, and thus that their advantaged social position is illegitimate. Accordingly,
if, as the literature suggests, expressions of ingroup-critical emotions are conditional on
perceptions of ingroup responsibility and illegitimacy, it follows that:
H6. Relative to white conservatives, white liberals will express significantly higher levels
of collective shame and guilt for their ingroup’s past and/or present victimization of
blacks.

23

Importantly, this relationship was partially mediated by (reduced) acknowledgement of ingroup privilege while
the effects of modern prejudice on general support for affirmative action for Aborigines were, themselves, partially
mediated by feelings of group-based guilt
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However, if perceived responsibility and illegitimacy is indeed the variable that drives
liberal vs. conservative differences in ingroup-critical emotions, we would expect that
controlling for its effects will largely eliminate them. More specifically, to the extent that
‘symbolic racism’ reflects a racial-hierarchy-legitimizing belief system, it follows that:
H6A. Controlling for symbolic racism will eliminate liberal vs. conservative differences
in expressions of guilt and shame.
3.5

Explaining Changes in White Racial Liberalism Across Time
If ingroup-critical emotions are important predictors of white racial liberalism, it follows

that overtime shifts in white racial liberalism reflect overtime shifts in the salience of ingroupcritical emotions. And because ingroup-critical emotions are activated by appraisals of ingroup
immorality and illegitimacy, it follows that their salience is a function of the availability of
appraisal-triggering information. Taken together, the current section makes the theoretical case
that ingroup-critical emotions interact with the media environment to effect changes in racial
attitudes. However, and extending the insights of the preceding sections, it ultimately argues that
the racial attitudes of some white subgroups (namely, white liberals and Democrats) are more
sensitive to shifts in the media environment than others.
3.5.1

The Case for Attitudinal Stability and Minimal Media Effects

That shifts in the media environment can spur meaningful changes in racial attitudes
across time is by no means an empirically uncontroversial proposition. In fact, it is at odds with
several major theoretical assumptions in the political science literature. First, aside from the ‘life
long openness’ model, most existing theories of racial attitudes conceives of them as being
generally stable. In fact, Converse (1964) viewed racial attitudes and policy preferences as the
only stable and meaningful elements of the average person’s political “belief system”. Likewise,
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Sniderman and Piazza (1993) write that, when it comes to race, Americans “have their feet, if not
exactly set in cement, then at any rate firmly planted” (p.137). Subsequent research has
generally supported these accounts. For instance, Sears and Levy (2003) and Henry and Sears
(2009) generally find that racial attitudes crystalize during young adulthood (typically between
the ages of 18-25) and remain relatively stable across the life span. Other research suggests that
racial attitudes crystalize even earlier (in childhood) and more or less persist for the duration of
one’s life (Sears & Funk, 1999). On immigration, Kustov, Laaker, and Reller (2021) similarly
find attitudes to be “remarkably stable across time”. Although exogenous ‘shocks’ (e.g.
economic recessions, refugee crises) may have some effect, it is small and transitory, with
immigration attitudes quickly reverting back “to an individual’s long-term equilibrium” (p.2)
The general stability of racial attitudes can be at least partly attributed to the fact that
issues of race are cognitively ‘easy’: i.e. little policy expertise or knowledge is required for the
formation of racial attitudes (Carmines & Stimson, 1980, 1982; Cobb & Kuklinski, 1997).
Unlike in more esoteric domains like healthcare and trade policy, a person can more readily lean
on his/her moral intuitions, symbols, values, and social perceptions (including stereotypes 24) to
inform his/her position on racial issues and his feelings towards other racial groups (Feldman,
1988; Sears & Levy, 2003). ‘Race’ is also by no means a novel issue, but one that routinely
features prominently in American political discourse. The upshot is that additional exposure to
race-related information is unlikely to move people’s attitudes in drastically different directions.
The foregoing is consonant with the dominant Minimal Effects Paradigm in the
communications literature, which holds that the power of the mass media to directly influence

24

On this point, Sniderman et al. (1986) suggest that “attributions in the case of needy groups are more available—
because more automatic or well rehearsed—than in the case of specific individuals. For in the case of groups the
attributions people offer are more likely to be scripted, drawing on stereotypes about the group in question and
expressing widely shared beliefs about the causes of success and failure” (p.424-425).
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attitudes is minimal (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1944; Kinder, 2003). As Richey (n.d.)
writes, a central reason for this is that “most human beings have heard millions of words about
politics before they interact as an adult with any political messaging, such as a campaign
commercial or a post on social media” (p.3). In other words, to successfully influence, media
messaging must compete with or outweigh the effects of years of prior socialization, life
experience, and other social shapers of attitudes. What is more, even its potential for influencing
is conditional on people tuning in and engaging with the message. The reality of selective
exposure, whereby politically uninterested or partisan consumers ‘tune out’ media content they
find boring or disagreeable, effectively limits the space for mass influence (Klapper, 1960;
Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; Iyengar and Hahn, 2009). On top of this, political media messaging is
seldom uniform or monolithic. On any political or social issue, one is likely to encounter
competing arguments whose attitudinal influence cancel out in the aggregate or which prompts
people to default to their preexisting values when deciding on the position to adopt (Zaller, 1992;
Sniderman, 2000). Thus, rather than changing minds on the issues, what direct influence the
media has is limited to shaping perceptions of issue importance (i.e. ‘agenda setting’) and/or the
issue-dimensions on which the performance of elected officials is evaluated (Iyengar and Kinder
1987). Aside from this, the media can only hope to impact attitudes indirectly or via a ‘two-step’
information flow process: i.e. the media influences opinion leaders who, in turn, influence those
in their social networks that listen to them (Katz 1957).
3.5.2

The Case for Media-Driven Racial Attitude Change

But there are good reasons for suspecting that the alleged stability of racial attitudes and
the minimal effects of the media in attitude formation are overstated. First, as Kellstedt (2000;
2003) notes, few Americans directly observe racial discrimination against blacks and other
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ethnic/racial minorities. Instead, their perceptions of discrimination and race relations are
typically informed by what they hear or observe in the media. Early work by Ball-Rokeach &
DeFleur (1976) speaks to this through the concept ‘media dependency’ 25. The general idea is that
when people have no direct personal experience with or information about a given social issue,
“they are dependent on in the media for information, and therefore more likely to be influenced”
(Gavin, 2018,p.832). Put differently, in the absence of direct information about the severity of an
issue, people often rely on cognitive heuristics, such as the ‘availability heuristic’—or the
frequency at which they recall hearing about an issue in the media—to make assessments of
prevalence and risk (Kuran & Sunstein, 1998). Similarly, in the account of exemplification
theory, media coverage of concrete or specific cases and incidents, especially when emotionallycharged, can lead people to (rightly or wrongly) treat them as exemplars of a broader social issue
or phenomenon (Gibson & Zillman, 1994; Zillman, 2002). As media coverage seldom reports
base-rate information regarding the prevalence or risk of a phenomenon, perceptions thereof
often hinge “entirely on the provision of exemplars” (Zillman, 2002, p.22).
Two possible media effects can be operative here: persuasion and framing effects (Chong
& Druckman, 2007; Slothuus, 2008). First, the media is essentially updating people’s
assessments of the scope or severity of discrimination. By exemplification theory, when the
media extensively covers individual cases of alleged anti-black discrimination, viewers are likely
to perceive them to be instantiations of a broader or more prevalent phenomenon. This can be

25

This concept bears close resemblance to the substitution hypothesis born out of ‘cultivation theory’, which,
broadly construed, posits that media consumption (e.g. crime-related news) shapes people’s perceptions of social
reality (e.g. the world is a violent place; Gerbner et al. 1977; Doob & Macdonald, 1979; Gerbner et al. 1980). Like
‘media dependency’, the substitution hypothesis suggests that media effects will be most pronounced among
consumers who lack personal experience with a given social phenomenon. Other hypotheses within this tradition,
like ‘audience reception theory’, suggests that these effects are conditional on consumer background characteristics,
experiences, and predispositions (Morgan, Shanahan, & Signorielli, 2014; Roche, Pickett, & Gertz, 2016).

66
considered a ‘persuasion effect’ insofar as a person previously thought the issue of racial
discrimination to be minor or non-existent, but has shifted this assessment in response to new
exemplifying information. Second, among both those who already or don’t already believe there
to be a high degree of racial discrimination, the media increases the accessibility and salience of
racial discrimination as an attribution of racial inequality and, thereby, as a consideration that
informs racial policy preferences. All told, because perceptions of racial discrimination both
shape the perceived legitimacy of racial inequality and, likely as consequence, are strongly
predictive of support for racially liberal policies like affirmative action (e.g. Bobo & Kluegel,
1993; Valentino & Brader, 2011; DeBell, 2017; Haaland & Roth, 2017), it follows that one way
the media can influence racial policy preferences is through its influence on perceptions of racial
discrimination as well as the weight given to racial discrimination in people’s attributions for
black disadvantage.
Kellstedt (2000; 2003) offered some of the first evidence of the media’s influence on
public racial policy liberalism. He conceptualizes American racial attitudes as an “internal tugof-war between cherished values that conflict with one another—a struggle where one side gains
ground over a period of time but the other side never truly loses, regaining strength and pulling
back the other way” (Kellstedt, 2003, p. 10). The ‘cherished’ but conflicting values he speaks to
are those of egalitarianism and individualism. His thesis is that whether public racial attitudes
swing in the liberal or conservative direction is a function of the extent that news outlets
emphasize egalitarian or individualist value considerations in their coverage of race-related
issues. Combining times series of news content data and racial policy attitudes, he finds that
aggregate swings in racial policy liberalism do indeed proceed shifts in the frequency at which
race-related media coverage speak to violations of egalitarian (vs. individualistic) norms.
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However, while noteworthy, it’s not clear that this relationship is driven by framing as opposed
to informational or persuasion effects 26. Because the author’s operationalization of
‘egalitarianism’ includes article that mention anti-black discrimination and unequal treatment,
this relationship may, in fact, be also evidencing the updating of public perceptions of the
prevalence or severity of racial discrimination 27.
Given that Kellstedt’s analysis predated the rise of digital media, a case be made that, by
furthering the public’s exposure to incidents of alleged racial injustice, the digitalization of news
has only enhanced the media’s potential to influence racial attitudes. First, digital and social
media platforms allow users to document, upload, and disseminate stories or events that
traditional media is limited in covering (Fox & McEwan, 2019). In the context of police
brutality, Intravia, Thompson, and Pickett (2020) note that “the widespread use of mobile
devices that capture photos and record videos can quickly go viral on the Internet and social
media and increase the public’s exposure to negative police-citizen encounters” (p.58). Indeed,
research shows that content that provokes negative emotions or moral outrage are more likely to
go viral online or be shared on social media (Berger and Milkman, 2012; Valenzuela, Pina, &
Ramirez, 2017; Jost et al., 2018; Brady, Crockett, Van Bavel, 2020). One study found that people
were more likely to learn about immoral acts online than through traditional media (print, TV,
radio etc.) and that online exposure, in turn, predicted greater moral outrage (Crockett, 2017).
Other studies have noted significantly positive relationships between digital news consumption,
on one hand, and perceptions of racial discrimination (Amaya, 2017) and police illegitimacy
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As Slothuus (2008) notes, researchers have typically failed to distinguish between these two effects. Instead, many
studies purporting to show ‘framing effects’ have used experimental manipulations that combine both persuasive
information and emphases on specific considerations or issue dimensions. A consequence of this practice is the
obscuring of the mechanism by which attitudes are changed. Attitudinal shifts that are attributed to ‘framing effects’
may, in fact, be the result of persuasion (and vice versa).
27
That Kellstedt found no significant effects of individualistic value frames on racial policy liberalism makes this
interpretation very plausible.
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(Intravia, Thompson, & Pickett, 2020) on another. Digital news media thus conceivably has
greater potential to trigger what Kuran and Sunstein (1999) term ‘informational cascades’
wherein initial media coverage of an event stirs public outrage (including protests) and responses
from political elites, which, in turn, stimulates further event or issue-related media coverage 28.
For instance, when user-uploaded content, such as a black person’s interaction with police or a
prejudiced white person, goes viral online, it is often receives attention from traditional and
mainstream news media and, thereafter, from political and party elites 29 (Freelon, Mcllwain, &
Clark, 2018).
The more frequent circulation and thus reach of racial injustice-related media should also
make it harder for whites to dismiss incidents of discrimination as isolated or non-racial
phenomena. For instance, Sigelman et al. (1997) found that the police killings of Malice Green
and Rodney King, respectively, decreased and had no significant effect, respectively, on the
extent that whites’ attributed racial inequality to discrimination. They speculated that whites may
be more likely to isolate such incidents “by treating them outside the historical context of
discrimination against blacks” (p.790). And yet a more recent studies by Sawyer and Gampa
(2018) and Mazumder (2019) found that white racial liberalism significantly increased during the
Black Lives Matter period, which was marked by a series of high-profile police shooting
incidents. It’s thus possible that single incidents of racial injustice are easy to dismiss as episodic
or unrepresentative of the treatment of blacks at large, but multiple (and video-documented)
incidents in close succession cultivate the perception that they are instantiations of a broader and
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Birkland (1998) similarly discusses the agenda-setting effects of ‘focusing events’ on interest group mobilization.
The role of political elites is worth dwelling on, as Barbera et al. (2019) show evidence that legislators are more
likely to follow than originate partisan discourse on Twitter. This is important in that, by speaking to issues and
adopting issue-frames (e.g. ‘systemic racism’, ‘privilege’) that resonate with partisan social media users and
activists, politicians may be amplifying and disseminating them to wider (or social media inactive) audiences.
29
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more pervasive phenomenon. Consistent with this interpretation, Carter and Murphy (2017)
found that exposure to multiple (vs. one) autobiographical essays discussing black authors’
experiences of subtle racial discrimination increased white participants’ perceived prevalence
thereof and decreased perceptions that the authors were playing the ‘race card’.
While increasing the availability and reach of race-related news content, the digital media
revolution has also changed the mode through which such content is consumed. Whereas the
format of news coverage in earlier eras was largely limited to print and audio, the advent of
camera phones has made it so that developments can now be vividly video-captured in real time.
This innovation is important as there are reasons for believing that video news formats are more
emotionally and thus attitudinally impactful than printed news (cf. Powell et al. 2018). First, as
Mullinix, Bolsen, and Norris (2021) argue, video footage of racial incidents features episodic
frames in that they focus attention on specific events and characters as opposed to presenting
abstract or general information about the broader issue context (i.e. thematic frames). Aaroe
(2011; see also Gross, 2008) demonstrates that the latter tends to elicit stronger emotional
responses and, when they do, are more effective at inducing attitude change in the direction
implied by the frame. This is because episodic frames are said to increase the ‘transportability’ of
the viewing experience or the extent that viewers “get immersed in a narrative and feel
empathetic toward the story characters” (Lee & Shin, 2014, p. 1091). For instance, Oliver et al.
(2012; see also Maier, Slovic, & Mayorga, 2017) showed that, relative to thematic framing,
episodic framing of health care issues (which focused on a specific person and his/her
experiences with the healthcare system) increased story engagement, which, in turn, predicted
stronger feelings of compassion and support for improving the healthcare of vulnerable
populations. More germane to the issue of race, Mullinix, Bolsen, and Norris (2020) tested the
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affective and attitudinal impact of articles and videos documenting instances of police use of
lethal or non-lethal police against African American men. With no exceptions, the authors found
respondents who viewed the lethal or non-lethal videos either alone or in combination with text
expressed stronger feelings of anger, anxiety, and upset than those in the purely textual or control
conditions. Turning to attitudinal outcomes, the authors observed a pattern of additive effects
such that the combination of text and video footage led to lower trust and confidence in law
enforcement than either in isolation 30. Given that videos are increasingly embedded in textual
news articles, this finding is noteworthy and suggests that, to the extent that it elicits stronger
affective reactions, new media may have greater potential to effect attitude change 31 (Holbert,
Garrett, & Gleason, 2010). Research also shows that information that provokes strong emotion is
better encoded in memory (see McGough 2002 for a review). As such, exposure to emotionally
provocative race-related stimuli may have a more enduring effect on racial attitudes 32.
New media should also afford whites more frequent direct exposure to the concerns,
sentiments, and racial activism of black Americans. For instance, blacks are just as likely to use
social media as whites, and are even slightly overrepresented on some platforms, like Twitter
(hence the term ‘Black Twitter’; Smith & Anderson, 2018). They are also more likely than

30

It’s worth noting that the effects of all conditions were moderated by racial resentment, which underscores the
importance of congruency between predispositions and information for message reception and attitude change
(Zaller, 1992).
31
Bennett and Iyengar (2008) are more skeptical of this proposition. They argue that new media has increased
audience fragmentation and selective exposure, which undercuts the media’s ability to influence mass attitudes. In
reply, Holbert, Garrett, and Gleason (2010) counter that recent trends of media fragmentation, individuation, and
digitalization actually afford more opportunities for lasting persuasion effects. Specifically, and drawing on the
insights of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, Priester, & Brinol, 2002), they
posit that greater individual choice over the what, when, and how of media consumption ensures that those tuning
into a message have both the ability and the motivation to receive it. The upshot is that the new ‘pull’ media
environment may conduce to deeper cognitive engagement that is more likely to result in enduring attitude change.
32
As far as this author is aware, no research has directly tested this hypothesis. However, the findings in Mazumder
(2018) are suggestive in that whites residing in counties that experienced historical civil rights protests were, years
later, more racially liberal (e.g. greater support for affirmative action, lower racial resentment) than those living in
counties in which protests were absent.
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whites to use social media to share race-related, including activist, content (Anderson, 2016).
Thus, since the advent of social media, white social media users—and, via cross-medium
information transfer, even non-users—are likely hearing black voices more frequently than ever
before. This has implications for the current theory, as recent research suggests that ingroup
members who are exposed to outgroup expressions of ingroup-directed emotions (in this case,
black expressions of disappointment) report higher levels of collective guilt and greater
willingness to participate in collective action 33 (Solak et al. 2016).
3.5.3

A ‘Zallerian’ Ingroup-Critical Emotions Account of Media-Driven Racial
Attitude Change

Recall that intergroup emotions theory holds that, when specific group categories are
salient, group members appraise information in terms of its implications for ingroups and
outgroups. Further, when group categories are salient, so too are the social status differences
between them. Accordingly, by increasing the salience of racial group memberships and the
status differences between them, increased media reporting on racial discrimination and bias is
likely to promote or activate group-based moral appraisals of blame and responsibility for racial
inequality. Even when such coverage is episodic or focused on specific instances of alleged
discrimination (e.g. George Floyd), people are likely to perceive such cases as exemplars of a
broader social problem (i.e., racism and racial inequality) that some group is responsible for
creating and/or allowing to persist. As the dominant racial group, these appraisals of blame and
responsibility are likely to implicate or be focused on white Americans. And this is especially
likely to be the case when media coverage implicitly or explicitly attributes a racial issue(s) to
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Importantly, and consistent with research reviewed in section 2.6, the expression of guilt was conditional on the
perceived legitimacy of racial inequality.
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the effects of past and/or present white racism—which I hereafter refer to as ‘racial equalitarian
media’ 34. In turn, negative white-focused moral appraisals are likely to give rise to emotions that
are critical of white people and sympathetic to blacks and/or other racial minorities. Related to
this point, Zaller (1992) notes how media messages “may involve subtle or even subliminal
images, and considerations may involve feelings or emotions” (p.41) 35. Accordingly, when white
Americans’ are exposed to racial equalitarian media messaging, I argue that such considerations
are likely to include ingroup-critical moral appraisals—which can be considered the ‘cognitive’
dimension of a consideration 36—and emotions (the ‘affective’ dimension). What is more, I
contend that these group-based moral considerations have animated white racial liberalism
throughout American history. In Myrdalian 37 (1944) terms, their expression can be traced to the
‘American Dilemma’ that crystalized with the ratification of the Founders’ constitution —a
dissonance between the nation’s avowed moral ideals of liberty and equality for all and its actual
moral practice of denying them to African slaves and their descendants.
Evidence of this can be found in the writings of abolitionists, which not only expressed
shame and guilt over slavery but also acknowledged the utility of provoking these emotions for
effecting social change 38 (Lamb-Brooks, 2016). It can also be found in the written letters sent by
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What do I mean by ‘racial equalitarian media’? I mean media that embodies the general assumptions of Myrdalian
anti-racist thought—that blacks and whites are inherently of equal ability, and thus differences between them must
be attributable to the direct and/or indirect effects of historical and/or continued white racism (Horton, 2005;
Jackson, 1994; Weiner, 2004). These assumptions, which are now widely endorsed (at least among ‘polite society’),
seminally influenced the civil rights movement, the enactment and interpretation of civil rights law, and the adoption
of affirmative action policies.
35
Unfortunately, despite their relevance to attitude formation (Petty & Brinol, 2015), emotions do not receive
extensive treatment in Zaller’s theory of public opinion.
36
Zaller’s (1992) conceptualizes ‘considerations’ as consisting of a combination of cognitive and affective elements.
37
Myrdal (1944), himself, implicitly and explicitly refers to feelings of guilt (or coping with them) on several
occasions. In one instance he writes he writes: “Meanwhile each of the two guilty regions points to the other’s
sins—the South assuaging its conscience by the fact that ‘the Negro problem is finally becoming national in scope’
and the North that ‘Negroes are much worse off in the South’” (p.47).
38
For instance, Angelina Grimske, an antebellum political activist, defends the strategy of “influencing slaveholders
by a feeling of shame and odium, as well as by a sense of guilt” (Grimske, 1838, p.126). Gillhooley (2020) writes
how abolitionists “sought to relieve their guilt and expunge the national sin” through their political activism (p.156).
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non-southern whites to president Eisenhower amidst Southern resistance to desegregation efforts,
in which expressions of shame were dominant theme. As Lee (2002) observes, many of such
authors reported feeling “ashamed to be white” and mentioned how, owing to their commitment
to racial equality, segregation and racism worked to diminish their “cherished self-conception”
(p.116). Reacting to a 1963 CBS TV episode that highlighted the conditions of impoverished
blacks, one Northern woman wrote: “I am ashamed to be one of the so-called white Christians
who have let such a situation exist. I feel guilty as I look around my clean suburban home and
my small ones sleeping in clean beds” (Bodroghkozy, 2012, p.169). A viewer from North Dakota
adds: “I was both angry and guilty. Angry because of the awful agony of the young couple.
Guilty because as a white man I am partially responsible for anguish so rife and unnecessary and
damaging” (Ibid.).
In fact, like the abolitionist movement before it, the strategy of the civil rights movement
at least partly rested on evoking such emotions among the white majority. As Bobbit (2007) tells
it, “King himself was very much aware that his strategy involved evoking a sense of guilt in
white Americans” (p.37). Indeed, Martin Luther King Jr. himself spoke directly to such
sentiment on multiple occasions, in one of which noting how the nonviolent Civil Rights
movement “arouses a sense of shame within them [the white community]…I think it does
something to touch the conscience and establish a sense of guilt” (Clark, 1963, p.42). Dr. King
also undoubtedly appreciated how media coverage of racial injustices (e.g. the lynching of
Emmett Till, efforts at preventing school desegregation in Little Rock) played an indispensable
role in transmitting the information that elicited these emotions. Speaking at a Selma protest,
King proclaimed that: “We are here to say to the white men that we no longer will let them use
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clubs on us in the dark corners. We’re going to make them do it in the glaring light of television”
(Bodroghkozy, 2012, p.2).
While slavery and state-sanctioned racial discrimination and violence are no longer,
media messaging that accentuates white vs. black status differences and implicates white
Americans in the mistreatment of blacks or the persistence of black disadvantage remains a
trigger of white collective shame and guilt today. For instance, against the backdrop of media
discourse on the role of racism in the federal government’s laggard response to hurricane
Katrina, Blodorn and O’Brien (2011) found that white residents of New Orleans who perceived
racism in Katrina-related events reported higher levels of collective guilt. More recently,
Schildkraut’s (2019) qualitative study found that many white liberal respondents reported an
increased sense of racial privilege—a precursor for feelings of shame and guilt--, which they
frequently attributed to “the role of the media and the police”. In the words of one respondent:
“Anytime I see the news of a black person dying to the police I think about how I’ve been pulled
over in traffic and only gotten warnings because I’m white” (p.433).
The qualitative evidence reviewed here suggests that ingroup-critical emotions have
always influenced the racial liberalism, including activism, of white Americans; and that media
has always played a role in their activation. However, it also lends support to the
conceptualization of ingroup-critical emotions as ‘time-dependent phenomena’, which refers to
the notion that the salience of specific group categorizations, the status differences between
them, and the degree that people appraise information in terms of such categorizations are not
constant (Smith & Mackie, 2006). As was noted in the previous chapter, people can identify with
different groups at different levels of social categorization (Turner et al. 1987; Oakes et al. 1994;
Reicher & Hopkins, 1996). And which group memberships are salient varies across time. For
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example, during times of war or in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, one’s American or national
identity is likely to be more salient than his/her racial or ethnic identity. As such, status
differences between the US and other countries are also likely to be more salient. However,
during periods of racial turmoil or following incidents of alleged racial injustice (e.g. Hurricane
Katrina, the killing of Georgie Floyd), the opposite is likely to be the case. And this is due, at
least in part, to the availability of cues in the information or media environment that elevate
racial over national self-categorizations (and vice versa).
Taken together, because the availability of racial equalitarian media varies across time, so
too does the salience of racial group memberships and the status differences between them; and
because the salience of racial group memberships and between-group status differences varies
across time, so too does the likelihood of engaging in group-based moral appraisals and
experiencing group-based emotions. When these appraisals are negative and racial-ingroupfocused, they give rise to ingroup-critical emotions, including collective shame, guilt, and/or
ingroup-directed anger. These emotions and their underlying appraisals then enter as
‘considerations’ that inform white Americans’ (racially liberal) responses to survey questions
about race and racial policy.
The above raises an important theoretical question: does white racial liberalism fall as the
availability of racial equalitarian stimuli declines? According to intergroup emotions theory, not
necessarily—as the repeated experience of group-based moral emotions overtime can have
lasting effects (Smith & Mackie, 2006). Specifically, and through the process of classical
conditioning, when whites repeatedly experience guilt and/or shame in response to instances of
perceived racial injustice against blacks, it is expected that these feelings will eventually become
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associated with their mental representations of blacks 39. In this case, these emotions are likely to
be reactivated whenever blacks are encountered or thought about. The upshot is that repeated
episodic emotional experiences can have enduring effects on racial attitudes. Such accords with
the findings of Mazumder (2018), who found that whites residing in counties that saw civil rights
protests were more racially liberal decades later.
3.5.3.1

The role of predispositions in exposure and reactions to racial equalitarian
messaging

Of course, as Zaller’s theory 40 and my own acknowledge, not all white Americans will be
equally or similarly exposed to racial equalitarian media messaging, nor will they all be equally
or similarly receptive to it upon exposure. Instead, and generally speaking, the white Americans
most likely to both attend and react to racial equalitarian media in an ingroup-critical fashion are
those that fall on the ‘liberal’ end of the ideological spectrum. My reasoning is as follows:
First, relative to their conservative counterparts, self-identified liberals tend to score
higher on average on a family of attributes that are associated with greater and more diverse
information consumption and political awareness. For instance, liberals tend to score higher 41
than conservatives on measures of psychological constructs like ‘need for cognition’ (Iyer,
Koleva, Graham, & Haidt, 2012; Carraro et al. 2011; Stern et al. 2013), broad personality traits
like ‘openness’ (Caprara et al. 1999; Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak & Halperin, 2008; Rentfrow et
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This is similar to the ‘association-propositional evaluation’ (APE) model adopted by Sawyer and Gampa (2018) to
explain movement-driven increases in white racial liberalism. By their account, the Black Lives Matter movement
modified whites’ implicit and explicit racial attitudes by altering existing or creating new (positive or sympathetic)
associative evaluations of black people.
40
The congruency between individual predispositions and media messaging is an important feature in Zaller’s
(1992) model of message reception and attitude change.
41
An important caveat is that, while significant, these relationships tend to be modest in size and hold more for
socio-cultural than economic dimensions of liberalism (conservatism).
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al. 2009), and other individual-level variables like educational attainment and cognitive ability 42
(Xu, Mar, and Peterson, 2013). All of these variables, some of which are closely related (e.g.
openness and need for cognition; Ksiazkiewicz, Ludeke, & Krueger, 2016), are believed to have
downstream effects on information-seeking and consumption tendencies as well as political
interest and engagement. For instance, need for cognition, which broadly relates to one’s
enjoyment of complex or effortful thinking, has been positively linked with political news
consumption and attention (Perse, 1992). Openness, a highly related personality trait, is found to
positively predict broad/deep information-seeking behaviors (Heinstrom, 2005), earlier adoption
of new social media platforms (Guadagno, Okdie, and Eno, 2008), online news consumption
(Gerber et al. 2010; Jordan et al. 2015), and both the diversity and number of news sources
consumed (Sinderman et al. 2020). Cognitive ability is positively associated with political
interest and engagement (Dawes et al. 2014, 2015; Weinschenk et al., 2019), and is also found to
facilitate information-seeking, comprehension, and the integration of new knowledge (including
current events) into long-term memory (Hambrick et al. 2008). Thus, to the extent that liberals
score higher than moderates and conservatives on these variables, they are more likely to be
active consumers of socio-political news, especially on the web, and thus have greater
opportunities to be exposed to racial equalitarian messaging.
Second, white liberals also tend to score higher on two related predispositions that are
more directly influential for engagement with as well as reacting to and processing racial
equalitarian messaging in an ingroup-critical manner. The first is other-oriented injustice
sensitivity, which, as was noted in section 3.3.1, is positively predictive of both dwelling on as

42

Time series data from the General Social Survey (1972-2018) show that whites that self-identify as ‘liberal’
consistently score higher on measures of verbal ability and educational attainment than those that self-identify as
‘conservative’; and these differences have increased across time.
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well as the emotional intensity of one’s reaction to incidents of injustice against others. Greater
injustice-sensitive individuals have also lower thresholds for what counts as injustice, which
increases the scope of possible triggers of moral-emotional attention. The second is
egalitarian/anti-hierarchy ideology (i.e., social dominance), which, similar to injustice sensitivity,
positively predicts both attention to inequality-related stimuli and greater sensitivity to evidence
of bias against low-status groups. Most importantly, whites higher on this orientation also tend to
be more inclined towards structuralist or bias-centric accounts of racial inequality (if only
because the alternatives are perceived to ‘justify inequality’ or ‘blame the victim’), which means
they are also more likely perceive disparate racial group outcomes (or social positions) to be
illegitimate and their racial ingroup responsible for their existence. Taken as a whole, insofar as
white liberals score higher on these predispositions, they are more likely than others to a) seek
out (vs. avoid) and become both emotionally and cognitively invested in racial equalitarian
media messaging, which is conducive to more enduring attitude change (Petty & Cacioppo,
1986; Petty, Priester, & Brinol, 2002); and b) accept (rather than resist) racial equalitarian media
messaging, which increases the likelihood that they will engage in ingroup-critical moral
appraisals and experience feelings of guilt, shame, and/or ingroup-directed anger.
Consistent with the preceding suppositions, Takahashi (2021) observed that white liberals
were both significantly less avoidant of and also rated media articles implicating white people in
racism as significantly less threatening than conservatives. Further, Derosa (2017) found that
conservatism negatively predicted feelings of shame, guilt, and anger in response to images
depicting police and other racialized violence against black people. Similar to Takahashi (2021),
she also observed that conservatives were more likely to report wanting to avoid information
about race and police relations than liberals. Additionally, anger and shame interacted with

79
political orientation in predicting avoidance such that liberals, but not conservatives, who
reported these emotions showed a greater interest in engaging information about racial issues.
These findings suggest not only that liberals are more likely to experience negative group-based
emotions when faced with racial-injustice-related information, but also that these emotions
motivate a desire to further seek out and consume such information. White conservatives, in
contrast, are more likely to resist or avoid such messaging and/or tune into ideologicallycongruent media (e.g. Fox News) instead.
For all of the above reasons, ingroup-critical considerations are likely to also arise more
naturally for white liberals than conservatives. Specifically, due to their greater exposure to and
interest in racial equalitarian media, they are likely to be more cognitively accessible for liberals
such that their emergence is less dependent on explicit priming or media framing. For instance,
was the federal government’s laggard and inadequate relief response to black victims of
Hurricane Katrina evidence of a racist social system that privileges white over black lives? Or
was it simply the result of government incompetence? For white liberals, the former
interpretation is more likely to be cognitively accessible even in the absence of exposure to
information that explicitly promotes it. This is because the consideration—that society unjustly
privileges whites over blacks—has already been internalized. As such, mere exposure to
information about the plight of black Katrina victims may be sufficient for evoking ingroupcritical moral appraisals. On the other hand, the emergence of ingroup critical appraisals among
those for whom they are less or not at all cognitively access will be more dependent on
information that explicitly primes them. While only suggestive of this, Cooley, Brown-Iannuzzi,
and Cottrell (2019) found that, relative to white liberals, white conservatives who read about a
court case in which a black (white) robbery suspect was questionably shot by police significantly
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less likely to attribute the incident to racial bias and significantly less likely to think that it
‘reflects the presence of racism’ in American society. However, when participants first read
about ‘white privilege’ before reading about the court case, attributions and perceptions of
racism increased regardless of ideology.
3.5.3.2

A rough conceptual model of media-driven white racial attitude change

For the sake of clarity, the diagram below offers a rough visual summary of the main
causal processes that comprise my ingroup-critical emotions theory of media-driven increases in
white racial liberalism. It begins with an exogenous 'shock' in the form of an immoral act
(typically perpetrated by a white person) or a phenomenon or event that negatively and
disproportionately affects member(s) of a historically victimized low-status racial group (a).

Figure 3.2 Conceptual model of media-driven white racial attitude change

Exogenous shocks can be anything that is likely to generate media coverage and attracts public
and political attention—from unjustified police shootings and racially-motivated hate crimes to
the racially insensitive or bigoted remarks of politicians, the racially discriminatory behavior of
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private citizens, and even new research that speaks to racial discrimination in different public
and/or private domains. Whatever its specific form, the ‘shock’ leads to increases in the
availability of racial equalitarian media coverage (b), which implicitly or explicitly frames the
act, event, or phenomenon in question in terms of a broader narrative of racism and white
supremacy. Greater availability and individual predispositions (c) that bear on general and, more
specifically, race-related media attention and engagement (openness, cognitive ability, injustice
sensitivity etc.) increases a person's likelihood and his/her frequency of exposure to racial
equalitarian messaging (d). In the minds of the exposed, exposure proximately functions to
increase the salience of racial group categories and the status differences between them (e),
increase the perceived degree or prevalence of mistreatment against the racial/ethnic minority
group(s) in question (f), and contextualize an issue or event as part of a broader phenomenon
(rather than an isolated incident). These effects heighten a white person’s awareness of his/her
membership in an advantaged racial group, which prompts group-based appraisals of
responsibility for the conditions of the low-status racial outgroup in question (g). Whether these
appraisals are negative and white-focused (vs. defensive and outgroup-focused) depends on the
extent that a white person attributes ingroup vs. outgroup-status differences to past and/or present
mistreatment (h). And the extent that a white person endorses such attributions is a function of
both predispositions (i; e.g. social dominance) and the perceived degree of discrimination against
the outgroup in question (j). The latter, which itself is partly a function of exposure (to the extent
that lower perceptions of discrimination result from a lack of awareness or information) and
predispositions (k; e.g. social dominance, injustice sensitivity), serves to increase the weight
given to racial discrimination in these attributions. Appraisals of white Americans as either
indirectly or directly responsible for the inferior conditions of a racial outgroup (l) is likely to
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feed into appraising their social position as illegitimate (m). These ‘local’ or wrongdoingfocused appraisals produce an emotional response (n) in the form of collective guilt (o).
However, they can also serve as the basis for more global negative appraisals of white
Americans’ moral character (p), which elicit feelings of moral shame (q). Together, ingroupcritical appraisals and the emotions they promote become ‘considerations’ that inspire the
expression of group-specific and/or group-general racially liberal attitudes (r).
To be clear, in the interest of simplicity, the diagram above does not depict all possible
nodes or outcomes. For instance, a more elaborate rendering would have included a path to
‘outgroup-critical’ appraisals (e.g. undeserving, lazy, violent) and emotions (e.g. anger, disgust),
which are likely to promote a racially conservative response. Additionally, in theory, there
should also be a path running from ‘ingroup-critical emotional response’ or ‘racial liberalism’
back to ‘exposure’ insofar as the former motivate further racial equalitarian media consumption.
Nonetheless, though incomplete, I felt it necessary to provide the reader with some visual
summary of primary theoretical variables and processes—especially before proceeding onward
to the formulation of relevant hypotheses.
3.6

Primary Hypotheses (7-16)
Like Kellstedt (2000; 2003; see also Engelhardt, 2019), this dissertation contends that

both the stability of racial attitudes and the non-role of the media in their formation is much
overstated. However, whereas Kellstedt’s theory of media-driven racial attitude change is groupneutral and identifies shifts in the availability of egalitarian value frames as the causal
mechanism, this dissertation offers a theory that is specific to white Americans 43 and in which

43

To be sure, the theory can be adapted to explain increases in racial liberalism among non-white racial/ethnic
minority groups. However, this adapted theory will inevitably feature group-based appraisals and emotions that are
unique to such groups.
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the media affects racial attitudes via the activation of group-based moral appraisals and
emotions. By this latter account, shifts in white racial liberalism across time at least partly reflect
shifts in the salience of ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions. And shifts in the salience
of the latter, in turn, reflect shifts in the salience or availability of (‘racial equalitarian’) media
coverage that implicates white Americans in the genesis and/or persistence of black
disadvantage 44. If these theoretical premises are valid, this dissertation expects to find that:
H7. Variation in white racial liberalism (t) follows variation in the salience of racial
equalitarian media (t-1) 45.
However, it’s also possible that the inverse relationship is true—i.e. shifts in salience of
racial equalitarian media may follow shifts in white racial liberalism to the extent the latter
increases demand for the former. Alternatively, the relationship might be reciprocal such that
both variables are mutually influential. Thus, if the causal relationship truly runs from media to
racial attitudes, I additionally need to show that:
H7A. The salience of racial equalitarian media (t) is not significantly predicted by
previous levels of white racial liberalism (t-1).
On the basis of the parallel publics assumption, Kellstedt (2000; 2003) opted to limit the
focus of his analysis to aggregate public racial policy liberalism. However, this chapter identified
a number of predispositions (openness, injustice sensitivity, egalitarianism etc.) that are likely to
influence both exposure to and whether a person reacts to racial equalitarian media in an
ingroup-critical and, thereafter, racially liberal fashion. Thus, theoretically speaking, there’s no

44

Naturally, there is likely to be a high degree of overlap between ‘racial equalitarian media’ and Kellstedt’s
operationalization of ‘egalitarian value frames’, as the former inevitably features the latter.
45
Following Kellstedt, I also expect this relationship to hold after adjusting for potential confounds, such as the
general availability of race-related media, generational replacement, consumer sentiment, and budgetary allocations
for civil rights agencies. These control variables will be discussed in the next chapter.
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reason to expect shifts in racial liberalism will manifest to the same degree across all segments of
the public. Accordingly, to the extent that white liberals and, by extension, white Democrats
score higher on relevant predispositions, the effects of racial equalitarian media on racial
liberalism are expected to be stronger for these subgroups than for white conservatives and
Republicans:
H7B. The effects of shifts in the salience of racial equalitarian media on racial liberalism
will be significantly stronger for white liberals and Democrats than white conservatives
and Republicans.

Figure 3.3 Illustrative summary of H7 and respective secondary hypotheses
Note. Solid lines with black arrowheads denote significant direct effects. Dotted lines with white
arrowheads denote insignificant direct relationships. Line thickness denotes the anticipated strength or size
of each relationship.

As will become more apparent in the coming chapter, a principle limitation in the
preceding hypotheses is that testing them entails time-series analyses of aggregated (annual)
data. While this approach may be sufficient for detecting broad trends across decades of time, the
non-granularity of the data lends itself to commissions of the ecological fallacy and unavoidably
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leaves many questions important questions unanswered. For instance, such an analysis would not
be able to tell us the source of variation in racial equalitarian media. Nor can we be sure that any
overtime relationships between these media trends and those in white racial liberalism are
necessarily causal. Though theoretically plausible confounds will certainly be controlled for,
such controls are likely to be both imperfect (i.e. contain a considerable degree of measurement
error) and non-exhaustive. In the latter case, we can never be sure that we’ve controlled for all
variables that may explain both increases in media coverage and white racial liberalism.
One avenue for addressing these limitations is to subsequently adapt and test the
hypotheses in question using a quasi-experimental design and more granular data. The
unexpected but widely publicized May 25 death of George Floyd at the hands of Minneapolis
police affords such an opportunity. It catalyzed one of the largest and longest waves of massprotest in American history. Media coverage of the incident and subsequent protests was so
persistent that one would practically have to go ‘off the grid’ to avoid it. Furthermore, a notable
feature of these protests was the conspicuous representation of a sizeable number of white
Americans. Indeed, whether it was white protestors brandishing ‘white silence=violence’ and
‘Black Lives Matter’ signs or surges in the book sales of White Fragility and other anti-racist
literature, the Floyd incident clearly had the trappings of many in the media deemed a ‘racial
reckoning’ (McLaughlin, 2020). It thus presents me with the perfect case study for testing some
of same the theoretical assumptions that are reflected in hypotheses 7A-B.
But just what are we looking for, exactly? More specifically, if—as my theory would
predict-- the death George Floyd indeed increased the salience of racial equalitarian messaging
and, as a result, the salience of ingroup-critical emotions, such as shame and guilt, what would
we expect to observe in the data? Unfortunately, the data on which these analyses will be
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conducted do not feature direct measures of white guilt and moral shame. As such, I have no
choice but to consider the effects of the Floyd incident on highly related variables. One such
variable is racial resentment (the reverse-coded version of which I term ‘racial liberalism’),
which is shown to be strongly correlated with collective guilt and shame 46—a finding that is
replicated in a later chapter—and which, as discussed, is also theorized to be an antecedent of
these emotions 47. Accordingly, if the Floyd incident occasioned increases in white shame and
guilt, we would also expect to observe coincident decreases (increases) in racial resentment
(racial liberalism):
H8. Compared to the pre-Floyd period, white racial liberalism is significantly higher
following the George Floyd incident.
Recall that feelings of collective moral shame have been associated with a desire to selfdistance oneself from one’s morally tainted ingroup. One possible means by which such
distancing behavior may manifest is in how favorable ingroup members are towards their racial
ingroup vs. racial outgroups 48. Thus, if the death of George Floyd indeed increased white
feelings of moral shame, it is also expected to have a negative effect on whites’ favorability
towards other whites relative to blacks:
H9. Compared to the pre-Floyd period, whites’ favorability towards other whites relative
to blacks will significantly decline following the George Floyd incident.

46

Most recently, Agadjanian et al. (2021) report a correlation coefficient of r=0.65 between racial resentment and
white guilt. Data from a March 2021 Cato Institute/YouGov survey shows a correlation coefficient of r=0.75
between racial resentment and white moral shame.
47
To be clear, ‘racial resentment’ is merely a modified and shorter measure of ‘symbolic’ or ‘modern racism’. To
the extent that it captures structuralist vs. individualist attributions for black disadvantage (what proponents of social
dominance theory would consider hierarchy (de-)legitimizing beliefs), it is theorized to condition the expression of
collective shame and guilt.
48
Chapter 6 presents evidence consistent with this suggestion. Specifically, it shows that white moral shame is the
strongest predictor of rating racial outgroups more warmly than fellow whites.
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Further, past research shows white shame and guilt to be strong predictors of support for
giving monetary reparations to black American descendants of slavery. Accordingly, if the Floyd
incident increased levels of shame and guilt, it can also be expected to have increased white
support for cash reparations:
H10. Compared to the pre-Floyd period, white support for paying financial reparations
to black people is significantly higher following the George Floyd incident.
Hypothesis 7B predicted that the racial attitudes of white Democrats and liberals would
more responsive to shifts in the salience of racial equalitarian media coverage than those of white
Republicans and conservatives. To adapt this proposition to the current study, the following
auxiliary predictions are added:
H8A-10A. The effects of the Floyd incident on all outcome variables will be stronger for
white Democrats and liberals than for white Republicans and conservatives.
Finally, and consistent with earlier discussion, the effects of the Floyd incident on white
racial attitudes will be inevitably and largely channeled through the media, as the effects could
only be direct for those that had first-hand exposure to the incident. Moreover, at the time of this
writing, there exists no evidence that the police officer (Derek Chauvin) that killed George Floyd
did so on account of racial bias. Media framing and commentary is thus essential for giving the
incident ‘racial equalitarian’ meaning; that is, connecting it to the broader narrative of racism and
white supremacy. Accordingly, a basic prediction is that the Floyd incident will occasion
significant increases in the frequency of racial equalitarian media:
H11. The salience of racial equalitarian media will be significantly greater in the postFloyd period.
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However, if racial equalitarian media indeed carries the liberalizing effects of the Floyd
incident on white racial attitudes, additional mediational hypotheses need to be tested:
H8B-10B. The salience of racial equalitarian media will mediate the effects of the Floyd
incident on all outcome variables.

Figure 3.4 Illustrative summary of H8-10 and respective secondary hypotheses
Note. Solid lines with black arrowheads denote significant direct effects. Lines with white arrowheads
denote significant indirect effects. Line thickness denotes the anticipated strength or size of condition
effects.

Clearly, none of the preceding hypotheses directly get at whether the predicted
relationships conform to the specific causal mechanisms that this thesis proposes. For even if
white racial liberalism, including variables that are good predictors of guilt/shame, follows the
specified media coverage and/or is found to spike in the post-Floyd period, it need not be the
case that ingroup-critical appraisals and emotions mediates these relationships. Furthermore,
hypotheses 1-5 were designed to test only whether ingroup-critical emotions are uniquely
associated with racial policy liberalism and pro-outgroup orientations. What’s needed, then, are
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experimental versions of these hypotheses. The first of these hypotheses thus directly tests
whether, as theorized, exposure to racial elicits ingroup-critical emotions:
H11. Whites who are exposed to racial equalitarian media report greater collective guilt
and moral shame than those exposed to a race-neutral stimulus.
Once again, though, and for the same reasons that informed H7B and H8A-10A, not all
whites are expected to be equally or similarly affected by racial equalitarian stimuli. Instead, and
in virtue of scoring higher on predispositions that positively influence ingroup-critical responses
to such stimuli, white liberals and Democrats might be expected to report higher levels of postexposure guilt and shame than conservatives and Republicans. On the other hand, given the
potential for ceiling effects, the inverse is also plausible. Specifically, white liberals and
Democrats may already score high enough on collective guilt and moral shame that any attempt
at elevating these emotions will, at most, prove only marginally effective. White conservatives,
in contrast, are likely to score very low on these measures, which would leave greater room for
the stimulus to affect them. Rather than opt for one over the other, I pit these two possibilities
against each other in the following secondary hypotheses:
H11A. White liberals and Democrats will report significantly greater increases in postexposure collective guilt and moral shame than conservatives and Republicans.
H11B. White conservatives and Republicans will report significantly greater increases in
post-exposure collective guilt and moral shame than liberals and Democrats.
If H11 holds true, it is expected that increased levels of post-exposure collective guilt and
moral shame will, in turn, lead to increases in support for pro-black policies. A test of this
proposition entails two predictions. First, it is predicted that:
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H12. Whites exposed to racial equalitarian media will show greater support for problack policies than those exposed to a race-neutral stimulus.
Next, collective guilt and moral shame are both expected to mediate the effects of racial
equalitarian media exposure on support for pro-black policies:
H12A. The effects of media exposure on support for pro-black policies will be mediated
by feelings of collective moral shame and/or guilt.
As was explained earlier, collective shame, more than guilt, is expected to have spill-over
effects on attitudes and support for policies that aren’t directly related to blacks. An initial test of
this proposition was formulated in H2, which predicted that feelings of ingroup-critical emotions
over whites’ past and/or present victimization of blacks and the persistence of racial inequality
would be associated with pro-immigration attitudes. H3 further specified that moral shame will
increase favoritism towards non-European vs. European immigrants, while H4 predicted it would
also relate to being warmer towards racial/ethnic outgroups relative to other whites.
Reformulated for the experimental context, the following similarly predict that:
H13. Whites exposed to racial equalitarian media will show significantly greater support
for increasing the number of immigrants admitted into the US than those exposed to a
race-neutral stimulus.
H14. Whites exposed to racial equalitarian media will admit significantly more
immigrants from non-European vs. European countries than those exposed to a raceneutral stimulus.
H15. Whites exposed to racial equalitarian media will be significantly warmer towards
racial/ethnic minority groups relative to other rights than those exposed to a race-neutral
stimulus.
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H13A-15A. The effects racial equalitarian media exposure on the above outcome
variables will be mediated by collective moral shame.
A final set of hypotheses confronts the possibility that the effects of racial equalitarian
media exposure on pro-outgroup attitudes are a matter of social desirability concerns. That is,
when whites are made to think of or perceive their ingroup as responsible for the origins and
persistence of black disadvantage, subsequently liberal attitudes on affirmative action and
immigration might be driven more by a concern for appearing non-prejudiced than a desire to
address and/or distance oneself from the ingroup’s perceived immorality. One way of accounting
for this possibility, which this research will adopt, is to test whether ingroup-critical emotions
predict a willingness to engage in personally costly pro-outgroup behavior. For consistency with
H5, I operationalize this outcome variable in terms of monetary contributions to a non-profit problack advocacy group. The prediction is then that:
H16. Whites exposed to racial equalitarian media donate significantly more money to a
pro-black advocacy group than those exposed to a race-neutral stimulus.
Because both shame and guilt are associated with policies that compensate or benefit
specific victimized groups, both emotions are also expected to mediate the effects of racial
equalitarian media on donations to a pro-black advocacy group:
H16A. The effects of racial equalitarian media exposure on donations to a pro-black
advocacy group will be mediated by collective shame and guilt.
Finally, because it theorized to predict a more group-general form of pro-outgroupness
than guilt, collective shame is also expected to account for post-exposure increases in donations
to a pro-immigration advocacy group:
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H17. Whites exposed to racial equalitarian media donate significantly more money to a
pro-immigration advocacy group than those exposed to a race-neutral stimulus.
H17A. The effects of racial equalitarian media exposure on donations to a proimmigration advocacy group will be mediated by collective shame.

Figure 3.5 Illustrative summary of H11-17 and respective secondary hypotheses
Note. Solid lines with black arrowheads denote significant direct effects. Lines with white arrowheads
denote significant indirect effects.

3.7

Chapter Summary
The central claim of this dissertation is that white racial liberalism is at least partly driven

by the negative but pro-social moral emotions that whites feel towards their racial ingroup.
Stated differently, white racial attitudes would be far more conservative in the absence of
collective shame and guilt. This chapter forwarded several hypotheses that attempt to
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demonstrate this basic relationship. However, it also went on to argue that the salience of
ingroup-critical emotions and their underlying moral appraisals is not constant but rather varies
across time in response to specific shifts in the information environment. More precisely, the
salience of ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions varies as a function of the availability
of media messaging that implicitly or explicitly implicates white Americans in black
disadvantage and the persistence of racial inequities. As the availability of such ‘racial
equalitarian’ messaging increases, so too does the salience of racial group memberships and the
status differences between them. Consequently, members of different racial groups become more
likely to appraise social issues, events, and outcomes in group-based terms. For white
Americans, greater exposure to racial equalitarian messaging increases the likelihood that groupbased appraisals will be critical and focused on their ingroup’s responsibility for others’
disadvantages, the legitimacy of its social position, and/or its (im)moral legacy and character in
general. As such, it also increases the likelihood that white Americans will experience feelings of
collective shame and guilt that ultimately motivate the expression of racially liberal attitudes.
While available data doesn’t permit a test of all aspects of this theory (for example, no
public opinion surveys have consistently measured racial identity importance let alone white
guilt and shame over time), this chapter posited several hypotheses that serve to test whether
increases in racial equalitarian media coverage do indeed move white racial attitudes in a liberal
direction. At the same time, it contends that not all whites will have equal exposure nor will all
react similarly to such media stimuli. A principal reason for this is that, in addition to differing
on predispositions that influence an individual’s frequency of exposure to racial equalitarian
media, white Americans also differ on those that influence the likelihood of responding in an
ingroup-critical fashion.

94
On this point, this chapter discussed three closely related variables that are likely to
condition a white person’s susceptibility to ingroup-critical appraisals: namely, egalitarian/antihierarchy ideology, attributions for racial inequality, and the perceived legitimacy of racial group
status differences. Specifically, the more ideologically opposed a person is to group status
differences and hierarchies, the more he/she will be inclined to attribute them to correctable
societal factors, such as racial discrimination. And the more that a person attributes group status
differences to discrimination, the more likely he/she is to perceive his/her racial group’s
advantaged social position as illegitimate and his/her racial group as responsible for the creation
and maintenance of an unjust social order. Finally, the more a person appraises his/her racial
group’s social position as illegitimate and his/her racial group as responsible for injustices
against others, the more likely he/she will experience ingroup-critical emotions like collective
shame and guilt.
Given that white liberals tend to have stronger egalitarian/anti-hierarchy orientations and
are also more likely to attribute racial inequities to past and/or present discrimination than
conservatives, it follows that racial equalitarian media exposure is more likely to trigger ingroupcritical moral appraisals and emotions among the former than the latter. Indeed, for white
liberals, exposure to information that highlights racial injustice, discrimination, and unequal
group outcomes is unlikely to be easily resisted. To the contrary, such information can be
expected to increase the weight ascribed to discrimination as a cause of racial inequality and, as a
consequence, increase the perception that whites are illegitimately advantaged and indirectly
and/or directly responsible for black disadvantage. On the other hand, to the extent that white
conservatives are less threatened by group inequalities and are more inclined to attribute them to
endogenous factors (e.g. cultural pathologies), they are more likely to cognitively resist
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messaging that suggests that whites are illegitimately advantaged and responsible for the
disadvantages of blacks and other groups. As a consequence, they will be less likely to engage in
critical moral appraisals of fellow white Americans and, therefore, less likely to experience
feelings of collective guilt and shame.
Several hypotheses followed from the foregoing assumptions. First, to the extent that
they are more attentive and susceptible to racial equalitarian media, increases in the frequency of
racial equalitarian media are expected to more strongly affect the racial attitudes of white liberals
than conservatives. Second, relative to conservatives, white liberals are also expected to express
higher levels of collective guilt and shame—both cross-sectionally and in response to racial
equalitarian media. Finally, to the extent it captures structuralist vs. individualist attributions for
black disadvantage—or what some collectively conceive of as ‘inequality (de)-legitimizing
beliefs’—symbolic racism is expected to account for ideological differences in the expression of
these emotions.
Before proceeding onwards, it’s important to acknowledge that there is no single
‘smoking gun’ piece of evidence that can validate my theory in its entirety. Instead, the object of
the remainder of this dissertation is to showcase multiple bodies of evidence that point in the
same direction. The next chapter begins this empirical quest at the aggregate level of analysis. Its
purpose is to ‘set the stage’ for the more direct tests of this theory’s predictions that will occupy
subsequent chapters. In particular, it will assess whether white racial liberalism indeed varies
across time in response to race-related media trends. Demonstrating as much constitutes a basic
but critical step in the course of testing my theory. For failure to do so would be a fatal blow to
the notion that the media effects shifts in racial liberalism through its generation of ingroupcritical emotion.
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4
4.1

RACIAL EQUALITARIAN MEDIA AND RACIAL AWOKENINGS

Introduction
In the introductory chapter, I mentioned that the racial attitudes of white Democrats and

liberals have become more liberal over the past ten years than at any point in decades. Both the
magnitude and speed of this change has been termed by some as the ‘Great Awokening’
(Yglesias, 2019). So, what does the ‘Great Awokening’ look like in practice? And what is
responsible for it and similar if smaller shifts in white racial attitudes over the past 60 years? The
current chapter begins with a graphical overview of the ‘Great Awokening’. It will then
introduce a novel index of racial liberalism that captures shifts in white racial attitudes as far
back as the 1950s. Accompanying this is another index that measures the salience of ‘racial
equalitarian media’—i.e., media messaging that speaks to black-white inequities in terms of antiblack discrimination, racism, and racial injustice. These two indexes will serve as the primary
dependent and independent variables, respectively, for the hypothesis tests that follow.
In all, this chapter aims to show that a) racial attitudes are far from static across time, b)
shifts in racial attitudes follow shifts in the flow of racial equalitarian media messaging; and that
c) white Democrats and liberals are much more sensitive to these informational trends than are
their Republican and conservative counterparts. To be sure, assuming they hold, none of these
findings would directly validate this dissertation’s primary contention regarding the role of ingroup critical emotions in the adoption of racially liberal attitudes. However, their absence would
certainly call this theory into question. For if racial attitudes are static and more or less
unresponsive to increases in ingroup-critical stimuli, on what basis can we suppose that shifts in
the salience of ingroup-critical emotions drive movement in racial liberalism? The hypotheses
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tested in this chapter are thus critical for demonstrating that this theory is indeed consistent with
what is observed in the data.
4.2

A Graphical Tour of the Great Awokening
The ‘Great Awokening’ of the past decade can be characterized as a rapid surge in the

number of whites who endorse four overarching beliefs: (1) Racial discrimination against blacks
is a frequent and pervasive phenomenon; (2) Inequalities between blacks and whites are
primarily, if not entirely, the result of past and/or present discrimination; (3) White people enjoy
illegitimate advantages on account of their skin color; (4) The government and other institutions
of political and economic influence should enact policies that compensate blacks for their
collective disadvantage and eliminate disparities in group outcomes.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 below provide a graphical summary of some of these trends in the
form of 24 different smoothed time series of racial attitudes 49. With few exceptions, we see that
white liberals and Democrats have either surpassed or closed the gap in racially liberal responses
that existed for decades between them and their non-white counterparts. For instance, and
referring to Figure 4.2, data from the General Social Survey shows that beginning in 2010, the
percentage of white liberals who disagreed with the statement: “Blacks should work their way up
without special favors,” has grown in almost every subsequent year the question was asked.
Starting in 2010, when 24% of white liberals (21% of white Democrats) said they disagreed with
the statement, the number rose to 30% (23%) in 2012, then 36% (26%) in 2014, and finally to
52% (39%) in 2016. It sits at around 50% as of 2018. Between 1994 and 2012, there was never a
year in which more white liberals or Democrats gave this response than their nonwhite
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These series were generated using data from the American National Election Study, General Social Survey, Pew
Research Center, and an assortment of surveys downloaded from the Roper Center for Public Opinion database. All
data are weighted to be nationally representative of the public at large. The exact sources for each time can be found
in Appendix A.1.
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counterparts. By 2016, however, a divide that started appearing in the preceding few years came
into full relief—that year, 29% of nonwhite liberals (28% of nonwhite Democrats) and 38% of
Black liberals (34% of Black Democrats), disagreed that “Blacks should work their way up
without special favors.” In other words, by 2016, white liberals were almost 80% more likely to
give this response than nonwhite liberals, and almost 40% more likely than Black liberals.

Figure 4.1 Selection of smoothed time series of racial attitudes for white and non-white liberals and white
conservatives

Figure 4.2 Selection of smoothed time series for white and non-white Democrats and white Republicans
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Figure 4.3 Time series of percent of whites attributing black disadvantage to discrimination (Left) and
disagreeing with ‘without special favors’ for blacks (Right) by ideological self-placement
Note. Data are weighted.

In addition to predating Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign and eventual election, a
close-up of these trends shows that more white liberals attribute black-white inequality to racial
discrimination than at any point since at least the 1970s. Data from the Pew Research Center
(Figure 4.4) largely dovetails the patterns observed in the General Social Survey (Figure 4.3). In
2012, just under 36% of white liberals and 42% of white Democrats felt that racial
discrimination was the ‘main reason why many black people can’t get ahead these days’. In fact,
a somewhat greater proportion (44.8%, 47.5%) felt that ‘Blacks who can’t get ahead in this
country are mostly responsible for their own condition’. Just two years later (i.e. 2014), however,
the former response grew to 50.3% and then to 57% in 2015. As of 2019, 79% of white liberals
and just under 70% of white Democrats gave this response. By comparison, the responses of
white moderates, conservatives, and Republicans exhibit little to no contemporaneous change.
Perhaps naturally, increases in the percent of white liberals and Democrats who attribute
racial inequality to discrimination coincide with similar increases in the percent that perceive
there to be ‘a lot of’ discrimination against blacks and consider racism to be a ‘big problem’ in
American society, respectively. Referring to Figure 4.5 below, from 2009 to 2014, the percent of
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white Democrats and liberals who perceived there to be ‘a lot of discrimination’ against blacks
jumped from 52.1 and 60.5% to 64% and 72%, respectively. By 2018—the final year of the
series—these figures had further grown to 87% and 90%. By comparison, the net change among
conservatives (34.5% to 48%) and Republicans (37% to 50%) from the beginning to the end of
the series was far more modest.

Figure 4.4 Percent of whites selecting ‘racial discrimination’ as the main reason for black disadvantage by
ideology and party-ID

Figure 4.5 White perceptions of anti-black discrimination by ideology and party-ID
Note. Data are weighted.

Similarly, Figure 4.6 shows that, between 1995-2011, the percent of white liberals and
Democrats who perceived ‘racism’ in the US to be a ‘big problem’ ranged from 30.7% and

101
25.7% to 46.8% and 52%, respectively. These proportions steadily grew to 61% and 53% in
2015, to 77% and 75% in 2017, and, finally, to 84% and 79% in 2020.

Figure 4.6 White perceptions of the severity of the problem of racism by ideology and party-ID
Note. Data are weighted.

Although across a much more limited time frame, the panel data presented in Figure 4.7
suggests that shifts in attitudes towards black disadvantage coincide with shifts in attitudes
towards white advantage. Specifically, the percent of white liberals who think that white people
benefit ‘a great deal’ from advantages in society that black people do not have jumped from
roughly 38% in 2016 to 55% in 2018. Once again, among white moderate and conservative
panelists, the same response increased modestly to not at all over the same period.
Earlier it was argued that feelings of shame over an ingroup’s moral deficiencies can
elicit a desire to distance oneself from his/her ingroup. One possible instantiation of this is
showing greater solidarity with a racial/ethnic outgroup(s) relative to one’s ingroup. In other
words, as whites come to appraise their racial ingroup with moral illegitimacy and racist
tendencies, we would expect to see an increase in expressions of solidarity with non-white
outgroups. Feeling thermometer data from the American National Election Studies is consistent
with this possibility. As shown in Figure 8, 2016 marked the first year on record that white
liberals rated blacks, Hispanics, and Asians significantly more warmly (an average of +3 points)
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than their own racial ingroup. By 2020, the final point in the series, this pro-outgroup warmth
bias had grown to an average of 10 points on the 0-100 feeling thermometer scale 50.

Figure 4.7 White privilege beliefs among white panelists by ideology

Figure 4.8 Racial/Ethnic ingroup vs. outgroup feeling thermometer differentials by ideology
Note. Data are weighted. Scores below horizontal red line along the y-axis (the neutral point) indicate that
respondents rated racial/ethnic outgroups more warmly on average than their own ingroup.

50

Interestingly, the previous trend in this direction in the white vs. blacks series also appears to have begun during a
period of racial tension and perceived injustice (e.g. the 1992 acquittal of police in the Rodney King incident and
subsequent LA riots).
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A nearly identical pattern is observed in panel data from the Democracy Fund Voter
Study Group (VSG), which began in 2011. Figure 4.9 shows that white liberal panelists in 2011
were 7 to 12 points warmer towards whites than they were towards blacks, Hispanics, and
Asians. By 2016, though, these differentials were trending in the opposite (i.e., pro-outgroup)
direction. By 2020, white liberal panelists were 12 to 14 points warmer towards the three
racial/ethnic minority groups than they were towards whites, which closely approximates the
estimates from the ANES.

Figure 4.9 Racial/Ethnic ingroup vs. outgroup feeling thermometer differentials by ideology
Note. Data are weighted. Scores below horizontal red line along the y-axis (the neutral point) indicate that
respondents rated racial/ethnic outgroups more warmly on average than their own ingroup

Figure 4.10, which uses data from the most recent waves of the ANES (top) and VSG
(bottom) surveys, suggests that white liberals are currently the only demographic group that
exhibits this pro-outgroup tendency. Indeed, regardless of political orientation, blacks, Hispanics,
and Asians all rated their racial/ethnic ingroups significantly more warmly on average than
racial/ethnic outgroups.
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Figure 4.10 Racial/Ethnic ingroup vs. outgroup feeling thermometer differentials by race/ethnicity and
ideology
Note. Data are weighted. Bars represent the average difference between how warm a respondent was towards his/her
racial/ethnic ingroup vs. racial/ethnic outgroups. Negative scores indicate that respondents rated racial/ethnic
outgroups more warmly on average than their racial/ethnic ingroup. Top panels show estimates from the ANES
2020 Time Series. Bottom panels show estimates from the 2020 wave of the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group.

Importantly, the emergence of this pro-outgroup warmth bias among white liberals is not
solely driven by greater relative warmth towards racial/ethnic minorities. Instead, it is also a
function of increases in outright negative sentiment towards other whites. Figure 4.11, which
presents time series data from the ANES (left panel) and the VSG (right panel) indicates that the
percent of white liberals who rate ‘whites’ in the ‘cool’ (below 50) region of the feeling
thermometer while rating blacks, Hispanics, and Asians in the neutral or warm regions has been
steadily growing since 2011-2012 (ANES: 1.4%, VSG: 1.2%) and reached series highs (ANES:
11.4%, VSG: 18.2%) in 2020. In fact, both the ANES and VSG data indicate that there were far
more ‘anti-white’ white liberals in 2020 than there were ‘anti-minority’ white conservatives 51
(ANES: 1%, VSG: 2.5%).

51

By ‘anti-minority’ I mean respondents who rated whites at or above the neutral point (50) while rating blacks,
Hispanics, and Asians in the ‘cool’ (< 50) region of the thermometer scale.
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Figure 4.11 Trends in ‘anti-white’ feeling thermometer scores by ideology
Note. Data are weighted. Plots represent the percent of respondents that rated whites below and blacks,
Hispanics, and Asians at or above the neutral point (50) of group feeling thermometer scales (0-100). Estimates for
certain ideological groups in certain years are missing due to the absence of observations in the ‘anti-white’
category.

It is reasonable to ask whether these rapidly shifting sentiments—perceiving greater
discrimination against blacks, greater white privilege, and attributing black-white inequality to
racial discrimination—coincide with greater support for pro-black social policies. Based on the
findings of Piazza and Sniderman (1993), it’s possible for whites to acknowledge discrimination
against blacks while remaining opposed to policies that, by conferring preferential treatment on
the basis of race, treat the ‘disease’ (i.e. discrimination) with the disease itself. However, a white
liberal might be more likely to think such policies are ‘just’ to the extent that they level an
otherwise unjustly uneven playing field. If whites are illegitimately advantaged in higher
education and employment, so this argument goes, granting special advantages to blacks is only
fair.
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Figure 4.12 presents data that supports this. In contrast to white moderates and
conservatives, white liberals show considerable increases in support for pro-black policies even
when the question makes implicit or explicit mention of preferential treatment. For instance, the
percentage of white liberals who favor giving preferences to blacks in hiring and promotion and
who feel that the ‘government has a special obligation to improve the living standards of blacks’
grew from 16.6% and 16.8% in 2010 to 41.5% and 50.9% in 2018. But while the number of
white moderates and conservatives who feel that the US spends ‘too little on improving the
conditions of blacks’ increased significantly over this time period, the level of support for the
‘special treatment’ items hardly moved. As we will see, this finding may have important
implications for the measure of racial liberalism that is introduced below.

Figure 4.12 Whites’ racial policy attitudes overtime by ideology
Note. Data are weighted.

4.3

What moves white racial mood?
The data featured in the previous section suggests that the assumed stability of white

racial attitudes is incorrect. Although they may not undergo substantial changes with any
regularity, such changes do periodically occur. The question the remainder of this chapter will
deal with is ‘why’. What is it that moves white racial attitudes in a liberal or ‘woke’ direction?
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The previous chapter proposed that variation in white racial liberalism is a function of the
frequency at which the media discusses black-white inequities in terms of white racism and
racial discrimination. Once again, this proposition is similar to the one advanced by Kellstedt
(2000; 2003), which posited that increases in public support for racially liberal policies follows
from increases in the salience of egalitarian (vs. individualist) value cues in the media’s coverage
of racial issues.
What is novel about my theory is the mechanism through which the media affects racial
attitudes and of the populations that are likely to be most affected. In the case of the former, my
theory argues that increases in such media content increases the salience of group-based,
including group-critical, moral appraisals and considerations. For whites with strong egalitarian
moral commitments, these moral appraisals are likely to be ingroup critical and are thus likely to
trigger feelings of ingroup-focused guilt and shame that inspire pro-outgroup attitudes. This
latter point gets at the second area of divergence: whereas Kellstedt’s theory implies that media
effects are similarly felt across all segments of the American public, my own suggests that, due
in part to their differing orientations to inequality, they will affect the racial attitudes of white
liberals and Democrats the most and white conservatives and Republicans the least.
4.3.1

Measuring Racial Liberalism

In the abstract, tests of the foregoing hypotheses seem straightforward: one need only
examine whether the attitudinal trends reported earlier follow similar trends in racial equalitarian
media. However, we quickly encounter an initial barrier. While media coverage is consistently
present across time (the New York Times doesn’t take holidays), survey questions on race are
not. For instance, the General Social Survey, which launched in 1972, transitioned away from
annual to biennial surveys in the 1990s. Surveys by the American National Elections Study are
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typically conducted even less frequently—every election year or every two years. To make
matters worse, the same surveys questions are not consistently asked across all survey waves.
The General Social Survey, for instance, only started asking about pro-black affirmative action
in 1994. In other cases, survey questions (e.g. attitudes towards racial busing, desegregation)
have been discontinued and only cover a limited time period. Thus, conventional methods for
generating singular aggregate indices of racial attitudes—e.g. standardizing and averaging
responses to disparate items, extracting a dominant factor via factor analysis—confront us with a
missing data problem. To designate one single indicator as our measure of racial liberalism
wouldn’t yield enough datapoints to be practically useful in statistical analysis. To simply
standardize and average multiple time series of attitudes would result in a scale of questionable
reliability, as the nature of the questions asked differ as a function of the racial issues du jour.
To circumvent these missing data issues, I follow Kellstedt’s (2000; 2003) lead in
adopting Stimson’s (2018) dyadic ratios algorithm (DRA) to generate an aggregate index of
racial liberalism. Stimson initially developed this approach for constructing aggregate measures
of public policy liberalism. Its logic is similar to that of a principal component analysis:
individual topic-related items are assumed to share or map onto a common latent construct. But
whereas the input in principal component analysis typically consists of the raw responses to
individual questions in a given sample, the DRA utilizes what are essentially the ratio of ‘liberal’
responses to the sum of liberal and conservative responses 52. This allows for ‘scores’ across
items to be combined and comparable across time.
But given that survey questions on race span multiple theoretically distinct attitudinal
dimensions—from approval of interracial marriage and racial stereotypes to perceptions of

52

A critical assumption here is that policy questions in any issue domain have ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ responses.
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discrimination and support for affirmative action--what items should be included as valid indices
of racial liberalism? The answer depends on one’s operationalization of ‘racial liberalism’.
Kellstedt (2000; 2003) opted for an operationalization that is limited to racial policy preferences.
The resulting index, which he defines as ‘racial policy liberalism’, is thus constructed only from
survey items that are manifestly about racial policy. A potential advantage of this approach is its
clear facial validity: measures of racial policy preferences are used to measure aggregate racial
policy preferences. It is thus easier to envision such items genuinely sharing a common
dimension, which may not be the case if policy-unrelated items (e.g. perceptions of
discrimination) were included. However, given that we are working with annual aggregate data,
a potential downside to this specificity is a considerable loss of information and greater
measurement error.
First, with individual-level cross-sectional data, statistically distinguishing between
different attitudinal dimensions is relatively straightforward. Running a factor analysis on a set of
cross-sectional measures of racial policy preferences and attributions of racial inequality will
conceivably show such items loading onto distinct factors. With aggregated annual data,
however, things get more complicated. For instance, if overtime variation in items tapping
attributions of racial inequality generally coincide with overtime variation in items measuring
racial policy preferences—i.e. when one goes up, so does the other—they are likely to load onto
a common factor even if they constitute discrete attitudinal dimensions. The inherent constraints
of Stimson’s DRA, which allows only for the estimation of up two dimensions, only compounds
this situation. Further, as Kellstedt (2000) notes, even items that measure the same policy area
(e.g. busing, school segregation) as others can load weakly or negatively onto the same factor.
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This is likely to be the case for shorter series constructed from fewer datapoints 53. And this can
pose problems for interpretation: do certain items load onto separate dimensions because they are
distinct or is their weak relationship with a theoretically predicted common dimension the result
of sampling error?
Thus, while greater specificity should, in theory, improve measurement validity, both the
aggregated structure of the data and the built-in limitations of the DRA do not allow one to easily
infer that this is indeed the case. And a researcher has to weigh this uncertainty against the
greater certainty of this approach’s attendant costs. For instance, if in certain years measures of
perceived discrimination and attributions of inequality are more abundant than measures of racial
policy preferences, limiting ourselves to the latter can result in ‘noisier’ estimates for certain
years. And if all these measures do indeed covary, we are effectively sacrificing information for
little to no gain.
Taking this tradeoff into account, I attempt to strike a balance with an operationalization
of racial liberalism that is broader than mere policy preferences, but which still retains internal
coherence. Specifically, and as illustrated in Table 4.1 below, my criteria for item inclusion
generally adheres to my earlier characterization of the ‘Great Awokening’. Accordingly, items
asking about attributions of racial inequality, perceptions of discrimination, racial advantage, and
support for ‘hierarchy-attenuating’ racial policies are all eligible for inclusion. On the other hand,
items measuring explicit anti-black prejudice (‘would you vote for a black president?’), racial
stereotypes, and feelings towards blacks are excluded. This decision is both a theoretical and
empirical one. First, compared to the items that meet the inclusion criteria, such items evoke
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Stimson’s DRA requires that individual series consist of at least three different datapoints. Series that minimally
satisfy this requirement are much more vulnerable to sampling error. As a skewed sample at one datapoint can have
a significant effect on a series’ correlation with the composite series.
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stronger social desirability pressures. With few exceptions, the series for these items exhibit clear
linear or deterministic (and typically downward) trends 54. This has generated debate in the social
sciences over whether the American public is genuinely becoming less prejudiced or whether
respondents are simply more conscious of egalitarian norms and thus avoid giving responses that
can be perceived as ‘racist’.

Table 4.1 Item selection criteria with examples
Selection
Criteria
Does the item ask
about the degree
or severity of
discrimination or
racism against
blacks?

Does the item ask
about attributions
of black-white
inequality?

54

Example Item #1

Example Item #2

Example Item #3

Example Item #4

How big a problem
is racism in our
society today? Is it
a big problem,
somewhat of a
problem, a small
problem, or not a
problem at all?

How serious a
problem do you
think racial
discrimination
against blacks is in
this country--a
very serious
problem, a
somewhat serious
problem, not too
serious, or not at
all serious?

Just your impression,
in the United States
today, is there a lot
of discrimination
against Blacks, or
not?

Next, we'd like to know
how widespread you
believe the problem of
racism is against blacks
among police officers
in this country. Would
you say it is very
common, fairly
common, fairly rare, or
very rare?

Source: ABC
News/Washington
Post
(N=7)

Source: Pew
Research Center
(N=8)

Source: CNN/ORC
(N=4)

Generations of
slavery and
discrimination have
created conditions
that make it
difficult for blacks
to work their way
out of the lower
class

(Please choose the
statement that
comes closer to
your own views-even if neither is
exactly
right.)...Racial
discrimination is
the main reason
why many black
people can't get
ahead these days,
blacks who can't
get ahead in this
country are mostly
responsible for
their own condition

Source: Public
Religion Research
Institute, Pew
Research Center
(N=7)
On the average
(Negroes/Blacks/Afr
ican-Americans)
have worse jobs,
income, and housing
than white people.
Do you think these
differences are
mainly due to
….discrimination?

(For each of the
following statements
please tell me whether
you tend to agree or
disagree with it, or if
perhaps you have no
opinion about the
statement.)... Black
people are not
achieving equality as
fast as they could
because many whites
don't want them to get
ahead

Admittedly, the same critique can be levelled at some of the items that did meet my criteria for inclusion. But the
issue is one of degree.
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Does the item ask
about perceptions
of white
advantage and/or
black
disadvantage?

Does the item ask
about attitudes
towards
‘hierarchy
attenuating’ racial
policies?

Source: ANES
(N=16)

Source: Pew
Research Center
(N=16)

Source: General
Social Survey
(N=23)

Source: ABC
News/Washington Post
(N=5)

In general, who do
you think has a
better chance of
getting ahead in
today's society-white people, black
people, or do white
people and black
people have about
an equal chance of
getting ahead?

Now, read each
statement and
please say if you
completely agree,
mostly agree,
mostly disagree or
completely
disagree with each
one.)...Blacks and
other minorities
receive equal
treatment as whites
in the criminal
justice system

In general, do you
think that Black
people have as good
a chance as white
people in your
community to get
any kind of job for
which they are
qualified, or don’t
you think they have
as good a chance?

Do you agree or
disagree with the
following statements?
White people in the
U.S. have certain
advantages because of
the color of their skin.

Source: CBS/New
York Times
(N=9)

Source: Public
Religion Research
Institute,
ABC/Washington
Post
(N=10)
We should make
every possible
effort to improve
the position of
blacks and other
minorities, even if
it means giving
them preferential
treatment

Source: Gallup,
CNN/ORC
(N=17)

Source: CCES
(N=4)

As I read some pairs
of statements, please
tell me whether the
first statement or the
second statement
comes closer to your
own views -- even if
neither is exactly
right.)...Our country
has made the
changes needed to
give blacks equal
rights with whites,
our country needs to
continue making
changes to give
blacks equal rights
with whites

Some people feel that
the government in
Washington should
make every possible
effort to improve the
social and economic
position of blacks and
other minority groups.
Others feel that the
government should not
make any special effort
to help minorities
because they should
help themselves. Where
would you place
yourself on this scale,
or haven't you thought
much about it?

Source: Pew
Research Center
(N=8)

Source: ANES
(N=20)

Some people say
that because of past
discrimination,
blacks should be
given preference in
hiring and
promotion. Others
say that such
preference in hiring
and promotion of
blacks is wrong
because it
discriminates
against whites.
What about your
opinion -- are you
for or against
preferential hiring
and promotion of
blacks?

Source: General
Social Survey
(N=13)

Source: Pew
Research Center
(N=15)
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I thus avoid these complications by sticking to items whose non-liberal response categories are
less socially taboo. Second, the response categories for some of these items do not readily lend
themselves to clear ideological demarcation 55. For instance, given a 7-point measure of
perceived black criminality or intelligence, at which level(s) does a ‘conservative’ response end
and a ‘liberal’ response begin? The same question besets the inclusion of 0-100 racial group
feeling thermometers: is a ‘conservative’ response a 60 and below? A 50 and below? There are
no obvious answers.
Overall, and with the help of the Roper Center for Public Opinion’s data archive, I
identified 90 different questions across 66 years (1954-2020) that both meet the criteria outlined
above and which were asked at 3 or more different time points. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the largest (and longest) aggregate index of racial attitudes ever assembled 56. Figure 4.13
shows the number of survey items per year from which the indexes were calculated across the
1954-2020 period.

Figure 4.13 Number of survey items per year by racial liberalism index
55

And because these trends are deterministic, they are likely to be less responsive or moved by exogenous ‘shocks’,
such as a high-profile police shooting.
56
To contrast, Kellstedt’s index is limited to just 19 items spanning the years 1950-1993.
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Before introducing the index itself, several things should be noted. First, no items could
be found for two of the years (1969, 1979) under study. The DRA thus estimates their respective
racial liberalism scores using the liberal-conservative response ratios of adjacent years 57. Second,
some indexes (e.g. sample, white) are comprised of more items than others (e.g. white x party,
white x ideology). In some cases, this is because only cross-tabs of responses—rather than the
complete dataset—were accessible via Roper’s data archive. In other cases, it is because standard
measures of ideological self-placement were not consistently administered until the 1970s. And
in still other cases, party affiliation was asked in lieu of ideology. Third, in some cases, the same
questions were asked by different surveys. For instance, the American National Elections Study
(ANES), General Social Survey (GSS), Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), and
Public Religion Research Institute have all fielded at least one of the items comprising the
standard 4-item ‘racial resentment’ battery across 3 or more time points (some of which overlap).
One solution is to pool these surveys and create singular series for each item. This, however, can
be risky if different survey organizations employ differing sampling methodologies or recruit
different samples. Thus, in such cases, and with a few exceptions 58, I opted to treat the items as
independent series. In the above example, this means separate series for each of the listed survey
organizations.
Some coding clarifications are also in order. Recall that the DRA works off the ratio of
‘liberal’ to the sum of ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ responses. Many of the included items (e.g.

57

Specifically, and to give an example, the estimate for 1969 is interpolated from the change (or lack thereof) in the
response ratio between 1968 and 1970.
58
In a small subset of these cases, the questions were never asked at more than two timepoints by the same survey.
That is, one survey organization may have only asked it in 1980, whereas another asked it in 1984 and again in
1988. As Stimson’s DRA requires that each series consist of 3 or more datapoints, I’m left with the option of either
omitting or pooling these data and treating them as a singular series. Because such instances were infrequent, and
because the total volume of included items should mitigate the bias of any sampling discordance, I opted for the
latter approach. Just to be sure, though, I also estimated the composite indexes both with and without the pooled
survey items. In the end, their inclusion did not meaningfully change the DRA estimates.
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‘Are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?’) do indeed have clear
‘conservative’ (‘opposed’) and ‘liberal’ (‘favor’) responses. For some items, though, the
ideological lines are less obvious. For instance, one item reads: “How much discrimination is
there in the US today against [Blacks]?”. The response categories are ‘A lot, ‘Some’, ‘Only a
little’, or ‘None at all’. In this case, it is not obvious which we should code as the ‘liberal’ and
‘conservative’ responses. However, two considerations come to mind. First, only a minority of
respondents in any given year fall into the bottom two categories; that is, overwhelming
majorities of respondents consistently acknowledge or perceive at least ‘some’ discrimination
against black (with ‘some’ being the modal response). To code the ‘Only a little’ and ‘None at
all’ categories as ‘conservative’ and ‘Some’ and ‘A lot’ as liberal some’ and ‘a lot’ categories as
‘liberal’ could be a problem to the extent that the ratios fed into Stimson’s DRA are less stable
when the numbers are lopsided or heavily skewed in one direction. An alternative, which I adopt,
is to treat the ‘a lot’ category as the ‘liberal’ and the remaining response categories as the
‘conservative’ response. In addition to yielding a less lopsided ratio, this approach also makes
theoretical sense. It comports both with part of my conceptualization of ‘woke’ racial attitudes as
well as with literature suggesting that perceptions of discrimination are ideologically
motivated 59. But if the reader is skeptical of this decision, it should be noted that it is not a very
consequential one. Ultimately, so long as some shift in the ratio of responses is detected, it will
be reflected (with some or varying degrees of error) in the DRA’s index estimation (Stimson,
2018).

59

In the first case, one component of what I characterize as ‘woke’ racial attitudes is a belief—rightly or wrongly-in the pervasiveness of racial discrimination in American society. This is arguably better captured by the ‘A lot’ than
‘Some’ category. In the second case, due to their differing orientations to inequality and distributive justice,
conservatives are inclined to downplay the extent of discrimination, whereas liberals are inclined to magnify it.
Accordingly, a typical conservative response can be expected to fall below the ‘A lot’ category (i.e. anywhere short
of acknowledging widespread discrimination), while a typical liberal response can be expected to above the ‘only a
little’ category.
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Table 4.2 shows the DRA estimation statistics for the racial liberalism indexes of
different group categories 60. For the sample as a whole (i.e. all respondents irrespective of race,
party, and ideology), the first dimension of the racial liberalism index accounts for 52.1% of all
the variance in the ratios of 90 time series. The mean and median series loadings on the first
dimension were 0.563 and 0.742, respectively. By comparison, the same figures for Kellstedt’s
(2000) index were 0.546 (mean) and 0.606 (median). Figure 4.14 compares Kellstedt’s samplelevel racial policy liberalism index to my own sample-level racial liberalism index. Though his
covers a shorter time period, the two are nonetheless highly correlated (r=0.76). My own racial
liberalism index thus appears to have reliability; and, assuming Kellstedt’s index is construct
valid, reasonable validity as well.
Table 4.2 Summary statistics for differential racial liberalism indexes
Time
Coverage

1954-2020

1972-2020

NonNonWhite
White White White
Sample White White
White
Dem.
Repub. Lib. Con.
Dem.
1st
52.1% 51.4% 46.2% 65.7% 43.9%
Dimension
2nd
18.2% 20.3% 16.7% 16.5% 17.1%
Dimension
Mean 1st
Dim.
0.563 0.548 0.447 0.665 0.377
Loading
Median 1st
Dim.
0.742 0.730 0.665 0.870 0.581
Loading
Number of
series

90

83

81

41.7% 63.9% 39%
19.1% 14.2% 20.5%
0.298

0.684 0.242

0.576

0.849 0.496

72

Interestingly, the estimates for the white Democrats and white liberal indexes are most
impactful, with the first dimension accounting for just under 66% of the variance in the former

60

A complete list of all the items and their loadings for each series can be found in Appendix A.1.
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and just under 64% in the latter 61. By comparison, those for the white Republicans and
conservatives are much weaker, with the first dimension accounting for just under 42% in the
former and 39% in the latter. One can also see that constituent items tended to load much more
strongly for white Democrats and liberals than for their Republican and conservative
counterparts. In fact, the estimates for the latter subgroups fall well short of those of the sample
as a whole. They are more comparable to those of the non-white groups than they are to those of
white Democrats and liberals 62. The reason for these differences is not immediately clear, though
it suggests that the racial attitudes of white Democrats and liberals are much more coherent than
those of other groups. I return to this question in the chapter discussion.
My generation of different racial liberalism indices for different population subgroups
begs the question: is it even necessary or worthwhile? Despite my theoretical rationale, the
‘parallel publics’ view would suggest not. Kellstedt (2003), for his part, argues that “lumping
black and white respondents together is easily justifiable”; and that it would actually be “more

61
It should be noted that the indexes for the partisan and ideological subgroups were constructed from the responses
of those who self-identified as white or non-white (see below) and either democrat/liberal or
republican/conservative. Depending on the survey, this could mean respondents had to choose from one of three
ideological response categories (liberal, moderate, conservative) or, in other cases, rate their degree of ideological
self-identification along 5 or 7-point Likert scales (e.g. 1=Very liberal, 7=Very conservative). In the latter case,
responses were collapsed to a 3 category scale (i.e. ‘Somewhat liberals’ were coded together with ‘very liberals’).
The index for whites is slightly more complicated. Survey questionnaires in earlier decades (1960s) typically
measured ‘race’ with 3-category items (e.g. white, black, other). As the Hispanic population started to grow, surveys
added a separate item that asked whether the respondent was of Hispanic ethnicity. As my interest is in the attitudes
of whites of European ancestry, including white Hispanics in my operationalization of ‘white’ could pose problems
if the racial attitudes of the two groups meaningfully differ. For instance, increases in white racial liberalism could
reflect increases in the size of the white-Hispanic population and/or an increased propensity among Hispanics to
identify as white. Accordingly, and because Hispanics could have constituted only a tiny share of those placing in
the ‘white’ category in earlier surveys, the responses comprising the white index are limited to those who selfidentified as ‘white’ in surveys spanning the 1950s-1960s, and those who self-identified as ‘white’ while reporting
no Hispanic ancestry in later years. The ‘non-white’ index consists of respondents who did not meet any of the
foregoing criteria. If the interest here was in understanding the dynamics of non-white racial attitudes, this approach
would be very problematic, as it fails to account for the steady overtime shift in the composition of the non-white
population. But in the current project, non-whites are included only as a rough comparison group. Even so, I attempt
to statistically control for this demographic change where necessary to improve the reliability of estimates.
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difficult to justify separating blacks and whites, for little support for such a procedure can be
found in the data” (p.75). In the current study, not only am I disaggregating the public by race,
but by partisanship and ideology as well. While there will certainly be absolute differences in the
racial liberalism scores of these differing populations, the question is whether they move in the
same direction by similar amounts at the same time. If the answer is ‘yes’, then there would be
little sense in statistical differentiation.

Figure 4.14 Comparison of author’s racial liberalism index and Kellstedt’s (2000, 2003) racial policy
liberalism index (1958-1993)

In the end, the data tells a more complicated story—one of ‘imperfectly parallel publics’.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present the intercorrelations between the raw and first-differenced racial
liberalism indices for different populations and political subgroups, respectively. Beginning with
the former, several interesting observations can be made. First, compared to non-whites (whose
coefficient falls just short of conventional levels of significance), we see that variation in white
racial liberalism is much more strongly correlated with variation in sample racial liberalism. To
some extent, this is unsurprising. For decades, whites constituted overwhelming majorities of
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survey respondents. The non-white indices were thus generated from much smaller samples,
which would increase random errors associated with sampling fluctuation. Table 4.4 also shows
that the first-differences of the non-white (and white; r=0.704, p < 0.001) series do significantly
and positively correlate (r=0.390, p=0.001) with those of the sample as a whole. This suggests
that year-to-year changes in racial attitudes among respondents as a whole do coincide with
changes among both whites and non-whites. And, indeed, the changes across the two groups are
significantly positively correlated (r=0.354, p=0.004). But by far the most surprising finding is
that, while correlated in levels of the data (r=0.707, p < 0.001), year-to-year changes in the series
of non-white Democrats (r=0.193, p=0.120) are not significantly related to those in the series of
their white counterparts. The former are, however, significantly related to those of white
Republicans (r=0.290, p=0.018) and conservatives (r=0.408, p=0.004).
Table 4.3 Intercorrelations between racial liberalism indexes
Mean

1. Sample

2. White

3. NonWhite

SD

N

5.58 0.100

7

1.82 0.320

7

9.66 0.840

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0.968***

0.220†

0.153

4. White
0.920*** 0.942*** 0.081
Dem.
2.70 0.290 7
5. White
0.864*** 0.891*** 0.061 0.955***
Lib.
8.12 0.650 9
6. Non0.790*** 0.764*** 0.400*** 0.707*** 0.526***
White Dem. 0.23 0.590 7
7. White
0.604*** 0.606*** 0.006 0.489*** 0.167 0.764***
Repub. 3.97 0.460 7
8. White
0.198
0.129
0.569*** -0.095
-0.068 0.473*** 0.726***
Con.
9.70 0.610 9
Note. †p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table 4.4 Intercorrelations of year-to-year changes between racial liberalism indexes
Mean
1. Sample
2. White
3. NonWhite

SD

N

0.461 0.320

6

0.481 0.620

6

0.116 0.260

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0.704***
0.390**

0.354**

4. White
0.525*** 0.714*** 0.269*
Dem.
0.661 0.800 6
5. White
0.466*** 0.437**
0.142
0.679***
Lib.
0.465 0.160 8
6. NonWhite
0.407*** 0.301* 0.715*** 0.193
0.067
0.318 0.770 6
Dem.
7. White
0.236†
0.167
0.171
-0.123 0.074 0.290*
Repub. 0.286 0.100 6
8. White
0.407** 0.291*
0.365*
0.241† 0.235 0.408** 0.621***
Con.
0.119 0.620 8
Note. †p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Upon first examination, it is not clear what to make of these findings. One potential clue
is found in the differing average variances and year-to-year changes between the different series.
The second and third columns of Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show that the white Democrats and liberal
series exhibit both higher degrees of average variance and year-to-year change than any other
group-level series. Once again, the same statistics for the non-white Democrats and liberal series
more resemble those of white Republicans and conservatives than those of white Democrats and
liberals. In other words, despite the large absolute gaps between them, the attitudinal dynamics
of the former are more in sync with each other than they are with white Democrats and liberals.
Thus, racial attitudes may show parallel movement across most segments of the population, but
this pattern somewhat diverges for white Democrats and liberals.
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Tables 4.3 and 4.4 also show that variation in racial liberalism among whites as a whole
is more strongly correlated with that of white liberals (r=0.89) and Democrats (r=0.94) than that
of white conservatives (0.13) and Republicans (0.61). The same holds when we look at the
correlations between the first-differences of these series: white Democrats (r=0.714, p < 0.001)
and liberals (r=0.437, p=0.002) correlate much more strongly with whites as a whole than do
white Republicans (r=0.167, p=0.180) and conservatives (r=0.291, p=0.045). This could suggest
that shifts in white racial attitudes are disproportionately driven by the former, which would
accord with the expectation that those of the latter are less responsive to shifts in the media
environment.
Figures 4.15 and 4.16 below, which graph the racialism liberalism scores across time for
the different subgroups, offer visual insight into some of the patterns reported above. It also
affords a clearer picture of what some have termed the ‘Great Awokening’. First, with some fits
and starts, we see that nearly all of the listed subgroups trended in a racially liberal direction
from the mid-1970s into the mid-1990s. At around the latter point, the trend appears to stabilize
for white Democrats and liberals while reversing in the conservative direction for the non-white
groups, white Republicans and white conservatives. These patterns more or less persist until
2014, a year marked by a series of widely publicized police shootings, racial unrest, and BLM
protests. Up to this point in time, white Democrats never scored less than 10 points lower on the
index than non-white Democrats. And, with a few exceptions, white liberals never surpassed the
scores of their non-white counterparts. But in 2014, the slopes of the line for both white
Democrats and liberals (and, though less clearly, for Republicans and conservatives) suddenly
shifts in the upward direction. Interestingly, it was not until the following year (2015) that nonwhite Democrats followed suit. Taken together, as non-white Democrats and white Republicans
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and conservatives trended together in a racially conservative direction, the racial attitudes of
white Democrats and liberals held steady. This, together with their somewhat sharper rate of
ascent in subsequent years, allowed white Democrats to close nearly the entirety of the gap with
non-white Democrats; and for white liberals to surpass and subsequently remain above the racial
liberalism of non-white liberals. What accounts for the apparent divergence of white Democrats
and liberals from other groups is not immediately obvious. For now, it suffices to demonstrate
that the series are ‘imperfectly parallel’, which offers some justification for their differentiation.

Figure 4.15 Racial liberalism overtime among the public as a whole and for race x partisan subgroups (19542020)
Note. Colored lines along the y-axis represent the median for each respective group series. The percent of variance
accounted for by each group index’s first dimension is in parentheses.

The question of ‘parallel publics’ aside, Figures 14 and 15 also suggest that the post-2013
era saw both the largest and quickest shift in racial attitudes on record. What is more, this
upward trajectory continued through the end of the series. By 2020, white Democrats and liberals
placed 24 and 26 points above their series medians, respectively; and, on the other side of the
political aisle, white Republicans and conservatives placed 6 and 1 point(s) above their own. In
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other words, on net, the attitudes of the latter groups have hardly moved, whereas those of the
former have become unprecedently progressive—so much so that they now ‘compete’ with their
non-white counterparts.

Figure 4.16 Racial liberalism overtime among the public as a whole and among white liberals and
conservatives (1972-2020).
Note. Colored lines along the y-axis represent the median for each respective group series. The percent of variance
accounted for by each group index’s first dimension is in parentheses.

But while the ‘Great Awokening’ may constitute the largest and quickest shift in racial
attitudes in the current data, there have clearly been ‘mini Awokenings’ scattered across earlier
periods in time. The question before us is whether and to what extent the media has driven this
variation. Towards arriving at an answer, the following section introduces my measure of ‘racial
equalitarian media’ coverage.
4.3.2

Measuring ‘Racial Equalitarian’ Media Messaging

In the previous chapter, I identified ‘racial equalitarian’ media as a theoretically likely
trigger of ingroup critical appraisals and emotions among white Americans. Such media was
characterized as that which (a) highlights status differences between black and whites
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Americans, and (b) implicitly or explicitly attributes these differences to the effects of past
and/or present white racism. More generally, messaging that elicits feelings of white guilt and
shame should explicitly or implicitly speak to the illegitimacy of racial inequality and the
advantages that whites unfairly enjoy therefrom.
When compared to the racial liberalism index, constructing a measure of the frequency at
which media coverage touches on the above themes is far less exacting. The first hurdle is
identifying a news archive from which to gather the data. I have opted to use ProQuest, which
stores articles from a diverse array of news publications. I am limited to those whose content
availability spans the temporal duration of the racial liberalism series. The largest, if only,
publication that satisfies this requirement is the New York Times (NYT). As the NYT is
sometimes considered to be a left-of-center newspaper, this raises potential questions of
coverage representativeness; that is, the NYT’s readership is disproportionately comprised of
those on one side of the political spectrum. However, as one of America’s largest national
newspapers, its issue coverage at any given time is likely to be moderately to highly correlated
with that of other publications. Kellstedt, for instance, found that his measure of egalitarian cues
in Newsweek correlated at r=0.58 with another derived from the New York Times. Other
research has established even stronger correlations between the issue coverage of the NYT and
that of other newspapers (e.g. Baumgartner et al. 2008; Barabas & Jerit, 2009). Thus, we can be
somewhat comfortable in treating the NYT as a rough bellwether or proxy of the news agenda as
a whole. But just to be sure, I will generate the same index for other news publications and assess
the strength of their relationship with the NYT.
Table 4.5 details how the articles comprising my index of ‘racial equalitarian’ media
coverage were selected. Specifically, each of the articles tallied by my index had to include one
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term (or variants thereof) from each of the four columns: they had to mention a term relating to
blacks or race, a term relating to whites, a term relating to disparate outcomes, and, finally, a
term relating to some form of (historical and/or persisting) mistreatment. Because it is possible
that racial attitudes respond to any media coverage of race, I additionally create index of the
volume number of NYT articles that either mentioned at least one of the terms in column 3. This
will ultimately serve as a control variable for testing whether racial attitudes are indeed uniquely
responsive to the themes discussed.
Table 4.5 Search terms for ‘racial equalitarian’ and race-related articles
ProQuest Search Terms (1954-2020)
Index
Racial
Equalitarian
Media

Race-related
media

Num. of
Articles
9557

625518

Black OR
African
American(s) OR
Negro OR Racial

AND

AND

AND

White

disparity OR gap OR
inequity OR inequality OR
underrepresented OR
overrepresented OR
disproportionate OR “more
likely” OR “less likely”
OR “as likely”

racism OR
racist(s) OR bias
OR discrimination
OR prejudice OR
injustice OR
oppression OR
slavery OR
enslave OR
marginalized

Black OR
African
American(s) OR
Negro OR Racial

Table 4.6 gives several randomly selected excerpted examples of ‘racial equalitarian’
news articles included in the index. For instance, a 2004 article titled ‘Study Says White Families
Wealth Advantage Has Grown’ begins by noting the findings of a recent study, which suggested
that the wealth gap between white and black (and Hispanic) families had become even larger as a
consequence of recent economic recession. It then quotes a researcher who attributes this gap to
a “history of discrimination”. Similarly, a 2015 article titled ‘Racial Penalties in Baltimore
Mortgages’ cites a study indicating that black borrowers were charged higher rates than similarly
situated whites, which is taken as evidence that “whiteness still confers ‘concrete advantages in
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the accumulation of wealth’”. Consistent with my operationalization of ‘racial equalitarian’
messaging, all of these examples foreground and problematize status differences between whites
and blacks while implicitly or explicitly attributing them to the effects of past and/or present
discrimination.
Table 4.6 Sample of excerpted ‘racial equalitarian’ news articles in the New York Times
Study Says White
Families' Wealth
Advantage Has Grown
October 18, 2004

Racial Penalties in
Baltimore Mortgages
May 31, 2015

In Treating Patients
for Pain, a Racial Gap
December 28, 1999

Health Insurance
Gaps Laid to Racial
Bias
May 14, 1991

The enormous
wealth gap between white
families and black and
Hispanic families grew
larger after the most recent
recession, a private
analysis of government
data has found.

…It found
that black borrowers in
Baltimore, especially those
who lived
in black neighborhoods,
were charged higher rates
and were disadvantaged at
every point in the
borrowing process
compared with similarly
situated whites.

Black patients with
broken arms or legs
were less likely to be
given painkillers in an
Atlanta emergency
room than white
patients with similar
injuries and complaints
of pain, a new study has
found.

The editor of a medical
journal said today that
longstanding racial
discrimination was one
reason black and
Hispanic people were
slipping through everwidening cracks of the
nation's health care
system.

…White households had a
median net worth of
greater than $88,000 in
2002, 11 times that of
Hispanic households and
more than 14 times that
of black households, the
Pew Hispanic Center said
in the study, being released
Monday.
…''Wealth is a measure of
cumulative advantage or
disadvantage,'' said
Roderick Harrison, a
researcher at the Joint
Center for Political and
Economic Studies, a
Washington research
organization that focuses
on black issues. ''The fact
that black and Hispanic
wealth is a fraction
of white wealth also
reflects a history
of discrimination.''

…Had black borrowers
been treated the same
as white borrowers, the
authors say, their loan
default rate would have
been considerably lower.
Instead, discrimination ha
rmed individuals and
entire neighborhoods.
…Over the life of a 30year loan, the researchers
say,these racial disparities
would cost the
average black borrower an
extra $14,904 -- and
$15,948 for the
average black borrower
living in
a black neighborhood -- as
compared
with white borrowers.
…As the study notes, these
facts show that whiteness
still confers "concrete
advantages in the

…Dr. Lewis R.
Goldfrank, the director
of emergency services at
Bellevue Hospital
Center in Manhattan,
said the results spoke
for themselves. ''I think
it's racism, flat out,'' he
said. ''This is a critical
issue for emergency
medicine and medicine
in general. How can we
say that we have the
best medical care in the
world and at the same
time not be able to
assure everyone -- with
confidence -- that they'll
get the same treatment
as the next person,
regardless of their skin
color? This is a wake-up
call to our inability to
understand the needs of
diverse groups of people
in our society.''

Inequity in access to
health care in the
United States, he said,
is due in part to
"longstanding,
systematic,
institutionalized racial
discrimination.”
Black and Hispanic
people have higher
rates of unemployment
than whites, and more
often have low-level
jobs. So, Dr. Lundberg
said, they have less
employment-related
health insurance and
are less likely to receive
medical care.
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accumulation of wealth
through homeownership"
and that
pervasive racial disadvanta
ge continues to
"undermine black socioeco
nomic status in the United
States today."

Note. Text in bold font denotes ‘racial equalitarian’ search terms.

Due to the fact that volume of annual NYT articles available in ProQuest varies across
time, we cannot just use indexes of the raw annual counts. Instead, we must use normalized
indexes that are insensitive to such variation. Two normalization approaches are possible. The
first is to divide the annual raw article counts by the total annual number of available articles.
The second is to divide the annual raw article counts by the total annual number of available
articles that refer to race. In the end, and after comparing the indexes derived from each of these
methods, I find that the latter (i.e., racial equalitarian articles as the percent of all race-related
articles) is somewhat more strongly associated with each of the racial liberalism series than the
former. On these grounds, I measure the salience of racial equalitarian media in terms of its share
of all race-related article, and ‘race-related media’ in terms of the percent of all annual NYT
articles that mention either ‘black(s)’, ‘African American(s)’, ‘Negro(es)’, and/or ‘racial’.
Figure 4.17 shows the percent of NYT articles that meet the ‘racial equalitarian’ search
criteria between 1953-2020 and 1953-2015. I opted to graph both the complete and truncated
series so as to underscore the variation that is obscured in the former. The obscuring of this
variation is largely the result of unprecedented increases in the frequency of such media coverage
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towards the final years of the series—a period spanning the first Trump administration and the
2020 killing of George Floyd. Consider that until 2013, the percent of annual NYT articles
matching the search criteria was never above 0.2%. This ceiling was finally altered in 2013
(0.26%) and has grown in every year since. By 2019, the racial equalitarian share reached 1.1%
of all articles before more than doubling in 2020 (2.4%). A glance at Figure 4.18 might suggest
that these record-setting increases are simply a biproduct of record levels of coverage on race in
general. But Figure 4.19 shows that this is not the case: the volume of racial equalitarian articles
has reached record levels even when measured as the percent of all race-related articles.

Figure 4.17 ‘Racial equalitarian’ articles as the percent of all New York Times articles
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Figure 4.18 Race-related articles as the percent of all New York Times articles
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Figure 4.19 ‘Racial equalitarian’ articles as the percent of all race-related articles in The New York Times

But are the trends in the NYT data representative of those media coverage at large? I
attempt to get at this question by examining the relationships between the NYT racial
equalitarian media index and versions constructed from articles featured in ProQuest’s Los
Angeles Times (LAT) and Wall Street Journal (WSJ) archives, respectively. While data for the
latter two series are only available beginning in 1985 and 1984, respectively, Table 4.7 shows
strong in-levels (i.e., not first-differenced) and first-differenced correlations between them and
that of the NYT index. In other words, increases in racial equalitarian messaging in the NYT
usually coincides with similar increases in the LAT and WSJ. We can thus tentatively conclude
that the trends in the NYT data are not ‘unique’ but rather reflect genuine shifts in the national
media agenda.
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Table 4.7 LAT and WSJ Correlations with NYT ‘Racial Equalitarian’ Articles Indexes

Publication

N

In levels

Firstdifference

‘Racial Equalitarian’
articles as percent of
all race-related
articles
FirstIn levels
difference

LAT (19852020)

36

0.977***

0.959***

0.968***

‘Racial Equalitarian’
articles as percent of
all articles

WSJ (198437 0.983*** 0.945*** 0.849***
2020)
Note. †p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

0.898***
0.742***

As a final check, I compare my tally of annual racial equalitarian articles in the New
York Times with a close approximation 63 of Kellstedt’s (2003) tally of the annual number of
race-related Newsweek articles that featured at least one reference to egalitarian considerations
and values. Because articles related to racial discrimination and inequality feature prominently in
both indexes, we would expect to observe at least some meaningful overlap in their time series.
And, referring to Figure 19 below, we indeed do. The two series are moderately but significantly
correlated both in levels of the data (r=0.461, p=0.002) and at their first differences (r=0.445,
p=0.004). Accordingly, we can be confident that my index of racial equalitarian articles is
capturing meaningful trends in race-related media coverage.

63

Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain the raw data directly from the author. Instead, using an open-source tool
called WebPlotDigitizer, I extracted the data from a screenshot of Kellstedt’s (2003) chart of the annual number of
articles containing egalitarian cues (pg. 38). While the extracted count is unlikely to perfectly match the original
count, it is nonetheless a very close approximation.
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Figure 4.20 Comparison of Kellstedt’s tally of Newsweek ‘egalitarian cues’ with author’s count of racial
equalitarian articles in The New York Times (1953-1994).

4.3.3

White Racial Liberalism vs. Racial Equalitarian Media Messaging: A
Comparison of Trends

Having introduced the racial liberalism and racial equalitarian media scales, the two
series will now be visually compared. Figure 4.21 does this with the white index. The two series
do appear to be strongly correlated. Of course, any two series that share an overtime trend will be
strongly but often spuriously correlated. Figure 4.22 thus graphs the first-differences of each
series. While not as readily discernable with the naked eye, we do see some evidence of a
genuine (though not necessarily causal) relationship. Generally speaking, when the racial
equalitarian share of race-related articles increases, so does white racial liberalism.
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Figure 4.21 White racial liberalism and the salience of racial equalitarian media across time

Figure 4.22 Year-to-year changes in white racial liberalism and the salience of racial equalitarian media
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Table 4.8 displays the Pearson correlation coefficients between the racial equalitarian
media index and each racial liberalism series. In levels of the data, we see that the former is
strongly correlated with (in order of magnitude) the racial liberalism series of white Democrats,
white liberals, whites as a whole, the sample as a whole, and non-white Democrats. In contrast, it
is correlated more weakly but still positively with the white republican series, weakly negatively
with the white conservative series, and insignificantly negatively with the non-white series. The
more rigorous test, though, is in the ‘First-difference’ column. Here we see that only year-to-year
changes in the racial liberalism series for the sample (p=0.060), whites (p=0.013), white
Democrats (p=0.043), and white liberals (p=0.088) are at least marginally significantly (p < 0.1)
correlated with year-to-year changes in racial equalitarian media coverage. Such could be
interpreted as preliminary support for H7B, which predicted that the racial attitudes of white
Democrats and liberals would be more responsive to shifts in the frequency of racial equalitarian
media than their Republican and conservative counterparts.

Table 4.8 Correlations between racial liberalism and racial equalitarian media series
Racial Liberalism

N

Sample

66

In levels

Firstdifference
0.234†

0.755***
White
0.778***
0.305*
Non-White
-0.058
0.069
White Democrat
0.847***
0.252*
Non-White Democrat
0.609***
0.098
White Republican
0.342**
-0.008
White Liberal
49 0.818***
0.251†
White Conservative
-0.294*
0.189
Note. †p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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4.4

Control Variables
If it can be established that shifts in racial attitudes follow shifts in the availability of

racial equalitarian media messaging, the question then becomes whether this relationship is
genuine or confounded by other variables. There are several theoretically plausible confounds,
some of which were identified and tested in Kellstedt (2000, 2003). But even assuming the
media independently influences racial attitudes, another question is how this influence compares
to that of other attitudinally-relevant variables. The sections that follow review the covariates
that will join our models of racial liberalism.
4.4.1

Non-Racial Policy Liberalism

What if increases in racial liberalism are epiphenomenal to a more general shift in public
policy liberalism? In other words, because liberal racial policies entail greater government
intervention on matters of race, increased support for such policies may simply reflect greater
public acceptance of government intervention in general. In fact, Stimson’s (2018) index of
aggregate public policy mood includes several items that measure support for pro-black
affirmative action and race-targeted government assistance. It is thus important that we include a
measure of general public policy liberalism, without racial policy items, as a control variable.
One way of doing so is to simply recompute Stimson’s publicly available Policy Mood index
while excluding race-related items. The problem is that the underlying data is at the sample level;
i.e. item response ratios are not disaggregated by race or political orientation. We would thus be
regressing each group-specific racial liberalism series on a group-general policy liberalism
variable, which—unless the latter is group-invariant across time—could bias our results.
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A better and more consistent solution, which I have opted to pursue, is to turn to some of
Stimson’s original data sources and generate group-specific policy mood variables. Specifically,
using data from the General Social Survey (1972-2018), American National Elections Study
(1956-2016), Pew American Values Survey (1987-2012), Cooperative Congressional Election
Study (2014-2019), and the Democracy Fund’s Voter Study Group (2011-2019), I create
corresponding general policy mood series for each group racial liberalism series. Constituent
items include preferred levels of government spending across the universe of non-racial policy
domains; general preferences over the extent of government services; attitudes towards the
government’s responsibility for reducing income inequality, guaranteeing jobs, and caring for the
needy; and general preferences about the size and scope of the federal government 64.
Figure 4.23 compares the resulting non-racial policy liberalism index for the sample
series to Stimson’s estimates of Public Policy Mood. Overall, and despite the former’s use of
different data sources, the two series appear to show a reasonable level of correspondence
(r=0.663, p < 0.001; r first difference=0.397, p=0.001). Figure 4.24 adds the non-racial policy
liberalism series for white Democrats and Republicans, while Table 9 shows the intercorrelations
across all four both in levels of the data and at their first differences. All told, and to varying
degrees, all four series are moderately to strongly intercorrelated. We can thus be confident that
the non-racial policy liberal series are capturing the same latent sentiment as Stimson’s index.

64

The entire list of items, including their factor loadings, can be found in Appendix A.2.
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Figure 4.23 Comparison of author’s non-racial policy liberalism index and Stimson’s index of public policy
mood

Figure 4.24 Comparison of author’s non-racial policy liberalism indexes and Stimson’s index of public policy
mood

Table 4.9 Correlations between author’s non-racial policy index (NRPL) and Stimson’s
index of public policy mood
1

1. Stimson Index
2. Sample NRPL

In
Levels
--0.663***

2

3

First
Difference
---

In
Levels
---

First
Difference
---

In
Levels
---

First
Difference
---

0.397**

---

---

---

---

757***

---

---

0.795***

0.390**

0.576***

3. White Democrats
0.819*** 0.428***
0.721***
NRPL
4. White Republican
0.436***
0.407**
0.895***,
NRPL
Note. †p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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4.4.2

Generational Replacement

Increased in racial liberalism could be the result of younger and more liberal generations
replacing those older and more conservative. For instance, Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo (1997;
chapter 4) argue that the socializing contexts in which people come of age strongly shapes their
racial attitudes. Those who were born and grew up prior to the Civil Rights era, when prejudicial
attitudes against blacks were the norm and (in the South) enshrined in state institutions, are
generally found to be more racially conservative than those born after. Kellstedt (2000) controls
for this cohort effect by counting the proportion of the adult population that turned 18 during or
after 1963. However, his data runs only to 1993, when the oldest respondent in this cohort would
have been 48 (born 1945) and the youngest respondent 18 (born 1975). The current data runs
through 2020, which means that later samples will increasingly include ‘Millennial’ and, if to a
lesser extent, ‘Gen-Z’ respondents. Grouping respondents from these cohorts with their ‘Baby
Boomer’ and ‘Gen-X’ predecessors implicitly assumes that there are no meaningful differences
in the racial attitudes of the older vs. younger post-Civil Rights generations. Given the
unlikelihood of this proposition, my measure 65 of generational replacement counts population
proportions for each birth cohort, beginning with the ‘Lost Generation’ (1883-1900) and ending
with the oldest members of Generation Z 66 (1997-2001). I then combined the Gen-X with the
Baby Boomer variable and the Gen-Z with the Millennial variable.
I did this for three reasons. First, to include all but one generation variable in a regression
model would have induced unreasonably high levels of multicollinearity (because shifts in one

65

For comparison, I also re-create Kellstedt’s generational replacement variable, which estimates the proportion of
respondents born in and after 1945.
66
Technically, Gen-Z is said to run through 2012. But any person born after 2001 would still be too young (and too
few in number) to be included in the samples underlying the final years of the racial attitudes data.
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almost always co-occur with shifts in others), which could render parameter estimates unstable
and complicate hypothesis testing. Second, the Gen-Z variable includes too few respondents to
stand on its own. Finally, when it comes to racial attitudes, the Baby Boomer and Gen-X cohorts
are more similar to each other than they are to Millennial and Gen-Z (and vice versa; DeSante &
Smith, 2020).
The resulting estimates, which were computed for each of the populations under study,
were derived from two different data sources. For all political groups, I use the American
National Election Study (ANES), which has data for age, party, and race from 1948-2016, and
for ideology from 1972-2016. For the sample and race-only groups, I use data from the Census
Bureau’s Current Population Survey 67 (CPS; 1961-2019). As the former survey is not conducted
on an annual basis, values are interpolated for missing years.
4.4.3

Consumer Optimism

Perhaps variation in racially liberal attitudes are a function of economic optimism. For
instance, Durr (1993) argues that as perceptions of economic conditions shift in the positive
(negative) direction, the public becomes more (less) willing to pay bankroll liberal social
policies. Like Kellstedt (2000), I control for this possibility with the University of Michigan’s
time series of consumer expectations. For this variable, data is available for all the years of the
racial liberalism series (1954-2020).

67
My reason for using a separate data source for the sample and race-only generation variables is to keep missing
value interpolation to the minimum. Unlike the ANES, the CPS has been conducted annually since 1961. Given the
choice between using estimated vs. observed values, the latter is always preferable. That being said, I tested data
from both sources and found that the CPS estimates better fit the models. However, it also should be noted that
using one over the other does not substantively alter the general pattern of results.
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4.4.4

Racial Policy Output

As suggested in the work of Wlezien (1995), it is possible that racial attitudes respond
‘thermostatically’ to the racial policy status quo. That is, when racial policy becomes more
liberal, it ultimately to produces a conservative backlash, which elected representatives respond
to by cutting regulations and spending for Civil Rights agencies. Conversely, when racial policy
moves in the conservative direction, the public is more likely to see merit in enacting racially
liberal policies. Similar to Kellstedt (2000), I account for this possibility with a rough index of
racial policy spending. Specifically, I measure annual budgetary allocations for six main antidiscrimination agencies as the proportion of all expenditures. These six agencies are the Civil
Rights Division of the Department of Justice (1958-2020), the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (1965-2020), the Office of Civil Rights in the Department of Education (19652020), the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Program in the Department of Labor (19662020), the Office of Civil in the Department of Health and Human Services (1978-2020), and the
Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity in Housing and Urban Development (1969-2020).
Values for years preceding the existence of these agencies are coded as 0. To generate an
aggregate index, I first standardized and then averaged the values across agencies. The series for
the resulting variable is shown in Figure 24 below.
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Figure 4.25 Index of federal spending on civil rights enforcement

4.4.5

Educational Attainment

Overtime increases in racial liberalism could stem (at least in part) from overtime
increases in educational attainment. One of the more important findings of Sniderman and
Piazza’s (1993) study of white racial attitudes was the positive effect of education on racial
tolerance and policy liberalism. Gomez and Wilson (2006) similarly link greater education to
structural (vs. individual-level) attributions for racial inequality. One interpretation of such
findings is that education tends to promote egalitarian values, exposure to and tolerance for
racial/ethnic, diversity, and higher-order cognitive skills that facilitate more sophisticated causal
attributions of racial inequality. Another interpretation is that education enhances awareness of
social norms, which, in turn, encourages people to give politically correct, if dishonest, responses
to race-related survey questions. Whatever the case, the possibility that increases in educational
attainment effect increases in both racial liberalism (or at least racially liberal responding) and
also in the demand for or in the output of racial equalitarian media cannot be excluded. I thus
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control for this potential influence using data on educational attainment from the ANES 68.
Specifically, and for each population group, I calculate the percept of respondents with at least a
BA degree. Values for missing years are again interpolated.
4.4.6

Non-White Controls

Any time series analysis of ‘non-white’ attitudes has to contend with the fact that the
racial/ethnic constitution of this category has changed markedly since the immigration reform
laws of 1965 and after. Whereas blacks may have comprised the overwhelming majority of nonwhite survey respondents in the 1960s and 70s, this predominance has steadily eroded ever since.
This poses obvious problems for statistical inference in that what may appear as ‘declines’ in
non-white racial liberalism may actually be due to increases in representation of non-black
racial/ethnic minorities whose racial attitudes are more conservative. Aside from gathering data
for specific or all racial/ethnic groups, the only recourse this leaves us it to try to statistically
control for the changing composition of the non-white population. I attempt to do so with data
from the CPS, which has measured racial identification in some form since 1961. Specifically, I
create variable that stores the black share of the non-white population for each year between
1961-2019. I then interpolate missing values for the years spanning 1954-1960.
Another potential source of error in using data from aggregate ‘non-white’ respondents is
the overtime sorting of non-whites into the Democratic Party 69. If non-whites increasingly

68

The choice of using the ANES rather than the CPS data rests on the disharmony of the latter’s measure of
education. Specifically, until 1992, the CPS asked respondents to indicate their highest year of school attendance.
Thereafter, it asked respondents to report their highest completed level (or degree) of schooling. While the CPS
dataset features a harmonized variable that combines the two versions, there are still major discontinuities in the data
that I wasn’t able to resolve.
69
At this point, one may reasonably ask why I am only including such controls for non-whites. In the first case, it
would seem appropriate to also control for the white proportion of the US in the white models. For perhaps steadily
increasing exposure to racial/ethnic diversity has a liberalizing effect on white racial attitudes. In the second case,
whites themselves have sorted into the Republican party; so why not also control for the proportion of whites who
identify as either Republican or Democrat? The simple answer to both of these questions is that I actually initially
tested such variables in models of white racial liberalism and, to my surprise, observed that—across all
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identify as Democrats, they are likely to increasingly adopt—if they do not already hold--the
party’s position on race. To account for this possibility, I use data from the ANES to create a
variable that stores the proportion of non-whites that identify as Democrats in each survey year
between 1956-2016. Values for missing years are interpolated.
4.5

Methodology
The first step in my analysis is to determine the causal order that best fits the data. On

this count, my hypothesis predicts that shifts in racial attitudes will temporally follow shifts in
racial equalitarian news media. To assess whether this is indeed the case, my analysis begins
with separate 70 two-variable granger causality tests for each racial series (white, non-white) and
each of the race x party and white x ideology series. Granger causality tests examine whether the
previous values of one variable significantly improve estimates of subsequent values of another
net of its previous values (Freeman, 1983). An important and often prohibitive assumption of
these tests is that of series stationarity. Simply put, variables are assumed to have time-invariant
means, variances, and autocorrelation structures. Failure to meet this requirement can result in
spurious relationships.
In the case of the current data, the time series graphs included earlier hardly depict a
pattern of stationarity. In fact, they show the presence of structural breaks or durable shifts in
series’ means. The results of several different unit root tests 71, which are summarized in Table

specifications—they contributed nothing in terms of error reduction. To the contrary, models that include them fit
the data much more poorly than models that don’t. Nor do these variables accounted for any of the effects of racial
equalitarian media on white racial liberalism. For whatever reason, and as will be shown below, this wasn’t the case
for models of non-white racial liberalism, in which such variables resulted in significant reductions in error.
Nevertheless, for transparency sake, I provide a regression table of models of white racial liberalism specified with
these controls in Appendix A.3.
70
Separate tests are conducted out of concern for multicollinearity. Especially given the relatively small size of the
current dataset, the entry of multiple variables and lags could result in high intercorrelations that bias tests of the null
hypothesis (For more on this issue, see Mansson, Shukar, & Sjolander, 2014).
71
The full results for each test can be found in Appendix A.4-A.7.
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4.10, confirm this visual inspection. With one exception (non-white racial liberalism in the
ADF), the null hypothesis of stationarity cannot be rejected for any of our variables in levels of
the data. However, most of the tests were not designed to test for stationarity in the presence of
structural breaks. A consequence of this is that these tests are likely to be biased in favor of not
rejecting the null hypothesis. To correct for this, Clemente, Montanes, and Reyes (1998)
developed tests of stationarity in the presence of either one or two structural breaks. The results
of these tests (for two structural breaks) are presented in the bottom-right corner of Table 4.10.
They generally converge with those of others. Specifically, none of the variables are consistent
with the hypothesis of stationarity in levels of the data. At first difference, this hypothesis can be
rejected for non-white Democrats and white Republicans, but not for any other series. With the
exception of the non-white series, which requires a 3rd difference to reach stationarity, all of the
remaining series achieve stationarity at second difference.
Table 4.10 Summary of unit root test results

Sample
Non-White
White
White
Democrats
Non-White
Democrats
White
Republican
White
Liberal
White
Conservative
Racial
Equalitarian
Media

Sample
Non-White
White

Augmented Dicky-Filler
At
1st
2nd
3rd
Level Diff. Diff. Diff.
NS
S
----S
------NS
S
-----

At
Level
NS
NS
NS

Phillips-Perron
1st
2nd
Diff. Diff.
S
--S
--S
---

3rd
Diff.
-------

NS

S

---

---

NS

S

---

---

NS

S

---

---

NS

S

---

---

NS

I

S

---

NS

S

---

---

NS

S

---

---

NS

S

---

---

NS

S

---

---

NS

S

---

---

NS

NS

I

S

NS

I

S

---

Kwiatowski-PhillipsSchmidt-Shin
NS
S
----NS
S
----NS
S
-----

Clemente, Montanes,
Reyes
NS
NS
S
--NS
NS
NS
S
NS
NS
S
---
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White
NS
S
----NS
NS
S
--Democrats
Non-White
NS
S
----NS
S
----Democrats
White
NS
S
----NS
S
----Republican
White
NS
S
----NS
NS
S
--Liberal
White
NS
S
----NS
NS
S
--Conservative
Racial
Equalitarian
NS
NS
S
--NS
NS
S
--Media
Note. NS=Non-stationary, S=Stationary, I=Inconclusive. ‘Inconclusive’ refers to cases wherein test results indicate
stationarity at some but not all lag lengths. Lag lengths were determined on the basis of selection statistics (AIC,
SBIC, HQIC etc.). Where statistics failed to converge on a single lag length, multiple lag lengths were tested.

Table 11 summarizes the consistency of results across the four unit root tests in terms of
their suggested order of integration. Three of the four tests indicate that the sample, white, white
Democrat, non-white Democrat, white Republican, white liberal, and white conservative series
are integrated of order 1, while the remaining test supports integration of order 2. The results for
the non-white series is more conflicting. One test supports stationarity in levels of the data,
another (specifically, the Clemente, Montanes, and Reyes test) at 3rd difference, and the
remaining two point to stationarity at first difference.
Table 4.11 Consistency in unit root test results
NonNonOrder of
White
White White White
Sample White White
White
Dem.
integration
Repub. Lib. Con.
Dem.
I(0)
0/4
1/4
0/4
0/4
0/4
0/4
0/4
0/4
I(1)
3/4
2/4
3/4
3/4
3/4
3/4
3/4
3/4
I(2)
1/4
0/4
1/4
1/4
1/4
1/4
1/4
1/4
I(3)
--1/4
------------Note. REM=Racial Equalitarian Media

REM
0/4
0/4
3/4
1/4

Determining the order integration is important for conducting the robustness check that
will follow the conventional granger tests. Specifically, Toda and Yamamoto (1995) propose a
procedure for testing granger (non-)causality in the context of non-stationary data. After
determining the maximum lag length p on the basis of information criteria (AIC, SIC etc.), this
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procedure calls for adding m exogenous lags of each variable in a VAR model in the levels of the
data, where m is defined as the maximum order of integration for the group of variables 72. Thus,
if one variable is I(1) and another is I(2), we would include 2 exogenous lags for each variable in
each equation. If, for example, the information criteria suggest a lag length of 4, the 5th and 6th
lags of each variable are added to the exogenous part of the VAR model. Finally, a Wald test is
used to test whether (only) lags p are equal to 0 in each equation. Rejection of the null signifies
rejection of Granger non-causality.
Table 4.12 shows the lag lengths suggested by various information criteria for each
‘racial liberalism + REM’ equation 73. For the sample, non-white, non-white Democrats, and
white conservative equations, all but one of the diagnostics (the likelihood ratio test) recommend
a lag length of 1. For the remaining equations, the results are split: the HQIC and SBIC
recommend a lag length of 1, while the FPE and AIC point to lengths of (depending on the
series) 3 to 5 lags. In light of this dissensus, and as a check of robustness, I will test whether the
results cohere across differing lag orders.
Table 4.12 Lag lengths suggested by various selection statistics
Variables
Sample + REM
Non-White +
REM
White + REM
White
Democrats +
REM
Non-White
Democrats +
REM
White
Republican +
REM
White Liberal +
REM

LR
8

FPE
1

AIC
1

HQIC
1

SBIC
1

8

1

1

1

1

8

5

5

1

1

8

3

3

1

1

7

1

1

1

1

7

5

5

1

1

4

4

4

1

1

In the presence of non-stationary data, the Wald test statistic does not follow its usual asymptotic 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖 2 under the
null hypothesis. The addition of m exogenous lags serves to correct for this.
73
Kellstedt’s (2000) Granger analyses used two lags, though he offered no explicit justification for doing so.
72
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White
Conservative + 7
1
1
1
1
REM
Note. Maximum lag length is set to 10. LR=Likelihood Ratio, FPE=Final Prediction Error, AIC=Akaike’s
Information Criterion, HQIC=Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion, SBIC=Schwar’s Bayesian Information
Criterion, REM=Racial Equalitarian Media.

4.6

Results (Part 1)
Table 13 presents the results of these tests for the sample overall and the two racial series.

First, we see that the pattern of results for the sample and white equations are remarkably similar.
We find strong evidence that, regardless of lag length, racial equalitarian media (REM) grangercauses sample (1 lag: p=0.001) and white racial liberalism (1 lag: p = 0.001; 5 lags: p=0.019) but
no evidence that sample (1 lag: p=0.852) and white racial liberalism (1 lag: p=0.893; 5 lags:
p=0.211) drives racial equalitarian media. In stark contrast, and irrespective of lag length, we
find no evidence that REM granger-causes non-white racial liberalism (1 lag: p=0.180), nor any
evidence that non-white racial liberalism granger-causes REM (p=0.702).
Table 4.13 Granger test results for sample and racial group series (1954-2020)
Sample

White
Endogenous Variables

Non-White

Exogenous
Variables

Lag
RL
REM
RL
REM
RL
REM
length
1
0.001
--0.001
--0.180
--2
0.002
--0.002
--0.704
--REM
3
0.007
--0.009
--0.752
--4
0.014
--0.012
--0.279
--5
0.024
0.019
--0.297
1
--0.852
--0.893
--0.702
2
--0.828
--0.226
--0.952
RL
3
--0.999
--0.417
--0.921
4
--0.454
--0.192
--0.821
5
0.716
0.211
0.885
Note. N=66 for all equations. Cell entries are p-values from Wald tests. P-values in bold font represent those
derived at lag length(s) suggested by different selection statistics. REM=Racial Equalitarian Media,
RL=Racial Liberalism.

Table 4.14 presents the results for the race x party and ideology series, respectively.
Starting with the equations for white Democrats, we see clear evidence that the REM variable
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granger-causes racial liberalism at both suggested lag lengths (1 lag: p < 0.001; 3 lags: p=0.006)
but no evidence that racial liberalism drives REM (1 lag: p=0.697; 3 lags: p=0.500). The pattern
of results for non-white Democrats is virtually identical. They suggest that the REM grangercauses non-white Democrats racial liberalism (1 lag: p < 0.001), but not the inverse (1 lag:
p=0.533). Turning to the white Republican equations, the results become more equivocal.
Evidence for joint causation is found at nearly all lag lengths. Thus, unlike the case of white
Democrats, the data is not clearly consistent with a unidirectional causal relationship running
from REM (1 lag: p=0.028; 5 lags: p=0.001) to racial attitudes (1 lag: p=0.047; 5 lags: p=0.032).
Instead, the data suggests that the relationship is generally reciprocal for white Republicans.
Table 1: Granger test results for racial group x party/ideology series (1954-2020)

Exogenous
Lags
Variables
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5

White
Democrats

Non-White
White
White
Democrats Republican
Liberal
Endogenous Variables

RL

REM

RL

0.000
0.002
0.006
0.010
0.010
-----------

----------0.697
0.558
0.500
0.321
0.386

REM

RL

REM

RL

REM

White
Conservative

RL

REM

0.000 --- 0.028 --- 0.000 --0.173
--0.001 --- 0.077 --- 0.011 --0.301
--REM
0.002 --- 0.042 --- 0.024 --0.741
--0.004 --- 0.063 --- 0.028 --0.880
--0.006 --- 0.001 --- 0.008 --0.790
----- 0.533 --- 0.047 --- 0.893
--0.647
--- 0.477 --- 0.026 --- 0.140
--0.645
RL
--- 0.848 --- 0.120 --- 0.083
--0.651
--- 0.128 --- 0.009 --- 0.354
--0.180
--- 0.265 --- 0.032 --- 0.539
--0.221
N
67
49
Note. Cell entries are p-values from Wald tests. P-values in bold font represent those
derived at lag length(s) suggested by different selection statistics. REM=Racial Equalitarian Media,
RL=Racial Liberalism.

Although spanning a shorter time period, the results for the white liberal equations
largely mirror those of white Democrats. We see clear evidence that REM (1 lag: p < 0.001; 4
lags: p=0.028) granger-causes white liberal racial liberalism, but no evidence for the inverse
relationship (1 lag: p=0.893; 4 lags: p=0.354). In contrast, the results of the equations for white
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conservatives do not resemble those of white Republicans. In fact, we see no evidence that REM
(1 lag: p=0.173) and white conservative racial liberalism (1 lag: p=0.647) are causally related in
any direction at any of the 5 lag lengths.
Thus far the results have wholly accorded with expectations. We observed clear evidence
that movement in white racial liberalism proceeds movement in REM. Moreover, we also
uncovered some evidence that this pattern is unique to non-white Democrats, white Democrats
and white liberals. But can we trust these results? Because all our variables non-stationary, there
is a reasonable possibility that they are spurious. Accordingly, and as mentioned earlier, I assess
the robustness of these results with Toda and Yamamoto’s (1995) procedure for testing granger
non-causality in the presence of non-stationary data. The battery of unit root tests conducted
earlier indicated that nearly all of the racial liberalism series were integrated to either order 1 or
2, while the REM variable was integrated to order 2. With this ordering, the Toda and
Yamamoto procedure would call for the inclusion of two additional lags for each (in levels)
variable in the exogenous component of each equation.
Table 4.15 displays the results of the Toda Yamamoto test for the sample, white and nonwhite equations. With the addition of 2 exogenous lags, neither REM (1 lag: p=0.111) nor
sample racial liberalism (1 lag: p=0.957) are significantly granger-causal at the suggested lag
length. However, and turning to the equation for whites, the results once again indicate—if less
clearly--that REM granger-causes white racial liberalism (1 lag: p=0.046; 5 lags: p=0.043), but
not the inverse (1 lag: p=0.352; 5 lags: p=0.512), at both of the suggested lag lengths. Finally,
and replicating the pattern of results observed earlier, we see that the effects of REM on nonwhite racial liberalism (and vice versa) are indistinguishable from 0 across all five lag lengths.
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Thus, with the exception of the sample equation, these results generally accord with those from
the conventional granger tests.
Table 4.15 Toda and Yamamoto test results for sample and racial group series (1954-2020)
Sample

White
Non-White
Endogenous Variables

Exogenous Endogenous
RL REM RL REM RL
REM
Variables
Lags (p)
1
0.111
0.046 --- 0.428
--2
0.061
0.128 --- 0.208
--REM
3
0.081
0.148 --- 0.156
--4
0.117
0.098 --- 0.166
--5
0.042
0.043 --- 0.143
1
0.957 --- 0.352 --0.592
2
0.993 --- 0.237 --0.707
RL
3
0.734 --- 0.402 --0.778
4
0.945 --- 0.627 --0.918
5
0.886 --- 0.512 --0.643
Note. N=67 for all equations. Cell entries are p-values from Wald tests. P-values in bold font represent those
derived at lag length(s) suggested by different selection statistics. Two lags are added to the exogenous part of each
equation. REM=Racial Equalitarian Media, RL=Racial Liberalism.

Moving to the results for the race x party and ideology equations (Table 16), we once
again find that REM granger-causes white Democrats racial liberalism (1 lag: p=0.007; 3 lags:
p=0.009) at both suggested lag lengths, while observing no evidence for causality in the inverse
direction (1 lag: p=0.945; 3 lags: p=0.528). Turning to non-white Democrats, the results are
generally at odds with those reported earlier. At the lag length suggested by nearly all of the
selection statistics, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effects of REM on non-white
Democrats racial liberalism are equal to 0 (1 lag: p=0.149). Nor can we reject it for the inverse
of this relationship (1 lag: p=0.617). It’s only when the lag length is set to 4 or 5 that we can
finally do so for the former (4 lags: p=0.004; 5 lags: p < 0.001), but not the latter (4 lags:
p=0.915; 5 lags: p=0.816) relationship. As with non-white Democrats, the results for the white
republican equations also diverge from those obtained under the conventional granger tests.
Before we observed a pattern suggestive of joint causation. Under the current tests, though, we
see that this pattern has disappeared. At the first of the two suggested lag lengths, the effects of
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REM (1 lag: p=0.065) on white Republican racial liberalism approach but fall short of
significance at the 95% level, while the effects of the latter (1 lag: p=0.336) do not come close to
reaching significance at this threshold. At the second of the two suggested lag lengths, though,
the REM’s effects (5 lags: p=0.016) on white Republican racial liberalism are distinguishable
from 0, while the latter’s effects (5 lags: p=0.154) on REM are not.
Table 4.16 Toda and Yamamoto test results for the racial group x party/ideology series
(1954-2020)
White
Democrats

Non-White
White
White
Democrats
Republican
Liberal
Endogenous Variables

White
Conservative

Exogenous
P Lags RL REM RL REM RL REM RL REM RL REM
Variables
1
0.007 --0.149
--0.065
--0.034
--0.835
--2
0.009 --0.283
--0.239
--0.029
--0.708
--REM
3
0.009 --0.158
--0.136
--0.005
--0.946
--4
0.012 --0.006
--0.197
--0.006
--0.901
--5
0.011 --0.000
--0.016
--0.003
0.895
1
--- 0.945
--0.617
--0.336
--0.163
--0.372
2
--- 0.420
--0.552
--0.758
--0.140
--0.721
RL
3
--- 0.528
--0.781
--0.570
--0.339
--0.227
4
--- 0.628
--0.915
--0.171
--0.545
--0.438
5
--- 0.350
0.816
0.154
0.325
0.090
N
67
49
Note. Cell entries are p-values from Wald tests. P-values in bold font represent those derived at length(s) suggested
by different selection statistics. Two lags are added to the exogenous part of each equation. REM=Racial
Equalitarian Media, RL=Racial Liberalism.

Finally, the pattern of results for the white liberal and conservative equations is generally
the same as that obtained in the conventional Granger models. Once again, and regardless of lag
length, we see that REM granger-causes white liberal racial liberalism (1 lag: p=0.034; 4 lags:
p=0.006 ) but observe no evidence that white liberal racial liberalism granger-causes REM (1
lag: p=0.163; 4 lags: p=0.545). Turning to the white conservative equations, we again find no
evidence that either of the variables are granger-causal at any lag length.
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4.6.1

Preliminary Discussion

The results thus far largely accord with earlier predictions. First, we observed evidence
that variation in white (but not non-white) racial liberalism temporally proceeds variation in the
proportion of annual race-related news articles that speak to black-white status differences in
terms of racial bias and injustice (i.e., REM). This pattern persisted when adjusting for the nonstationarity of the data. Second, and as also predicted, we consistently found that movement in
white Democrats and white liberal racial liberalism temporally followed movement REM. This
was the case across all lag specifications both before and after adjusting for non-stationarity. On
the other hand, the results for white Republicans were more equivocal, while those for white
conservatives showed no evidence of significant granger effects in any equation. In the case of
the former, we initially observed a pattern of joint causation such that white Republican racial
liberalism was both granger-caused by and also granger-caused variation in REM. Adjusting for
non-stationarity overturned this pattern. the effects of REM on white Republican racial
liberalism either approached or reached significance at the two suggested lag lengths, while the
effects of the latter on the former were consistently indistinguishable from 0. some evidence of a
causal relationship running from REM to white republican racial liberalism was found at a lag
length of 1, where the effects of the former on the latter were significant at the p < 0.1 level. But
whether these ‘marginally significant’ effects are genuine or simply random noise is unclear. For
white conservatives, though, the results were clear. As expected, in none of the equations nor at
any of the lag lengths did REM significantly granger-cause racial liberalism (and vice versa).
If, as the results suggest, REM drives white racial liberalism, the next question is whether
this effect is substantively meaningful both in and of itself and in relation to that of other
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variables. First, it is possible that the relationship itself is confounded by other variables that
explain both variation in racial attitudes and in REM. Second, even if the effects of media on
racial attitudes are unique, they may be paltry and/or dwarfed by the effects of other variables.
Like Kellstedt (2000), I attempt to address these questions with a series of lagged dependent
variable models 74. In the analyses that follow, the dependent variables are the racial liberalism
series for the sample as a whole and for each subpopulation. A lagged racial liberalism variable
is included as a covariate to control for the effects of previous lags of exogenous variables that
are left out of the model. As detailed earlier, the exogenous variables include the percent of
annual NYT articles that refer to black people or mention the term ‘racial’, the proportion of
Baby Boomer/Gen-X and Millenial/Gen-Z respondents, the percent of respondents with at least a
BA degree, federal spending on civil rights agencies, consumer optimism, and (non-racial)
public policy liberalism.
4.7

Results (Part 2)
The granger test results provided some but ultimately ambiguous evidence that REM

drives shifts in the racial liberalism of the sample as a whole, clear evidence that it drives drifts
in racial liberalism among whites, and no evidence that it causes shifts in racial liberalism among
non-whites. The results 75 of the dynamic regression model 76 for sample racial liberalism are
shown in Table 4.17. Those in column (a) indicate that REM remains a significant (p < 0.001)

74

In light of the non-stationarity of some of the variables, a dynamic regression model could output spurious results
in the absence of at least some cointegration. Fortunately, the residuals of all the models below are stationary. The
ADF test statistics all exceed the 0.05% critical values suggested by MacKinnon (1990, 2010). Engle-Granger tests
were additionally run and the null hypothesis of no cointegration was rejected for all models.
75
Because data for non-racial policy liberalism was not available for the years 1954, 1955, and (at the time of this
writing) 2020, all model results are limited to the 1956-2019 period. While this entails a loss of three observations, it
helps to ensure that estimates are comparable across models.
76
Neither the Breusch-Godfrey nor the Durbin h test indicated the presence of serial correlation in any of the
models.
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predictor of racial liberalism net of the previous year’s racial liberalism. Specifically, a standard
deviation (SD) increase (+0.92 percentage points) in the racial equalitarian share of race-related
articles is expected to produce a 0.259SD rise (+1.39 points) in sample racial liberalism. To be
clear, these are only the immediate or short-run effects. The coefficient on the lagged racial
liberalism indicates that roughly 76% of these immediate effects persists into the following
period. Interestingly, and turning to column (b), controlling for the share of all NYT articles that
refer to blacks or race enlarges the magnitude of the immediate effects by roughly 74%
(𝛽𝛽=0.451; p < 0.001), which amounts to a more 2.4-point increase on the racial liberalism index.
Also of note, the coefficient for the race-related articles variable is both significantly negative
and less than half the size (𝛽𝛽=-0.204; p=0.028) of that of REM. This suggests that, once the
influence of REM articles is removed, race-related media actually has a negative effect on
sample racial liberalism 77. More importantly, it suggests that sample racial liberalism doesn’t
respond to the volume of race-related news content in general, but rather to the frequency at
which the media discusses black-white status differences in terms of racial discrimination and
injustice.
Column (c) adds the two generational cohort variables. Such leads to a very modest
reduction in the effects of REM (𝛽𝛽=0.442, p < 0.001) which remain a significantly positive
predictor of sample racial liberalism. Column (d) controls for higher educational attainment,
which, in addition to boosting model fit (Adjusted 𝑅𝑅 2 =0.892), considerably enhances the

significant positive effects (𝛽𝛽=0.531, p < 0.001) of REM on racial liberalism. These effects are
moderated, but remain both sizeable and significant (𝛽𝛽=0.448; p < 0.001), after the remaining
control variables are added in column (e). Specifically, and in terms of the metric of the

77

This is similar to what was observed in Kellstedt (2000), which found that the number of Newsweek stories on
race had a negative (but statistically insignificant) effect on racial policy liberalism.
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dependent variable, holding all other predictors constant, a standard deviation increase in REM
predicts a roughly 2.4-point increase in sample racial liberalism. The results of a likelihood ratio
test also indicate that a model excluding the REM variable would see a significant reduction
(p<0.001) in overall model fit. Although the effects of the two generational replacement
(𝛽𝛽 Boomers/GenX= -0.984, p < 0.001; 𝛽𝛽 Millenials/GenZ= -0.900, p < 0.001 ) and educational attainment

(𝛽𝛽=1.59, p < 0.001) variables are larger in size, REM continues to account for variation in racial
liberalism is noteworthy.
Table 4.17 The determinants of sample racial liberalism (1956-2019)
(a)
Racial
Liberalism
(t-1)
REM
Race-Related Articles
Black Proportion.
of Non-White
Population.
Non-White
Proportion Democrat
Proportion
Boomer/Gen X
Proportion
Millenial/Gen-Z
Percent With College
Degree

(b)

Sample
(c)

(d)

(e)

0.755*** 0.706*** 0.725*** 0.604*** 0.619***
(0.070)
(0.068)
(0.086)
(0.066)
(0.069)
0.259*** 0.451*** 0.442*** 0.531*** 0.448***
(0.053)
(0.097)
(0.094)
(0.081)
(0.091)
-0.204* -0.220* -0.202*
-0.109
--(0.090)
(0.097)
(0.086)
(0.082)
---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

-1.13** -0.984***
(0.335)
(0.374)
-1.01** -0.900***
----(0.281)
(0.288)
1.81** 1.59***
(0.501)
(0.514)
0.076
Civil Rights Spending
--------(0.117)
-0.047
Consumer Sentiment
--------(0.043)
Non-Racial
0.137*
--------Public Policy Mood
(0.051)
0.052
0.063** 0.059*** 0.061***
0.051
Constant
(0.042)
(0.042)
(0.050)
(0.048)
(0.051)
0.855
0.845
0.858
0.892
0.895
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2
Note. N=64 in all models. Cells are standardized beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
---

---

-0.040
(0.086)
0.039
(0.054)

Table 7.18 presents the results from the white and non-white models, which, initially,
seem to suggest that increases in REM don’t equally affect the attitudes of whites and non-

156
whites. Specifically, and referring to columns (a) in both models, we see that REM significantly
positively predicts white racial liberalism (𝛽𝛽=0.307, p=0.001) while only weakly and
insignificantly positively influencing that of their non-white counterparts (𝛽𝛽=0.076, p=0.143)
The difference in the size of these coefficients is significantly different from zero (p=0.016).
But, as suspected, this result proves to be misleading. Column (aa) of the non-white model shows
that once the black proportion of the non-white population (𝛽𝛽=0.291, p=0.035) and the
proportion of non-whites identifying as Democrats 78 (𝛽𝛽=0.127, p=0.219) is held constant, the
effects of REM turn significantly positive and balloon in size (𝛽𝛽=0.311, p < 0.001). They are
now statistically indistinguishable (p=0.976) from those acting on white racial liberalism.
Moving to column (b), we see that, once again, controlling for the percent of NYT articles that
are race-related (column b) substantially boosts the effects of REM on both white (𝛽𝛽=0.543,
p=0.001) and non-white (𝛽𝛽=0.586, p < 0.001) racial liberalism. Controlling for generational
replacement (columns c) results in a tiny reduction in these effects for whites (𝛽𝛽 =0.525; p
<0.001) and a small boost (𝛽𝛽 =0.627; p < 0.001) for non-whites. Subsequently adjusting for
rates of higher educational attainment (columns d) enlarges the effects of REM on white racial
liberalism (𝛽𝛽=0.685; p<0.001) while moderating its effects on non-white (𝛽𝛽=0.566; p < 0.001)
racial liberalism. Further adjusting for civil rights spending, consumer optimism, and non-racial
policy liberalism (columns e) model attenuates, but hardly eliminates these effects. In substantive
terms, a one standard deviation increase in the volume of REM predicts roughly 3.2 and 2.5
point increases in white (𝛽𝛽=0.565; p <0.001) and non-white (𝛽𝛽=0.425; p=0.002) racial
liberalism, respectively. To give a rough estimate of the practical impact of these effects,

78

Somewhat surprisingly, in addition to yielding a poorer fits across all models, adjusting for the white proportion
of the population and the proportion of whites self-identifying as democrats had virtually no effect on the
relationship between racial equalitarian media and white racial liberalism. These control variables were thus
excluded from the models shown. Readers interested in viewing these excluded results can refer to Appendix A.3.
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consider that, between 2010 and 2019, white racial liberalism increased by roughly 16 points. If
the parameter estimates are to be trusted, this would mean that more than half of this change (9
points) can be attributed to increases in the volume of REM.
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Table 7.18 The determinants of white and non-white racial liberalism (1956-2019)
(a)

(b)

White
(c)

(d)

(e)

(a)

(aa)

Non-White
(b)
(c)

(d)

(e)

Racial
0.705*** 0.641*** 0.643*** 0.456*** 0.423** 0.852*** 0.652*** 0.614*** 0.644*** 0.699*** 0.713***
Liberalism
(0.098) (0.098) (0.140) (0.118) (0.127) (0.073) (0.112) (0.113) (0.123) (0.123) (0.117)
(t-1)

REM
Race-Related
Articles
Black
Proportion
of NonWhite
Population
Non-White
Proportion
Democrats
Proportion
Boomer/
Gen X
Proportion
Millenial/
Gen-Z
Percent
With College
Degree
Civil Rights
Spending
Consumer
Sentiment
Non-Racial
Public Policy
Mood

0.307** 0.543** 0.525*** 0.685*** 0.565*** 0.076 0.311** 0.586*** 0.627*** 0.566*** 0.425**
(0.090) (0.132) (0.121) (0.111) (0.097) (0.051) (0.082) (0.144) (0.145) (0.128) (0.129)
---

-0.247** -0.253** -0.227** -0.110
(0.089) (0.087) (0.074) (0.069)

---

---

-0.253* -0.392* -0.374* -0.287*
(0.109) (0.170) (0.155) (0.128)

---

---

---

---

---

---

0.291*
(0.135)

0.327* 0.477* 0.519*
(0.128) (0.224) (0.230)

---

---

---

---

---

---

0.127
(0.103)

0.247* 0.266* 0.281* 0.333**
(0.118) (0.122) (0.119) (0.121)

---

---

-0.008
(0.116)

-1.19**
(0.416)

-1.09*
(0.469)

---

---

---

-0.014 -0.368†
(0.080) (0.193)

-0.259
(0.266)

---

---

0.035
(0.056)

-1.01** -0.947**
(0.325) (0.316)

---

---

---

0.241 -0.151
(0.209) (0.277)

-0.087
(0.316)

---

---

---

1.91**
(0.604)

0.721†
(0.362)

0.502
(0.375)

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

1.84**
(0.601)
0.065
(0.111)
0.046
(0.045)
0.128*
(0.055)

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

0.375†
(0.218)

0.321
(0.199)
0.033
(0.061)
0.384**
(0.137)
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Constant

0.059** 0.054*** 0.047** 0.038
(0.056) (0.054) (0.061) (0.050)

0.035
(0.049)

0.028†
(0.067)

0.022
(0.060)

0.021
0.022 0.023† 0.024**
(0.059) (0.059) (0.057) (0.056)

Adjusted R2 0.822
0.842
0.837
0.871
0.875
0.715
0.761
0.770
0.771
0.787
Note. N=64 in all models. Cells are standardized beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

0.798
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Earlier it was predicted that racial equalitarian media would have stronger effects on
white Democrats and liberals than white Republicans and conservatives. The results in Table
4.19 below appear to offer only mixed support for this proposition. In columns (a), we see that,
net of lagged racial liberalism, increases in REM have a significantly positive influence on white
Democrat racial liberalism (𝛽𝛽=0.252, p < 0.001) but only a modest and insignificant positive
effect on white Republican racial liberalism (𝛽𝛽=0.040, p=0.241). Importantly, the difference
between these coefficients is statistically distinguishable from zero (p < 0.001). Turning to
columns (b), we see that controlling for the volume of race-related content again increases the
magnitude of these effects for both groups. A standard deviation increase in REM corresponds to
a significant 0.364SD (or +3.05 points; p <0.001) increase in white Democrats racial liberalism
and to an insignificant 0.128SD (+0.91 points; p=0.062) increase in white republican racial
liberalism, though the difference in the size of these coefficients is not significant (p=0.104)
While the results thus far cohere with predictions, they take a curious and unexpected
turn in the remaining three models. Specifically, after adjusting for generational replacement
(columns c), the effects of REM on white Republican racial liberalism (𝛽𝛽=0.389, p < 0.001)
become somewhat larger (if insignificantly so, p=0.561) than those on white Democrat racial
liberalism (𝛽𝛽=0.316, p < 0.001). What explains this turnaround is not immediately clear, but it
appears to be largely driven by the Millenials/Gen-Z variable. While not shown below, when
only the Boomers/Gen-X variable is added to the model, the effects of REM on white
Republican racial liberalism (𝛽𝛽=0.131; p=0.094) fall short of significance at the 95% threshold.
But when the Millenials/Gen-Z variable takes its place, REM’s effects on white Republican
racial liberalism become both significant and more than double in size (𝛽𝛽=0.265; p=0.002). A
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plausible interpretation of these dynamics is that the Millenials/Gen-X covariate is acting as a
suppressor variable. While it has only a weak and insignificant bivariate association with white
Republican racial liberalism (r=0.054; p=0.663), it appears to account for criterion-irrelevant
variance in the REM variable, with which it is strongly correlated (r=0.719; p < 0.001). The
removal of this criterion-irrelevant variance would then improve the estimates of its effects on
racial liberalism, which, in turn, would also improve the overall fit of the model (as indicated by
the boost in adjusted R2). All of this is consistent with what is observed here. The mystery,
though, is why this suppression effect isn’t similarly observed among white Democrats. In the
interest of proceeding with the remainder of the results, I leave this question to secondary
analysis.
Continuing with columns (d), we see that adjusting for higher educational attainment
further moderates the effects of racial equalitarian media on white Democrat racial liberalism
(𝛽𝛽=0.252; p=0.001), while enhancing those acting on white Republican racial liberalism
(𝛽𝛽=0.484; p < 0.001). Remarkably, the latter coefficient is nearly twice the size of the former,
though this difference falls well short of conventional levels of significance (p=0.167). Adding
the remaining control variables to the model (columns e) further increases the size of this
disparity, which nonetheless still falls short of significance (p=0.110). In this final model, a one
standard deviation increase in racial equalitarian media predicts a 1.9 and 3-point rise in white
Democrat (𝛽𝛽=0.223; p=0.010) and white Republican (𝛽𝛽=0.486; p < 0.001) racial liberalism,
respectively. Despite the smaller size of the former, the inclusion of racial equalitarian news
salience in the white Democrats model still results in a significant improvement in model fit
(p=0.008).
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Table 4.19 The determinants of white Democrat and Republican racial liberalism (1956-2019)
Racial Liberalism
(t-1)
REM

White Democrats
White Republican
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
0.784*** 0.772*** 0.728*** 0.655*** 0.616*** 0.908*** 0.866*** 0.421** 0.393*
(0.064) (0.059) (0.087) (0.077) (0.090) (0.039) (0.064) (0.142) (0.147)
0.252*** 0.364*** 0.316*** 0.252**
(0.053) (0.074) (0.069) (0.074)

0.223*
(0.084)

0.040
(0.033)

(e)
0.392*
(0.140)

0.148† 0.389*** 0.484*** 0.486***
(0.078) (0.090) (0.130) (0.128)

Race-Related
Articles

---

-0.131†
(0.067)

-0.145†
(0.080)

-0.108
(0.074)

-0.047
(0.088)

---

-0.123
(0.107)

-0.244*
(0.102)

-0.306*
(0.123)

-0.295*
(0.121)

Proportion Baby
Boomer/Gen X

---

---

0.008
(0.079)

-0.432*
(0.165)

-0.336*
(0.171)

---

---

0.464**
(0.129)

0.265†
(0.152)

0.326†
(0.176)

Proportion
Millenial/Gen-Z

---

---

0.111†
(0.062)

-0.417*
(0.201)

-0.405*
(0.212)

---

---

Percent With
College Degree
Civil Rights
Spending
Consumer
Sentiment
Non-Racial
Public Policy Mood
Constant

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

0.940** 0.849**
(0.312) (0.315)
-0.002
--(0.064)
0.026
--(0.039)
0.054
--(0.064)

0.059** 0.058*** 0.055*** 0.049**
(0.038) (0.037) (0.039) (0.035)

0.046
(0.036)

-0.375*** -0.471*** -0.480***
(0.086) (0.117) (0.109)
0.246
(0.152)

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

0.032†
(0.040)

0.218
(0.156)
-0.033
(0.113)
-0.026
(0.033)
0.010
(0.059)

0.031 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.014**
(0.039) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034)

0.926
0.908
0.913
0.915
0.928
0.892
0.895
0.920
0.921
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2
N
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
Note. N=64 in all models. Cells are standardized beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

0.918
64
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Overall, increases in college-education prove to be the strongest predictor (𝛽𝛽=0.849;
p=0.007) of racial liberalism for white Democrats. A one standard deviation increase (+10.5
percentage points) in the share of white Democrats with at least a BA degree is expected to
increase racial liberalism by 7.1 points. For white Republicans, though, these effects are both
smaller and statistically insignificant (𝛽𝛽=0.218; p=0.168). Instead, and in terms of absolute size,
REM is the strongest predictor of white Republican racial liberalism. Needless to say, this result
is unexpected and will be further anatomized below.
Given the ideological-partisan sorting of the past few decades, one would expect to
observe a similar pattern of results for white liberals and conservatives. And, as shown in Table
4.20 below, we generally do. Beginning with columns (a), the unadjusted effects of racial
equalitarian media on racial liberalism is significantly positive for white liberals (𝛽𝛽=0.317; p <
0.001) while much weaker and insignificant for white conservatives (𝛽𝛽=0.056; p=0.425)--a
difference that is unlikely to be zero (p=0.003). Controlling for the volume of race-related news
articles (columns b) again enhances these effects considerably for both white liberals (𝛽𝛽=0.553, p
<0.001) and conservatives (𝛽𝛽=0.260; p=0.047). The difference between these coefficients
remains significant (p=0.045) at the p < 0.05 level. The results in columns (c), which adjusts for
generational replacement, exhibit the same pattern as before: the effects of racial equalitarian
media on white liberal racial liberalism are slightly attenuated (𝛽𝛽=0.472; p<0.001), while those
acting on white conservative racial liberalism are further magnified (𝛽𝛽=0.410; p=0.030).
Controlling for higher educational attainment (columns d) has the inverse effect—slightly
boosting the influence of REM on white liberal racial liberalism (𝛽𝛽=0.492, p<0.001) while
slightly lowering its influence on white conservative racial liberalism (𝛽𝛽=0.401; p=0.035).
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Table 4.20 The determinants of white liberal and conservative racial liberalism (1972-2019)
(a)
Racial Liberalism 0.740***
(t-1)
(0.087)
0.317***
REM
(0.080)
Race-Related
--Articles
Proportion Baby
--Boomer/Gen X
Proportion
--Millenial/Gen-Z
Percent With
--College Degree
Civil Rights
--Spending
Consumer
--Sentiment
Non-Racial
--Policy Liberalism
Constant

White Liberal
(b)
(c)
(d)
0.706*** 0.461*** 0.454***
(0.078) (0.093) (0.097)
0.553*** 0.472*** 0.492***
(0.097) (0.080) (0.095)
-0.259** -0.164 -0.185†
(0.069) (0.102) (0.101)
0.181* 0.196†
--(0.086) (0.105)
0.251** 0.267*
--(0.061) (0.111)
-0.049
----(0.111)
---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

0.037* 0.035*** 0.023** 0.023**
(0.050) (0.046) (0.039) (0.039)

White Conservative
(e)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
0.379** 0.909*** 0.793*** 0.660*** 0.661*** 0.465**
(0.114) (0.070) (0.084) (0.094) (0.095) (0.135)
0.514*** 0.056
0.260* 0.410* 0.401* 0.428*
(0.102) (0.069) (0.127) (0.182) (0.183) (0.187)
-0.213
-0.301† -0.204
-0.200 -0.151
--(0.106)
(0.164) (0.223) (0.219) (0.212)
0.200
0.091
0.104
0.368
----(0.139)
(0.078) (0.128) (0.279)
0.307*
-0.384** -0.375* -0.492†
----(0.120)
(0.132) (0.165) (0.259)
-0.047
-0.017 -0.153
(0.110)
(0.144) (0.180)
-0.065
-0.059
------(0.051)
(0.102)
0.039
-0.110
------(0.065)
(0.099)
0.033
0.184
------(0.128)
(0.112)
0.019*
(0.040)

-0.034
(0.066)

-0.030*
(0.064)

-0.025
(0.061)

-0.025 -0.017
(0.062) (0.060)

0.882
0.902
0.928
0.927
0.927
0.799
0.812
0.832
0.828
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2
N
47
47
47
47
47
47
47
47
47
Note. N=64 in all models. Cells are standardized beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

0.832
47
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In the final model (columns e), which further adjusts for civil rights spending, consumer
optimism, and non-racial policy liberalism, a one standard deviation increase in REM is expected
to increase racial liberalism by just under 4.1 points for white liberals (𝛽𝛽=0.514; p<0.001) and by
2.4 points for white conservatives (𝛽𝛽=0.428; p=0.028). To offer a rough approximation of their
practical impact, consider that between 2013-2019, racial liberalism jumped by just over 20
points for white liberals and by 6.4 points for conservatives. The estimates in column (e) suggest
that 10.3 and 2.7 of these points, respectively, can be attributed to increases in REM across this
same period.
Overall, and unlike the results in the final model for white Democrats, REM proves to be
the strongest single predictor of racial liberalism among white liberals. For white conservatives,
it is also influential though it trails the (negative) impact (𝛽𝛽=-0.492; p=0.065) of a growing
Millenial/Gen-Z cohort. However, as we will discover below, the significant effects of REM on
both white republican and conservative racial liberalism are conditional on controlling for this
latter cohort variable. And that none of the effects are strong or significant in its absence
suggests that the relationship has a time dependency that is not the case for the racial liberalism
of white Democrats and liberals. Thus, what was initially interpreted as evidence inconsistent
with hypothesis H7B may actually prove consistent in the final analysis.
4.8

Robustness checks and secondary analyses
Given that the both racial equalitarian news salience and racial liberalism surged to

unprecedented levels in the past decade, it’s appropriate to ask whether the results observed
above are largely, if not entirely, driven by this ‘Great Awokening’. In other words, do the
significant predictive effects of racial equalitarian news salience vanish when we exclude the
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‘Great Awokening’ period? Is racial equalitarian news salience as predictive of racial liberalism
in earlier decades?
To get at the foregoing questions, I sequentially rerun the models in columns (e) of each
table while trimming 5 years off the data each time. Table 4.21 presents the beta coefficients of
racial equalitarian mediafor each time period for the sample as a whole, whites, and non-whites.
The top row of results are those from columns (e) of Tables 4.17-4.18, the data for which runs
from 1956-2019. When we limit the data to the 1956-2015 period, which is still long enough to
cover the early years of the Great Awokening, we see that the effects of REM are relatively
smaller but remain significant for all three of the listed populations. But when we truncate the
data to the 1954-2010 period, we see that only the coefficient for the sample (p=0.033) and for
whites (p=0.006) achieves statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level. Across all of the data
periods, which conclude with 1954-1985, the white coefficient reaches p < 0.05 significance in
all but the 1954-1990 period. Furthermore, its size does not systematically or linearly change
from one data period to the next. Unsurprisingly, given that whites constituted the
overwhelming majority of respondents in earlier decades, we see a similar pattern for the sample
coefficients. From 1954-2010, the sample coefficient reaches significance at the p < 0.05 level
(p=0.033), but its size is somewhat reduced relative to estimates over longer time spans. This is
likely due to the steep drop in the size of the non-white coefficient (p=0.567), which is no longer
significant in this period. In fact, across all subsequent periods, the non-white coefficient not
only never reaches significance, but it also progressively declines and, with one exception,
becomes consistently if modestly negative. These results are broadly consistent with those
observed in the granger tests, which offered no clear evidence that REM is causally related to
non-white racial liberalism.
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Table 4.21 Effects of REM on sample, white, and non-white racial liberalism in various
time periods
Period

N

1956-2019

64

1956-2015

60

1956-2010

55

1956-2005

50

1956-2000

45

1956-1995

40

1956-1990

35

Sample
0.448***
(0.091)
0.343***
(0.064)
0.274*
(0.124)
0.260†
(0.133)
0.281†
(0.156)
0.347*
(0.149)
0.488*
(0.197)

NonH0: White –
White Non-White=0
0.565*** 0.425**
0.339
(0.092) (0.129)
0.384*** 0.241**
0.179
(0.082) (0.086)
0.404**
0.088
0.013
(0.139) (0.153)
0.376*
0.012
0.006
(0.145) (0.180)
0.387*
0.072
0.021
(0.172) (0.232)
0.429*
0.014
0.023
(0.175) (0.227)
White

0.410
(0.249)

-0.021
(0.250)

0.032

0.735*
0.691*
-0.139
< 0.001
(0.281)
(0.299) (0.317)
Note. With exception of the right-most column, which shows p-values from a Wald test of equality of coefficients,
cells are standardized beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All estimates are adjusted for the
control variables featured in columns (e) of the primary models.
1956-1985

30

The left side of Table 4.22 below shows the coefficients of REM for the white Democrat
and Republican models. The most important and assuring observation here is that, with one
exception, the coefficients for white Democrats remain statistically significant across all data
periods. In stark contrast, we find that the larger coefficient for white Republicans in the 19542019 period is apparently an outlier. While it remains significant when the data is shortened to
the 1954-2015, it is more than half the size of its 1954-2019 counterpart. In fact, such appears to
mark the beginning of the end of the REM-racial liberalism relationship for white Republicans.
Indeed, when we examine the white Republican coefficients for the remaining periods, we see
that they become progressively smaller—ultimately in the negative direction—while never
approaching statistical significance. What is more, the differences between the white Republican
and Democrats coefficients become statistically significant and progressively widen across all
remaining time periods. In other words, the lack of earlier support for the prediction that REM
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would have a stronger effect on white Democrats than white Republican racial liberalism appears
to be largely a product of the ‘Great Awokening’ years. As was noted earlier, it’s during these
years that the decades long decline in white Republican racial liberalism finally reversed.
Table 4.22 Effects of REM on the white Democrat, Republican, liberal, and conservative
racism liberalism in various time periods
White x Party

White x Ideology
H0: White
H0: White
Dem. –
Lib. –
White White
White White
Period N
Period N
White
White
Dem. Repub.
Lib.
Con.
Repub.=0
Con.=0
19560.223* 0.486***
19720.514*** 0.428*
64
0.110
47
0.641
2019
(0.084) (0.128)
2019
(0.102) (0.187)
19560.226** 0.215**
19720.303*** 0.132
60
0.913
43
0.059
2015
(0.075) (0.066)
2015
(0.076) (0.085)
19560.372** 0.070
19720.240* 0.103
55
0.008
38
0.227
2010
(0.113) (0.079)
2010
(0.092) (0.102)
19560.386** 0.019
19720.265* -0.047
50
0.002
33
0.025
2005
(0.124) (0.085)
2005
(0.105) (0.121)
19560.420* -0.102
19720.185† -0.124
45
< 0.001
28
0.030
2000
(0.167) (0.088)
2000
(0.096) (0.122)
19560.459* -0.108
19720.173† -0.137
40
< 0.001
23
0.029
1995
(0.176) (0.092)
1995
(0.095) (0.116)
19560.401† -0.154
35
0.001
--- --1990
(0.197) (0.120)
19560.605* -0.064
30
0.004
--- --1985
(0.222) (0.205)
Note. With exception of the right-most column, which shows p-values from a Wald test of equality of coefficients,
cells are standardized beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All estimates are adjusted for the
control variables featured in columns (e) of the primary models.

The above may also explain why the white Republican coefficient shrinks and becomes
insignificant in the absence of controlling for the size of the Millenial/Gen-Z population.
Specifically, if REM only significantly predicts white Republican racial liberalism in the final
years of the data, it follows that earlier variation in the former is unrelated to variation in the
latter. But, as illustrated in Figure 4.26 below, because growth in the white Republican
Millenial/Gen-Z population partially coincides with both increases in REM and the reversal of
declines in white republican racial liberalism, controlling for it serves to suppress the variation in
REM that is criterion-irrelevant. On the other hand, because all of these trends move more or less
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in the same direction for white Democrats, the Millenial/Gen-Z variable has a confounding rather
than a suppressive influence on the REM-racial liberalism relationship. Hence, controlling for
this variable enhances the effects of REM for white Republicans while moderating them for
white Democrats.

Figure 4.26 Generational composition of white Democrats and Republicans across time.
Note. Plots for white Democrats and Republicans are graphed along different y-axes (not shown)

Though the underlying sample of cases is smaller, the patterns for the white liberal and
conservative coefficients, which are shown in the right side of Table 4.22, are very similar. The
effects of REM on white liberal racial liberalism reach or approach conventional levels of
significance in all time periods. But for white conservatives, they only approach significance in
the 1972-2019 period. And, similar to the case of white Republicans, the size of the coefficient
steadily declines and ultimately becomes and remains negative by the final two data periods. At
the same time, the difference between them and the white liberal coefficients both widens and
reaches conventional levels of significance.
In sum, the results of these secondary analyses generally comport with what the earlier
granger tests suggested. They show that the relationship between REM and racial liberalism is
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largely limited to or is only time-independent among white Democrats and liberals. In contrast,
they suggest that the significant and (for white Republicans) stronger relationship that was
subsequently observed for white Republicans and conservatives is largely an artifact of trends
that transpired during the Great Awokening period. When these years are excluded from the data,
the effects of racial equalitarian news salience on white Republican and conservative racial
liberalism are both no longer significant and are also significantly smaller than those for white
Democrats and liberals.
4.9

General Discussion
Overall, the findings of this chapter generally cohere with earlier predictions. First, H9

predicted that increases in the salience of racial equalitarian media (REM) would effect increases
in white racial liberalism. In the end, the results of all analyses lend support for this proposition.
Both the conventional and stationarity-corrected granger tests suggested that REM grangercauses white racial liberalism, but that white racial liberalism does not granger-cause REM
(H9A). Additionally, a series of dynamic regression models showed that the effects of REM on
white racial liberalism were both statistically and substantively significant net of a host of
theoretically-relevant confounds. Literally interpreted, the estimates of these effects would
indicate that around a half of the increase in white racial liberalism from 2010-2019 was due to
contemporaneous increases in REM. While the reality is likely more complicated, the evidence
suggests that these effects are far from trivial, especially when the long-run effects are
considered. When one further considers the likely measurement error embedded in the REM and
racial liberalism indexes, they may even be understated.
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Critically, the results also consistently showed that the effects are not simply due to
increases in race-related news coverage in general as opposed to increases in coverage of blackwhite inequities and injustice. In fact, adjusting for the volume of race-related news articles
actually considerably bolstered the effects of REM. This suggests that white racial attitudes do
not simply positively respond to any media coverage of race, but specifically media messaging
that speaks to black-white status differences in terms of past and/or present discrimination.
While no formal predictions were made with respect to the drivers of non-white racial
liberalism, it bears asking whether the effects of REM are unique to whites. On this point, it
should be clarified that there’s nothing in this dissertation’s theory that suggests that non-white
racial attitudes should be impervious to trends in REM. Instead, the theory would only predict
that such messaging activates different sets of group-based moral emotions in whites than nonwhites 79. Unfortunately, the present data does not permit a test of this hypothesis. That being
said, the best we can say is that the evidence on this question proved inconclusive. On one hand,
the non-white racial liberalism series did not significantly correlate with the REM index. Both
the conventional and Toda and Yamamoto granger tests also provided no evidence that REM
granger-caused non-white racial liberalism (or vice versa). However, the results of the dynamic
regression models raised the possibility that these results were, in fact, biased on account of not
adjusting for the overtime changes in racial/ethnic composition and partisan leanings of the nonwhite population. When the latter was controlled for, the effects of REM on non-white racial
liberalism were at once statistically significant and also statistically distinguishable from those
on white racial liberalism. However, we ultimately learned that these effects may, in fact, be an
artifact of the Great Awokening years. When these years are excluded from the analysis, the

79

Specifically, whereas such coverage is expected to elicit ingroup-focused guilt, shame, and anger among whites, it
is likely to stoke feelings of outgroup (i.e. white)-directed anger and victimhood among non-whites.
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effects of REM on non-white racial liberalism become both small and insignificant. This could
be because there is genuinely no causal relationship or, quite plausibly, the non-white variables
have too much error that, despite the best efforts of this researcher, could not be statistically
corrected for in the present data 80. Future researchers interested in the dynamics of non-white
racial attitudes are thus advised to disaggregate the non-white category into different
racial/ethnic groups so as to preclude the possibility that parameter estimates are biased by
demographic changes.
A secondary hypothesis (H9B) predicted the effects of REM on racial liberalism would
be stronger for white Democrats and liberals than for their Republican and conservative
counterparts. This chapter can offer qualified support for this prediction. First, only the white
Democrat and white liberal racial liberalism series were at least marginally significantly
correlated at first difference with the REM index. Further, both granger tests indicated that REM
granger-caused white Democrat and liberal racial liberalism, while neither provided clear and
consistent evidence that such was the case for white Republicans and conservatives. This pattern
also reared itself in the results of the first two dynamic regression models. Controlling for
previous racial liberalism and, thereafter, the volume of race-related news coverage, REM
significantly positively predicted both white Democrat and liberal racial liberalism. For white
Republicans, though, the effects to this point were both insignificant and significantly smaller
than those for white Democrats and liberals. Among white conservatives, they achieved
significance after adjusting for the volume of race-related news coverage, but remained
significantly smaller than they were for white liberals.

80

Some evidence favoring the former interpretation was observed in the robustness checks. Specifically, the woke
news coefficient for non-whites was both insignificant and negative during periods in which blacks still constituted
the overwhelming majority of the non-white population. But if this interpretation is valid, it begs the question: why
are non-white racial attitudes not similarly influenced by increases in racial equalitarian news salience?
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Subsequent models, however, would yield evidence against H9B. After controlling for
generational replacement, namely the proportion of Millenial and Gen-Z Republicans, REM’s
effects on white republican racial liberalism not only became significant, but they were also
(insignificantly) larger than those observed for white Democrats. The effects on white
conservative racial liberalism also grew in size, though they remained [insignificantly] smaller
than they were for white liberals. By the final model, the effects of REM were over twice the size
for white Republicans than for white Democrats, while the effects for white conservatives were
smaller but indistinguishable in size from those for white liberals.
Had the analysis ended here, the verdict on H9B would have been inconclusive at best.
But, as with the case for non-whites, subsequent tests suggested that the effects on white
Republican and conservative racial liberalism may be illusory. As once the data for the ‘Great
Awokening’ years is excluded from the model, the effects for these subgroups all but disappear
and become significantly smaller than those for white Democrats and liberals. Meanwhile, the
effects for the latter groups remain generally significant and positive as far back as the 19541985 and 1972-2005 periods, respectively. Together with the fact that the granger test results
only indicated causality in the case of white Democrats and liberals, the totality of the evidence
would seem to support H9B. Perhaps a more qualified if literal interpretation of the data would
be that the predictions of H9B hold until the onset of the Great Awokening. Such, of course,
would assume that the subsequent rise in white Republican and conservative racial liberalism
was caused by, rather than merely coincided with, record increases in racial equalitarian news
salience. While the present data does not allow for a sufficient test of this supposition 81, it’s not
altogether implausible nor inconsistent with this dissertation’s theory. For instance, it could be

81

A granger test on such a small number of data points is unlikely to yield reliable inferences.
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that white Republicans and conservatives—and the news outlets they attend to—generally avoid
or remain unaware of ingroup-critical information until its availability reaches a threshold at
which it can no longer be ignored. For white Democrats and liberals, which are more likely to
attend to or seek out such information, this threshold will naturally be lower.
An additional and non-exclusive possibility is that, whether due to greater cognitive and
political sophistication or fewer value conflicts, the racial attitudes of white Democrats and
liberals are more coherent than those of other groups. If so, then the lower responsiveness of
other groups to shifts in REM could stem from the fact that their disparate racial attitudes—
perceptions of discrimination, attributions of inequality, support for race-conscious policies
etc.—have weaker covariation. Evidence suggestive of this was observed in the covariance
structures of the items comprising the racial liberalism indexes of different groups. Specifically,
whereas the first dimension of the white Democrat and liberal racial liberalism indexes
accounted for 63-66% of constituent item variance, this figure was noticeably lower (39-46%)
for all other groups.
Of course, there may be many other interpretations that are equally if not more consistent
with these data. Rather than engage in tireless conjecture, the following chapter will utilize other
data in search for deeper insight.
4.10

Conclusion
If white racial attitudes are generally immobile or unresponsive to shifts in the

information environment, the theory presented in this dissertation is hard to defend. After all, if
changes in white racial attitudes do not follow changes in the flow of race-related media
messaging, the idea that ingroup-critical appraisals and emotions mediate such a relationship
becomes non-sensical. While not presenting any evidence of this mediation, the preceding
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chapter nevertheless laid the initial empirical groundwork while replicating the substantive
findings of Kellstedt (2000, 2003).
First, it established that white racial attitudes do indeed vary over time, but in some
periods and among some political groups more than others. In regards to the first point,
Baumgartner et al.’s (2009) characterization of the speed and (in)frequency of policy change
seems apposite to the current context : though racial attitudes are generally more or less stable
for extended stretches of time, when they do change, the change is typically rapid and
substantial. Further, while periods of parallel changes in racial attitudes across different
demographics are certainly discernable in the present data, some divergence from this pattern
was also observed. Specifically, trends in the racial attitudes of white Democrats and liberals did
not always resemble those of their Republican and conservative counterparts.
Second, this chapter offered consistent evidence that variation in white racial attitudes
follows, rather than precedes, variation in the frequency at which black-white status differences
are discussed and attributed to racial discrimination in the news media. Although more
equivocal, the evidence also suggests that white Republicans and conservatives are, on balance,
less responsive to these changes in the news media than white Democrats and liberals.
But the evidence offered here is limited in that it rests on aggregate small sample data,
including variables that likely contain non-negligible degrees of measurement error, and some
whose missing values had to be interpolated. We also can’t be certain that the REM-racial
liberalism relationship is not spurious or the result of other unconsidered variables; nor that it
holds at the individual-level. The extent that the REM index is capturing reporting on real world
events (e.g. police shootings) or abstract discussions of racial inequality (or both) is also unclear.
Thus, what we need is corroborative and granular data; a closeup rather than a birds-eye view of
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the media and attitudinal dynamics. Such is the purpose of the next chapter, which will leverage
quasi-experimental and panel designs in the search for supplemental evidence.
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5
5.1

THE ‘FLOYD EFFECT’ ON WHITE RACIAL LIBERALISM

Introduction
The previous chapter presented evidence that shifts in white racial liberalism follow shifts

in the salience of media highlights status differences between whites and blacks in terms of racial
discrimination and bias. It also provided evidence suggesting that the racial attitudes of white
Democrats and liberals are more sensitive to these media trends than are Republicans and
conservatives. However, because the underlying data was aggregated at an annual level, there
were a number of questions that went unaddressed. First, the specific drivers of variation in
racial equalitarian media (REM) remain unclear. Is movement incident-based--a response to high
profile cases of alleged racial injustice? Or does it more generally follow the salience of race in
political discourse (or both)? Second, while the racial liberalism index used in the previous
chapter was exhaustive and useful for tracking racial attitudes across time, it risked conflating
distinct attitudinal dimensions, such as perceptions of discrimination and support for pro-black
policies. The theoretical connection between the items comprising the index and the ingroupcritical emotions that inform responses were also less than obvious. Finally, the data did not
allow me to definitively conclude that the racial attitudes of white Democrats and liberals are
more sensitive to REM stimuli than Republicans and conservatives.
The current chapter sheds light on the preceding questions by studying the impact of the
May 25 death of George Floyd on white racial attitudes. More specifically, it attempts to get at
the following:
1) Did the widely publicized killing of George Floyd increase white racial
liberalism?
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2) Did the widely publicized killing of George Floyd increase the frequency of
racial equalitarian news coverage?
3) Does the frequency of racial equalitarian news coverage predict racial attitudes
before and after the Floyd incident?
4) Did the Floyd incident equally affect the racial attitudes of white
Democrats/liberals and Republicans/conservatives?
Crucially, the data allows me to get at these questions and also permits me to examine whether
attitudinal markers of collective shame and guilt are apparent in the wake of the Floyd incident.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I will briefly review the theoretical logic and
expectations that inform this chapter’s hypotheses (H8-H10). In the process, I will clarify how
anticipated findings relate to and serve to advance this dissertation’s theory. I will then introduce
the novel dataset and research design on which this chapter’s analyses are based. Next, I discuss
the quasi-experimental methods used for causal inference, including their assumptions and
limitations. I also discuss several robustness tests used to ensure the validity of the results. After
reviewing the variables, I will proceed to test the central hypotheses. The section thereafter
scrutinizes the data with additional tests and analyses. This chapter concludes with a discussion
of the main results and sets the stage for the chapter that follows.
5.2

Theoretical recapitulation and the current study
As was previously noted in Chapter 3, group-based emotions, such as collective guilt and

shame, are ‘time-dependent phenomena’. Their activation is ultimately function of ‘exogenous
shocks’ that increase the availability of information that implicates and renders salient specific
group identities. In the case of racial group identities, such ‘shocks’ can include high-profile
incidents of alleged or actual racial injustice committed by members of a dominant racial group
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against members of disadvantaged others. As these events heighten awareness of racial group
memberships and the status differences between, group members are likely to process and
appraise them in group-based terms and become sensitive to their implications for their ingroup’s
social standing. For members of advantaged racial groups, one such appraisal concerns the
moral reputation and legitimacy of their ingroup’s social status. As theorized, this is especially
likely to be the case when media coverage of racial incidents implicitly or explicitly speaks to the
illegitimacy of prevailing status differences and the complicity of the advantaged racial group in
their continuation. Those susceptible or sympathetic to such messaging—i.e. those inclined
towards societal or structural accounts of group differences—are likely to appraise themselves
and/or their ingroup as either directly and/or indirectly responsible for the plight of
disadvantaged outgroups. When the focus of these ingroup-critical moral appraisals are limited
to specific ingroup moral violation--as opposed to the morality of the ingroup as a whole-ingroup members are likely to experience and express feelings of guilt and remorse. These
feelings, in turn, inspire support for reparative policies that compensate a victimized outgroup.
But when the focus of a moral appraisal is more global and implicates an ingroup’s essential
(defective) moral character, ingroup members are likely to experience and express feelings of
collective moral shame. In addition to inspiring support for more expansive pro-outgroup
policies, moral shame is also likely to motivate the adoption of attitudes and behaviors that serve
to morally distinguish or distance group members from their morally-tainted ingroup.
The previous chapter offered evidence that increases in the frequency at which news
media implicates whites in black disadvantage tend to move white racial attitudes in a racially
liberal or pro-black direction. However, the data was much too coarse for identifying the
‘exogenous shocks’ or salient racial events that effect shifts in such media coverage.
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Additionally, the use of a Stimsonian racial liberalism index did not allow me to demonstrate
increases in specific racial attitudes that are theoretically and empirically associated with moral
shame and guilt.
Studying the attitudinal effects of the Floyd helps me to fill these gaps. First, the
‘exogenous shock’ of the Floyd incident enables a test of whether the frequency of racial
equalitarian media is at least partly a function of the occurrence of racialized events that involve
white ‘perpetrators’ and black victims. Second, the dataset featured in this chapter contains
measures of several attitudinal bellwethers of collective guilt and moral shame. The first of these
measures are ‘racial resentment’, which, as a subsequent chapter will show, strongly overlaps
with moral shame and guilt to the point that it’s not obvious that they are statistically
distinguishable constructs. The strength of these relationships suggests that if the Floyd incident
is found to affects levels of white racial resentment, we can reasonably infer (though by no
means conclude) that it also affected levels of white guilt and moral shame. A second measure,
ratings of racial group favorability, allows me to test whether the Floyd incident increased
attitudes that signal or reflect ingroup-distancing. Because it is both theoretically and empirically
predictive of such attitudes, to find that post-Floyd whites rated other whites more unfavorably—
and blacks more favorably—would constitute indirect or suggestive evidence of the operation of
moral shame. A third and final measure is of support for reparations. Both past research and a
subsequent chapter in this dissertation find moral shame and guilt to be among the strongest
predictors of reparative pro-outgroup policies, including granting cash reparations to African
Americans. Thus, if the Floyd incident is found to increase whites’ support for reparations, we
can reasonably infer that it also increased levels of moral shame and guilt.
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Lastly, the data permits a test of whether increases in racial equalitarian media mediates
the effects of the Floyd incident on these attitudinal outcomes. Demonstrating as much would
lend additional supportive evidence to a critical plank of my thesis—i.e. that, due to its activation
of ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions, white racial attitudes are sensitive to media
coverage that implicates whites in the persistence of racial inequality.
To be clear, none of these anticipated findings would constitute ‘smoking gun’ evidence
of my theory’s validity. After all, the dataset I work with in this chapter does not include direct
or explicit measures of white guilt and moral shame. And, if such a dataset was available, it
would be foolish to settle for proxy measures or variables that are strongly associated with these
emotions. But under the current circumstances, the best I can do is demonstrate a pattern of
results that strongly converge with the expectations of my theory. The search for more direct
evidence will be left to subsequent chapters.
5.3

Methodology
5.3.1

Data

Data for the attitudinal variables used in this study come from the Democracy Fund +
UCLA’s Nationscape tracking survey, which was fielded by the survey organization Lucid. This
rolling cross-sectional survey canvassed different nationally representative samples of American
adults (18+) nearly every day between July 18, 2019 and July 1, 2019. The pooled dataset
consists of 318,736 respondents, 67.5% of which identify as non-Hispanic whites and 47% as
male (Mean age=44.5). The average daily sample consists of 911 respondents (Median=868,
SD=473), including an average of 615 non-Hispanic whites (Median=583, SD=318).
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5.3.2

Procedure

For the current study, I employ an Unexpected Event during Surveys Design (UESD) to
assess the causal effect of the Floyd incident on white racial attitudes (see Munoz, FalcoGimeno, and Hernandez 2020 for an overview of this method). This approach attempts to
approximate the inferential power of a traditional randomized experiment by exploiting
exogenous variation in substantively relevant variables that is induced by the unexpected
occurrence of an event at a given time interval. In the present context, the occurrence of the
Floyd incident serves to exogenously assign cross-sectional survey respondents to ‘treatment’
(those surveyed after the Floyd incident) and ‘control’ (those surveyed before the Floyd incident)
groups.
As implied, a critical requirement for causal identification here is that an event occurs
unexpectedly, as predicted events (e.g. an election outcome) can lead to violating assumptions of
excludability and temporal ignorability. The former specifies that any differences between
respondents interviewed before and after the event be due solely to the event’s occurrence. A
potential complication here is the occurrence of collateral events 82 such that an unexpected event
occasions a series of subsequent events that affect responses on Y. The months of protests
triggered by the Floyd incident would reasonably fall into this category. As such, any
differences between pre-Floyd and post-Floyd attitudes cannot be narrowly interpreted as a
consequence of the event itself. Instead, they will be interpreted 83 as the joint effect of the Floyd
incident plus subsequent media and public reactions (e.g. protests).

82

Simultaneous events pose similar threats to excludability. However, to the best of this author’s knowledge, there
was no Floyd-unrelated event that co-occurred with the Floyd incident and subsequent protests that would similarly
affect responses to race-related outcome variables. As such, this issue is less of a concern.
83
For simplicity, I nonetheless refer to the effects as those of the ‘Floyd incident’ or ‘Floyd effect’
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The assumption of temporal ignorability assumes that the occurrence of an event does not
influence the selected timing of survey interviews. In other words, the time at which survey
respondents are scheduled to be interviewed should be as good as random. All individuals should
have an equal probability of being interviewed before or after an event’s occurrence. Threats to
this assumption could arise if, for instance, the occurrence of an event makes some respondents
more willing to participate in a survey than others (Brehm, 1993). As the Nationscape survey
relies on online non-probability samples, the prospect of this may not be trivial. To mitigate any
such bias, I first conduct a series of balancing tests to examine the extent of unit homogeneity—
i.e. whether pre- and post-Floyd samples meaningfully differ on key sociodemographic and
political background characteristics. Where statistically significant differences are observed, I
use entropy weighting to match the means of covariates across samples (Hainmueller, 2012).
This allows me to relax the strict ignorability assumption and to rely on the more tenable
conditional ignorability assumption, which holds that “treatment status is independent of
individuals’ potential outcomes conditional on a set of covariates” (Munoz, Falco-Gimeno, &
Hernandez, 2020, p. 10).
Noncompliance poses an additional problem for causal inference in the UESD
framework. Specifically, though post-event respondents are all assumed to have been ‘treated’ by
the event, some may actually have little to no awareness of the event and, thereby, they may not
have been ‘treated’ in practice. While this issue is most likely to arise when events have low
public salience, it can also surface in the hours and days immediately proceeding highly salient
events. The latter is most likely to be the case in the context of the Floyd incident. The media
data presented in Figure 5.1 suggests as much. For instance, New York Times articles and
Twitter tweets mentioning ‘George Floyd’ only begin to appear two days after the incident. At

184
least some of this lag is undoubtedly because the incident occurred on the night of May 25--with
Floyd officially pronounced dead at 9:25PM. Furthermore, the video footage of the incident
seems 84 to not be released publicly until the night of May 26. Thereafter, it would have taken at
least some time for much of the public—or, more specifically, a sufficient subset of Nationscape
survey respondents—to have watched the video and/or to become aware of the incident.

Figure 5.1 The salience of the Floyd incident as reflected in media coverage, Google searches, and Twitter
tweets

The foregoing considerations are particularly pertinent to the selection of temporal
bandwidths when analyzing the data. If too narrow a bandwidth is chosen, such as the days
immediately preceding and proceeding the Floyd incident, respondents’ exposure thereunto—
and the number of respondents themselves--might be too limited for detecting causal effects. On
the other hand, if the bandwidth is too wide, I run the risk of incident-unrelated trends and events
influencing any observed differences in attitudinal outcomes.

84

This impression is based the time-stamp of the first Google news search result that referenced the video.
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Weighing these tradeoffs, I opt for a bandwidth of ±38 days around the day of the
incident, but I also test shorter and longer bandwidths as a robustness check. This decision is
informed by several considerations. First and most basic, a 38-day bandwidth corresponds to the
period between the Floyd incident and the final survey day (July 1). And. as suggested in Figure
1, the Floyd incident and subsequent protests were still salient topics in both media coverage and
Twitter discourse even at the conclusion of the survey. For instance, on July 1, 2020, ‘George
Floyd’ was still being mentioned in just under 16% of all New York Times articles. Thus, any
causal ‘Floyd effect’ should still be operative in the final weeks and days of the data. Second, 38
days should provide sufficiently balanced and large enough samples for detecting small
differences. Given that the racial attitudes under analysis have already underwent dramatic
change in previous years, as was shown in Chapter 4, we would expect any post-Floyd change to
be relatively smaller in magnitude (due to ceiling effects). A bandwidth of 38 days should be
wide enough to generate enough observations for detecting small attitudinal changes while being
narrow enough to mitigate threats to excludability. With all of the above being said, to exclude
the possibility that observed effects are unique to a 38-day bandwidth, I will also test whether
alternative bandwidths meaningfully alter the pattern of results. In addition, to test for any
overtime decay (or growth) in observed effects, I interact the treatment variable with a ‘days
from incident’ variables in all analyses (see the section below)
Of course, even if it can be established that post-Floyd racial attitudes significantly differ
from those pre-Floyd, a question that remains is whether the effect is unique to racial attitudes.
If, for instance, post-Floyd respondents are significantly more liberal even on policy issues that
are not obviously race-related (e.g. abortion, climate change, healthcare), any ‘Floyd effect’
would be too indiscriminate to be interpreted as uniquely racial. As an additional robustness
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check, I will thus examine whether post-Floyd increases are manifest in any non-racial policy
attitudes.
5.3.3

Primary Variables

5.3.3.1

Experimental Instruments

This study’s treatment is operationalized with a dummy variable that codes respondents
surveyed between April 17-May 24 as ‘0’ (i.e. the control group) and those surveyed between
May 26-July 1 as ‘1’ (the treatment group). As was mentioned above, this variable will be
interacted with another that stores the number of days between the day of the Floyd incident and
the day on which respondents were surveyed. As our bandwidth is 38 days, this latter variable
ranges from -38 to +38 with 0 representing the day of the Floyd incident. For eventual robustness
checks, I create similar variables for narrower bandwidths of ±7 and ±14 days as well as wider
others that cover the entire pre-Floyd (July 18 2019-May 24 2020) and post-Floyd (May 26-July
1 2020) period.
5.3.3.2

Outcome Measures

Racial liberalism is measured with an averaged index of three variables (α=0.68). Two of
these variables come directly from Kinder and Sanders’ (1996) racial resentment scale 85. The
first asks respondents the extent that they disagree (1) or agree (5) with a statement that reads,
“Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for
blacks to work their way out of the lower class”. The second measures disagreement
(1)/agreement (5) with a statement that reads, “Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities
overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special
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Unfortunately, the Nationscape survey did not include all four items that constitute the standard racial resentment
battery.
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favors”. Finally, the third constituent variable 86 asks respondents how much discrimination
(1=None at all, 5=A great deal) they think there is “in the United States today” against a list of
social groups one of which are blacks. Respondents who neglected or weren’t able to provide
data for all three variables (just under 2% of the sample) are coded as missing. To generate the
index, I take the mean scores across the three constituent variables and then standardize the
composite output.
Pro-white (vs. black) favorability is measured as the difference between respondents’
favorability of whites vs. blacks. ‘Favorability’ here refers to survey items that asks respondents
whether they have a favorable impression towards blacks and whites. I code ‘haven’t heard
enough’ responses (which amount to 12.9% and 12.7% of all responses to the white and black
favorability items, respectively) as a middle or neutral category 87 (3) to create 5-point scales
ranging from ‘Very unfavorable’ (1) to ‘Very favorable’ (5). I then subtract the black from the
white favorability scores to generate a differenced scale that ranges from -4 (strong pro-black
bias) to 4 (strong pro-white bias).
Support for reparations is measured with an item that asks respondents whether they
agree or disagree with a policy of granting “reparations payments to the descendants of slaves”. I
code ‘agree’ responses as ‘1’ and ‘disagree’ and ‘not sure’ responses as ‘0’.
Racial equalitarian media is measured with an index first introduced in the previous
chapter. However, in the present chapter, time dimension of the index is in days rather than

86
Though this item does not feature in Kinder and Sander’s (1996) racial resentment battery, it does capture a core
element (i.e. denial of discrimination against blacks) of most scholarly conceptions of symbolic racism. In addition,
an almost identically worded item (‘How much discrimination against blacks do you feel there is in the United
States today, limiting their chances to get ahead?’) is included in the Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale (Henry & Sears,
2002). Finally, a Cronbach’s alpha test shows that the inclusion of this variable leads to greater reliability(α=0.68)
relative to a two-variable scale in which it is excluded (α=0.58).
87
To exclude this many respondents from the analyses would be to sacrifice a large amount of data. The 5-point
scales, which code the foregoing as the ‘neutral’ category, also correlate a bit more strongly with each other
(Rho=0.30) than do the 4-point scales (Rho=0.25).

188
years. Specifically, the index was recreated so as to cover the time duration of the sample data
(July 18 2019-July 1, 2020). In addition, the normalization method I use is the percent of daily
NYT articles, rather than the percent of daily race-related NYT articles 88. Thus, each data point
represents the percent of NYT all articles in each day that satisfy the search criteria presented in
section 4.3.2 of chapter 4.
5.3.4

Control Variables

As the approach taken here is quasi-experimental, and thus the researcher is unable to
randomly assign values of predictor variables, I need account for the possibility that at least some
of the post-Floyd attitude change results from variation in the composition of the sample.
Following the recommendations of Munoz, Falco-Gimeno, and Hernandez (2020), I begin with a
series of balancing tests that compare the treatment and control samples on a battery of
covariates that potentially influence both survey participation and racial attitudes. These
covariates are political ideology (1=Very liberal, 5=Very conservative), party affiliation
(1=Strong Democrat, 7=Strong Republican), educational attainment (1=Less than high school
diploma, 6=Doctorate degree), household income (1=Less than $15,000, 24=$250,000 and
above), sex (1=Male, 0=Female), political interest (1=Hardly at all, 4=Most of the time), and
census region (1=South, 0=Northeast/Midwest/West). Figure 5.2 graphs the regression
coefficients for the treatment (vs. control) group on each of these variables for white
respondents. While between-group differences are generally modest and indistinguishable from 0
across most of the 8 variables, those for ideology (ß=0.028 p=0.049), political interest (ß=-0.031;
p=0.011), and sex (ß=-0.017; p=0.010) do reach conventional levels of significance.

88

Whereas the former fit the data more poorly than the latter in the previous chapter, the opposite is the case here.
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Figure 5.2 Test of unit homogeneity (white sample)
Note. Plots are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Confidence intervals that do not overlap with the red line
on the x-axis indicate the presence of significant differences in a variable between white respondents in the
38 day post-Floyd period and white respondents in the 38 day pre-Floyd period.

As I will also be examining whether the Floyd effect is conditional on political
orientation, I conduct the same tests for white Democrats, liberals, Republicans, and
conservatives. The results are presented in Figure 5.3. Beginning with white Democrats, we see
that those in the treatment group were slightly but significantly less educated (ß=-0.054;
p=0.050), have lower household incomes (ß=-0.321; p=0.031), and are less likely to be male (ß=0.030; p=0.007) than those in the control group. Differences in all other variables are not
distinguishable from 0. Turning to white Republicans, the only difference that achieves
significance is political interest (ß=-0.033; p=0.041). For white liberals, only the male
composition is significantly different from the control group (ß=-0.029; p=0.031). Finally, for
white conservatives, none of the differences in any of the covariates reach significance at the
95% level, though differences in the male composition fall just short (ß=-0.021; p=0.061).
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Figure 5.3 Test of unit homogeneity (white subgroups)
Note. Plots are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Confidence intervals that do not overlap with the red line
on the x-axis indicate the presence of significant differences in a variable between white respondents in the
38 day post-Floyd period and white respondents in the 38 day pre-Floyd period.

In sum, while the treatment and control group are virtually indistinguishable on most of
the eight covariates, there are some small but significant imbalances. In order to be sure that they
do not contribute to any observed Floyd effect, I use Hainmueller and Xu’s (2013) Stata
‘ebalance’ package to implement an entropy balancing procedure. Specifically, this software
enables me to reweight the data so that the treatment and control samples among whites overall
and within each political subgroup have identical means across all covariates 89.

89

I additionally include these covariates as statistical controls in several of the analyses.
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5.4

Results
5.4.1

Pre/Post-Floyd trends in racial equalitarian media: testing H11

Hypothesis 11 predicted that the salience of racial equalitarian media would be
significantly greater in the post-Floyd than the pre-Floyd period. I test this prediction with a
visual inspection of the REM data. Figure 5.4 graphs the REM series both for the entire period of
the Nationscape data (left panel) as well as for the ±38 day bandwidth (right panel) that will be
used in most analyses. As expected, the racial equalitarian share of daily New York Times
(NYT) jumped to series highs following the Floyd incident (dashed red line). Specifically, from
July 18, 2019 to May 24, 2020, an average of 0.92% of daily NYT articles fit the REM search
criteria. But from May 26 to July 1, this daily average climbed to 6%, a more than 6-fold
increase. Further, there was not a single day of the pre-Floyd period in which REM coverage
(Max=4.29%) reached or exceeded this threshold. In fact, there were no REM articles
whatsoever for 37% of the 313 pre-Floyd days. In contrast, this cannot be said for any of the 38
days in the post-Floyd period. While none of this is surprising, these results confirm H11 and
offer evidence that at least some of the overtime variation in REM is driven by high profile
racialized police incidents. In practical terms, they suggest that when such incidents occur, the
media increasingly publishes articles that highlight black-white status differences while
discussing them in terms of discrimination and bias. Of course, if no post-Floyd shifts in
attitudes are observed below, the significance of such media coverage would be called into
question. Thus, the attitudinal outcomes are where we turn to next.
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Figure 5.4 Racial equalitarian articles as the percent of daily New York Times articles
Note. Dashed red vertical line represents May 25 (the day of the incident), while the two horizontal lines along the
y-axis denote the series means for the pre-Floyd (light black line) and post-Floyd (light green line) periods.

5.4.2

Direct effects of the Floyd incident on white racial attitudes: testing H8-10

Figure 5.5 graphs lowess-smoothed (bandwidth=0.3) time series of each of the three
outcome variables. Referring first to the left-most panel, we indeed observe a noticeable postFloyd bump in white racial liberalism, which accords with the expectations of H8. Table 5.1,
which displays the means of each outcome variable for the 38 days before and after the Floyd
incident, confirms that white racial liberalism significantly (p < 0.001) increased by roughly
0.174 of a standard deviation. However, if looking at the dark black line, the eyeball test would
suggest that that this increase pre-dated the Floyd incident. In which case, can we really be so
confident that the post-Floyd bump would not have occurred in the absence of the Floyd
incident? In truth, the apparent pre-Floyd increase is a graphical artifact. Figure 5.6, which
graphs the series for the ±38 day bandwidth, shows that while racial liberalism did inch upwards
in early May, it was actually trending downward both in the days leading up to and also on the
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day of and days immediately proceeding the incident itself. Thus, there’s no evidence that the
post-Floyd increase is merely a continuation of pre-Floyd trend.

Figure 5.5 Pre and post-Floyd trends in white racial attitudes (complete series)
Note. Plots are LOESS-smoothed with 95% confidence areas. Parallel green and black lines along the y-axis
represent the white sample’s mean racial liberalism score before and after the death of George Floyd, respectively.

Figure 5.6 Pre and post-Floyd trends in white racial attitudes (±38 days)

Note. Plots are LOESS-smoothed with 95% confidence areas. Parallel green and black lines
along the y-axis represent the white sample’s mean racial liberalism score before and after the
death of George Floyd, respectively.
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Table 5.1 Comparison of means tests
Racial Liberalism

Pro-White (vs. Black)
Favorability
-38 Days +38 Days

Support for
Reparations
-38 Days
+38 Days

-38 Days
+38 Days
White
-0.181
-0.007***
0.194
0.150*
16.29%
18.94%**
Mean
N
20,228
20,735
20,154
20,640
6,870
6,972
Note. Data limited to white respondents. Cell entries are predicted margins from OLS models.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Continuing onward to, the effect of the Floyd incident on favorability of whites vs. blacks
is comparatively less pronounced but still discernable. We see that the gap between white and
black favorability ratings was trending in the pro-white direction in the weeks and days leading
up to the Floyd incident. But after May 25, this trend abruptly reverses and moves in the negative
direction before rebounding in the later weeks of the post-Floyd period. Overall, though, and
consistent with H10, the pro-white favorability difference among whites fell by 0.044 points, a
very modest but nonetheless significant (p=0.018) decrease. Interestingly, and likely explaining
the modesty of this change, when the individual favorability variables are collapsed into
‘favorable’ and ‘unfavorable’ dummies, we see that almost of all the change is driven by
increases in ‘unfavorable’ views of both whites (+2.6 points, p < 0.001) and blacks (+2.9 points,
p < 0.001). And, as we will see later, this latter change (i.e., increases in unfavorable views of
blacks) is entirely attributable to an eventual white Republican and conservative post-Floyd
backlash.
Finally, the pattern for reparations attitudes is more difficult to interpret. H9 predicted
that white support for reparations would significantly increase from the pre- to post-Floyd
period. In the end, while white support is significantly (p=0.003) but modestly higher on average
in the post-Floyd (18.94%) vs. the pre-Floyd (16.29%) period —and does appear to point upward
after May 25--the long-run trend does not appear to depart much from that of the latter.
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5.4.3

Indirect effects on white racial attitudes: testing H8B-10B

Hypotheses 8B-10B predicted that the effects of the Floyd incident on each outcome
variable would be at least partially explained by increases in REM. Columns (b) of Table 5.2
begins a test these predictions. First, controlling for REM leads to a roughly 40% reduction in the
treatment’s direct effects on racial liberalism (ß =0.103; p < 0.001) while reducing them to
insignificance in the case of pro-white vs. black favorability (ß=-0.017; p=0.579) and support for
reparations (ß =-0.060; p=0.966), the latter of which turn negative. Further, net of the treatment,
REM remains a significantly positive predictor of racial liberalism (ß=0.012, p <0.001) and
support for reparations (ß=0.479; p=0.018), but an insignificantly negative predictor of
favorability towards whites vs. blacks (-0.005; p=0.463). When excluding REM and adjusting
for the 8 control variables (columns c), the effects of the treatment on racial liberalism (ß=0.174,
p < 0.001) and pro-white vs. black favorability (ß=-0.043; p=0.014) change very little from their
baseline (columns a), though its effects on support for reparations (ß =3.45, p < 0.001) is
moderately boosted. When REM is added to these covariate-adjusted models (columns d),
though, the treatment no longer significantly predicts favorability (ß=-0.018, p=0.525) nor
support for reparations (ß=1.97, p=0.128), while its effects on racial liberalism (ß=0.120) are
moderated but remain significant at the p < 0.001 level. The results of a causal mediation
analysis 90, which are shown in Table 5.3, confirm these patterns. They indicate that around 32%

90

These mediation models were fitted using Stata’s ‘sureg’ (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) command. Each
model consists of two equations: one regressing the outcome variable(s) on the treatment, the REM index, and
background covariates, and another regressing REM on the treatment and background covariates. Following the
guidance of Preacher and Hayes (2008), I calculate the indirect or mediated treatment effects by multiplying the
covariate-adjusted effects of the treatment on REM by the covariate-adjusted effects of REM on a given outcome
variable. I then calculate bootstrapped standard errors for these estimates from 10,000 replications.
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of the treatment’s total effects on white racial liberalism are mediated by REM (ß=0.057, p <
0.001). For favorability towards whites vs. blacks, this figure jumps to 58%, though, in the case,
only the total effects of the treatment (ß=-0.043, p=0.012) are distinguishable from zero
(ßIndirect=-0.025, p=0.263; ßTotal=-0.018, p=0.529). Finally, virtually all (94%) of the treatment’s
total effects on support for reparations is mediated by REM (ß=0.080, p=0.004). Thus, we find
evidence that REM partially and fully mediated the treatment’s total effects on white racial
liberalism (H8B) and support for reparations (H10B), respectively, but no conclusive evidence
that REM mediated its total effects on white vs. black favorability ratings (H9B).
Table 5.2 Direct effects of treatment and REM on white racial attitudes
Racial Liberalism (Z)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
0.173*** 0.103*** 0.174*** 0.120***
Treatment
(0.014)
(0.023)
(0.012)
(0.018)
0.012***
0.009***
REM
----(0.003)
(0.003)
-0.181*** -0.190*** 1.02*** 1.02***
Constant
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.044)
(0.034)
N
40,963
0.007
0.008
0.346
0.347
𝑅𝑅2
White - Black Favorability
-0.044*
-0.017
-0.043*
-0.018
Treatment
(0.019)
(0.024)
(0.014)
(0.022)
-0.005
-0.004
REM
--(0.004)
(0.003)
0.194*** 0.198*** -0.795*** -0.792***
Constant
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.073)
(0.073)
N
40,794
0.000
0.000
0.090
0.090
𝑅𝑅2
Support for Reparations (%)
2.65**
-0.060
3.45***
1.97
Treatment
(0.890)
(1.40)
(0.819)
(1.29)
0.479*
0.262
REM
----(0.203)
(0.181)
16.29*** 15.93*** 62.04*** 61.94***
Constant
(0.009)
(0.622)
(3.35)
(3.34)
N
13,842
0.001
0.002
0.170
0.170
𝑅𝑅2
Note. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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Table 5.3 Results of causal mediation models
Racial
Liberalism

White –
Black
Favorability
-0.018
(0.029)

Support for
Reparations

Direct
0.119***
0.005
Effect
(0.018)
(0.035)
Indirect
0.057***
-0.025
0.080**
via
(0.014)
(0.023)
(0.028)
REM
Total
0.176***
-0.043*
0.085***
Effect
(0.012)
(0.017)
(0.022)
Proportion
0.323
0.582
0.942
Mediated
Note. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients with bootstrapped standard errors (10,000 reps) in parentheses.
The mediator variable in each model is the Racial Equalitarian Media (REM) index. All models are adjusted for
background control variables
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

5.4.4

Effects of treatment x time on white racial attitudes

Columns (a) of Table 5.4 display the estimated effects of the treatment x days interaction
on each of the three outcome variables. For white racial liberalism, this interaction is
significantly negative term (ß=-0.004; p=0.002), which indicates that the incident’s effects on
this outcome became increasingly negative in later days of the post-Floyd period. A similar
pattern is observed for differences in white vs. black favorability. Though modestly lower
overall, the significantly positive treatment x days interaction (ß=0.005; p=0.003) reveals that the
effects of the Floyd incident ultimately moved in the pro-white direction with the passage of
days. In contrast, when it comes to white support for reparations, the interaction term is
insignificant (ß=-0.077; p=0.342), which suggests that the positive effects of the Floyd incident
on this variable are fairly constant across the 38 days of the post-Floyd period. Adjusting for the
8 control variables (columns b) does not meaningfully change the interaction term’s coefficient
for any of the three outcome variables.
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Table 5.4 Results of treatment x days interaction models
Pro-white vs. Black
Support for
Favorability
Reparations
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
0.113*** 0.118*** -0.101** -0.080**
-0.320
0.633
Treatment
(0.028) (0.023) (0.037)
(0.028)
(1.79)
(1.66)
Days from
0.004*** 0.003*** -0.001
-0.001
0.117*
0.124**
incident
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(0.001)
(0.049)
(0.045)
Treatment x -0.004** -0.003** 0.005**
0.005**
-0.077
-0.098
Days
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
(0.002)
(0.081)
(0.075)
-0.113*** 1.08*** 0.172*** -0.815*** 18.47*** 64.42***
Constant
(0.018) (0.046) (0.025)
(0.077)
(1.13)
(3.49)
N
40,963
40,794
13,842
0.008
0.347
0.001
0.090
0.002
0.171
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2
Note. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Coefficients in
columns (b) are adjusted for ideological strength, party strength, education, household income, age, sex, political
interest, and region of residence.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Racial Liberalism

The results thus are generally consonant with earlier predictions. Statistically significant
changes in the racially liberal direction were observed for all outcome variables in the 38 days
following the Floyd incident. However, all of them were relatively modest in magnitude, while
those for racial liberalism and pro-white favorability eventually trended in a racially conservative
direction. As I will demonstrate below, at least some of this can be attributed to the
countervailing effects of intra-white ideological polarization.
5.4.5

Direct effects on white racial attitudes by party/ideology: testing H8A-10A

Hypotheses 8A predicted that the effects of the Floyd incident on racial liberalism would
be stronger for white Democrats and liberals than for Republicans and conservatives. Figures 5.6
and 5.7 offer visual support of this hypothesis as it pertains to racial liberalism: the post-Floyd
increases among white Democrats and liberals are much more pronounced than those observed
for Republicans and conservatives. In fact, the comparison of means in Table 5.5 shows that
racial liberalism increased by 0.239SD (p< 0.001) and 0.254SD (p < 0.001) among the former
two groups, respectively, and by 0.125SD (p<0.001) and 0.122SD (p < 0.001) among the latter.
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As reflected in Figure 5.13, which graphs the average marginal effects from the treatment x
party/ideology interaction terms, the differences in the size of these coefficients are all
significant at the p < 0.001 level.

Figure 5.6 Pre and post-Floyd trends in white racial liberalism by party and ideology (complete series)

Figure 5.7 Pre and post-Floyd trends in white racial liberalism by party and ideology (±38 days)
Note. Plots are LOESS-smoothed with 95% confidence areas. Parallel green and black lines along the y-axis
represent a subgroup’s mean racial liberalism score before and after the death of George Floyd, respectively.
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Hypothesis 9A, which relates to the effects of the treatment on pro-white vs. black
favorability differences, also finds support in the data. These trends are visualized in Figures 5.8
and 5.9. Though white Democrats (Mean-38=-0.120) and liberals (Mean-38=-0.179) rated blacks
more favorably than whites on average even in the 38-day pre-Floyd period, this difference grew
by 0.149 (p < 0.001) and 0.195 (p < 0.001) points, respectively, in the 38 days following the
Floyd incident. In contrast, though white Republicans (Mean-38=0.443) and conservatives (Mean38=0.445)

rated whites more favorably than blacks on average in the pre-Floyd period, the size of

these pro-white favorability differences actually slightly increased in the post-Floyd period—by
0.058 points (p=0.021) for white Republicans and by 0.108 points (p < 0.001) for white
conservatives. In absolute terms, the size of the changes in this variable for these two subgroups
was significantly smaller than that of those observed among white Democrats (p < 0.001) and
liberals (p < 0.001), which accords with H9A.

Figure 5.8 Trends in whites’ favorability towards whites vs. blacks by party and ideology (complete series)
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Figure 5.9 Trends in whites’ favorability towards whites vs. blacks by party and ideology (±38 days)

To examine whether these changes in favorability differentials are driven by increases in
favorable vs. unfavorable views of whites and/or blacks, I create dummy variables for the
‘favorable’ and ‘unfavorable’ categories of each group’s favorability scale. The average change
in these response categories for each group are shown in Figure 5.10 below. For white
Democrats, we see that the changes are almost equally due to increases in unfavorable views of
whites (ß=0.027, p=0.001) and increases in favorable views of blacks (ß=0.024, p=0.008).
Among white liberals, however, all of this change is driven by decreases in favorable views (ß=0.038, p=0.001) and slightly larger increases in unfavorable views of whites (ß=0.043, p <
0.001). Interestingly, for both white Republicans and conservatives, the comparatively modest
changes appear to be entirely due to increases in unfavorable views of whites (ßWhiteRep=0.022, p
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< 0.001; ßWhiteCon=0.020, p < 0.001) and even larger increases in unfavorable views of blacks 91
(ßWhiteRep=0.057, p < 0.001; ßWhiteCon=0.057, p < 0.001)

Figure 5.10 Average effects of treatment on percent of whites with ‘favorable’ and ‘unfavorable’ views of
blacks and whites by party and ideology.

Finally, and turning to support for reparations (Figures 5.11 and 5.12), whereas support
significantly increased by roughly 5.6 (p=0.001) and 7.4 (p=0.001) percentage points among
white Democrats (24.4%  29.9%) and liberals (34.0%  41.4%) 92, respectively, it
(insignificantly) grew by only 1.3 (p=0.180) points among white Republicans and by 2 points
(p=0.050) points among conservatives. Supporting H10A, the differences in the size of these
changes between these groups (White Democrats vs. Republicans: p=0.033; White Liberals vs.
Conservatives: p=0.031) are all significant at the p < 0.05 level.

91

As will be further elaborated on below, the treatment x day interactions helps to make sense of these patterns.
For both white Democrats and liberals, virtually all this increase in support is a function of movement out of the
‘disagree’ category. The small but significant increase among white Republicans, meanwhile, is mostly due to
movement out of the ‘not sure’ category.

92
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Figure 5.11 Trends in white support for reparations by party and ideology (complete series)

Figure 5.12 Trends in white support for reparations by party and ideology (±38 days)
Note. Plots are LOESS-smoothed with 95% confidence areas. Parallel green and black lines along the y-axis
represent a subgroup’s mean support for reparations before and after the death of George Floyd, respectively.
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Figure 5.13 Summary of average treatment effects on white racial attitudes by party and ideology

Table 5.5 Comparison of means tests
Pro-White (vs. Black)
Support for
Favorability
Reparations
-38 Days
+38 Days -38 Days +38 Days -38 Days +38 Days
White Democrat
0.361
0.600***
-0.120
-0.270***
24.37% 29.94%**
White Republican
-0.597
-0.472***
0.443
0.501*
11.21%
12.53%
White Liberal
0.496
0.750***
-0.179
-0.373***
34.02% 41.43%**
White Conservative
-0.690
-0.568***
0.445
0.553***
7.95%
9.97%*
Note. Cell entries are predicted margins from OLS models in which the treatment is interacted with either
ideology or party-ID.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Racial Liberalism (Z)

5.4.6

Indirect effects via REM

The middle section of Table 5.6 indicates that adjusting for the 8 control variables does
little to attenuate the baseline effects (top section) of the treatment. If anything, doing so actually
enhances its effects on support for reparations among all subgroups. Models in the bottom
section of Table 5.6 add REM x party-ID/ideology interaction terms 93. We now see that the

93

Thus, each of these models contains two interaction terms: one where the treatment is interacted with partyID/ideology and another where REM is interacted with party-ID/ideology.
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average treatment effects on racial liberalism are reduced by just over a third among white
Democrats (ß=0.240 0.158), by 27% among white Republicans (ß=0.1250.091), by 40%
among white liberals (ß=0.2480.149), and by a little under 15% among white conservatives
(ß=0.1150.098). Further, holding both the treatment and all other covariates constant, the
independent effects of REM on racial liberalism are significantly positive only for white
Democrats (ß=0.014; p < 0.001) and liberals (ß=0.017; p < 0.001). In contrast, its effects on
racial liberalism among white Republicans (ß=0.006, p=0.099) and conservatives (ß=0.003,
p=0.449) are not distinguishable from zero. Turning to the reparations models, controlling for
REM reduces the treatment’s effects on support to insignificance for white Democrats (ß=6.29, p
< 0.001 1.02, p=0.699) and liberals (ß=7.87, p < 0.0010.943; p=0.785), while somewhat
enhancing them for white Republicans (ß=1.83, p=0.050 3.08, p=0.037) and conservatives (ß
=2.19, p=0.031 2.83, p=0.086). As in the case of the racial liberalism models, the independent
effects of REM on support for reparations are only positive and only reach significance among
white Democrats (ß=0.921, p=0.012; ßRepublican=-0.222, p=0.248) and liberals (ß=1.23, p=0.012;
ßConservative=-0.113, p=0.623). Finally, controlling for REM somewhat reduces the treatment’s
effects on white vs. black favorability for white Democrats (ß=-0.147, p < 0.001  ß=-0.101,
p=0.029), only marginally for white liberals (ß=-0.185, p < 0.001  ß=-0.172, p=0.004) and
conservatives (ß=0.112, p < 0.001  ß=0.095, p=0.048), and not at all for white Republicans
(ß=0.055, p=0.027  ß=0.055, p=0.186). Diverging from the results of the other two outcome
models, REM has no independent effects on the favorability differentials of any of the 4 groups.

206

Table 5.6 Baseline and adjusted treatment effects on white racial attitudes
Pro-White vs. Black Favorability
Support for Reparations
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
Dem.
Repub.
Lib.
Con.
Dem.
Repub.
Lib.
Con.
Baseline Models
0.239*** 0.125*** 0.254*** 0.122*** -0.149*** 0.058* -0.195*** 0.108*** 5.57**
1.13
7.41**
2.02*
Treatment
(0.021) (0.017) (0.026) (0.026)
(0.030) (0.025) (0.039)
(0.029) (1.73) (0.106) (2.27)
(1.03)
0.361***
0.496***
-0.120***
-0.179***
24.37***
34.02***
Constant
(0.015)
(0.018)
(0.021)
(0.027)
(1.16)
(1.55)
Adjusted R2
0.257
0.348
0.063
0.080
0.040
0.124
Controlled Models (Excluding REM x Party/Ideology Interaction)
0.240*** 0.125*** 0.248*** 0.115*** -0.147*** 0.055* -0.185*** 0.112*** 6.29*** 1.83* 7.87***
2.19*
Treatment
(0.019) (0.016) (0.023) (0.018)
(0.029) (0.025) (0.037)
(0.029) (1.62) (0.935) (2.17)
(1.01)
1.05***
1.17***
-0.826***
-0.965***
59.73***
60.55***
Constant
(0.053)
(0.066)
(0.089)
(0.114)
(4.05)
(4.93)
Adjusted R2
0.368
0.441
0.095
0.127
0.172
0.199
Controlled Models (Including REM x Party/Ideology Interaction)
0.158*** 0.070** 0.149*** 0.098** -0.101*
0.055 -0.172** 0.095*
1.02
3.08*
0.943
2.83†
Treatment
(0.031) (0.022) (0.036) (0.028)
(0.046) (0.042) (0.059)
(0.048)
(2.62)
(1.48)
(3.46)
(1.65)
0.014*** 0.006† 0.017*** 0.003
-0.008
0.000
-0.002
0.003
0.921* -0.222
1.23*
-0.113
REM
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
(0.006) (0.366) (0.192) (0.489) (0.229)
1.04***
1.16***
-0.820***
-0.963***
59.18***
59.75***
Constant
(0.053)
(0.066)
(0.089)
(0.114)
(4.03)
(4.89)
Adjusted R2
0.368
0.442
0.095
0.127
0.174
0.201
Group N
15,851 20,631
10,514
13,714
15,824
20,503
10,941
14,306
5,358
6,923
3,749
4,786
Model N
36,482
25,337
36,327
25,247
12,281
8,535
Note. Cell entries are unstandardized conditional coefficients from these treatment (REM) x ideology/party-ID interaction terms with robust standard errors in
parentheses. Both the baseline and the first controlled model include treatment x party-ID/ideology interaction terms. The second controlled model adds an REM x
party-ID/ideology interaction.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
White
Dem.

Racial Liberalism
White
White
Repub.
Lib.

White
Con.
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The results thus far suggest that REM partially and completely mediates the effects of the
treatment on racial liberalism and support for reparations, respectively, among white Democrats
and liberals. In contrast, little to no evidence of mediation is observed for these outcomes among
white Republicans and conservatives. Lastly, when it comes to white vs. black favorability
differentials, no clear evidence of mediation is observed for any of the 4 groups.
To provide a more formal test of this suggested mediation, I fit a series of moderated
mediation models 94 with Stata’s ‘sureg’ command. Each of these models consists of two
equations: one where REM is regressed onto the treatment, and another where the outcome
variable is regressed on treatment x ideology/party-ID and REM x ideology/party-ID interactions
along with the background/demographic control variables. Indirect effects are then calculated by
multiplying each group’s estimated REM coefficient in the outcome equation by the coefficient
of the treatment in the REM (mediation) equation. Direct effects are calculated by multiplying
each group’s coefficients in the outcome equations. Standard errors for all of these estimates are
bootstrapped from 10,000 replications.
The results of these moderated mediation models are shown in Table 5.7. For the racial
liberalism models, they generally confirm what was suggested above: just under 40% and 33%
of treatment’s total effect on white Democrat (ßIndirect=0.080, p=0.001, Bias Corrected 95%
CI=0.034, 0.125) and liberal (ßIndirect=0.098, p < 0.001, Bias Corrected 95% CI=0.045, 0.147)
racial liberalism, respectively, was indirectly conveyed via REM. In contrast, none of the effects
via REM on white Republican (ßIndirect=0.032, p=0.123, Bias Corrected 95% CI=-0.009, 0.073;
share mediated=17.4%) and conservative (ßIndirect=0.016, p=0.465, Bias Corrected 95% CI=0.027, 0.060; share mediated=10.5%) racial liberalism approach significance. Differences in the

94

Why moderated mediation? Because the effects of both the treatment and REM are conditional on party-ID and
ideology.
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size of these indirect effects are significant for those between white liberals and conservatives
(p=0.014, z=2.34) but fall short of significance for those between white Democrats vs.
Republicans (p=0.126, z=1.53). For support for reparations, around 77% and 86% of the
treatment’s total effects on white Democrat (ßIndirect=0.048, p=0.025, Bias Corrected 95%
CI=0.006, 0.090) and liberal (ßIndirect=0.068, p=0.015, Bias Corrected 95% CI=0.014, 0.124)
support, respectively, are mediated through REM. Among white Republicans (ßIndirect=-0.013,
p=0.266, Bias Corrected 95% CI=-0.035, 0.010) and conservatives (ßIndirect=-0.008, p=0.804,
Bias Corrected 95% CI=-0.033, 0.018), these indirect effects are negative and indistinguishable
from zero. Differences in the size of these coefficients are significant both for those between
white liberals and conservatives (p=0.014, z=2.46) and also for those between white Democrats
and Republicans (p=0.012, z=2.50). Finally, the treatment’s indirect effects on white vs. black
favorability ratings via REM do not approach significance for any of the 4 groups (ßDem-Indirect=0.043, p=0.213, Bias Corrected 95% CI=-0.111, 0.026; ßRep-Indirect=0.002, p=0.959, Bias
Corrected 95% CI=-0.060, 0.066; ßLib-Indirect=-0.012, p=0.786, Bias Corrected 95% CI=-0.105,
0.077; ßCon-Indirect=0.017, p=0.644, Bias Corrected 95% CI=-0.057, 0.088).
In sum, REM mediated more than a third and nearly all of the treatment’s effects on
racial liberalism and support for reparations, respectively, among white Democrats and liberals.
In stark contrast, and in line with theoretical expectations, indirect effects on these outcomes
tended to be significantly smaller and never approached significance for white Republicans and
conservatives. Lastly, no significant indirect effects via REM were observed for any of the 4
groups when it comes to white vs. black favorability ratings.
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Table 5.7 Results of moderated-mediation models
Racial Liberalism
White
White
White
White
Dem.
Repub.
Lib.
Con.
0.160*** 0.152*** 0.150*** 0.135**
(0.031)
(0.034)
(0.036)
(0.040)

White – Black Favorability
White
White
White
White
Dem.
Repub.
Lib.
Con.
-0.104* -0.097† -0.172** -0.167*
(0.046) (0.051) (0.059)
(0.066)

White
Dem.
0.014
(0.027)

Reparations
White
White
Repub.
Lib.
0.003
0.011
(0.030) (0.035)

White
Con.
-0.003
(0.039)

Direct
Effect
Indirect
0.080**
0.032 0.098*** 0.016
-0.043
0.002
-0.012
0.017
0.048* -0.013 0.068*
-0.008
via
(0.027)
(0.023)
(0.021)
(0.022)
(0.035) (0.033) (0.046)
(0.037)
(0.022) (0.012) (0.028)
(0.013)
REM
Total 0.240*** 0.184*** 0.247*** 0.152** -0.148*** -0.095 -0.185*** -0.150† 0.062***
0.079*** -0.010
-0.010
Effect
(0.019)
(0.041)
(0.022)
(0.047)
(0.028) (0.064) (0.037)
(0.079)
(0.016)
(0.022)
(0.042)
Proportion
0.333
--0.397
----------0.774
--0.861
--Mediated
Note. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. The mediator variable is the Racial Equalitarian
Media (REM) Index.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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Taken together, and with the exception of the preceding, these results are generally
consistent with the notion that the racial attitudes of white Democrats and liberals are more
responsive to increases in REM messaging than their Republican and conservative counterparts.
5.4.7

Treatment x days interaction effects

The analyses thus far have been largely concerned with the main effects of the treatment.
But given the mass protests and, in some cases, looting and violence that unfolded during the 38
days following the Floyd incident, we’re also interested in determining if and to what extent
these effects evolve with the passage of time. Accordingly, columns (a) of Table 5.8 show the
baseline effects of a three-way treatment x days x party-ID/ideology interaction on each outcome
variable. Beginning with racial liberalism, we see that the positive effects of the treatment
become significantly stronger with the passage of days for white Democrats (ß=0.006; p <
0.001), insignificantly stronger for white liberals (ß=0.003; p=0.096), and significantly weaker or
negative for both white Republicans (ß=-0.003; p=0.009) and conservatives (ß=-0.004; p=
0.003). A similar pattern is observed for the treatment’s effects on pro-white vs. black
favorability ratings. As more days elapse in the post-Floyd period, the negative effects become
insignificantly stronger for white Democrats (ß=-0.006; p=0.072), insignificantly more positive
for liberals (ß=0.003; p=0.338), and significantly positive or pro-white among white Republicans
(ß=0.009; p < 0.001) and conservatives (ß=0.009; p < 0.001). Recall that for the latter two
subgroups, the effects on these favorability differentials were limited to increases in unfavorable
views of both whites and blacks. Though not shown, when ‘unfavorable’ dummies on the
treatment x day interaction, we learn that unfavorable views of whites significantly decrease
with the passage of days among white Republicans (ßWhiteRep=-0.001, p=0.005; ßWhiteCon=0.000,
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p=0.727) while those of blacks significantly increase among both subgroups (ßWhiteRep=0.002,
p=0.007; ßWhiteCon=0.003, p=0.001) While somewhat speculative, these results are suggestive of a
Floyd ‘backlash’ among white Republicans and conservatives as (presumably) ‘riots’ and
‘looting’ became more prominent in later post-Floyd media coverage. Finally, the interactive
effects on support for reparations are indistinguishable from 0 for all subgroups.
Table 5.8 Results of treatment x days x party-ID/ideology interaction models
Racial Liberalism
(b)
(a)
(b)
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
White
Dem. Repub. Dem. Repub.
Lib.
Con.
Lib.
Con.
0.112** 0.107** 0.113** 0.113*** 0.202*** 0.119** 0.186*** 0.119**
Treatment
(0.041) (0.033) (0.038) (0.031) (0.051) (0.038) (0.047) (0.035)
Days from 0.003** 0.000 0.003*** 0.000
0.001
0.000
0.002
-0.000
incident (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Treatment x 0.006*** -0.003** 0.005*** -0.003** 0.003† -0.004** 0.003* -0.004**
Days
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
0.377***
1.08***
0.491***
1.17***
Constant
(0.026)
(0.057)
(0.034)
(0.072)
Adjusted R2
0.258
0.369
0.349
0.442
White vs. Black Favorability
-0.134* -0.068 -0.122* -0.060 -0.305*** -0.052 -0.271*** -0.030
Treatment
(0.060) (0.052) (0.058) (0.052) (0.077) (0.058) (0.074) (0.058)
Days from -0.000 0.003** -0.001 0.003*
0.003
0.004** 0.002 0.004**
incident (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Treatment x -0.004† 0.009*** -0.004† 0.008*** 0.003 0.009*** 0.002 0.008***
Days
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
-0.067
-0.786***
-0.119*
-0.919***
Constant
(0.042)
(0.097)
(0.053)
(0.124)
Adjusted R2
0.064
0.097
0.081
0.128
Support for Reparations
0.600
-1.76
1.76
-1.01
2.47
-0.538
5.24
-0.571
Treatment
(3.42)
(2.05)
(3.24)
(1.94)
(4.49)
(2.17)
(4.32)
(2.08)
Days from 0.129
0.080†
0.118
0.075†
0.126
0.070
0.066
0.075
incident (0.079) (0.079) (0.075) (0.044) (0.103) (0.047) (0.098) (0.047)
Treatment x 0.146
0.025
0.116
0.005
0.199
-0.011
0.136
-0.021
Days
(0.126) (0.072) (0.119) (0.070) (0.158) (0.078) (0.153) (0.076)
26.46***
62.05***
35.07***
60.76***
Constant
(2.13)
(4.46)
(2.91)
(5.48)
Adjusted R2
0.041
0.173
0.124
0.200
Note. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients in columns
(b) are adjusted for ideological strength, party strength, education, household income, age, sex, political interest, and
region of residence.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
(a)
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Models in column (b) adjust the above estimates for the 8 background/demographic
control variables. Save for the interaction term reaching p < 0.05 significance for white liberals
(ß=0.003, p=0.035) in the racial liberalism model, this adjustment does not meaningfully change
any of the baseline estimates.
5.5

Robustness checks and secondary analyses
5.5.1

Tests of bandwidth sensitivity

To what extent are the preceding results a function of the selected time bandwidth? I
examine this question by re-running my models at bandwidths of a week, two weeks, and for the
full sample (i.e., July 18 2019-May 24 2020 vs. May 26-July 1 2020). Table 5.9 below presents
the results. Beginning with ± 1 week, we see that racial liberalism was insignificantly and
significantly higher, respectively, among white Democrats (ß=0.034; p=0.448) and liberals
(ß=0.118; p=0.047) in the week following the Floyd incident than in the week preceding it.
However, the results of the treatment x days interaction terms (ßWhiteDem=0.047, p=0.005;
ßWhiteLib=0.050, p=0.019) suggests that these differences start becoming larger in the later days of
the first post-Floyd week. This would be consistent with the several days lag in media coverage
of the incident that was noted earlier. Indeed, when the bandwidth is expanded to ± 2 weeks,
thus capturing this later growth, all of the main effects become comfortably significant
(ßWhiteDem=0.140, p < 0.001; ßWhiteLib=0.218, p < 0.001). On the other hand, the week to week
differences for both white Republicans (ß=0.097; p=0.007) and conservatives (ß=0.099;
p=0.017) do reach significance at the p < 0.05 level. The interaction terms for both of these
groups are significantly (ßWhiteRep=0.026, p=0.045) and insignificantly (ßWhiteCon=0.020, p=0.159)
positive, though, which suggests that the previously observed decay or reversal in their racial
liberalism occurred in later weeks.
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Table 5.9 Model results at alternate bandwidths

Treatment
group
Treatment
x Days
N
Treatment
group
Treatment
x Days
N
Treatment
group
Treatment
x Days
N
Treatment
group
Treatment
x Days
N
Treatment
group
Treatment
x Days
N

±1 Week
±2 Weeks
White –
White –
Racial
Support for Racial
Support for
Black
Black
Reparations liberalism
liberalism
Reparations
Favorability
Favorability
Whites
0.072*
-0.080*
1.35
0.133*** -0.083**
2.06
(0.030)
(0.040)
(1.93)
(0.023)
(0.030)
(1.46)
0.057***
-0.051*
0.183
0.024***
-0.013†
0.184
(0.015)
(0.020)
(1.01)
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.363)
8,462
8,432
2,900
15,411
15,347
5,244
White Democrats
0.034
-0.154*
5.62
0.140*** -0.144**
4.09
(0.045)
(0.067)
(3.85)
(0.033)
(0.049)
(2.78)
0.047**
-0.021
2.99*
0.030***
-0.009
0.234
(0.017)
(0.022)
(1.48)
(0.006)
(0.008)
(0.510)
3,353
3,343
1,133
6,054
6,042
2,069
White Republicans
0.097**
-0.054
-2.70
0.113***
-0.035
0.209
(0.036)
(0.058)
(2.06)
(0.033)
(0.042)
(1.62)
0.026*
-0.005
-0.195
0.009†
0.003
0.606*
(0.015)
(0.022)
(0.670)
(0.005)
(0.008)
(0.308)
4,168
4,148
1,424
7,637
7,592
2,590
White Liberals
0.118*
-0.261**
2.73
0.218*** -0.244***
4.41
(0.059)
(0.086)
(4.97)
(0.041)
(0.065)
(3.68)
0.050*
-0.014
1.68
0.034***
0.002
0.648
(0.021)
(0.028)
(1.89)
(0.007)
(0.011)
(0.675)
2,254
2,245
774
4,067
4,053
1,403
White Conservatives
0.099*
-0.014
-2.09
0.111***
-0.007
1.68
(0.041)
(0.064)
(2.36)
(0.031)
(0.047)
(1.79)
0.020
0.032
1.78†
0.008
0.001
0.759**
(0.014)
(0.021)
(0.943)
(0.006)
(0.008)
(0.271)
2,949
2,948
988
5,374
5,368
1,813

Full sample
White –
Racial
Support for
Black
Reparations
liberalism
Favorability
0.208***
(0.011)
-0.001
(0.001)
190,199

-0.038**
(0.014)
0.004**
(0.001)
190,211

3.76***
(0.698)
0.028
(0.064)
63,066

0.254***
(0.016)
0.006***
(0.002)
74,544

-0.153***
(0.022)
-0.004†
(0.002)
74,567

5.88***
(1.36)
0.504***
(0.067)
24,738

0.174***
(0.013)
-0.003**
(0.001)
94,273

0.065**
(0.020)
0.009***
(0.002)
94,267

3.20***
(0.763)
-0.212***
(0.045)
31,259

0.244***
(0.019)
0.003†
(0.002)
49,257

-0.166***
(0.029)
0.003
(0.003)
49,241

9.02***
(1.78)
0.199
(0.158)
16,312

0.164***
(0.015)
-0.004**
(0.001)
66,392

0.097***
(0.024)
0.009***
(0.002)
66,446

2.82**
(0.825)
-0.011
(0.078)
21,993
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Note. The ‘Treatment group’ and ‘Treatment x Days’ rows represent separate models. Cell entries in the ‘Treatment group’ row are unstandardized bivariate
OLS coefficients. Cell entries in the ‘Treatment x Days’ row are the unstandardized OLS coefficients from three-way treatment x days x party-ID/ideology
interactions. Constituent terms and their coefficients are not shown.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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The pattern for white vs. black favorability ratings are somewhat different. Both white
Democrats (ß=-0.154, p=0.021) and liberals (ß =-0.261, p=0.002) were significantly less prowhite and more pro-black in their favorability responses in the week following the Floyd
incident. However, and referring to the interaction terms, the magnitude of the treatment’s antiwhite/pro-black effects on these differentials did not meaningfully change as the days elapsed
(ßWhiteDem=-0.021, p < 0.345; ßWhiteLib=-0.014, p=0.629). In contrast, while in the expected
direction, the week to week changes among white Republicans (ß=-0.054, p=0.354) and
conservatives (ß=-0.014, p=0.831) are not significant—nor are the interaction terms. That these
pre vs. post-Floyd differences remain insignificant even when the bandwidth is widened to ± 2
weeks speaks both to their modest size and conflicting directions (i.e., increases in white
unfavorability ultimately fade and are replaced by increases in black unfavorability ).
Turning to support for reparations, white Democrat (ß =5.62; p=0.144) and liberal
(ß=2.73, p=0.583) support was nominally but not significantly higher in the 7 days following the
Floyd incident. Though the treatment x days interaction effects were significant for white
Democrats (ß=2.99, p=0.043)—and insignificant for white liberals (ß=1.68, p=0.374)—they
become indistinguishable from zero when the bandwidth is widened to ± 2 weeks. That the main
effects remain insignificant at this bandwidth but are significant at ± 38 days suggests that the
increases in support are too modest to be detected in smaller samples. Though in the other
direction, a similar picture appears to hold for white Republicans (ß=-2.70; p=0.191) and
conservatives (ß =-2.09; p=0.377), for whom support was nominally but insignificantly lower in
the week following the Floyd incident. At ± 2 weeks, these changes become positive but still fall
short of 0.05 significance (ßWhiteRep=0.209, p=0.897; ßWhiteCon=1.68, p=0.348).
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In sum, and depending on the subgroup in question, the results of the above indicate that
post-Floyd changes in racial liberalism and pro-white vs. black favorability are generally
apparent in the 7 days following the Floyd incident. These changes, however, come into starker
relief when the bandwidth is expanded to ± 2 weeks. This is both due to larger sample sizes as
well as subsequent growth in the magnitude of the Floyd effect. On the other hand, and likely
owing to smaller sample sizes, increases in support for reparations were comparatively static and
only reached significance at higher bandwidths.
5.5.2

Are the Floyd effects limited to racial attitudes?

An outstanding question is whether the effects of the Floyd incident were unique to racial
attitudes. Recall that non-racial policy liberalism emerged as a significant positive predictor of
racial liberalism in some of the models of chapter 4 (and in the models of Kellstedt 2000). Thus,
we can’t discount the possibility that the Floyd incident effected increased liberalism in general.
To examine this possibility, I regress 56 different non-racial policy measures—all dummy-coded
so that ‘1’ denotes a ‘liberal’ response--on the ± 38 days treatment variable for whites as a whole
and for each white subgroup. There are two things we are looking for. The first is consistency:
are there significant increases in liberal responses across the universe of available policy items?
Of course, with 280 different hypothesis tests (56 items x 5 groups), we would expect 14 of them
to reach 0.05-level significance on chance alone. Thus, we must also examine the relative
magnitude of any significant increases: are they of similar size to those observed for the racial
outcome variables?
Figure 5.14 shows the percent of hypothesis tests that reached different thresholds of
significance for whites as a whole and for each white subgroup. Overall, shifts in the liberal
direction were significant at the 95% threshold or lower in 41 of the 280 (or 14.6%) hypothesis
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tests. Sixteen of these tests were significant at the p < 0.01 level, while just three were significant
at the p < 0.001 level. To contrast, across the 20 (4 items x 5 groups) hypothesis tests conducted
on the 3 racial liberalism and single reparations item(s), 65% (or 13) were significant at the p <
0.001 level, while only 1 fell short of the p < 0.05 level. For the hypothesis tests conducted on
the white Democrat and liberal samples, 91.1% (or 5 of 56) and 92.9% (4 of 56), respectively,
fell short of the p < 0.05 threshold. Thus, among these groups, the number of tests that reached
this level of significance was not much above what would be expected by chance. Among white
Republicans (76.8%) and conservatives (85.7%), though, the number is considerably higher.

Figure 5.14 Distribution of p-values

Figure 5.15 scatter plots the p-values for both the non-racial and racial items for each
white subgroup. Interestingly, we see that the non-racial issue items that reached the p < 0.05
level tended to differ by subgroup. For instance, among white Democrats, no significant changes
were observed in the issue categories of healthcare, the environment, taxes, education, gun
control, foreign policy, and trade policy. However, among white Republicans, and with the
exception of taxes, there were significant changes on at least one item in each of these categories.
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Figure 5.15 Scatter plot of p-values by issue category
Note. Dashed red and green lines along the y-axis represent the p < 0.05 and p < 0.001 significance cutoffs,
respectively. Figures in parentheses denote the number of survey items in each issue category.

When correcting for multiple hypothesis testing, though, it becomes clear that, with a few
exceptions, only the race outcome variables remain significant. To implement this correction, I
opted to use the Romano-Wolf procedure for multiple comparisons (Romano & Wolf, 2005a, b,
2016). This procedure resamples from the data to create an asymptotic approximation for the
distribution of effects in a dataset. Compared to the familiar and conservative Bonferroni (1935)
procedure, this method affords researchers superior type-I and type-II error rates by accounting
for underlying dependencies among groups of p-values. In resampling the data to generate a null
distribution of test statistics whilst reckoning with variable intercorrelations, it allows researchers
to observe which in a set of tests are more likely to be representations of chance and which tests
stand apart from those tests consistent with the null.
Figure 15.6 depicts Romano-Wolf stepdown p-values for each white subgroup based on
1,000 bootstrap replications 95. Among white Democrats and liberals, three of the race outcome

95

For this procedure, I use the ‘rwolf’ Stata package developed by Clarke, Romano, and Wolf (2019).
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variables are all significant at the p < 0.01 level while support for reparations is significant at the
p < 0.05 level. The only race-unrelated item to reach significance at the p < 0.05 threshold after
correction is one of the dataset’s 4 measures of modern sexism. Specifically, the percent of white
Democrats and liberals disagreeing that ‘women who complain about harassment often cause
more problems than they solve’ went up by 5.7 and 7.2 points, respectively, in the 38-day postFloyd period. While it’s not immediately clear what to make of these increases, it should be
noted that they are significantly smaller (p < 0.001, < 0.001) than the 11.2 and 10.7 point
increases in the percent of white Democrats and liberals, respectively, who disagreed that ‘blacks
should work their way up without special favors’.

Figure 15.16 Romano-Wolf p-values

The picture for white Republicans is slightly different. Replicating the main results, the
change in Republican support for reparations is not distinguishable from 0, though changes in the
other three race outcomes are significant at the p < 0.01 level. Two of the non-racial outcomes,
namely support for allowing transgender people to serve in the military (p=0.046) and support
for a public healthcare option (p=0.036), reach significance at the p < 0.05 level. A third,
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opposition to deportations (p=0.082), is significant at the p < 0.1 threshold. Finally, among white
conservatives, only the 9.1-point increase in the percent who perceive there to be ‘a lot/a great
deal’ of discrimination against blacks remains significant (p=0.001) at the p < 0.05 level. The 2point increase in the percent disagreeing that ‘blacks should work their way up without special
favors’ item falls just short of this threshold (p=0.060), while similar increases in the percent
agreeing with the ‘Generations of slavery and discrimination’ (+3.6%, p=0.842) item and in
those supporting reparations (+1.2%, p=0.889) fall well above it.
Overall, then, when adjusting the hypothesis tests to account for the presence of false
positives, the variables that remain significant at least at the p < 0.05 threshold are largely limited
to this study’s primary outcome variables. Such not only offers compelling evidence of the Floyd
effect, but also its outcome specificity.
Further evidence of this specificity can be found in comparisons of the change in the
proportion of whites who perceive there to be ‘a lot’ or ‘a great deal’ of discrimination against
blacks vs. other social groups. Table 5.10 shows that, across all white subgroups, shifts in
perceptions of discrimination against non-black groups were significantly smaller than, and often
in the opposite direction to, shifts in perceptions of anti-black discrimination. Interestingly, we
also again observe some evidence of a Floyd backlash among white Republicans and
conservatives for whom the percent perceiving ‘a lot’ or ‘a great deal’ of anti-white
discrimination went up 2.5 (p=0.004) and 1.7 (p=0.089) points, respectively. This is consistent
with what was observed in the main analyses wherein it was found the effects of the Floyd
incident on these subgroups’ racial liberalism and pro-white vs. black favorability ultimately
moved in the racially conservative direction in the later days of the post-Floyd period 96.

96

While not reported above, a treatment x days interaction significantly positively predicted white Republican
(ß=0.002; p < 0.001) and white conservative perceptions (ß=0.002; p=0.018) of anti-white discrimination. This once
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Table 5.10 Change in share perceiving ‘a lot/a great deal’ of discrimination against
different social groups
Whites
Blacks
Asians Muslims Christians Women Men
0.009
0.092*** -0.018** -0.005
0.001
0.014* 0.001
Whites
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.006) (0.007)
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
White
-0.016* 0.086*** -0.037** -0.005
-0.014*
0.010 -0.018*
Democrats
(0.007)
(0.010)
(0.011) (0.010)
(0.007) (0.011) (0.009)
White
0.025** 0.093*** -0.010
-0.008
0.011
0.015† 0.009
Republicans (0.009)
(0.009)
(0.008) (0.010)
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
White
-0.007 0.074*** -0.029*
0.011
-0.021*
0.007 -0.018*
Liberals
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.014) (0.012)
(0.009) (0.014) (0.009)
White
0.017† 0.092*** 0.003
0.002
0.023* 0.031** 0.019*
Conservatives (0.010)
(0.011)
(0.009) (0.012)
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
Note. Cell entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for
the political subgroups were estimated from treatment x party-ID/ideology interactions. Dependent variables are
dichotomous (e.g. 0=None at all/A little/A moderate amount, 1=A lot/A great deal).
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Though the Floyd incident may have most strongly affected perceptions of anti-black
discrimination, this specificity is not equally manifest in comparisons of black/white vs. other
group favorability ratings. Table 5.11 shows the change in ‘favorable’ and ‘unfavorable’
responses for each of the 15 target groups featured in the dataset. These results make clear that
shifts in favorability were not limited to blacks and whites. Looking only at the racial/ethnic and
social group targets, we see that there is not a single one for which no significant movement can
be found across any of the subgroups. We also see that, for whites as a whole, movement was
greater in the favorability ratings of several other social groups than it was in those of whites and
blacks. For instance, the percent reporting favorable and unfavorable impressions of gays and
lesbians increased and decreased by +3.8 (p < 0.001) and -3 (p < 0.001) percentage points,
respectively. In contrast, movement in the impressions of ‘whites’ and ‘blacks’ is limited to +2.6
(p < 0.001) and +2.9 (p < 0.001) point increases, respectively, in the percent reporting
‘unfavorable’ impressions. At the same time, it is noteworthy that ‘whites’ are the only social

again suggests that the racially liberalizing effects of the Floyd incident were short-lived for these two subgroups,
which was not the case for white Democrats and liberals.
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group target that saw significant increases in ‘unfavorable’ responses across all white subgroups.
For white Democrats and liberals, increases in unfavorable views of ‘white men’ (+3.1 and +4.8,
respectively) constituted the single greatest shifts in sentiments towards any of the listed
ethnic/racial and social groups. On the other hand, for white Republicans and conservatives, the
largest singular changes were +5.7 (p < 0.001) and +6.7 (p < 0.001) point increases, respectively,
in the percent reporting ‘unfavorable’ impressions of blacks. These are followed by +4.6 (p <
0.001) and +5.2 (p < 0.001) point increases, respectively, in the percent reporting ‘favorable’
impressions of ‘gays and lesbians’.
Table 5.11 Changes in whites’ favorability/unfavourability towards various social groups
White
Democrats
0.006
-0.018†
Favorable
(0.006) (0.010)
Whites
0.026*** 0.026**
Unfavorable
(0.004) (0.008)
-0.001
-0.018
Favorable
(0.006) (0.011)
White
Men
0.025*** 0.031**
Unfavorable
(0.005) (0.010)
0.009
0.025**
Favorable
(0.006) (0.009)
Blacks
0.029*** 0.003
Unfavorable
(0.005) (0.007)
0.026*** 0.020*
Favorable
(0.007) (0.010)
Hispanics
-0.021*** -0.013*
Unfavorable
(0.005) (0.007)
0.027*** 0.020*
Favorable
(0.007) (0.010)
Asians
-0.026*** -0.019**
Unfavorable
(0.004) (0.006)
0.022**
0.018
Favorable
(0.007) (0.011)
Undocumented
Immigrants
-0.023** -0.014
Unfavorable
(0.007) (0.011)
0.022** 0.022*
Favorable
(0.007) (0.011)
Muslims
-0.015* -0.019*
Unfavorable
(0.007) (0.009)
0.007
0.004
Favorable
(0.006) (0.010)
Jews
-0.009*
-0.008
Unfavorable
(0.004) (0.006)
Whites

White
Republicans
0.004
(0.007)
0.023***
(0.005)
0.010
(0.008)
0.021***
(0.006)
-0.010
(0.009)
0.057***
(0.008)
0.030**
(0.009)
-0.026***
(0.007)
0.033**
(0.009)
-0.028***
(0.007)
0.026**
(0.008)
-0.029**
(0.009)
0.022*
(0.010)
-0.012
(0.010)
0.014
(0.009)
-0.011†
(0.006)

White
White
Liberals Conservatives
-0.039**
0.006
(0.012)
(0.009)
0.044***
0.020**
(0.011)
(0.006)
-0.041**
0.012
(0.014)
(0.009)
0.048***
0.019**
(0.013)
(0.006)
0.012
-0.022*
(0.010)
(0.011)
0.007
0.067***
(0.008)
(0.009)
0.010
0.025*
(0.011)
(0.011)
-0.012
-0.016*
(0.008)
(0.009)
0.005
0.034**
(0.011)
(0.011)
-0.010
-0.023**
(0.008)
(0.008)
0.021
0.027**
(0.013)
(0.009)
-0.028*
-0.025*
(0.012)
(0.010)
0.022†
0.018
(0.012)
(0.011)
-0.019†
-0.008
(0.010)
(0.012)
0.003
0.013
(0.011)
(0.011)
-0.009
-0.010
(0.008)
(0.007)
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-0.003
-0.019†
0.008
-0.036**
-0.003
(0.007) (0.011)
(0.010)
(0.013)
(0.011)
0.001
0.018
-0.009
0.028*
0.005
Unfavorable
(0.007) (0.011)
(0.008)
(0.014)
(0.008)
0.038*** 0.028** 0.046***
0.009
0.052***
Favorable
(0.007) (0.009)
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.018)
Gays and
Lesbians
-0.030*** -0.028*** -0.036*** -0.013
-0.033**
Unfavorable
(0.006) (0.007)
(0.010)
(0.009)
(0.011)
-0.008
-0.020†
0.001
-0.009
0.009
Favorable
(0.007) (0.012)
(0.007)
(0.014)
(0.008)
Socialists
0.003
0.012
0.001
0.001
-0.015
Unfavorable
(0.007) (0.010)
(0.009)
(0.012)
(0.011)
-0.020** -0.045***
-0.003 -0.055***
0.004
Favorable
(0.007) (0.011)
(0.010)
(0.013)
(0.012)
Labor Unions
0.017* 0.034***
0.005
0.042***
0.000
Unfavorable
(0.006) (0.009)
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.012)
-0.112*** -0.201*** -0.047*** -0.228*** -0.032***
Favorable
(0.007) (0.011)
(0.008)
(0.013)
(0.009)
Police
0.127*** 0.214*** 0.061*** 0.232*** 0.045***
Unfavorable
(0.006) (0.011)
(0.007)
(0.013)
(0.008)
-0.012 -0.036***
0.003
-0.047***
0.006
Favorable
(0.007) (0.009)
(0.008)
(0.011)
(0.010)
Republicans
0.010
0.034**
0.003
0.039**
-0.003
Unfavorable
(0.007) (0.010)
(0.007)
(0.012)
(0.008)
-0.001
-0.002
-0.005
0.005
0.002
Favorable
(0.007) (0.009)
(0.008)
(0.011)
(0.009)
Democrats
-0.001
0.004
0.005
-0.001
-0.003
Unfavorable
(0.007) (0.007)
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.010)
Note. Cell entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Coefficients for the political subgroups were estimated from treatment x party-ID/ideology interactions
Dependent variables are dichotomous (e.g. 0=Neutral/Favorable, 1=Unfavorable).
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Evangelical
Christians

Favorable

Considering now the political group targets, we see that the favorability ratings of
‘police’ saw the greatest change of all group targets. Among white Democrats and liberals, for
instance, ‘unfavorable’ views of the police jumped roughly +21 (p < 0.001) and +23 (p < 0.001)
percentage points, respectively. Unfavorable views of the police also increased among white
Republicans (+6.1; p < 0.001) and conservatives (+4.5; p < 0.001), though much more modestly.
While not surprising, such constitutes the most unambiguous evidence of the causal effects of the
Floyd incident. Less expected, at least upon first examination, is that these causal effects also
appear to extend to ‘labor unions’, which, at least traditionally, are generally allied with the
Democratic Party. While no changes significant changes are observed for white Republicans and

224
conservatives, among white Democrats, favorable and unfavorable views of ‘labor unions’
dropped and increased -4.5 and +3.4 percentage points, respectively, in the 38-day post-Floyd
period. Among white liberals, these figures were -5.5 and +4.2 percentage points. A plausible
explanation of these findings is that attitudes were not souring on labor unions per se, but to
police unions and their perceived resistance to policy reforms. While only suggestive, Figure 10
below indeed shows that Tweets and Google searches referring to ‘police union(s)’ spiked in the
post-Floyd period. But as this question is largely tangential to the thrust of the current study, I
will leave it aside for future research.

Figure 5.17 Pre and post-Floyd trends in the frequency of Twitter tweets mentioning (left) and Google search
interest (right) in the term ‘police union(s)’

Finally, of the two partisan target groups, significant changes obtain only for
favorability/unfavourability of Republicans among white Democrats and liberals. Among the
former group, favorability of Republicans fell 3.6 points (p < 0.001) while unfavorability
increased 3.4 points (p=0.002). For white liberals, these figures were -4.7 (p=0.001) and +3.9
(p=0.001) percentage points. On one hand, this could suggest that the ‘Floyd effect’ is essentially
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a partisan effect. That is, to the extent that non-whites and homosexuals are associated with the
Democratic party; and to the extent that the response of Trump and Republican Party to the
Floyd incident was perceived as antagonizing and unsympathetic, it’s possible that the Floyd
incident made white Democrats and liberals more favorable to political ingroup members and
less favorable towards groups (whites, white men, evangelical Christians, police etc.) associated
with the political outgroup. And yet this interpretation can’t readily explain why unfavorability
of whites initially increased among white Republicans and conservatives—nor does it account
for their increases in favorable views of Asians, Hispanics, and homosexuals 97.
5.6

Discussion
The current study sought to replicate and extend some of the findings reported in chapter

4 by examining white racial attitudes and the frequency of racial equalitarian media both before
and after the May 25th death of George Floyd. First, it was predicted that the Floyd incident
would result in significant increases in racial liberalism and in support for reparations, and in
significant decreases in favorable views of whites vs. blacks. All of these predictions bore out in
the data. Compared to the 38 days preceding the Floyd incident, white racial liberalism—i.e. the
percent perceiving ‘a lot/a great deal’ of discrimination against blacks, disagreeing that blacks
should work their way up ‘without special favors’, and agreeing that slavery and discrimination
has impeded black advancement—was significantly higher in the 38-day post-Floyd period. So
was support for granting cash reparations to blacks, which saw a roughly 3 percentage point
increase. In the other direction, we observed a significant decrease in the extent that whites were
rated more favorably than blacks. We also saw that the frequency of racial equalitarian media,

97

The idea that these latter increases result from greater social desirability pressures in the post-Floyd period is also
dubious, as it does not explain why white Republicans and conservatives felt ‘comfortable’ reporting greater
negativity towards blacks.
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which was found to be a robust predictor of racial liberalism in chapter 4, spiked considerably in
the post-Floyd period; and that this increase partially and almost entirely mediated the effects of
the Floyd incident on white racial liberalism and support for reparations, respectively.
However, it was ultimately learned that both the magnitude and nature of the treatment’s
effects were obscured by intra-white polarization. Consistent with hypotheses 8A-10A, the Floyd
incident was found to have a significantly stronger liberalizing effect on the racial attitudes of
white Democrats and liberals than on those of their Republican and conservative counterparts.
First, among the former two subgroups, scores on the racial liberalism index were roughly a
quarter of a standard deviation higher in the post-Floyd period—an increase that was more than
double the size of the one observed among white Republicans and conservatives. What is more, a
series of interaction models showed that the positive effects of the Floyd incident on the racial
liberalism of these latter two subgroups ultimately turned negative—moving attitudes in the
conservative direction—in the later days of the post-Floyd period. Importantly, this pattern was
not observed among white Democrats and liberals. To the contrary, we observed some evidence
that the positive effects for these subgroups grew (in the racially liberal direction) with the
passage of time.
Second, and supporting H9A, declines in pro-white vs. black favorability were found to
be significantly larger among white Democrats and liberals than Republicans and conservatives.
For white Democrats and liberals, these larger declines were the largely the result of concurrent
decreases in favorable views of whites, on one hand, increases in unfavorable views of whites,
on another. But among white Republicans and conservatives, initial increases in unfavorable
views of whites ultimately faded and were overtaken by larger increases in unfavorable views of
blacks. Together with the ultimately negative effects of the Floyd incident on these subgroup’s
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racial liberalism, as well the small increase in the percent perceiving ‘a lot/a great deal’ of
discrimination against whites, these findings are suggestive of a right-wing backlash against the
rhetoric and perceived violence of subsequent Floyd protests. At the same time, they also suggest
that the Floyd incident activated ingroup-critical emotions among all white subgroups, but
particularly among white Democrats and liberals 98. This interpretation, though, is somewhat
complicated by the fact that significant swings in the favorable/less unfavorable direction were
also observed in the favorability ratings of other social groups 99, such as homosexuals (among all
but white liberals), Asians (among all but white liberals), Hispanics (among whites as a whole,
white Democrats, and white Republicans), and Muslims (among all but white conservatives).
However, given that moral shame is thought to encourage a broader form of pro-sociality or
‘pro-outgroupness’, these findings are not altogether inconsistent with this dissertation’s theory.
Third, though the Floyd incident significantly increased support for reparations across
most of the white subgroups, this increase was found to be significantly larger among white
Democrats (+6.3 points) and liberals (+7.9) than Republicans (+1.8) and conservatives (+2).
While even the former two increases are not especially large, the reader should bear in mind that
this is a policy on which public opinion has remained relatively stable across time. For instance,
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Indeed, as we will see in the next chapter, white shame appears to be one of, if not the strongest predictor(s) of
rating blacks (among other racial/ethnic outgroups) more favorably than whites.
99
While there may be many other possible accounts of this pattern, one possibility is that, given the close
association and active collaboration between the Black Lives Matter and LGBT movements, protests against racial
injustice will inevitably feature rhetoric in support of LGBT rights. In fact, as shown on the left side of the figure in
Appendix B.1, the Floyd incident clearly occasioned an increase in both Twitter mentions of and Google search
interest in ‘LGBT’. Thus, the public salience of LGBT issues was clearly greater in the post-Floyd than pre-Floyd
period. Second, in recent years, ‘people’ or ‘communities of color’ have become the dominant umbrella terms for
non-whites, particularly in discussions of racial justice and inequality. And, similar to the trends in ‘LGBT’, the
right side of the figure in Appendix B.1 shows that Tweets and Google searches referring to ‘of color’ and ‘PoC’
jumped considerably in the post-Floyd period. An implication here is that the rhetoric surrounding racial incidents
that implicate blacks increasingly refer to non-whites as a whole. Thus, the association of ‘blacks’ with ‘people of
color’ entails that incidents that trigger sympathy towards blacks effectively triggers sympathy to non-whites as a
whole. In fact, this is precisely one of the predicted effects of white moral shame that will be tested in a later
chapter.
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the available polling data 100 on this policy question shows that between 1997 and 2015, support
for reparations among white Democrats ranged between 11-13%. A more than 6 point increase in
the space of several weeks is thus quite unprecedented. And, given their documented
relationships with support for reparations, it also suggests that, as my theory would predict, the
Floyd incident increased the salience of ingroup-critical emotions.
Finally, auxiliary hypotheses H8B-10B received partial support in the data. With respect
to H8B, the results showed that frequency of racial equalitarian media (REM) mediated roughly
a third the Floyd treatment’s positive effects on racial liberalism among whites as a whole. More
dramatically, and supporting H10B, it was found that REM completely mediated the treatment’s
positive effects on whites’ support for reparations. Crucially, in both cases, the results of
subsequent moderated mediation models revealed that these indirect effects via REM were larger
and only significant for white Democrats and liberals—i.e., groups that are more likely to tune
into and consume (vs. avoid) REM messaging. Coupled with the findings of chapter 4, this
suggests that increases in racial liberalism among white Democrats and liberals are far more a
function of increases in REM than is the case for white Republicans and conservatives. On the
other hand, that none of the liberalizing effects of the Floyd incident on the racial attitudes of
white Republicans and conservatives were significantly mediated through REM; and, further,
that these groups’ racial attitudes ultimately trended back in the racially conservative direction as
the post-Floyd days elapsed suggests that they are more likely to ultimately tune out REM
messaging and tune into racially conservative messaging.

100

A time series graph for this item, along with all the data sources used in its construction, can be found Appendix
B.2
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One glaring exception to the pattern of REM mediation was H9B, which received limited
to no support in the data. Specifically, the treatment’s indirect effects via REM on white vs.
black favorability ratings were not significant for whites overall nor for any of the 4 political
subgroups. Why this was the case is unclear. One unexplored possibility is that the treatment’s
effects on favorability ratings were actually mediated by racial liberalism. By this account, REM
essentially acted as a distal mediator; that is, it spurred increases in racial liberalism, which in
turn, spurred decreases in white vs. black favorability 101. If true, it would suggest that changes in
some racial attitudes follow from REM-driven changes in others. Future research should
examine whether this is indeed the case.
5.7

Conclusion
The current chapter attempted to fill several of the outstanding empirical gaps from the

previous. One of its central findings was that the Floyd incident effected attitudinal outcomes
(increased negativity towards whites, support for reparations) that are both theoretically and
empirically linked to ingroup-critical emotions. If only indirectly, it also offered evidence
suggesting that white Democrats and liberals—those whose egalitarian moral commitments
make them more susceptible to their expression—experience these emotions more strongly than
their Republican and conservative counterparts. However, to be compelling, the case for this
dissertation’s theory cannot rest on indirect evidence alone. Despite frequent references to the
influence of ingroup-critical emotions on white racial attitudes, I’ve yet to present any evidence
that directly substantiates this supposition. And actual measures of these emotions have thus far
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Consistent with this, the effects of the treatment on the white vs. black favorability ratings of white Democrats
and liberals are reduced to insignificance when adjusting for racial liberalism. A proper test of this account, though,
requires the fitting and comparison of this and alternative mediation model specifications.
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been absent. Thus, in the chapters that follow, we will finally move beyond ‘indirect’ evidence
and ‘suggestive’ relationships and head-on confront this dissertation’s core propositions.
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6
6.1

INGROUP-CRITICAL EMOTIONS AND RACIAL LIBERALISM

Introduction
The purpose of the current chapter is severalfold. First and most basic, it will attempt to

demonstrate what has hitherto been only theoretical: i.e. that ingroup-critical emotions are
important predictors of racial policy liberalism, and pro-outgroup orientations more generally.
But more than that, it will also compare their predictive effects to those of other attitudinal
measures, such as racial resentment and social dominance, which are considered by some to be
the primary determinants of white racial attitudes. Towards facilitating these analyses, this
chapter will also examine whether, as theory and past research suggest, the ingroup-critical
emotions of shame and guilt are statistically distinguishable constructs. Part of this test will rest
on the results of a factor analysis, while another will explore whether, as expected, shame
predicts a broader form of ‘pro-outgroupness’ than does guilt. Finally, this chapter will attempt
to shed light on the root of ideological differences in the expression of ingroup-critical emotions.
Such is important not only for setting the stage for the chapter that follows, but also for
explaining why the racial attitudes of white liberals are more sensitive to shifts in the salience of
racial equalitarian media.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I will introduce the data and the variables that
will feature in subsequent analysis. Next, I will conduct both exploratory and confirmatory factor
analyses in an attempt to verify that shame and guilt are statistically distinguishable, and thus
worthy of being treated as separate variables. Tests of primary hypotheses will follow, which
will examine the relationships between ingroup-critical emotions and support for pro-black and
liberal immigration policies. Thereafter, ideological differences in ingroup-critical emotions will
be examined, including the potential of racial resentment to account for them. This analysis
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consists of three parts. The first uses factor analysis to determine whether racial resentment,
moral shame and guilt are statistically distinguishable concepts. The second uses factor analysis
to test whether, as theorized, racial resentment is statistically indistinguishable from societal vs.
endogenous attributions of racial inequality. The third uses linear regression to examines the
extent that controlling for this expected general racial resentment factor accounts for liberalconservative differences in moral shame and guilt. A final empirical section consists of a
robustness check and an attempted replication of primary hypotheses on other data.
6.2

Data/Methods
The primary data featured in this chapter was gathered via the online crowdsource survey

service Prolific in collaboration with a fellow researcher from the Department of Psychology at
Michigan State University 102. Data collection commenced and was completed on August 27,
2020. Overall, the survey drew participation from 1,011 American adult respondents who were
compensated at a rate of $10 per hour of their time. Of this sample, 59 respondents indicated a
racial/ethnic background other than ‘White American/Caucasian’ and were excluded from the
dataset 103. An additional 62 respondents had missing data on one or more model-relevant
variables. To keep the sample size constant across models, these respondents are also excluded
from analyses, leaving an operational sample of 890 respondents (Mean age=34.3, SD=12.59). In
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This study received the approval of the Institutional Review Board at Michigan State University (MSU). It was
funded by an internal grant received by collaborator and MSU Department of Psychology member, Carlos David
Navarrete.
103
To clarify, Prolific allows for pre-screening of respondents on various background traits, including race and
ethnicity. And my collaborator and I made sure to apply a filter that ostensibly limited the availability of the survey
to non-Hispanic white American respondents. However, Prolific profiles of respondents may contain faulty or
outdated information. Where discrepancies surfaced between the race/ethnicity listed on the respondents’ Prolific
profiles and that reported during the survey, such respondents were dropped from the data.
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terms of demographic and political composition, 47% of this sample identified as male, 66.6% as
Democrat 104 (vs. 23.9% Republican), and 55.5% reported having a Bachelor’s degree or more.
6.2.1
6.2.1.1

Primary Variables
Ingroup-critical emotions

Collective shame is measured with two separate 4-item and 3-item indexes 105, all of
which are adapted from Brown et al. (2008). Each index corresponds to one of two theorized
dimensions of shame: moral shame and image shame. Recall (see section 2.2.3.2 of Chapter 2)
that earlier researchers mistakenly concluded that shame was predictive of anti-social behavior.
More recently, however, researchers have argued that this relationship is, in fact, an artifact of
not partialing ‘image shame’ from ‘moral shame’, the latter of which is predictive of prosociality (Allpress et al. 2014). A true account of moral shame’s relationship with pro-outgroup
attitudes thus requires that we adjust for variation in the former that is more related to
reputational than moral concerns. Likewise, an accurate reading of the effects of ‘image shame’
on pro-outgroup attitudes requires that we remove variation related to moral shame. Of course, if
these two dimensions of shame are statistically indistinguishable, then the theoretical distinction
between them is moot (if not questionable) and a singular ‘collective shame’ index would be
justified. The same applies to collective guilt, which is operationalized with an index consisting
of four 7-point Likert items that were also adapted from Brown et al. (2008). Specifically, if
variation in the items constituting my measure of guilt largely overlap with variation in those
intended to capture shame, then there’s little to gain (apart from strong multicollinearity) from
treating them as separate constructs in this study’s analyses. The first analysis below will thus be

104

This political imbalance informed my decision to attempt a replication of reported findings in more representative
samples.
105
The items and their descriptive statistics are presented in Table 6.1 below.
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a factor analysis to determine the degree of unique variation in each of the three affective
constructs. In the meantime, question wordings and descriptive statistics for each of the items
comprising the three measures of ingroup-critical emotions are provided in Table 6.1 below.
Each item is measured along a 7-point Likert scale ranging from ‘Strongly disagree’ (1) to
‘Strongly agree’ (7).
Table 6.1 Measures of white moral shame, image shame, and guilt
Moral Shame
When I think of the manner in which black people have been treated, I sometimes think
that we white Americans are racist and mean.
My racial group’s treatment of black people makes me feel somewhat ashamed about
what it means to be white.
I feel ashamed for the racist tendencies of white people
I do not feel ashamed to be white for the way we treated black people (r)
Image Shame
I feel humiliated when I think of how white Americans are seen negatively by others for
how they have treated black people
I feel disgraced because the behavior of white Americans towards black people has
created a bad image of white Americans in the eyes of others
To think how white Americans are seen for their treatment of black people makes me
feel ashamed
Guilt
I feel guilty for the manner in which black people have been treated by white
Americans
I feel guilty about the social inequalities between white and black people.

N

Mean
---

SD
---

940

4.90

1.91

940

4.60

2.05

940

5.11

1.87

940

4.40

1.85

937

3.84

1.87

937

4.36

1.87

937

4.29

1.86

938

4.59

2.00

938

4.49

1.97

Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for the behavior of white Americans
938
4.41
towards black people
When I think about then racism that exists towards black people, I feel guilty to be a
938
3.84
White American.
Note. All items are answered on a 7-point scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’.

6.2.1.2

2.04
2.01

Pro-black policy support

I operationalize pro-black policy support with three different items. The first is a measure
of support for affirmative action for blacks in the labor market, which was taken from the
General Social Survey. This item begins by briefly stating general arguments in favor of (‘Some
people say that because of past discrimination, black people should be given preference in hiring
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and promotion’) and against (‘Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion is wrong
because it discriminates against whites’). Respondents are then asked to give their own opinion
on a 5-point scale (1=Oppose strongly, 5=Favor strongly; Mean=2.88, SD=1.32). The second
item, which is also taken from the General Social Survey, is a measure of support for
government assistance for blacks. As with the affirmative action measure, this item begins with a
general argument in favor of (‘black people have been discriminated against for so long’) and
against (‘should not be giving special treatment’) the government having a “special obligation to
help improve [black people’s] living standards”. Respondents are then asked to place themselves
on a 5-point scale (Mean=3.46, SD=1.39) ranging from ‘I strongly feel that our government
should not be giving special treatment to black’ (1) to ‘I strongly feel that our government should
help black people’ (5). A third and final item, which was taken from a September 2019 APNORC survey, measures support for paying reparations for “slavery and racial discrimination in
this country by making cash payments to African Americans who are descendants of slaves” on a
5-point scale (1=Oppose strongly, 5=Favor strongly; Mean=2.88, SD=1.50).
The above items form a reliable index 106 (α=0.878), with Spearman Rho correlation
coefficients ranging from 0.689 to 0.732. I thus generate a summary scale by averaging them
together and standardizing the composite to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. But, as a
check of robustness, I will also analyze these outcomes individually to ensure that no single item
is responsible for the summary scale’s relationship with any of the ingroup-critical emotions.
6.2.1.3

Immigration liberalism

To test whether, as predicted, ingroup-critical emotions spillover to attitudes and policies
implicating non-black racial/ethnic minority groups, I include three different measures of

106

A Cronbach’s Alpha test shows that reliability significantly declines if any of the three items are dropped.
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immigration policy attitudes. The first item measures support for increasing [legal] immigration
into the US with a question taken from the General Social Survey. This question reads: “Do you
think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the US to
live should be increased, decreased, or kept the same as now?”. Responses (Mean=4.64,
SD=1.56) range from ‘Decreased a lot’ (1) to ‘Increased a lot’ (7).
A follow-up question, which I personally developed for the current study, asked
respondents to indicate the percent of immigration admissions that they think should be allocated
to “European and non-European countries”. Respondents were asked to enter a percentage figure
(MeanEuropean=44.54%, SD=16.38%) blank boxes corresponding to each set of countries.
As a check against the possibility that the expected pro-immigration effects of collective
shame differ as a function of the legality of the immigration in question, a second item that asks
about decriminalizing illegal border crossings was taken from the 2018 American National
Election Studies Pilot survey. This item measured the extent that respondents either favor or
oppose “ending criminal penalties for people crossing the US border illegally” on a 5-point scale
(1=Oppose strongly, 5=Favor strongly; Mean=3.27, SD=1.44).
6.2.1.4

Racial ingroup vs. outgroup warmth

I measure the tendency to favor racial outgroups over one’s racial ingroup with four 0100 feeling thermometers, which ask respondents to rate their feelings towards whites (i.e. the
ingroup; Mean=70.42, SD=23.29), blacks (Mean=72.33, SD=23.38), Hispanics (Mean=72.33,
SD=23.16), and Asians (Mean=73.78, SD=22.36). I then subtract the white thermometer scores
from each of the three racial/ethnic outgroup scores to create warmth differential scales. As the
three differential scales form a reliable composite index (α=0.952), I also generate a summary
scale by averaging across them (Mean=2.39, SD=24.02).
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6.2.1.5

Pro-outgroup behavior

To examine the possibility that the effects of ingroup-critical emotions on attitudinal
outcomes are driven by socially desirability pressures, I design and include a measure of prooutgroup behavior. This measure begins by introducing respondents to two non-profit advocacy
organizations—one of which is committed to “dismantling systemic racism and building antiracist multicultural diversity within institutions and communities”, and another that is committed
to “overturning strict immigration laws and defending the rights of undocumented and new
immigrants”. Respondents are then told that these organizations are “financially dependent on
individual donations to fund their operations”; and that the researchers would like to give them
“the opportunity to make a contribution of up to ten dollars to each organization”. Respondents
are then instructed to indicate their intended monetary donations on sliding scales (MeanAntiracism=3.79,

SD=3.81; MeanPro-immigration= 3.66, SD=3.78) ranging from 0 (i.e. no donation) to 10

(maximum donation). Finally, to bolster the credibility of the cover story, respondents are told
that the researchers will “record [their] contributions and follow up with more information at the
conclusion of the survey”.
6.2.2
6.2.2.1

Secondary/Control Variables
Symbolic racism

Given that some consider it to be the most robust predictor of racial policy attitudes, it
important that I compare the predictive effects of ingroup-critical emotions to those of symbolic
racism. In the current study, I operationalize this construct with Kinder and Sanders’ (1996) fouritem ‘racial resentment’ scale (e.g. ‘Generations of slavery and discrimination have created
conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class’), which
respondents respond to on 5-point Likert scales (1=Strongly agree, 5=Strongly disagree). Where
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necessary, I reverse-code the items so that higher scores denote greater racial liberalism. The
composite scale (α=0.899; Mean=3.72, SD=1.17) is generated by averaging the responses across
the 4 items. I then standardize the scale to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
It should be noted that controlling for racial resentment entails a very rigorous test of the
independent pro-social effects of ingroup-critical emotions. This is partly because, as some
researchers have argued (e.g. Schuman, 2000; Carmines, Sniderman, & Easter, 2011), the racial
resentment scale conflates racial prejudice with opposition to liberal racial policies. A
consequence of this (i.e. content overlap between X and Y variables) is an artificial inflation of
racial resentment’s relationship with separate measures of support for liberal racial policies. In
the current study, this means that controlling for racial resentment in models of pro-black policy
support may misleadingly render the effects of other predictors insignificant. Nonetheless,
controlling for it is important for determining whether ingroup-critical emotions account for
unique variation in racial policy attitudes or whether their effects are mostly redundant.
6.2.2.2

Attributions for racial inequality and perceptions of racial discrimination

One of the hypotheses tested in this chapter is that racial resentment will account for
ideological differences in ingroup-critical emotions. The underlying reasoning is that the
expression of the latter is conditional on the perceived legitimacy of black-white status
differences, which, itself, is argued to be a function of the extent that a person attributes black
disadvantage to past and/or present bias and discrimination vs. endogenous group factors (e.g.
cultural deficits, illegitimacy rates). I join past researchers in contending that the racial
resentment scale largely measures these attributional tendencies. To test this assumption, I
examine racial resentment’s relations to three measures—two of which I personally developed-that capture (a) perceptions of the severity of anti-black discrimination in contemporary US
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society, and (b) the extent that a respondent thinks that past and/or present discrimination
explains contemporary black-white inequalities. The wording of each of the three items is shown
in Table 6.2. In the first, respondents are asked to indicate on a 0-100 scale the extent they
believe that socio-economic inequalities between blacks and whites are due to past and/or current
racial discrimination and bias 107. The second gets at the same question by asking respondents the
extent that they disagree or agree with the notion that equal economic outcomes between blacks
and whites would prevail today in the absence of past and/or present discrimination. The third
and final item simply measures respondents’ perceptions of the severity of existing anti-black
discrimination. While all three items do form a reliable index (α=0.818), they are used only for
assessing their statistical relations with the racial resentment indicators.
Table 6.2 Measures of attributions for racial inequality
On average, African-Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than
white people. Using the sliding scale below, to what extent do you think these
differences are the result of past and/or current racial discrimination and
bias? A 0 on the scale below means that you think they are not at all due
to past and/or current discrimination and bias; a 50 would mean that you think
they are equally due to past and/or current discrimination and bias AND other
factors unrelated to discrimination and bias; and an 100 would mean that you
think it is entirely due to past and/or current discrimination and bias.

N

Scale

Mean

SD

936

0-100

65.03

27.84

936

1-7

4.97

1.57

936

1-5

4.00

1.05

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
If not for past and current discrimination, black and whites today would earn the
same incomes
Please tell me how much discrimination there is against each of the following
groups in our society today. Would you say there is a lot of discrimination,
some, only a little, or none at all? Blacks.
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Some of the wording for this item was adopted from the General Social Survey’s measures of racial inequality
attributions. These measures differ from the one I use in that they list four different causes (e.g. lack of education)
and ask respondents on a dichotomous yes/no scale whether they think black-white differences are mainly due to
each. The advantage of my measure is that it is designed to better get at the extent that respondents feel black-white
differences are accounted for by discrimination vs. other factors. Its primary disadvantage is that it does not probe
the specific ‘other factors’ that respondents attribute black-white inequality to. For present purposes, though, this
disadvantage is irrelevant as my interest is solely in determining how much respondents attribute black-white
differences to discrimination and bias.
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6.2.2.3

Social dominance

By my theory, the expression of ingroup-critical emotions should be at least partly
dependent on one’s orientation to social inequality and social hierarchies. Thus, specifying
models that include both measures of emotions and orientations is highly questionable if the
researcher’s interest is in the former’s relationship with racial policy attitudes. But for the same
reason that I control for racial resentment, I opted to include social dominance orientation as a
control variable in certain models to examine the extent that the effects of ingroup-critical
emotions are independent. Specifically, I use the abbreviated 8-item SDO7 battery developed
and tested in Ho et al. (2015). Half of these 7-point (1=Strongly disagree; 7=Strongly agree)
items are designed to measure the ‘pro/anti-dominance’ dimension of SDO (e.g. ‘An ideal
society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom’), while another half is
intended to capture its ‘pro/anti-egalitarian’ dimension (e.g. ‘Group equality should not be our
primary goal’). I recode each of the items so that higher scores reflect stronger anti-dominance
and pro-egalitarian orientations, respectively. I then create summary measures for each of the
two dimensions by averaging responses to the 4 dominance (α=0.815, Mean=5.75, SD=1.21) and
4 egalitarianism (α=0.785, Mean=5.52, SD=1.22) items. These summary measures are then
standardized to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
6.2.2.4

Demographic/Background variables

As additional controls, I include measures of age, sex (0=Female, 1=Male), education
(1=High school or less, 4=Graduate degree), political ideology (1=Very liberal, 7=Very
conservative), and party affiliation (1=Strong Democrat, 7=Strong Republican).
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6.3

Results/Analysis
6.3.1

Are white moral shame, image shame, and guilt statistically distinct?

To assess the empirical case for operationalizing shame and guilt with three separate
indexes, I begin by subjecting their constituent items to exploratory factor analysis. I use oblique
promax rotation to allow for intercorrelations between factors. The results, along with the
descriptive statistics and question wording for each 7-point item (1=Strongly disagree,
7=Strongly agree), are provided in Table 6.3. Overall, they support the 3-factor solution
suggested by recent theory. The items designed to tap moral shame load separately (with
loadings ranging from 0.519 to 0.739) from those intended to get at image shame and guilt.
Likewise, the items developed to measure image shame load separately (0.726 to 0.789) from
those relating to moral shame and guilt. Finally, the guilt items load more strongly on a third
factor (0.512 to 0.802) than either of the factors representing moral and image shame.
Table 6.3 Results of exploratory factor models
When I think of the manner in which black people have been treated, I
sometimes think that we white Americans are racist and mean.
My racial group’s treatment of black people makes me feel somewhat ashamed
about what it means to be white.
I feel ashamed for the racist tendencies of white people
I do not feel ashamed to be white for the way we treated black people (r)
I feel humiliated when I think of how white Americans are seen negatively by
others for how they have treated black people
I feel disgraced because the behavior of white Americans towards black people
has created a bad image of white Americans in the eyes of others
To think how white Americans are seen for their treatment of black people
makes me feel ashamed
I feel guilty for the manner in which black people have been treated by white
Americans
I feel guilty about the social inequalities between white and black people.
Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for the behavior of white
Americans towards black people
When I think about then racism that exists towards black people, I feel guilty to
be a White American.

Moral
Shame

Image
Shame

Guilt

0.739

0.008

0.143

0.682

0.086

0.171

0.568

0.135

0.273

0.519

-0.012

0.111

-0.100

0.789

0.093

0.128

0.735

0.048

0.154

0.726

0.095

0.087

0.076

0.802

0.146

0.075

0.749

0.157

0.131

0.640

0.205

0.157

0.512
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Proportion of variance explained
X2
N
Note. Cell entries are oblique-rotated factor loadings.

0.735

0.675
10000
937

0.799

I next attempt to validate this 3-factor structure via a confirmatory factor analysis 108, the
results of which are presented in Table 6.4. Column (a) tests a one factor model in which all
items form a common dimension. Measures of fit suggest that this model fits the data relatively
poorly (R-RMSEA=0.226, R-CFI=0.961, R-TLI=0.951). Columns (b) and (c) test different twofactor models. The first tests the assumption that image and moral shame form a common
dimension, which is distinct from white guilt. The fit of this model is superior to the previous
one-factor model, but still poor relative to the models that follow (R-RMSEA=0.200, RCFI=0.970, R-TLI=0.961). A second two-factor model tests the assumption that moral shame
and guilt form a common dimension whose variation is distinct from that of image shame. This
model is found to be superior to the previous two-factor model, but still fits the data rather poorly
(R-RMSEA=0.150, CFI=0.983, TLI=0.978). Column (d) tests the theorized three-factor model in
which the indicators comprising each emotion form unique respective dimensions. Of the four
models tested thus far, measures of fit indicate that this three-factor model offers the best fit to
the data (R-RMSEA=0.105, R-CFI=0.992, R-TLI=0.989). Thus, a three-factor solution receives
the most support in the data. However, a glance at the inter-factor correlations reveals very
strong relationships between factors, particularly between moral shame and guilt (0.933).

108

All confirmatory factor analyses in this chapter are conducted using R’s lavaan package, which offers superior
flexibility to Stata’s ‘SEM’ command when it comes to modeling non-continuous data. For the estimation method, I
use diagonal weighted least squares as it provides more accurate parameter estimates than maximum likelihood
when assumptions of multivariate normality are violated and/or when data are ordinal.
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Table 6.4 Results of confirmatory factor models

When I think of the manner
in which black people have
been treated, I sometimes
think that we white
Americans are racist and
mean.
My racial group’s treatment
of black people makes me
feel somewhat ashamed
about what it means to be
white.
I feel ashamed for the racist
tendencies of white people
I do not feel ashamed to be
white for the way we treated
black people (r)
I feel humiliated when I
think of how white
Americans are seen
negatively by others for how
they have treated black
people
I feel disgraced because the
behavior of white Americans
towards black people has
created a bad image of white
Americans in the eyes of
others
To think how white
Americans are seen for their
treatment of black people
makes me feel ashamed
I feel guilty for the manner in
which black people have

(a)
Factor
1

Factor
1

(b)
Factor
2

(c)
Factor Factor
1
2

Factor
1

0.831
(0.011)

0.844
(0.010)

0.912
(0.006)

---

0.838
(0.010)

---

0.858
(0.016)

---

---

---

0.399
(0.026)

0.786
(0.014)

0.938
(0.006)

---

0.919
(0.006)

---

0.954
(0.019)

---

---

---

0.365
(0.020)

0.885
(0.009)

0.873
(0.008)

0.895
(0.008)

---

0.881
(0.008)

---

0.912
(0.018)

---

---

---

0.225
(0.021)

0.864
(0.010)

0.675
(0.016)

0.688
(0.017)

---

0.684
(0.016)

---

0.706
(0.014)

---

---

---

0.320
(0.022)

0.648
(0.018)

0.763
(0.013)

0.777
(0.013)

---

---

0.822
(0.012)

---

0.822
(0.013)

---

---

0.532
(0.020)

0.672
(0.018)

0.799
(0.011)

0.812
(0.011)

---

---

0.862
(0.010)

---

0.863
(0.014)

---

---

0.480
(0.019)

0.722
(0.016)

0.862
(0.009)

0.882
(0.008)

---

---

0.961
(0.006)

---

0.960
(0.017)

---

---

0.470
(0.017)

0.808
(0.012)

0.934
(0.005)

---

---

---

---

0.944
(0.031)

---

0.944
0.938
(0.004) (0.004)

(d)
Factor
2

(e)
Factor General Factor
3
Factor
1

(f)
Factor
2

Factor General
3
Factor

0.414 0.909
(0.046) (0.009)
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been treated by white
Americans
I feel guilty about the social
inequalities between white
and black people.

0.915
(0.005)

Even if I have done nothing
bad, I feel guilty for the
0.927
behavior of white Americans (0.005)
towards black people
When I think about then
racism that exists towards
0.913
black people, I feel guilty to (0.006)
be a White American.

---

0.926
0.920
(0.005) (0.005)

---

---

---

0.926
(0.030)

---

0.175 0.903
(0.032) (0.008)

---

0.940
0.933
(0.004) (0.005)

---

---

---

0.940
(0.030)

---

0.122 0.927
(0.027) (0.006)

---

0.930
0.920
(0.005) (0.006)

---

---

---

0.930
(0.030)

---

0.011 0.937
(0.025) (0.006)

0.818
(0.011)

---

0.779 0.915
0.933
(0.014) (0.007) (0.162)
0.820
0.835
Factor 2
--------------(0.011) (0.068)
0.982
Factor 3
----------(0.903)
Robust RMSEA
0.226
0.200
0.150
0.105
Robust CFI
0.961
0.970
0.983
0.992
Robust TLI
0.951
0.961
0.978
0.989
Robust X2
2139.310
1659.147
948.516
466.827
df
44
43
43
41
p<
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
Note. Cell entries are standardized beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Factor 1

---

---

0.915
(0.006)

---

0.079
0.996
0.994
226.125
33
0.001
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Gignac and Kretzschmar (2017) argue that the results of correlated factor models can be
misleading, and that a general factor model should be additionally fitted to better evaluate the
distinctiveness of hypothesized dimensions. This is the purpose of column (e), which replaces
the correlated three-factor model with a general factor model in which between-factor
relationships are recast as the result of a single factor. The three rows preceding the fit statistics
in column (e) show the strength of these loadings. Specifically, 93.3% of the variance in the
‘moral shame’ factor, 98.2% of the variance in the ‘guilt’ factor, and 83.5% of the variance in the
‘image shame’ factor is shared with the general factor.
Following the recommendations of Gignac and Kretzschmar (2017), I calculate the
unique variance in of each of these factors using Schmid and Leiman’s (1957) decomposition
procedure 109. Using the transformed loadings, I then computed the OmegaHS coefficient for
each of the three lower-order factors 110. These coefficients can be interpreted as the ratio of
reliable variance specific to a lower-order factor to the total variance in its indicators. They
suggest that just 13.4%, 28.6%, and 3.6% of the modeled common variance in the indicators of
moral shame, image shame, and guilt, respectively, is unique to those factors. In other words,
these results suggest that most of the variance in each of the emotions is shared or result from a
common factor. The bifactor model depicted in column (f) provides a different but substantively
similar look at the unique vs. shared variance across factors. Here, indicator loadings on each
group factor represent the non-general or unique variance, while loadings onto the general factor
signify the general or shared variance 111. For instance, the guilt indicator loadings on the group

109
This procedure entails subtracting the squared general factor loadings from 1 and multiplying the differences by
their respective lower-order factor loadings.
110
This is done by dividing the sum of the squared decomposed lower-order factor loadings by the sum of the
decomposed lower-order and genera-factor loadings.
111
It should be noted that, in general factor models, local dependence violations are absorbed into the general factor,
whereas they are absorbed by the group factors in the case of bifactor models.
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factor range from 0.011 to 0.414 while those on the general factor range from 0.903 to 0.937.
This means that hardly any of the variance in the guilt indicators is unique to the guilt group
factor. With group factor loadings ranging from 0.225 to 0.399, the picture is comparatively less
extreme in the case of moral shame. But a majority of the variance in its indicators is still shared
with the general factor. Of the three group factors, the indicators loading on the image shame
factor exhibit the greatest degree of non-general variance. The group factor loadings of these
indicators range from 0.470 to 0.532, while their general factor loadings range from 0.672 to
0.808.
In sum, there is a high but varying degree of generality in these data. Variance in guilt
appears to be the most general, followed by moral shame and image shame. Confronted with this
reality, there are several possible approaches I can take when modeling the influence of ingroupcritical emotions on the outcome variables featured in this study. The first is to ignore the results
from the general factor model in favor of the hypothesized correlated three-factor model. In
practical terms, this would entail the creation of three separate summary scales, all of which
would be included in the regressions I run below. The principal advantage of this approach is
that it is supported by theory, allows for the testing of the emotion-specific hypothesis, and
comports with the results of the exploratory factor analysis. But the obvious disadvantage is that
the large overlap in the variance of the three hypothesized emotions could, on account of strong
collinearity, render parameter estimates unreliable. A second approach acknowledges the
apparent unidimensionality of the three factors and opts for a general ‘ingroup-critical emotions’
factor. While not supported by theory, this approach has the advantage of reduced collinearity
and parameter estimates that are more reliable. A third approach is a compromise between the
previous two. It acknowledges the overlapping variance of the three factors, but also notes that
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this overlap is greatest for moral shame and guilt and less so for image shame. This approach
thus calls for combining the moral shame and guilt indicators while leaving those of image
shame as separate. Its advantage is that it reduces the extent of collinearity while still allowing
for tests of some emotion-specific hypotheses 112. Its downside is that it preserves some
(potentially high) degree of collinearity and is inconsistent with the theory that guilt and shame
are distinct if overlapping emotions.
In the end, and for the purposes of the main analyses, I opt for the first and third of the
approaches above. This decision is informed by both theory and empirical observation. In the
first case, recall that recent theory suggests that variation in collective shame reflects both moral
and image-related concerns. Whereas the former is found to positively predict pro-social/prooutgroup orientations, the effects of the latter are found to be negative. Thus, modeling both of
these dimensions together should remove the variation in moral shame that overlaps with imagerelated concerns while removing the variation in image shame that overlaps with moral concerns.
The expected outcome is that moral shame will then become a stronger positive predictor and
image shame a negative predictor of pro-outgroup attitudes. On the other hand, if all of the
emotions are treated as a single factor, the ‘negative’ or anti-social variation in shame can no
longer be partialed out. A potential consequence of this is that the pro-outgroup effects of this
general ‘ingroup-critical emotions’ factor will be at least someone attenuated. But rather than
merely speculate, I will examine this possibility in the coming section.
Beyond this theoretical rationale, the results of both the EFA and CFA suggested a 3factor solution best fit the data. While the general factor model suggested a high degree of

112

For instance, because image-related shame is theorized to negatively associate with pro-outgroup attitudes and
behavior, controlling for its influence should enhance the effects of moral shame/guilt. On the other hand, if all of
the emotions are combined to form a single index, the negative effects of image shame would conceivably suppress
some of the pro-social influence of moral shame/guilt.
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overlapping variance, which would increase the risk of strong collinearity, some have argued
that, owing to advances in computational algorithms an accuracy, “multicollinearity does not
affect standard errors of regression coefficients in ways previously taught” (Friedman & Wall,
2005, p.127). Nevertheless, rather than ignoring such concerns altogether, I will use variance
inflation indicators to monitor the extent of the problem. And, as a robustness check, I will later
rerun the models using the bifactor loadings for each of the three group emotion factors 113.
With the above being said, the remaining question is how to construct the individual
emotion variables. The approach I adopt is to create factor-weighted summary indexes 114.
Specifically, I multiply each respective emotion indicator by the product of its lower-order factor
loading (column d of Table 6.4) and the general factor loading of its respective group factor 115
(column e). I then add these weighted indicator scores together and standardize the composite
scores to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. To create the combined ‘moral shame/guilt’
index, I follow the same procedure as before but sum across the moral shame and guilt
indicators. For exploratory purposes, I also generate a combined ‘ingroup-critical emotions’
scale that sums across all factor-weighted indicators.

113

The bifactor loadings are essentially residualized of shared variance. Using them in regression models thus
allows one to examine how successful conventional models were in partitioning outcome-related variance across
highly colinear predictors.
114
In truth, these factor-weighted summary scales are almost perfectly correlated—and, in the case of guilt, is
perfectly correlated--with their (equal) unit-weighted counterparts. Specifically, the bivariate Pearson coefficients
between each emotion’s factor-weighted and unit-weighed summary scale are 0.9992 (moral shame), 0.9998 (image
shame), and 1 (guilt). Given that the lower-factor loadings were generally similar for each emotion, this is not
unexpected. While an argument could be made in favor of using the unit-weighted scales, I opt to stick with the
factor-weighted versions in the event that the small differences between them are substantively influential in the
aggregate.
115
For instance, for the first moral shame indicator in column (d) of Table 3, I multiply the raw variable by 0.800,
which is the product of 0.858 (lower-order loading) and 0.933 (general factor loading). I then follow the same
procedure for the remaining 3 indicators and sum the output.
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6.3.2

The effects of white shame and guilt on pro-black policy preferences: testing H1

I begin by estimating a series of basic OLS models with the pro-black policies index as
the outcome variable. These models are methodologically oriented—they are intended to
examine the performance of the emotion variables so as to assess their viability as separate
predictors. Columns (a)-(c) of Table 6.5 show the bivariate standardized effects of the individual
emotion variables, respectively, on support for pro-black policies. By itself, the moral shame
index (ß=0.723, p < 0.001) explains around 52.3% of the variance in this outcome, while the
guilt index (ß=0.700, p < 0.001) alone accounts for 49%. By comparison, the bivariate effects of
image shame (ß=0.477, p < 0.001) are significantly weaker—explaining roughly 23% of the
variance in the pro-black policy index.
Column (d) tests whether entering moral and image shame simultaneously into the model
enhances the positive effects of the former while shifting those of the latter in the negative
direction. This prediction receives some support. We see that the coefficient on moral shame
(ß=0.743, p < 0.001) slightly increases while the once significantly positive bi-variate effects of
image shame (ß=-0.029, p < 0.001) are now insignificantly negative. However, somewhat
unexpectedly, we also observe (column e) that this pattern is much more pronounced when guilt
is substituted for moral shame. Specifically, the effects of the former (ß=0.775, p < 0.001)
increase to an even greater degree while those of image shame become significantly negative
(ß=-0.101, p=0.009).
A comparison of the results in column (e) and (g), though, suggests that both moral
shame and guilt contribute to this pattern. When moral shame (ß=0.490, p < 0.001) is added to
the model, the significantly negative effects of image shame are further boosted (ß=-0.168, p <
0.001). The degree of collinearity in this model (Mean VIF=3.33, Max VIF=4.20) is perhaps less
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than desirable, but still tolerable by conventionally suggested thresholds 116. When the combined
moral shame/guilt index (ß=0.867, p < 0.001) is substituted for the respective individual scales
(column h), this collinearity naturally declines (Mean VIF=2.24). Importantly, the fit of this
model (Adjusted R2=0.562) is virtually equal to the model in which the emotions are entered as
separate predictors (Adjusted R2=0.563).
Table 6.5 Exploratory models of pro-black policy support
Moral Shame

(a)
0.723***
(0.021)

(b)

(c)

(d)
(e)
0.743***
------(0.031)
0.477***
-0.029 -0.101**
--(0.029)
(0.033) (0.038)
0.700***
0.775***
----(0.023)
(0.037)

Image Shame

---

Guilt

---

Moral Shame +
Guilt

---

---

---

---

---

‘Ingroup-Critical
Emotions’ Index

---

---

---

---

---

(f)
(g)
(h)
0.460*** 0.490***
--(0.044) (0.045)
-0.161*** -0.168***
(0.034) (0.033)
0.313*** 0.409***
--(0.046) (0.051)
0.867***
----(0.031)

---

---

---

(i)
---------

0.699***
(0.022)

-0.001
0.002
0.002
-0.001
0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.000
-0.000
(0.023) (0.030) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
Adjusted R2
0.523
0.227
0.490
0.523
0.493
0.551
0.563
0.562
0.489
Mean VIF
------1.86
2.25
3.40
3.33
2.24
--VIF Moral Shame
------1.86
--3.40
3.48
----VIF Image Shame
------1.86
2.25
2.31
2.24
--VIF Guilt
--------2.25
3.40
4.20
--VIF Moral Shame
------------2.24
--+ Guilt
Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are standardized Beta coefficients with robust standard errors in
parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Constant

Column (i) shows the bivariate effects of the ‘Ingroup-critical emotions’ index (ß=0.699,
p < 0.001). As expected, these are effects are considerably weaker than those of the moral
shame/guilt index in column (h). They also account for significantly less variance in the problack policy index (Adjusted R2=0.489). Finally, though not shown, moral shame did not

116

Of course, this issue may worsen as additional variables are entered into the model. I will thus continue to
monitor it in all subsequent analyses
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significantly (ß=-0.027, p=0.220) interact with those of guilt, which suggests that their effects on
pro-black policy support are additive rather than conditional on one another.
The above results suggest that lumping image shame with the moral shame and guilt—as
is the case with the singular ‘ingroup-critical emotions index’—understates the combined effects
of the latter two emotions. While collinearity could become an even greater concern in more
elaborate models, it is tolerable at present. Accordingly, for all subsequent models, I will report
the full results for those estimated with the emotions as individual predictors while also reporting
(in grey font) the parameter estimates for the moral shame/guilt index (modeled separately).
I now proceed to the results of controlled models, which are presented in Table 6.6.
Those in column (a), the baseline model, are identical to the results reported in column (g) of
Table 6.5. To recapitulate, they show that both moral shame (ß=0.490, p < 0.001) and guilt
(ß=0.409, p < 0.001) independently positively predict support for pro-black policies, which
accords with the prediction of the H1. While the effects of the former are a bit stronger than the
latter, the difference is not distinguishable from zero (p=0.388). Combined, a one standard
deviation increase in moral shame/guilt corresponds to a 0.867 (p < 0.001) standard deviation
increase in pro-black policy support—a truly large effect. Image shame (ß=-0.161, p < 0.001),
on the other hand, turns into a significant negative predictor of pro-black policy support when
moral shame and guilt are held constant.
Thus far, then, the results all accord with earlier predictions. But to what extent are the
positive effects of moral shame and guilt confounded by political orientation and/or other
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background variables like education? The model 117 depicted in column (b) attempts to address
this question by adding controls 118 for ideology, party strength, education, age, and sex.
Table 6.6 Effects of predictors on pro-black policy index
(a)
0.490***
(0.045)
-0.161***
(0.034)
0.409***
(0.051)
0.867***
(0.031)

(b)
0.297***
(0.046)
-0.095**
(0.032)
0.361***
(0.047)
0.632***
(0.041)

Racial Resentment (r)

---

---

SDO-Egalitarianism

---

---

---

SDO-Anti-Dominance

---

---

---

Background/Demographic
control variables

---

√

---

Moral Shame
Image Shame
Guilt
Moral Shame + Guilt

(c)
0.179***
(0.049)
-0.092**
(0.030)
0.361***
(0.045)
0.524***
(0.044)
0.419***
(0.036)

(d)
0.372***
(0.044)
-0.144***
(0.033)
0.401***
(0.044)
0.741***
(0.037)

(e)
(f)
0.168** 0.128**
(0.049)
(0.048)
-0.097** -0.067*
(0.030)
(0.030)
0.359*** 0.332***
(0.044)
(0.042)
0.514*** 0.454***
(0.044)
(0.043)
0.411*** 0.351***
--(0.039)
(0.040)
0.122*** 0.059†
0.044
(0.029)
(0.030)
(0.029)
0.080**
-0.029
-0.023
(0.029)
(0.030)
(0.031)
---

---

√

0.414
-0.009
0.002
-0.008
0.307
(0.072) (0.020)
(0.022)
(0.020)
(0.070)
0.634
0.643
0.582
0.644
0.678
Adjusted R2
(.0004) (-.0017) (.0005)
(-.002)
(.0015)
2.20
3.36
2.94
3.07
Mean VIF
2.33 (2.19)
(2.03)
(2.69)
(2.32)
(2.63)
VIF Moral Shame
4.40
4.67
4.13
4.81
5.09
2.47
2.37
2.35
2.51
VIF Image Shame
2.31
2.39
(2.45)
(2.33)
(2.31)
(2.50)
VIF Guilt
4.20
4.35
4.23
4.21
4.24
4.38
VIF Moral Shame + Guilt
2.24
3.45
3.72
2.96
3.83
4.24
Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are standardized Beta coefficients with robust standard errors in
parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame and Guilt
index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Adjusted R2 row correspond to changes in Adjusted R2 of models
where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows indicate the
VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted for the separate indexes.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Constant

0.000
(0.022)
0.563
(-.0002)
3.33
(2.24)
3.48

Adjusting for background/demographic covariates moderates the effects of all three
emotions, particularly those of moral shame (ß=0.297, p < 0.001) whose coefficient is now

117

Collinearity in this ‘separate emotions’ model was at an acceptable level overall (Mean VIF=2.36). However,
while still falling below conventionally suggested thresholds (< 5), the relatively higher variable inflation factor
scores of moral shame (VIF=4.23) and guilt (VIF=4.27) may or may not be a cause for concern. The inflation score
of the combined moral shame/guilt index is naturally lower (VIF=3.28).
118
Given the large number of response categories in some of these categorical and ordinal control variables (e.g.
ideology, party-ID etc.), I opt to exclude their parameter estimates from the regression tables featured in this chapter.
Complete regression tables that include these parameter estimates are provided in Appendix C.
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(insignificantly, p=0.413) weaker than that of guilt (ß=0.361, p < 0.001). The combined effects
of these emotions are reduced by roughly a quarter of their baseline magnitude (column a), but
they still remain strong. Specifically, holding all other variables constant, a one standard
deviation increase in moral shame/guilt is expected to produce a roughly 0.63 standard deviation
(p < 0.001) increase in pro-black policy support. Neither a two-way moral shame/guilt x
ideology (p=0.985) nor a moral shame/guilt x party (p=0.933) interaction was significant, which
suggests that the strength of the effects of these emotions are not conditional on political
orientation.
Given its strong associations with moral shame (r=0.730) and guilt (r=0.617), perhaps the
effects of these emotions are epiphenomenal to or confounded by ‘racial resentment’. Column (c)
tests this assumption by adding racial resentment (reverse-coded) as a covariate and dropping
(for now) the demographic/background control variables. In the end, the inclusion of racial
resentment (ß=0.419, p < 0.001) considerably reduces the effects of moral shame (ß=0.179, p <
0.001) while attenuating those of image shame (ß=-0.092, p=0.002) and guilt (ß=0.364, p <
0.001) to a somewhat lesser degree. Nonetheless, the majority of the effects of the moral
shame/guilt index (ß=0.524, p < 0.001) are independent of racial resentment, which suggests that
previous political scientists have generally overlooked an important source of variance in problack policy support.
The model shown in column (d) similarly tests the extent that the effects of moral shame
and guilt are independent of social dominance orientation (SDO), which, like racial resentment,
is also identified as an important predictor of racial policy attitudes. In the end, the entry of the
two SDO dimensions (ßSDO-Egal=0.122, p < 0.001; ßSDO-AntiDom=0.080, p=0.009) does not
moderate the coefficients on the three emotions to the same degree as racial resentment. The
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effects of moral shame (ß=0.372, p < 0.001) decline somewhat, while those of guilt (ß=0.401, p
< 0.001) and image shame (ß=-0.144, p < 0.001) are only marginally affected. When racial
resentment is re-entered into the model (column e), the positive effects of moral shame (ß=0.168,
p < 0.001) and guilt (ß=0.359) are naturally further reduced. Nonetheless, net of two of the most
influential predictors of racial policy attitudes identified in the existing literature, the combined
effects of moral shame/guilt remain large and significant (ß=0.514, p < 0.001). In fact, when the
demographic/background controls rejoin the model (column f), the effects of the moral
shame/guilt index (ß=0.454, p < 0.001) on pro-black policy support are larger than those of any
other variable, including racial resentment (ß=0.351, p < 0.001).
As the use of the pro-black policy index somewhat obscures the practical impact of moral
shame and guilt, I estimate a series of binary logit variables (1=Favor, 0=Neutral/Oppose) for
each of the former’s constituent policy items. Figure 6.1 graphs the predicted probabilities of
favoring each of the three policy outcomes at differing levels of the moral shame/guilt index and
for different model specifications corresponding to three of the letter-coded columns of Table
6.6.

Figure 6.1 Predicted probabilities of favoring a given pro-black policy at varying levels along the combined
moral shame and guilt index.
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As shown, the positive influence of the moral shame/guilt index on the likelihood of
endorsing each policy item is fairly if varyingly large. Holding image shame to its mean, a 1
standard deviation shift from below to above the sample mean level of moral shame/guilt
predicts a nearly 64 point increase (0.0760.716) in the odds of favoring affirmative action, just
under a 75 point increase (0.1570.903) in the odds of favoring group-based government
assistance, and almost a 70 point increase (0.0750.773) in the odds of favoring reparations.
These expected increases are somewhat attenuated, but remain large when adding and holding
the demographic/background controls to their medians/means 119 (Model B). The same +1SD
swing now predicts just under a 52 point increase (0.0910.611) in the odds of favoring
affirmative action, and roughly 60 point increases in the odds of favoring group-based
government assistance (0.2420.841) and reparations (0.0770.666), respectively. Finally,
additionally holding racial resentment and the two SDO variables to their means (Model F)
further reduces these estimated increases to 31 points (0.1070.087) in the case of affirmative
action and to roughly 43-44 points (0.2540.688) for group-based government assistance and
reparations (0.0770.516).
To compare these effects with those of racial resentment, I re-run Model F with the moral
shame/guilt index set to its mean. In the end, moving 1 standard deviation from below to above
mean racial resentment predicts increases in support for affirmative action (+33 points;
0.0790.408), group-based government assistance (+45 points; 0.2450.690), and reparations
(+28 points; 0.1160.399) that are statistically and substantively indistinguishable in size from

119

Apart from age, all background control variables are ordinal or categorical. Thus, age is held to its means,
whereas all other controls are held to their medians/modes. In the current sample, this translates to a respondent that
is female, 34 years of age, self-identifies as ‘slightly liberal’, leans towards the Democratic party, and has a BA
degree.
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those observed for moral shame/guilt, though the increases in support for reparations (44 points
vs. 28 points) are noticeably (if still insignificantly, p=0.133) smaller.
6.3.3

The effects of white shame and guilt on immigration policy preferences: testing
H2-H2A

Given that my measures of guilt and shame exclusively reference whites’ treatment of
blacks, their positive effects on support for pro-black policies are perhaps unsurprising. But
hypotheses H2-2A predicted that these emotions, particularly shame, would also influence
attitudes towards policies that do not directly implicate black Americans. I thus begin by testing
whether ingroup-critical emotions affect preferences for different levels of immigration into the
US.
Table 6.7 presents results from a series of ordinal logit models 120 with the 7-point
measure of support for increasing immigration levels as the outcome variable. The baseline
model (column a) exhibits a pattern that is similar to the one observed in Table 6.6. Specifically,
both moral shame (OR=2.92, p < 0.001) and guilt (OR=1.43, p=0.008) significantly positively
predict supporting higher levels of immigration, while image shame (OR=0.588, p < 0.001)
negatively predicts such preferences. However, as expected, the effects of moral shame are
significantly stronger (p=0.002) than those of guilt. But the combined effects 121 of these two
emotions are very large (OR=4.03, p < 0.001). Table 5B shows the predicted probabilities of
each response at one standard deviation below and above the means of the moral shame/guilt

120

A brant test indicated that these models violate the proportion odds assumption. Using Williams’ (2006) gologit2
Stata package, generalized ordered logit models—which correct for these violations—were subsequently estimated
for comparison. The predicted odds of these models did not meaningfully differ from those observed in the
conventional ordered logit models. As such, and because the their results are easier to present, I opted to stick with
the latter.
121
Once again, moral shame did not significantly interact with guilt (OR=1.05, p=0.508) in predicting preferred
immigration levels.
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index. Holding image shame to its mean, those placing one standard deviation below the mean of
this index are far more likely to give a ‘decrease’ (36.3%) or ‘kept the same’ (42.2%) than an
‘increase’ (21.5%) response. For those scoring 1 standard deviation above, though, an ‘increase’
response (75.3%) becomes far more likelier than a ‘decrease’ (3.5%) or ‘kept the same’ (15%)
response. Interestingly, this movement is primarily into the ‘increase a moderate amount’
(+27.7%; 0.0730.350) and ‘increase a great deal’ (+26.1%; 0.0240.285) response categories
as opposed to into the ‘increase a little’ category (+6.3%; 0.1180.181).

Table 6.7 Effects of predictors on preferred immigration levels
(a)
2.92***
(0.359)
0.588***
(0.060)
1.43**
(0.192)
4.03***
(0.421)

(b)
2.03***
(0.279)
0.664***
(0.070)
1.28†
(0.175)
2.45***
(0.311)

Racial Resentment (r)

---

---

SDO-Egalitarianism

---

---

---

SDO-Anti-Dominance

---

---

---

Background/Demographic
Controls

---

√

0.086
(-.0048)
-3.38
(0.158)
-2.61
(0.122)
-1.98
(0.106)
-0.088
(0.073)
0.854
(0.079)
2.33
(0.110)
3.33
(2.24)
3.48
2.31
(2.24)

0.121
(-.0019)
-4.81
(0.355)
-3.98
(0.332)
-3.30
(0.327)
-1.27
(0.309)
-0.256
(0.306)
1.32
(0.310)
2.20
(1.95)
4.40
2.47
(2.34)

Moral Shame
Image Shame
Guilt
Moral Shame + Guilt

Pseudo R2
/cut1
/cut2
/cut3
/cut4
/cut5
/cut6
Mean VIF
VIF Moral Shame
VIF Image Shame

(c)
1.68***
(0.234)
0.668***
(0.068)
1.29†
(0.166)
2.10***
(0.275)
2.32***
(0.237)

(d)
2.14***
(0.291)
0.629***
(0.065)
1.42*
(0.193)
2.92***
(0.352)

1.13
(0.111)
1.61***
(0.158)

(e)
1.57**
(0.227)
0.679***
(0.070)
1.31*
(0.181)
1.99***
(0.269)
1.97***
(0.210)
1.03
(0.099)
1.37**
(0.137)

(f)
1.50**
(0.230)
0.702**
(0.074)
1.24
(0.172)
1.78***
(0.248)
1.66***
(0.185)
0.987
(0.095)
1.36**
(0.143)

---

---

---

√

0.112
(-.0005)
-3.56
(0.168)
-2.76
(0.129)
-2.09
(0.107)
-0.064
(0.076)
0.934
(0.081)
2.46
(0.114)
3.36
(2.69)
4.67
2.37
(2.33)

0.104
(-.0012)
-3.52
(0.167)
-2.71
(0.127)
-2.04
(0.104)
-0.066
(0.075)
0.901
(0.080)
2.41
(0.113)
2.94
(2.30)
4.13
2.35
(2.31)

0.118
(-.0002)
-3.61
(0.170)
-2.80
(0.130)
-2.11
(0.108)
-0.056
(0.077)
0.949
(0.082)
2.49
(0.115)
3.07
(2.62)
4.81
2.39
(2.36)

0.136
(-.0004)
-4.61
(0.363)
-3.76
(0.340)
-3.05
(0.335)
-0.934
(0.316)
0.107
(0.313)
1.72
(0.317)
2.33
(2.19)
5.09
2.51
(2.50)

---
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VIF Guilt
4.20
4.35
4.23
4.21
4.24
4.38
VIF Moral Shame + Guilt
2.24
3.28
3.72
2.96
3.83
4.24
Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors in
parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame
and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Pseudo R2 row correspond to changes in Pseudo R2 of
models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows
indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Table 6.8 Predicted probabilities of preferring different levels of immigration at varying
levels along the combined moral shame and guilt index
DECREASE
Decrease a
lot
Decrease a
moderate
amount
Decrease a
little
KEPT THE
SAME
Increase a
little
Increase a
moderate
amount
Increase a
great deal
INCREASE

Model A
-1SD
+1SD
0.363
0.035
0.125
0.009
(0.018) (0.002)

Model B
-1SD
+1SD
0.241
0.050
0.066
0.012
(0.017) (0.003)

Model E
-1SD
+1SD
0.190
0.057
0.050
0.013
(0.010) (0.003)

Model F
-1SD
+1SD
0.208
0.076
0.052
0.017
(0.013) (0.005)

0.108
(0.017)

0.010
(0.002)

0.072
(0.016)

0.014
(0.004)

0.056
(0.011)

0.016
(0.003)

0.062
(0.014)

0.022
(0.006)

0.130
(0.017)
0.422
(0.022)
0.118
(0.012)

0.016
(0.003)
0.150
(0.015)
0.118
(0.015)

0.103
(0.020)
0.464
(0.023)
0.163
(0.024)

0.024
(0.007)
0.234
(0.039)
0.237
(0.020)

0.084
(0.013)
0.456
(0.023)
0.187
(0.018)

0.028
(0.005)
0.263
(0.027)
0.243
(0.017)

0.094
(0.019)
0.476
(0.025)
0.176
(0.024)

0.037
(0.010)
0.330
(0.045)
0.253
(0.018)

0.073
(0.009)

0.350
(0.021)

0.102
(0.021)

0.320
(0.033)

0.126
(0.017)

0.294
(0.025)

0.109
(0.022)

0.247
(0.038)

0.024
(0.004)
0.215

0.285
(0.026)
0.753

0.031
(0.008)
0.296

0.159
(0.034)
0.716

0.041
(0,007)
0.354

0.143
(0.020)
0.680

0.031
(0.023)
0.316

0.093
(0.023)
0.593

Turning to column (b) of Table 6.7, we see that adjusting for ideology, party, education,
age, and sex moderates the positive effects of moral shame (OR=2.03, p < 0.001) and guilt
(OR=1.28, p=0.073)—the latter of which now falls short of the 95% significance threshold-while also reducing the negative effects of image shame (OR=0.651, p < 0.001). The combined
influence of moral guilt and shame (OR=2.45, p < 0.001) is reduced to just more than half its
original size. Nevertheless, these effects remain very meaningful. The corresponding Model B in
Table 6.8 shows that, when image shame and the 5 background controls are set to their
medians/means, moving one standard deviation below to above the mean of the moral
shame/guilt index predicts a 42 point increase (0.2960.716) in the probability of giving an
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‘increase’ response, and roughly 23 and 19 point declines in the odds of giving a ‘kept the same’
(0.4640.234) and ‘decrease’ (0.2410.050) response, respectively. Once again, movement
into the ‘increase’ category is largely confined to the ‘increase a moderate amount’ (+21.8%;
0.1020.320) and ‘increase a lot’ (12.8%; 0.0310.159) responses. Two-way moral
shame/guilt x ideology (p=0.308) and moral shame/guilt x party-ID (p=0.159) interactions were
not significant, which suggests that, in addition to being mostly independent of it, the strength of
these effects does not vary by political orientation.
Column (c) in Table 6.7 indicates that racial resentment (OR=2.32, p < 0.001) singlehandedly moderates the effects of moral shame (OR=1.68, p < 0.001) to an even greater extent
than the 5 background controls combined. The influence of guilt (OR=1.29, p=0.064) and image
shame (OR=0.668, p < 0.001), on the other hand, are relatively less affected, while that of moral
shame/guilt (OR=2.10, p < 0.001) is reduced to roughly half its baseline magnitude. Column (d)
substitutes the two social dominance dimensions for racial resentment. While the (anti)
dominance dimension has a significant positive influence (OR=1.61, p < 0.001) on preferring
higher levels of immigration, its effects again appear to be more independent of moral shame
(OR=2.14, p < 0.001) and guilt (OR=1.42, p=0.011) than was the case for racial resentment.
Further evidence of this is found in column (e), which keeps the two dominance dimensions in
the model while adding racial resentment. While remaining significant, the positive effects of
moral shame (OR=1.57, p=0.001) and, if to a lesser extent, guilt (OR=1.31, p=0.048) are once
again substantially reduced. However, the combined effects of these emotions remain fairly
sizeable (OR=1.99, p < 0.001). Referring to the corresponding Model E of Table 6.8, holding
image shame, racial resentment, and the two social dominance dimensions at their means,
moving 1 standard deviation below to above mean moral shame/guilt predicts a nearly 33 point
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increase (0.3540.680) in the probability of giving an ‘increase’ response, most of which is
again due to movement out of the ‘kept the same’ (-19.3%; 0.4560.263) and into the ‘increase
a moderate amount’ (+16.8%; 0.1260.294) and ‘increase a lot’ (+10.2%; 0.0410.143)
categories. Adding the 5 background controls to the model (column/Model F) does not
drastically change these estimates. Fixing all other variables at their means/medians, moving
from one standard deviation below to above mean moral shame/guilt (OR=1.79, p < 0.001) is
expected to produce a nearly 28 point increase (0.3160.593) in the probability of an ‘increase’
response, including 13.8 and 6.2 point increases in the odds of giving an ‘increase a moderate
amount’ (0.1610.313) and ‘increase a lot’ (0.0310.093) responses, respectively.

Figure 6.2 Predicted probabilities of preferring different levels of immigration (7-point scale) at varying levels
along the combined moral shame and guilt index
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Figure 6.3 Predicted probabilities of preferring different levels of immigration (collapsed 3-point scale) at
varying levels along the combined moral shame and guilt index

While the preceding results suggest that ingroup-critical emotions, particularly moral
shame, are important determinants of support for lax immigration policies, we can’t discount the
possibility that this relationship is unique to legal immigration. Accordingly, in what follows, I
test whether the effects of ingroup-critical emotions similarly extend to attitudes towards illegal
immigration.
Table 6.9 presents the results of a series of ordinal logit models 122 with the 5-point
measure of support for decriminalizing illegal border entries as the dependent variable. In
column (a), the baseline model, we see that the significant positive effects of moral shame
(OR=2.70, p < 0.001) are of a comparable size to those observed for preferred legal immigration
levels. Once again, they are also significantly larger (p=0.003) than those of guilt (OR=1.30,
p=0.036). Image shame again emerges as a significant negative predictor (OR=0.798, p=0.027),

122

These models also violate the proportional odds assumption. But as before, their estimates do not meaningfully
differ from those obtained from (gologit) models that correct for this violation.
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though its effects on the current outcome are somewhat weaker than those observed in the
previous immigration levels model.
Table 6.9 Effects of predictors on attitudes towards the decriminalization of illegal border
crossings
(a)
2.70***
(0.354)
0.798*
(0.078)
1.30*
(0.165)
3.46***
(0.396)

(b)
1.67***
(0.233)
0.960
(0.100)
1.18
(0.148)
1.88***
(0.239)

Racial Resentment (r)

---

---

SDO-Egalitarianism

---

---

---

SDO-Anti-Dominance

---

---

---

Background/Demographic
Controls

---

√

---

Moral Shame
Image Shame
Guilt
Moral Shame + Guilt

(c)
1.49**
(0.216)
0.912
(0.093)
1.18
(0.154)
1.70***
(0.226)
2.49***
(0.258)

(d)
1.97***
(0.270)
0.848
(0.086)
1.29*
(0.163)
2.45***
(0.270)

1.25**
(0.096)
1.41***
(0.131)

(e)
1.39*
(0.201)
0.915
(0.093)
1.18
(0.147)
1.60***
(0.207)
2.19***
(0.236)
1.17†
(0.109)
1.18†
(0.112)

(f)
1.25
(0.184)
1.00
(0.106)
1.13
(0.145)
1.38*
(0.185)
1.68***
(0.203)
1.09
(0.104)
1.15
(0.111)

---

---

√

---

0.091
0.148
0.124
0.109
0.128
0.162
(-.0043)
(-.0012) (-.0004) (-.0014)
(-.0002)
(-.0001)
-1.89
-3.92
-2.02
-1.96
-2.03
-3.63
/cut1
(0.097)
(0.323)
(0.106)
(0.103)
(0.104)
(0.325)
-0.743
-2.66
-0.769
-0.765
-0.777
-2.33
/cut2
(0.077)
(0.302)
(0.080)
(0.079)
(0.081)
(0.307)
-0.068
-1.90
-0.035
-0.065
-0.039
-1.54
/cut3
(0.074)
(0.294)
(0.076)
(0.074)
(0.075)
(0.300)
1.27
-0.366
1.39
1.32
1.40
0.032
/cut4
(0.088)
(0.284)
(0.087)
(0.086)
(0.092)
(0.292)
3.33
3.36
2.94
3.07
2.33
Mean VIF
(2.24)
(2.69)
(2.30)
(2.62)
(2.25)
VIF Moral Shame
3.48
4.67
4.13
4.81
5.09
2.31
2.37
2.35
2.39
2.51
VIF Image Shame
(2.24)
(2.33)
(2.31)
(2.36)
(2.40)
VIF Guilt
4.20
4.23
4.21
4.24
4.38
VIF Moral Shame + Guilt
2.24
3.72
2.96
3.83
4.12
Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors in
parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame
and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Pseudo R2 row correspond to changes in Pseudo R2 of
models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows
indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Pseudo R2

Table 6.10 shows the predicted probabilities (which are visualized in Figure 6.4) in of
each response along the 5-point support for decriminalization scale at 1 standard deviation below
and above the means of the combined moral shame/guilt index. The estimates of Model A
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indicate that, holding image shame to its mean, those who place 1 standard deviation below the
mean of moral shame/guilt have a 24% chance of giving a ‘favor’ response, as compared to a
78.6% chance for those scoring 1 standard deviation above. And, in what has become a familiar
pattern, most of this shift can be attributed to movement into the ‘favor strongly’ (+41.6%;
0.0780.494) response category.
Table 6.10 Predicted probabilities of differing levels of support/opposition to
decriminalizing illegal border crossings at varying levels along the combined moral shame
and guilt index
Oppose
Oppose
Strongly
Oppose
Somewhat
Neither
Favor
somewhat
Favor
Strongly
Favor

Model A
-1SD
+1SD
0.618
0.123
0.343
0.043
(0.028) (0.007)
0.275
0.080
(0.020) (0.010)
0.141
0.092
(0.013) (0.010)
0.163
0.292
(0.016) (0.018)
0.078
0.494
(0.012) (0.029)
0.241
0.786

Model B
-1SD
+1SD
0.397
0.157
0.157
0.050
(0.031) (0.011)
0.240
0.107
(0.029) (0.020)
0.187
0.127
(0.016) (0.018)
0.282
0.362
(0.032) (0.021)
0.134
0.354
(0.027) (0.047)
0.416
0.716

Model E
-1SD
+1SD
0.419
0.219
0.171
0.074
(0.022) (0.012)
0.248
0.145
(0.023) (0.018)
0.182
0.151
(0.016) (0.015)
0.263
0.342
(0.022) (0.020)
0.136
0.288
(0.020) (0.030)
0.399
0.630

Model F
-1SD
+1SD
0.359
0.227
0.132
0.074
(0.028) (0.017)
0.227
0.153
(0.031) (0.027)
0.192
0.164
(0.017) (0.019)
0.304
0.365
(0.032) (0.024)
0.144
0.243
(0.030) (0.041)
0.448
0.608

Figure 6.4 Predicted probabilities of differing levels of support/opposition to decriminalizing illegal border
crossings at varying levels along the combined moral shame and guilt index.
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Continuing onwards, adding the 5 background controls to the model (column b of Table
6.9) reduces the still significant positive influence of moral shame (OR=1.67, p < 0.001), while
rendering the effects of guilt (OR=1.18, p=0.198) and image shame (OR=0.960, p=0.696)
insignificant at even the p < 0.1 threshold. The combined effects of moral shame/guilt (OR=1.88,
p < 0.001) also see a substantial reduction, but they remain very meaningful. The corresponding
predicted odds in Table 6.10 show that, while setting all other predictors to their medians, a
swing from 1 standard deviation below to above mean moral shame/guilt is expected to result in
a 30 point increase (0.4160.716) in the odds of giving a ‘favor’ response, including a 22 point
increase (0.1340.354) in the likelihood of a ‘favor strongly’ response. The strength of these
effects did not significantly vary by ideological self-placement (p=0.239) nor partisanship
(p=0.342).
Turning now to columns (c)-(e) of Table 6.9, we see that, as before, the positive influence
of moral shame is far more reduced with the addition of racial resentment (column c; OR=1.49,
p=0.006) than with the addition of the two SDO dimensions (column d; OR=1.97, p < 0.001).
But even when these three variables are entered together (column e), the positive effects of moral
shame (OR=1.39, p=0.021) remain statistically significant. The positive influence of guilt, on the
other hand, is no longer significant (OR=1.18, p=0.184). The combined effects of moral shame
and guilt (OR=1.60, p < 0.001), though, are both statistically and substantively significant.
Referring back to Table 6.10, respondents who scored one standard deviation above mean moral
shame/guilt but at the means/medians of all other predictors are just over 23 points
(0.3990.630) more likely to give a ‘favor’ response—and roughly 15 points (0.1360.288)
more likely to give a ‘favor strongly’ response--than those scoring 1 standard deviation below.
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Column (f) of Table 6.9 re-enters the 5 background controls into the model. We now see
that the effects of moral shame (OR=1.25, p=0.133) are both reduced and no longer significant at
even the p < 0.1 level. However, its inflation factor (VIF=5.09) is now problematic by
conventional standards, which suggests that the loss of significance could be due to strong
collinearity. Be this as it may, the effects of the combined moral shame/guilt index (OR=1.38,
p=0.016), while moderated, are still both statistically and substantively significant. Referring
again to Table 6.10, when all other variables are fixed at their means/medians, a respondent who
scores 1 standard deviation above mean moral shame/guilt is 16 points (0.4480.608) more
likely to favor--including nearly 10 points (0.1440.243) more likely to ‘favor strongly’-decriminalizing illegal border entries than those scoring 1 standard deviation below.
The above results demonstrate that the effects of ingroup-critical emotions on
immigration liberalism are not confined to attitudes towards legal immigration, but rather appear
to influence immigration attitudes in general. And yet another question is whether or to what
extent this pro-immigration sentiment is race neutral; that is, do ingroup-critical emotions,
particularly moral shame, predict favoritism towards immigrants from non-European vs.
European countries? To get at this question, I estimate a series of linear regression models with
my measure of racial immigration favoritism as the outcome variable. The results are presented
in Table 6.11 below.
Hypothesis 2A predicted that moral shame, more than guilt, would predict favoring nonwhite over white immigrants. The results of the baseline model in column (a) support this
proposition. Whereas moral shame (ß=6.04, p < 0.001) significantly positively predicts admitting
more immigrants from non-European vs. European countries, the effects of guilt (ß=1.64,
p=0.115) are both significantly smaller (p=0.017) and insignificant in and of themselves.
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Table 6.11 Effects of predictors on percent of immigration admissions allocated to nonEuropean countries
(a)
6.04***
(0.974)
-3.07***
(0.799)
1.64
(1.05)
7.68***
(0.797)

(b)
2.66**
(0.963)
-2.36**
(0.767)
1.63
(1.00)
4.08***
(0.956)

-0.513
(0.709)
6.00***
(0.702)

(e)
-0.124
(0.991)
-1.34†
(0.733)
0.935
(0.973)
0.836
(0.936)
6.05***
(0.816)
-1.43*
(0.694)
4.39***
(0.700)

(f)
-0.253
(0.966)
-1.48*
(0.733)
1.29
(0.966)
1.09
(0.966)
5.07***
(0.883)
-1.84**
(0.689)
4.54***
(0.743)

Racial Resentment (r)

---

---

SDO-Egalitarianism

---

---

---

SDO-(Anti)Dominance

---

---

---

Background/Demographic
Control Variables

---

√

---

---

---

√

55.64***
(0.515)
0.122
(-.0053)
3.33
(2.24)

57.31***
(2.12)
0.202
(-.0003)
2.20
(2.03)

55.47***
(0.484)
0.228
(.0008)
3.36
(2.69)

55.64***
(0.487)
0.214
(.0001)
2.94
(2.30)

55.50***
(0.470)
0.263
(.0005)
3.07
(2.62)

53.36***
(2.13)
0.290
(.0003)
2.52
(2.19)

VIF Moral Shame

3.48

4.40

4.67

4.13

4.81

5.09

VIF Image Shame

2.31
(2.24)

2.47
(2.45)

2.37
(2.33)

2.35
(2.31)

2.39
(2.36)

2.51
(2.50)

VIF Guilt

4.20

4.35

4.23

4.21

4.24

4.38

VIF Moral Shame + Guilt

2.24

3.45

3.72

2.96

3.83

4.24

Moral Shame
Image Shame
Guilt
Moral Shame + Guilt

Constant
Adjusted R2
Mean VIF

(c)
0.273
(1.02)
-1.77*
(0.748)
0.752
(0.989)
1.01
(0.967)
7.87***
(0.757)

(d)
2.84**
(0.971)
-2.03**
(0.753)
1.54
(1.00)
4.17***
(0.821)
---

Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are standardized Beta coefficients with robust standard errors in
parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame
and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Adjusted R2 row correspond to changes in Adjusted R2
of models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows
indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in moral shame corresponds to a 6 point increase
in the percent of immigration admissions that a respondent would allocate to non-European
countries. For instance, a respondent scoring 1 standard deviation below mean moral shame is
expected to be allocate admissions almost evenly (49.6%) across the two sets of countries. On
the other hand, those scoring 1 standard deviation above mean moral shame are expected to favor
non-European immigration at a rate of 61.6%. Though the effects of guilt are individually
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insignificant, a standard deviation increase in the combined moral shame/guilt index predicts a
nearly 8-point increase (ß=7.68, p < 0.001). The results for image shame again accord with the
theoretical literature. Excluding guilt and moral shame from the model (not shown), a one
standard deviation increase in image shame predicts a significant (p < 0.001) 2.4-point increase
in the percent of admissions allocated to non-Europeans. However, when guilt and moral shame
are added to the model, these effects remain similar in magnitude (ß=-3.07, p < 0.001) but are
now in the negative or pro-European direction.
Given that immigrants disproportionately affiliate with the Democratic party, it’s possible
that the above relationships are confounded by partisanship. Column (b) tests this account by
adjusting for political ideology and party affiliation along with the three other background
controls. As shown, while still significant, the effects of moral shame (ß=2.66, p=0.006), are less
than half their original size. Those scoring 1 standard deviation above mean moral shame are
now expected to favor non-European immigration at a rate of 58.3% as compared to a rate of
53% among those scoring 1 standard deviation below. While the positive effects of guilt (ß=1.10,
p=0.284) remain individually insignificant, a standard deviation increase in the combined moral
shame/guilt index is expected to result in just more than a 4 point increase (ß=4.08, p < 0.001) in
the percent of admissions allocated to non-European countries. At one standard deviation below
the mean, a respondent favors non-European immigration at a 51.6% rate. At one standard
deviation above, this rate jumps to almost 60%. Thus, regardless of a respondent’s party
affiliation, higher levels of moral shame/guilt results in greater favoritism towards non-European
immigrants. However, a significant (p=0.010) two-way moral shame/guilt x party interaction
shows that the effects only reach significance and are also more than twice and nearly 8 times the
size among white Democrats (ß=5.76, p < 0.001) than among white independents (ß=2.53,
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p=0.130) and white Republicans (ß=0.757, p=0.598), respectively. A similar pattern is observed
when a moral shame/guilt is interacted with ideology: the effects of the former are largest and
only reach significance (ß=5.15, p < 0.001) among white liberals (ßModerate=2.79, p=0.123;
ßConservative=2.01, p=0.165) Thus, whereas this wasn’t the case for previous outcome variables,
political orientation appears to condition the effects of moral shame/guilt on favoring nonEuropean vs. European immigration.
The results in columns (c)-(e) suggest that the main effects of moral shame are almost
entirely accounted for (or perhaps mediated by) racial resentment. Specifically, column (c)
shows that, when racial resentment is added to the model, the effects of moral shame (ß=0.273,
p=0.790) become indistinguishable from 0. And, notably, this is also the case for the combined
moral shame/guilt variable 123 (ß=1.00, p=0.300). Controlling for both SDO dimensions (column
d) does not produce a similar outcome. The effects of both moral shame (ß=2.84, p=0.004) and
the combined moral shame/guilt index (ß=4.24, p < 0.001) remain significantly positive when
these SDO indexes are entered into the model and racial resentment is dropped. And, though not
shown, the latter remain significant (ß=3.06, p=0.001) when the background controls are added
to this model 124. In the final model (column f), the combined effects of moral shame and guilt
(ß=1.09, p=0.258) are both only positively and only reach significance among white Democrats
(ß=2.40, p=0.020; ßIndependent=-1.01, p=0.555; ßRepublican=-2.11, p=0.130). Thus, the results suggest
that the effects of moral shame and guilt on favoritism towards non-European immigration are
conditional on political orientation and also overlap considerably with those

123

The effects of this variable remain significant for white Democrats (dy/dx=2.05, p=0.046), but they are less than
a third of their baseline size.
124
The moral shame/guilt interaction term, however, shows that these effects are stronger and only significant for
white Democrats (ß=4.43, p < 0.001; ßIndependent=1.31, p=0.425; ßRepublican=0.082, p=0.951) and white liberals (ß
=3.76, p < 0.001; ßModerate=1.76, p=0.270; ßConservative=0.1.32, p=0.348)
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6.3.4

Effects of white shame and guilt on racial ingroup vs. outgroup warmth

Section 4.2 of Chapter 4 briefly noted that, for the first time on record, the average white
Democrat and liberal feeling thermometer score in 2016 was warmer towards racial/ethnic
outgroups than other whites. Chapter 5 subsequently revealed that, in the wake of the George
Floyd incident, whites—and particularly white Democrats and liberals—exhibited an increased
tendency of rating whites less favorably/more unfavorably than blacks and other racial/ethnic
minorities. My theory argues that both of these findings are reflections of white shame, which is
expected to motivate a desire to morally distance or distinguish oneself from one’s morally
tainted ingroup while signaling solidarity with non-white racial/ethnic outgroups. But is the
current data consistent with this assertion? I attempt to answer this question below by modeling
the average difference between a respondent’s feeling thermometer ratings of whites vs.
racial/ethnic outgroups 125.
Table 6.12 presents the results from a series of linear regression models. Recall that
hypothesis 3 expected that moral shame, more than guilt, would predict rating racial/ethnic
outgroups more warmly than other whites. Consistent with this expectation, column (a) shows
that moral shame (ß=11.96, p < 0.001) is a strong and significantly positive predictor of this
tendency. In contrast, the predictive effects of guilt (ß=1.91, p=0.218) are both significantly
smaller (p=0.001) and insignificant in and of themselves. When combined, though, a standard
deviation increase in moral shame/guilt is expected to result in nearly 14 points more warmth
towards racial/ethnic minorities vs. whites. The predicted margins, which are graphed in Figure
6, show that a respondent who scores 1 standard deviation below mean moral shame/guilt rates

125

Because the effects of none of the ingroup-critical emotions significantly differ as a function of the specific target
group (Blacks, Hispanics, Asians), I opt to use the average differential as the outcome variable. Results for groupspecific models are reported in the Appendix.
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whites 11.8 points more warmly on average than blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. Those who score
1 standard deviation above the mean, however, rate the latter groups nearly 16.2 points more
warmly on average than whites. Once again, and broadly supportive of recent theory, the effects
of image shame are significantly positive when entered alone into the model (ß=5.82, p < 0.001),
but they turn significantly negative (ß=-3.89, p =0.001) upon the addition of moral shame and
guilt.
Table 6.12 Effects of predictors on non-white vs. white warmth differentials
Moral Shame
Image Shame
Guilt
Moral Shame +
Guilt
Racial
Resentment (r)
SDOEgalitarianism
SDODominance
Constant
Adjusted R2
Mean VIF

(a)
11.96***
(1.48)
-3.89**
(1.13)
1.91
(1.55)
13.99***
(1.10)

(b)
8.30***
(1.51)
-2.49*
(1.24)
1.50
(1.41)
9.22***
(1.47)

(c)
7.00***
(1.57)
-2.77*
(1.23)
1.15
(1.50)
7.46***
(1.51)
6.78***
(1.06)

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

2.35**
(0.724)
0.215
(-.0136)
3.32
(2.24)

13.87***
(3.10)
0.261
(-.0067)
2.19
(2.02)

(d)
6.90***
(1.35)
-2.44*
(1.18)
1.71
(1.46)
8.18***
(1.25)

2.19**
(0.713)
0.250
(-.0046)
3.36
(2.68)

0.854
(1.02)
8.35***
(0.995)
2.35**
(0.681)
0.302
(-.0038)
2.94
(2.30)

(e)
5.62***
(1.47)
-2.14†
(1.20)
1.45
(1.46)
6.48***
(1.44)
2.62*
(1.16)
0.174
(1.06)
7.42***
(1.01)
2.28**
(0.682)
0.306
(-.002)
3.07
(2.61)

(f)
5.51***
(1.52)
-1.77
(1.22)
1.36
(1.40)
6.25***
(1.52)
1.78
(1.27)
0.055
(1.09)
6.71***
(1.05)
10.39***
(3.12)
0.314
(-.002)
2.32
(2.18)

---

VIF Moral
Shame
VIF Image
Shame

3.47

4.38

4.66

4.12

4.80

5.08

2.30
(2.24)

2.47
(2.45)

2.36
(2.34)

2.35
(2.32)

2.39
(2.37)

2.51
(2.49)

VIF Guilt

4.19

4.34

4.22

4.20

4.23

4.36

VIF Moral
2.24
3.45
3.69
2.95
3.80
4.23
Shame + Guilt
Note. N=889 for all models. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in
parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame
and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Adjusted R2 row correspond to changes in Adjusted R2
of models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows
indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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As was suggested earlier in the context of favoritism towards non-European immigrants,
given that the average respondent is likely to associate racial/ethnic minorities with the
Democratic Party, it’s important that I test whether the relationships reported above are
confounded by partisanship. In the end, the results in column (b) show that, controlling for party
affiliation, ideology, age, education, and sex, both moral shame (ß=8.30, p < 0.001) and the
combined moral shame/guilt index (ß=9.22, p < 0.001) remains a significantly positive predictor
of pro-outgroup feeling thermometer bias. At one standard deviation below mean moral
shame/guilt, a respondent is expected to rate whites 6.8 points more warmly on average than the
three racial/ethnic minority groups. At one standard deviation above, this margin reverses to
roughly 11.6 points in favor of the non-white groups. However, these effects are qualified by
significant (p < 0.001) moral shame/guilt x party interaction 126. The predicted margins from this
interaction are shown in Figure 6. In the baseline model, a standard deviation increase in moral
shame/guilt corresponds to roughly 11.9 points (p < 0.001) more warmth towards racial/ethnic
outgroups among white Democrats as compared to approximately 4.8 (p=0.047) and 1.7
(p=0.430) points more warmth among white Independents and Republicans, respectively 127.
Further adjusting for ideology, education, age, and sex (Model b) slightly enhances these
conditional effects for all partisan groups (ßDemocrat=12.23, p < 0.001; ßIndependent=5.36, p=0.027,
ßRepublican=3.63, p=0.131). Thus, while the positive effects of moral shame/guilt are generally
independent of partisanship, their magnitude does indeed vary as a function of partisanship.

126

A moral shame/guilt x ideology interaction is also significant (p=0.003), but it results in a relatively smaller boost
in overall model fit.
127
For ease of presentation, and due to the small number of Republicans in the sample, these interaction effects were
modeled with the collapsed 3-point party-ID variable.
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Figure 6.5 Predicted non-white vs. white warmth differential at varying levels along the combined moral
shame and guilt index
Note. Points above and below the dashed red line denote pro-outgroup and pro-ingroup feeling thermometer biases,
respectively. The x-axis represents differing levels along the combined moral shame/guilt index.

Figure 6.6 Predicted non-white vs. white warmth differentials by party-ID at various levels along the
combined moral shame and guilt index
Note. Points above and below the dashed red line denote pro-outgroup and pro-ingroup feeling thermometer biases,
respectively. The x-axis represents differing levels along the combined moral shame/guilt index.

Columns (c)-(e) of Table 6.12 once again examine the extent that the pro-outgroup
effects of ingroup-critical emotions are independent of racial resentment and social dominance
orientation. The results in column (c) show that the addition of racial resentment (ß=6.78, p <
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0.001) into the model substantially reduces the coefficient of moral shame (ß=7.00 p < 0.001)
while cutting the combined effects of moral shame/guilt (ß=7.46 p < 0.001) to nearly half their
baseline (i.e. column a) size. Now, scoring 1 standard deviation above the mean of the latter
shame predicts rating racial/ethnic minority groups just under 10 points more warmly than
whites, while those 1 standard deviation below are expected to be roughly 5.1 points warmer
towards whites than non-whites. Column (d) drops racial resentment from the model and adds
the two SDO dimensions. The inclusion of the latter also reduces the coefficient of moral shame
(ß=6.90 p < 0.001) and the combined moral shame/guilt index (ß=8.18, p < 0.001). When all
three of these variables are entered together (column e), the effects of moral shame (ß=5.62, p <
0.001) and moral shame/guilt (ß=6.48, p < 0.001) are further reduced but remain significant. The
addition of the remaining control variables (column f) does not meaningfully change these
results. Net of all other variables, a standard deviation increase in moral shame/guilt predicts
nearly 6.3 points (p < 0.001) more warmth towards racial/ethnic minorities relative to whites. At
one standard deviation below, the average respondent is expected to favor whites by a 3.8 point
margin. At one standard deviation above the mean, non-whites are rated roughly 8.7 points more
warmly than whites. Once again, these effects are qualified by a significant (p < 0.001) moral
shame/guilt x party interaction. While the effects are positive for white independents (ß=1.28,
p=0.614) and Republicans (ß=0.479, p=0.837), they are far stronger and only achieve
significance among white Democrats (ß=8.89, p < 0.001). That being said, with the exception of
SDO-(Anti)Dominance (ß=6.74, p < 0.001), the effects of moral shame/guilt are at least
nominally stronger than every other predictor in the model, including racial resentment (ß=2.13,
p=0.090)
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Whites with high levels of moral shame and guilt may rate racial/ethnic outgroups
relatively more warmly than other whites, but do they actually harbor negative feelings towards
the latter? Recall that section 4.2 of Chapter 4 cited data from the ANES, which showed that the
share of white liberals who rated racial/ethnic minorities at or above the midpoint of the feeling
thermometer scale while rating whites below it (i.e., in the ‘cool’ region) reached a record high
in 2020. Once again, my theory would suggest that this trend is at least partly the product of
increases in collective shame. To determine whether shame plausibly accounts for these
increases in ‘anti-whiteness’, I transform the white feeling thermometer into an ‘anti-white’
dummy that assigns a ‘1’ to respondents (9.7%) who rated whites in the ‘cool’ region (i.e. < 50)
of the scale while rating all other racial/ethnic groups at or above the midpoint 128 (i.e. the neutral
and ‘warm’ areas of the scale). All other respondents are coded as ‘0’. I then estimate a series of
binary logit models that mirror the OLS specifications in Table 6.12 but which include the ‘antiwhite’ dummy as the outcome variable.
The results of these models are reported below in Table 6.13. In the baseline model of
column (a), we see that moral shame (OR=6.36, p < 0.001) significantly and strongly increases
the odds of rating whites on the negative or ‘cool’ side of the feeling thermometer scale. On the
other hand, neither guilt (OR=1.11, p=0.698) nor image shame (OR=0.834, p=0.251)
significantly influence this likelihood. In fact, guilt contributes practically nothing to the fit of
any of the models. And, in certain models (columns b & d), the combined influence of moral
shame and guilt is even weaker than the individual influence of the former. Thus, while the
complete and original results are provided in Table 6.13, I drop guilt as a covariate when

128

I code this variable as such to ensure that I’m predicting only the tendency to be cool towards whites and neutral
or warm to all other groups. Assigning a ‘1’ to all those who rated whites below the midpoint risks including
respondents who were negative towards all racial groups.
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calculating the predicted odds of ‘anti-white’ ratings. These predicted odds are shown in Figure
6.7. In Model A, which holds image shame to its mean, we see that moving from one standard
deviation below to above mean moral shame corresponds to nearly a 21 point increase
(0.0060.216) in the odds of placing in the ‘anti-white’ category, while a min-max swing
predicts a roughly 34 point increase (0.0010.337).

Table 6.13 Effects of predictors on probability of ‘anti-white’ feeling thermometer scores
(a)
6.36***
(1.82)
0.834
(0.132)
1.11
(0.293)
5.49***
(0.578)

(b)
5.13***
(1.68)
1.00
(0.174)
1.01
(0.275)
3.68***
(1.09)

0.130**
(0.081)
0.234
(-.0188)
2.29
(2.10)

(c)
3.83***
(1.24)
0.921
(0.151)
1.05
(0.277)
2.91***
(0.869)
1.69
(0.562)
1.32
(0.297)
1.13
(0.294)
0.034***
(0.008)
0.208
(-.0124)
3.07
(2.61)

(d)
3.94***
(1.31)
1.05
(0.185)
0.993
(0.237)
2.75**
(0.851)
1.47
(0.471)
1.30
(0.312)
1.13
(0.320)
0.088***
(0.055)
0.243
(-.0131)
2.52
(2.26)

Racial Resentment (r)

---

---

SDO-Egalitarianism

---

---

SDO-(Anti)Dominance

---

---

0.040***
(0.009)
0.190
(-.0243)
3.32
(2.24)

VIF Moral Shame

3.47

4.33

4.80

5.04

VIF Image Shame

2.30
(2.24)

2.46
(2.43)

2.39
(2.37)

2.50
(2.48)

VIF Guilt

4.19

4.32

4.23

4.35

VIF Moral Shame + Guilt

2.24

3.41

3.80

4.21

Moral Shame
Image Shame
Guilt
Moral Shame + Guilt

Constant
Pseudo R2
Mean VIF

Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cell
entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries
in parentheses in the Pseudo R2 row correspond to changes in Pseudo R2 of models where this combined index are
substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows indicate the VIF scores for models in which
the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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Figure 6.7 Predicted probability of an ‘anti-white’ feeling thermometer score at varying levels of moral
shame

The results in column (b) show that moral shame (OR=5.13, p < 0.001) remains a
significantly positive and strong predictor of negative white thermometer ratings when the 5
background controls are added to the model. The effects of guilt (OR=1.01, p=0.961) and image
shame (OR=1.00, p=0.993), however, remain negligible and insignificant. The marginal odds
shown in Model B of Figure 6 suggest that the adjusting for the background controls did very
little to attenuate the baseline effects of moral shame. Holding all other variables to their
medians, jumping from 1 standard deviation below to above mean moral shame predicts just
over a 14 point increase (0.0060.147) in the odds of providing an ‘anti-white’ feeling
thermometer score, while a min-max swing predicts a bit more than a 22 point increase
(0.0010.225). Whereas these effects were conditioned by partisanship in the warmth
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differential models, the two-way moral shame x party interaction is not significant (p=0.537)
here 129.
Column (c) shows that the entry of racial resentment (OR=1.69, p=0.115) and the two
SDO dimensions (ORSDO-Egal=1.32, p=0.212; ORSDO-AntiDom=1.13, p=0.647) into the model
moderates the still significant effects of moral shame (OR=3.83, p=0.002) to a similar degree as
the background controls. However, none of these three variables—nor guilt (OR=1.05, p=0.865)
nor image shame (OR=0.921, p=0.615)--significantly affect the probability of giving an ‘antiwhite’ feeling thermometer score. In the final model (column d), in which the background
controls are also added, the effects of moral shame (OR=3.94, p < 0.001) remain significant and
are even slightly boosted. In fact, with the exception of age (OR=0.959, p=0.006), moral shame
is the only variable in the model that significantly predicts ‘anti-white’ thermometer scores.
Model D of Figure 6.7 shows at 1 standard deviation below mean moral shame, a respondent has
only a vanishingly small and insignificant 0.7% (p=0.118) chance of rating whites in the ‘cool’
side of the thermometer scale. At 1 standard deviation above, though, these odds climb to
9.4% 130 (p=0.041).
All told, the results above indicate that moral shame is not only a robust predictor of
cooler feelings towards whites relative to racial/ethnic outgroups, but that it also uniquely
predicts outwardly negative feelings towards whites as well. However, due to the small number
of ‘anti-white’ respondents, estimates of these effects come with a high degree of uncertainty. In
a later section, I will attempt to replicate them on a larger and more politically balanced sample.

129

This lack of significance likely owes itself to a lack of power stemming from the small number of ‘anti-white’
respondents in the sample, particularly among Republicans (N=3) and Independents (N=6).
130
To be sure, and as is evident in Figure 6, these estimates are very noisy. For instance, the 95% confidence
interval around the 9.4% figure ranges from a low of 0.2% to a high of 27.5%.
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6.3.5

The effects of white shame and guilt on pro-outgroup behavior: testing H4-H5

To this point, all of the analyses have focused on the effects of ingroup-critical emotions
on pro-outgroup or anti-ingroup attitudes. One potential criticism with this is that ‘talk is cheap’.
Particularly in the context of a survey that asks sensitive questions about race, expressions of
support for pro-black and liberal immigration policies may only amount to token ‘signaling’ or
respondent efforts to present themselves as non-prejudiced to the researcher. Accordingly, and
while by no means a perfect solution, I test the extent that ingroup-critical emotions are also
predictive of pro-outgroup behavior that entails a personal (if modest) financial cost.
Specifically, respondents were given the opportunity to donate up to $10 to a racial justice and/or
pro-immigration advocacy organization. To bolster the cover story 131, they were also told that
their contribution would be recorded and that the researchers would ‘follow up with more
information at the conclusion of the survey’. These ‘donation’ variables thus serve as the
outcomes in the analyses that follow.
Because the prediction errors for each of the two donation items are strongly correlated
(r=0.723), I opt to model the data with series of Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR)
equations. This method allows for errors to correlate across equations, which potentially
improves the efficiency of the estimates over those that would be obtained through a standard
equation-by-equation OLS model. The results of these SUR equations are presented in Table
6.14 below.

131

Whether or to what extent the respondents actually bought this cover story is unknown.
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Table 6.14 Effects of predictors on monetary donations ($)

Moral Shame
Image Shame
Guilt
Moral Shame
+ Guilt
Racial
Resentment
(r)
SDOEgalitarianism
SDODominance
Constant
Adjusted R2
Mean VIF

Racial Justice Advocacy Group
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
0.898*** 0.857*** 0.869*** 0.869**
(0.218)
(0.243)
(0.256)
(0.261)
-0.310†
-0.274
-0.319†
-0.287
(0.181)
(0.186)
(0.184)
(0.187)
0.810**
0.722**
0.821**
0.741**
(0.242)
(0.244)
(0.242)
(0.244)
1.66***
1.51***
1.61***
1.52***
(0.169)
(0.216)
(0.229)
(0.239)
---

---

---

---

---

---

3.79***
(0.118)
0.139
(.0006)
3.32
(2.24)

3.90***
(0.526)
0.137
(.0009)
2.19
(1.94)

-0.215
(0.197)

-0.277
(0.214)

0.202
(0.174)
0.118
(0.168)
3.82***
(0.118)
0.139
(.001)
3.07
(2.61)

0.151
(0.175)
0.190
(0.174)
3.94***
(0.537)
0.138
(.0006)
2.32
(2.18)

Pro-Immigration Advocacy Group
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
0.559*
0.367
0.427†
0.356
(0.220)
(0.243)
(0.258)
(0.261)
-0.213
-0.109
-0.214
-0.128
(0.182)
(0.185)
(0.185)
(0.187)
0.937*** 0.797** 0.912*** 0.796***
(0.243)
(0.243)
(0.244)
(0.244)
1.42***
1.12***
1.30***
1.13***
(0.179)
(0.216)
(0.230)
(0.239)
---

---

---

---

---

---

3.68***
(0.119)
0.114
(.0007)
3.32
(2.24)

4.97***
(0.525)
0.127
(.0004)
2.19
(1.94)

0.154
(0.198)

-0.044
(0.213)

0.220
(0.175)
-0.187
(0.169)
3.68***
(0.119)
0.114
(.0000)
3.07
(2.61)

0.175
(0.175)
-0.121
(0.174)
4.98***
(0.536)
0.125
(.0005)
2.32
(2.18)

VIF Moral
3.47
4.38
4.80
5.08
3.47
4.38
4.80
5.08
Shame
VIF Image
2.30
2.47
2.39
2.51
2.30
2.47
2.39
2.51
Shame
(2.24)
(2.33)
(2.35)
(2.49)
(2.24)
(2.33)
(2.35)
(2.49)
VIF Guilt
4.19
4.34
4.23
4.36
4.19
4.34
4.23
4.36
VIF Moral
Shame +
2.24
3.27
3.82
4.23
2.24
3.27
3.82
4.23
Guilt
Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are unstandardized Beta coefficients with robust standard errors in
parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame
and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Adjusted R2 row correspond to changes in Adjusted R2
of models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows
indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Beginning with columns (a), we see that both moral shame (ß=0.898, p < 0.001) and guilt
ß=0.810, p=0.001) significantly predict greater monetary contributions to the racial justice
advocacy group, which offers support for H4. While the effects of the former are slightly larger
than the latter, the difference is not distinguishable from 0 (p=0.835). In terms of the combined
effects (ß=1.65, p < 0.001), moving from 1 standard deviation below to above mean moral
shame/guilt is expected to produce a nearly $3.30 (+0.870SD) increase ($2.16$5.45) in
monetary contributions. The results also suggest that a model that substitutes this variable for the
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separate moral shame and guilt indexes fits the data just as well if not slightly better (ΔAdjusted
R2=+0.0006). In fact, this remains the case across every model, which suggests that the effects of
moral shame and guilt on these outcomes substantially overlap. Turning now to the right side of
Table 14, we observe a similar but also unexpected pattern. While moral shame (ß=0.559,
p=0.011) and guilt (ß=0.937, p < 0.001) both independently predict greater donations to the proimmigration advocacy group, the effects of the latter are now noticeably (though not
significantly, p=0.374) larger than the former. The effects of moral shame are also significantly
smaller (p=0.038) than those observed in the ‘racial justice group’ model, while those for guilt
are not significantly different (p=0.482). Thus, H5, which predicted that moral shame would be
more predictive of pro-immigration donations than guilt, receives no support in these results.
When combined, though, a 1 standard deviation shift from below to above mean moral
shame/guilt (ß=1.42, p < 0.001) corresponds to a $2.85 (+0.756SD) increase ($2.26$5.10) in
pro-immigration donations. The difference between this increase and the one observed for the
racial justice group equation is significant (p=0.083) at the p < 0.1 level.
The results in columns (b) show that adjusting for the 5 background controls only
modestly reduces the effects of moral shame (ß=0.857, p < 0.001) and guilt (ß=0.771, p=0.001)
on contributions to the racial justice group. However, their inclusion does reduce the positive
effects of moral shame (ß=0.392, p=0.103) on pro-immigration contributions to insignificance.
Those of guilt (ß=0.797, p= 0.001), on the other hand, are only marginally affected. For the
racial justice group equation, a one standard deviation swing from below to above mean moral
shame/guilt (ß=1.51, p < 0.001) predicts a $3.01 increase in donations (+0.790SD;
$2.30$5.32). For the pro-immigration group equation, the same swing in moral shame/guilt
(ß=1.19, p < 0.001) is expected to result in an increase of $2.24 (+0.594SD; $2.48$4.86). The
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difference between these two increases is significant (p=0.017) at the p < 0.05 level. The
influence of moral shame/guilt on both donations is also again qualified by significant party x
moral shame/guilt interactions. However, in this case, the interaction is in the positive (i.e. nonDemocrat) direction. Specifically, the average effect of a standard deviation increase in moral
shame/guilt on racial justice donations are roughly $0.99 (p=0.003) and $0.91 (p=0.030) greater
for white Republicans (ß=2.13, p < 0.001) and independents (ß=2.06 p < 0.001), respectively,
than Democrats (ß=1.14, p < 0.001). Similarly, for the pro-immigration group equation, the
average effects are $0.74 (p=0.028) and $0.60 (p=0.155) greater for white Republicans (ß=1.59,
p < 0.001) and independents (ß=1.44, p =0.001) than Democrats (ß=0.936, p < 0.001), though
only the first of these differences is significant at the p < 0.05 threshold.
Columns (c) substitutes racial resentment and the two SDO dimensions for the
background controls. We see that the positive effects of moral shame (ß=0.869, p= 0.001) and
guilt (ß=0.821, p=0.001) on racial justice donations change very little from their baseline. For
donations to the pro-immigration organization, the effects of moral shame (ß=0.427, p=0.098)
are now somewhat smaller and only significant at the p < 0.1 threshold, while those of guilt
(ß=0.912, p < 0.001) are hardly affected. Notably, neither racial resentment (ßRacialJustice=-0.215,
p=0.273; ßProimmigration=-0.154, p=0.436) nor either of the SDO dimensions (SDO-E: ßRacialJustice=0.202, p=0.174; ßProimmigration=-0.220, p=0.175; SDO-D: ßRacialJustice=-0.118, p=0.168;
ßProimmigration=-0.187, p=0.270) significantly affect donations to either advocacy group.
Finally, returning the background controls to the model (columns d) does not
meaningfully alter the effects of moral shame (ß=0.869, p=0.001) nor guilt (ß=0.741, p=0.002)
on contributions to the racial justice group. Together, a one standard deviation shift from below
to above mean moral shame/guilt (ß=1.52, p < 0.001) predicts a $3.04 increase (+0.798SD;
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$2.28$5.33) in these contributions. Crucially, apart from ideological self-placement, no other
variable in the model is found to significantly affect these donations. The coefficients on every
other variable are also significantly smaller than either those of moral shame or guilt. Turning
now to the final pro-immigration equation, we again see that guilt (ß=0.796, p < 0.001) but not
moral shame (ß=0.356, p=0.172) significantly affects donations, which is counter to the
expectations of H5. Their combined effects, however, are significantly positive (ß=1.13, p <
0.001). A one standard deviation jump from below to above mean moral shame/guilt predicts a
$2.25 (+0.596SD; $2.55$4.81) increase in donations to the pro-immigration advocacy groups,
respectively.

Figure 6.8 Predicted donations ($) to racial justice and pro-immigration advocacy groups at varying levels
along the combined moral shame and guilt index
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Figure 6.9 Average effect of a standard deviation increase in combined moral shame and guilt on donations
($) to racial justice and pro-immigration advocacy groups by party identification.

6.3.6

Explaining ideological differences in white shame and guilt: testing H6-H6A

This chapter has thus far spoken very little to ideological differences in the expression of
ingroup-critical emotions. This is no small omission, as a central plank of this dissertation’s
theory is that not all whites equally susceptible to ingroup-critical emotions; and that, on account
of their differing orientations to racial inequality, white liberals are more likely than
conservatives to perceive racial inequality—white advantage and black disadvantage—as
illegitimate. Perceptions of illegitimacy, in turn, are theorized as conditioning the expression of
ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions. While hypothesis 6 predicted that white liberals
would express higher levels of collective shame and guilt than moderates and conservatives,
auxiliary hypothesis 6A was formulated with the intention of testing whether differing
understandings or attributions of racial inequality would account for these differences. It
predicted that, to the extent that measures of ‘symbolic racism’ actually capture perceptions of
discrimination and attributions of black disadvantage, controlling for it should mostly if not
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entirely account for differing levels of ingroup-critical emotions between white liberals and
conservatives. The analyses that follow thus evaluate evidence of this account in the current data.
I begin by first showing the magnitude of the ideological differences in levels of ingroup
critical emotions and racial resentment. Figure 6.10 below graphs the factor-weighted
standardized and unstandardized/unit-weighted scores for each variable along a collapsed 3-point
measure of ideological self-identification.

Figure 6.10 White shame, guilt, and racial resentment by ideological self-identification

Consistent with H6, white liberals are generally a world apart from conservatives and
even moderates on each of these outcomes. Compared to conservatives, they score 1.32 standard
deviations higher on moral shame, 0.77 standard deviations higher on image shame, 1.07
standard deviations higher on guilt, and 1.51 standard deviations higher on (reverse-coded) racial
resentment. Whereas the average white liberal respondent tended towards an ‘agree’ response to
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each of the items comprising moral shame and guilt, the average white conservative respondent
tended towards a ‘somewhat disagree’ response.
Given its sizeable relationships with moral shame (r=0.730) and guilt (r=0.617), and the
fact that these are the variables on which the ideological divide is greatest, I will next focus on
whether racial resentment accounts for liberal-conservatives differences in moral shame and
guilt. But due to their strong relationship, this analysis begins with an attempt at verifying that
these variables are statistically distinguishable constructs.
Table 6.15 presents the results of an exploratory factor analysis of the moral shame, guilt,
and racial resentment items. They suggest that racial resentment indeed constitutes a distinct
factor. All of its 4 constituent items load most strongly (0.606 to 0.885) on factor 2 and only
weakly on factors 1 (-0.032 to 0.132) and 3 (-0.043 to 0.137).
Table 6.15 Results of exploratory factor models
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked
their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. (r)
-0.032

0.871

-0.036

Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it
difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

0.063

0.664

0.105

It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only
try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

0.018

0.885

-0.043

0.132

0.606

0.137

0.254

0.190

0.534

0.425

0.037

0.519

0.466

0.114

0.407

0.241

0.221

0.251

0.932

0.070

-0.053

0.875

0.093

-0.017

Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
When I think of the manner in which black people have been treated, I
sometimes think that we white Americans are racist and mean.
My racial group’s treatment of black people makes me feel somewhat ashamed
about what it means to be white.
I feel ashamed for the racist tendencies of white people
I do not feel ashamed to be white for the way we treated black people (r)
I feel guilty for the manner in which black people have been treated by white
Americans
I feel guilty about the social inequalities between white and black people.
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Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for the behavior of white
Americans towards black people
When I think about then racism that exists towards black people, I feel guilty to
be a White American.
Proportion of variance explained
X2
N
Note. Cell entries are oblique-rotated factor loadings.

0.862

0.010

0.033

0.786

-0.028

0.099

0.779

0.662
11000
936

0.648

The results of a subsequent confirmatory factor analysis are shown in Table 6.16.
Column (a) fits a single factor model, which fits the data rather poorly (R-RMSEA=0.220, RCFI=0.953, R-TLI=0.943; R- X2=2499.387). A correlated 3-factor model, which is fitted in
column (b), fits the data much better (R-RMSEA=0.107, R-CFI=0.990, R-TLI=0.987; RX2=592.492). We also see that the ‘racial resentment’ factor correlates strongly with both moral
shame (0.819) and guilt (0.700), which suggests a considerable degree of shared variance. To
examine this further, column (d) adds a general factor. While fitting marginally worse than the
previous (R-RMSEA=0.113, R-CFI=0.988, R-TLI=0.985; R-X2=658.773), the results show that,
of the three group factors, the ‘racial resentment’ factor loads the weakest (0.797)—but still
strongly—onto the general factor. The OmegaHS score of the ‘racial resentment’ group factor is
0.149, which suggests that 14.9% of the reliable variance in its indicators can be uniquely
attributed to the group (vs. general) factor. By comparison, the OmegaHS scores of the ‘moral
shame’ and ‘guilt’ group factors are 0 and 0.035, which means that virtually all of the variance in
their respective indicators can be attributed to the general factor.
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Table 6.16 Results of confirmatory factor models
(a)
Factor
1
Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities
overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks
should do the same without any special favors. (r)

(b)
Factor Factor
1
2

(c)
(d)
Factor Factor Factor Factor
1
2
1
2

Factor
1

0.910 0.911
(0.008) (0.008)

---

0.937
(0.008)

Generations of slavery and discrimination have created
conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their
way out of the lower class.

0.860 0.862
(0.011) (0.011)

---

---

It's really a matter of some people not trying hard
enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be
just as well off as whites.

0.894 0.896
(0.009) (0.009)

---

0.916
(0.008)

Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they
0.875 0.878
deserve.
(0.010) (0.010)

---

---

Percent of racial inequality attributed to past and/or
present discrimination
How much discrimination is there against blacks in our
society today?
If not for past and current discrimination, black and
whites today would earn the same incomes.

0.790
(1.03)
0.804
(0.014)

-----

0.818
(1.05)
0.849
(0.015)

-----

Factor
3

(f)
General
Factor

0.919
(0.008)

---

0.936
(0.008)

---

---

---

0.878 0.873
(0.011) (0.011)

---

---

0.876
(0.011)

---

---

---

0.902
(0.009)

---

0.916
(0.008)

---

---

---

0.894
(0.010)

---

0.908
(0.010)

---

0.892
(0.010)

---

---

---

---

---

-----

---

0.800
(1.03)
0.815
(0.014)

-----

0.806
(1.04)
0.822
(0.013)

0.661
(0.019)

---

0.690
(0.019)

---

0.670
(0.019)

---

0.675
(0.019)

---

Factor 1

---

---

0.933
(0.011)

---

0.914
(0.009)

---

0.930
(0.009)

---

Factor 2

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

Factor 3

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

Robust RMSEA

0.145

0.142

(e)
Factor
2

0.081

0.122

0.821
(1.05)
0.847
(0.015)
0.690
(0.019)

0.924 0.867
(0.009) (0.015)
0.959
--(0.011)
--0.075

---

------0.919
(0.161)
0.996
(11.80)
0.950
(0.369)
0.079
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Robust CFI

0.977

0.980

0.993

0.985

0.995

Robust TLI

0.966

0.967

0.989

0.976

0.991

193.983
13
0.001

69.623
11
0.001

Robust X2
289.156
257.363
93.119
df
14
13
13
p<
0.001
0.001
0.001
Note. Cell entries are standardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

0.995
0.990
75.518
11
0.001
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The bifactor model in column (e) offers an alternative means of assessing the extent of
non-general vs. general variance. Here we see that the group-factor loadings of the racial
resentment indicators range from 0.449 to 0.621, which suggests that 20.2% to 39.9% of their
variance is explained by the group-factor. To contrast, the indicator loadings on the moral shame
and guilt group factors, respectively, range from 0.031 to 0.226 132 and 0.331 to 0.452, which
means that roughly 0.096% to 5.1% and 11% to 20% of their variance is accounted for by their
respective group factors.
Two conclusions follow from the analyses above. First, it appears that a majority of the
variance in racial resentment is general or results from a common dimension that is shared with
moral shame and guilt. As will be further discussed later, this could have important implications
for how scholars interpret its relationship with racial policy attitudes. Second, despite this
generality, a non-trivial if still minority share of the variance in its constituent items appears to
be unique to racial resentment. Whether this means that racial resentment is distinct enough from
moral shame and guilt to be treated as a separate construct is certainty debatable, and it warrants
further research. But for the purposes of examining whether or to what extent it accounts for
ideological differences in ingroup-critical emotions, I will proceed on the (in my assessment,
reasonable) assumption that it is.
Having shown some evidence that moral shame and racial resentment are statistically
distinguishable constructs, the next step is testing my theory’s assumptions about the nature of
the latter. Specifically, if racial resentment taps perceptions of the prevalence or severity of
discrimination against blacks along with its role in explaining black disadvantage, we would
expect explicit measures of the latter and some or all of the racial resentment items to share a

132

The group-factor paths of one of the moral shame indicators had to be dropped on account of negative variance.

290
common latent variable. The 3 explicit measures used here, which were first introduced in
section 6.2.2.2, are designed to assess (a) respondents’ perceptions of the severity of anti-black
discrimination today, and b) respondents’ beliefs about the extent that existing black-white
socio-economic disparities can be attributed to past and/or current discrimination. I begin by
entering these 3 items into an exploratory factor analysis with the 4 racial resentment items. The
oblique-rotated results, which are shown in Table 6.17, portray a somewhat complicated picture.
On one hand, they suggest a two-factor solution is superior to a single. However, one of the
racial resentment items (‘blacks have gotten less than they deserve’) loads more strongly on the
‘discrimination/attributions’ (0.543) than the intended racial resentment factor (0.345), while a
second (‘Generations of slavery and discrimination’) loads almost equally strongly on both
(0.430 vs. 425).
Table 6.17 Results of exploratory factor models
Factor
1

Factor
2

0.157

0.746

Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for
blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

0.430

0.425

It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder
they could be just as well off as whites.

0.094

0.775

0.543

0.345

0.715
0.566

0.157
0.250

0.651

0.044

Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way
up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. (r)

Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
Percent of racial inequality attributed to past and/or present discrimination
How much discrimination is there against blacks in our society today?
If not for past and current discrimination, black and whites today would earn the same
incomes
Proportion of Variance
X2
N
Note. Cell entries are oblique-rotated factor loadings.

0.915
0.891
4374.33
936
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At first blush, these results would appear to be in line with Tarman and Sears (2005),
which found that these two specific racial resentment items loaded on a ‘structural attributions’
factor, whereas the ‘try harder’ and ‘without special favors’ items loaded on a separate
‘individual attributions’ factor. Specifically, because the three explicit attribution measures all
reference discrimination—a structural attribution—they perhaps naturally cohere with the
‘structural’ racial resentment items.
To resolve any remaining ambiguity, I turn again to a confirmatory factor analysis to
compare the fits of different model specifications. The results in Table 6.18 suggest that, of the
six models, the single factor model (column a) fit the data the poorest (R-RMSEA=0.145, RCFI=0.977, R-TLI=0.966; R-X2=289.156). The fit of a two-factor model (column b) wherein the
racial resentment and the discrimination/attribution items load on separate factors is only
marginally better (R-RMSEA=0.142, R-CFI=0.980, R-TLI=0.967; R-X2=257.363). Column (c)
fits a different two factor solution in which the paths for the two racial resentment items that
cohered more or equally strongly with the discrimination/attribution items in the EFA are
removed from factor 1 and added to factor 2. The results indicate that this model fits the data
considerably better than the previous two (R-RMSEA=0.081, R-CFI=0.993, R-TLI=0.989, RX2=193.983). And, despite loading almost equally strongly on both factors in the EFA, the
results in column (d) show that keeping the ‘generations of slavery’ indicator in the racial
resentment factor actually leads to a deterioration in model fit (R-RMSEA=0.122, R-CFI=0.985,
R-TLI=0.976, R-X2=193.983).
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Table 6.18 Results of confirmatory factor models
(a)
Factor
1

(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2

0.910
(0.008)

0.911
(0.008)

---

0.937
(0.008)

Generations of slavery and discrimination have created
conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their
way out of the lower class.

0.860
(0.011)

0.862
(0.011)

---

---

It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough;
if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well
off as whites.

0.894
(0.009)

0.896
(0.009)

---

0.916
(0.008)

0.875
(0.010)

0.878
(0.010)

---

---

Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame
prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the
same without any special favors. (r)

Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they
deserve.

---

0.936
(0.008)

---

---

---

0.878 0.873
(0.011) (0.011)

---

---

0.876
(0.011)

---

---

---

0.902
(0.009)

---

0.916
(0.008)

---

---

---

0.894
(0.010)

---

0.908
(0.010)

---

0.892
(0.010)

---

---

---

---

---

-----

0.790
(1.03)
0.804
(0.014)
0.661
(0.019)

---

0.690
(0.019)

---

0.670
(0.019)

---

0.675
(0.019)

---

Factor 1

---

---

0.933
(0.011)

---

0.914
(0.009)

---

0.930
(0.009)

---

Factor 2

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

Factor 3

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

Robust RMSEA

0.145

---

0.818
(1.05)
0.849
(0.015)

0.919
(0.008)

---

Percent of racial inequality attributed to past and/or present
discrimination
How much discrimination is there against blacks in our
society today?
If not for past and current discrimination, black and whites
today would earn the same incomes.

---

0.142

-----

(f)
Factor General
3
Factor

0.800
(1.03)
0.815
(0.014)

0.081

-----

0.806
(1.04)
0.822
(0.013)

0.122

0.821
(1.05)
0.847
(0.015)
0.690
(0.019)

-------

0.924 0.867 0.919
(0.009) (0.015) (0.161)
0.959 0.996
--(0.011) (11.80)
0.950
----(0.369)
0.075

0.079
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Robust CFI

0.977

0.980

0.993

0.985

0.995

Robust TLI

0.966

0.967

0.989

0.976

0.991

93.119
13
0.001

193.983
13
0.001

69.623
11
0.001

Robust X2
289.156
257.363
df
14
13
p<
0.001
0.001
Note. Cell entries are standardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

0.995
0.990
75.518
11
0.001
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Having established (at least in the current data) that racial resentment is more or less
indistinguishable from discrimination-based (vs. individualist) attributions of black disadvantage,
I now extract a new variable consisting of the general factor scores. This variable will be used to
test H6A, which predicted that controlling for attributions of black disadvantage would largely
account for ideological differences in the expression of moral shame and guilt. For comparison, I
also test the influence of the original 4-item racial resentment index; and, because they are also
theoretically implicated in ideological differences, that of the two SDO dimensions.
Table 6.19 presents the results of a series of linear regression models in which the factorweighted z-scored moral shame index is regressed on a collapsed 3-point measure of ideological
self-placement either alone or with other covariates. Cell entries for each ideology category are
predicted margins (i.e. predicted moral shame z-score), while those for other variables are
standardized beta coefficients. The bottom row shows the difference between white liberal and
conservative margins, the significance of which is determined with a Wald test. In the baseline
model shown in column (a), we see that white liberals and conservatives are roughly 1.34SD
apart on moral shame. The model in column (b) examines how much of this difference is
accounted for by standard background/demographic control variables 133 (i.e. party identification,
education, sex, and age). In the end, the entry of these variables reduces the white liberalconservative ‘moral shame gap’ to roughly 0.74SD. Thus, these variables collectively explain
approximately 45% of the baseline difference. Model (c) drops these predictors and adds the new
racial resentment general factor scale. As expected, the inclusion of this variable dramatically

133

For simplicity’s sake, and because my focus here is solely on explaining ideological differences in moral shame
as opposed to variation in moral shame in general, I exclude the parameter estimates for each of the
background/demographic control variables.
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narrows the ‘moral shame gap’ 134. While the liberal-conservative difference remains significant,
it is now less than one-fifth its baseline size (0.243SD, p=0.001). By itself, then, the general
‘racial resentment’ factor accounts for nearly 82% of the original gap. For comparison, the
results in column (d) suggest that the standard 4-item racial resentment scale explains just under
71% of the gap. The general factor thus explains 0.151SD more of this difference, a difference
which itself is significant (p=0.004) at the p < 0.01 level.
Table 6.19 Explaining ideological differences in moral shame
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
General RR Factor
Racial Resentment (r)
SDO-Egalitarianism
SDO-(Anti)Dominance

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
0.438*** 0.266*** 0.102** 0.151*** 0.275*** 0.095**
(0.032)
(0.037) (0.029) (0.033)
(0.032) (0.029)
-0.583*** -0.446*** -0.185** -0.255*** -0.430*** -0.192**
(0.082)
(0.085) (0.068) (0.071)
(0.072) (0.065)
-0.905*** -0.470*** -0.141* -0.244*** -0.508*** -0.115*
(0.069)
(0.092) (0.060) (0.067)
(0.069) (0.059)
0.693***
0.622***
--------(0.027)
(0.034)
0.607***
----------(0.032)
0.385*** 0.179***
--------(0.037) (0.032)
0.063† -0.066*
--------(0.037) (0.031)

(g)
0.072*
(0.031)
-0.141*
(0.067)
-0.080
(0.070)
0.596***
(0.037)
--0.176***
(0.032)
-0.070*
(0.032)

Demographic/
--√
--------√
Background controls
Adjusted R2
0.336
0.401
0.603
0.547
0.467
0.617
0.626
Liberal - Conservative
+1.34*** +0.736*** +0.243** +0.394*** +0.784*** +0.210** +0.152†
Note. Cell entries in italic font are predicted margins. Cell entries corresponding to other predictors are standardized
Beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

The results in column (e) show that, by themselves, the two SDO dimensions account for
approximately 41% of the liberal-conservative moral shame gap. Thus, while explaining
somewhat more of the difference than the background/demographic controls, their moderating
influence is far more limited than that of the racial resentment variables 135. In fact, when
134
While purely suggestive, the results of a mediation analysis confirm the superiority of a model in which racial
resentment mediates the effects of ideology (AIC=3746.115, BIC=3779.825) over a model in which ideology
mediates the effects of racial resentment (AIC=4778.394, BIC=4812.103).
135
Theory would suggest that the social dominance dimensions are antecedent to attributions, and thus the latter are
a more proximate cause of shame and guilt. While the cross-sectional nature of the data doesn’t permit a true test of
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comparing the results in column (f) to (c), we see that, net of the general racial resentment factor,
the two SDO variables only independently narrow the gap by an additional (but statistically
insignificant, p=0.928) 0.033SD. Finally, when the background/demographic controls rejoin the
model (column g), the gap further declines to 0.152 and is now only significant (p=0.089) at the
p < 0.1 level.
Overall, the above results suggest that the overwhelming majority of liberal-conservative
differences in moral shame is accounted for by the general racial resentment factor. Table 6.20
below shows the same with respect to liberal vs. conservative differences in guilt.
Table 6.20 Explaining ideological differences in guilt
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
General Factor

(a)
(b)
(c)
0.359*** 0.217*** 0.063†
(0.036)
(0.045) (0.035)
-0.493*** -0.329*** -0.143*
(0.078)
(0.084) (0.071)
-0.740*** -0.417*** -0.069
(0.069)
(0.100) (0.068)
0.614***
----(0.031)

Racial Resentment (r)

---

---

---

SDO-Egalitarianism

---

---

---

SDO-(Anti)Dominance

---

---

---

(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
0.111** -0.224*** 0.061†
0.050
(0.038)
(0.037)
(0.035)
(0.040)
-0.210** -0.369*** -0.155*
-0.127†
(0.072)
(0.072)
(0.068)
(0.070)
-0.171* -0.411*** -0.056
-0.041
(0.073)
(0.071)
(0.066)
(0.080)
0.567*** 0.548***
----(0.038)
(0.041)
0.527***
------(0.035)
0.370*** 0.182*** 0.181***
--(0.039)
(0.037)
(0.036)
0.001
-0.116** -0.123**
--(0.040)
(0.035)
(0.035)

Demographic/
--√
--------√
Background controls
Adjusted R2
0.230
0.281
0.440
0.388
0.330
0.455
0.462
Liberal - Conservative
+1.10*** +0.634*** +0.132 +0.282** +0.636*** +0.117
+0.091
Note. Cell entries in italic font are predicted margins. Cell entries corresponding to other predictors are standardized
Beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

At baseline (column a), white liberals score 1.10SD higher than conservatives on guilt.
The background/demographic controls collectively reduce this difference to 0.634SD (p <
0.001), which is roughly 58% of its baseline size. In contrast, the general RR factor alone

this account, it would explain why attributions better account for liberal vs. conservative differences in the
expression of shame and guilt.
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(column c) cuts the gap to a statistically insignificant 0.132SD (p=0.121), which is just 12% of
its baseline magnitude 136. Once again, the standard racial resentment index (column d) reduces
this gap to a slightly but significantly (p=0.038) lesser degree. The liberal-conservative divide
(0.282SD, p=0.002) also remains statistically significant in this model, which wasn’t the case in
the model with the general RR factor. Turning to columns (e) and (f), though the two SDO
dimensions explain around 42% of the original gap when entered alone, their independent
moderating influence falls to a paltry -0.015SD when the general RR factor is added.
All told, the preceding results indicate that, as predicted, nearly all of the white liberalconservative differences in moral shame and guilt are a function of differing orientations to or
understandings of racial inequality. However, given the cross-sectional nature of these data, it
must be emphasized that this account is purely suggestive.
6.3.7
6.3.7.1

Secondary analyses/robustness check
Examining the residualized effects of white moral shame and guilt

Based on recent theory, both moral shame and guilt were expected to predict support for
policies that attempt to repair the ingroup’s specific wrongs against a specific outgroup (i.e.,
blacks), while only moral shame was expected to predict a more general pro-outgroup/antiingroup orientation. Overall, the behavior of moral shame and guilt approximated these theorydriven predictions. Even where guilt was found to be significantly associated with outcomes
beyond pro-black policy support, its effects were almost always at least nominally smaller than
those of moral shame. The question is whether this pattern was obtained because the underlying
theory is indeed correct or whether the pattern itself is merely a statistical artifact. In support of

136

A mediation analysis again supports the superiority of a model in which racial resentment mediates the effects of
ideology (AIC=4056.004, BIC=4089.714) over a model in which ideology mediates the effects of racial resentment
(AIC=5088.283, BIC=5121.993).
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the latter account, the results of an earlier confirmatory factor analysis suggested that most of the
variance in the moral shame and guilt indicators was shared between them. These findings could
be reasonably interpreted as indicating moral shame and guilt are hard to distinguish at the
construct level. Treating their scale scores as separate predictors risks a model with strong
collinearity, rendering their parameter estimates unstable and unreliable, and little room for
theoretical interpretation due to the poor independent measurement of moral shame and guilt.
The stronger effects of moral shame versus guilt on outcomes that do not obviously implicate
black Americans may simply be random — a byproduct of the difficulty OLS models have in
assigning outcome variance across correlated independent variables.
Cleaner estimates of the unique or non-shared effects of the three emotions can be
achieved by using a bifactor model to compute factor scores for their prediction of each of the
outcome variables featured in this chapter. Such a bifactor model was previously fitted and
reported in column (f) of Table 6.4 in section 6.3.1. To this model, I now add regression
equations that regress the different outcome variables on each residualized group factor and the
general factor. In a second model, I add the group factor of racial resentment. The purpose here
is to test whether, net of their shared variance, the residual or unique variance of shame, guilt,
and racial resentment significantly relates to each outcome. More generally, it is a means of
assessing the reliability of earlier models’ assignments of outcome variance to highly collinear
predictors.
Columns (a) in Table 6.21 reports the standardized beta coefficients of the three emotion
group factors (i.e., their bifactor loadings) and a general factor for each model. For instance, in
the model predicting pro-black policies, virtually all of what was previously reported as the
independent effects of guilt can be attributed to variance shared with other putatively explanatory
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factors. In other words, the variance guilt retains after being stripped of its general variance is not
significantly predictive (ß=0.052, p=0.117) of pro-black policy support. The same cannot be said
of moral (ß=0.254, p < 0.001) and image shame (ß=-0.155, p < 0.001); their residualized
variance still significantly positively and negatively predicted pro-black policy support,
respectively. Nonetheless, most of the effects of the three emotions on this outcome appeared to
stem from what they share (ß=0.707, p < 0.001). Column (b) adds the bifactor results for the
racial resentment group factor. Doing so moderates the coefficient on moral shame (ß=0.146,
p=0.001), which suggests that at least some of its unique outcome-related variance overlaps with
that of racial resentment. Additionally, the unique variance in guilt then related significantly
(ß=0.087, p=0.012) at the p < 0.05 level, suggesting that the absorption of racial resentment’s
shared variance into the general factor increased the unique outcome-related variance in guilt.
The pattern of results in the ‘immigration levels’ model is substantially like what was
observed in the earlier ordinal logit regression. The residualized effects of moral shame
(ß=0.393, OR=1.55, p < 0.001) are the largest of the three, followed by image shame (ß=-0.176,
OR=0.629, p < 0.001), and guilt (ß=0.101, p =0.018). As expected, the unique effects of moral
shame are significantly larger than those of guilt. Thus, for this outcome, the effects of the three
emotions are a combination of the unique effects of each factor and those common to all factors
(ß=0.415, p < 0.001). Column (b) in this model shows the unique outcome-related variance in
racial resentment (ß=0.418, p < 0.001) is both significant and equal in size to that of moral
shame (ß=0.399, p < 0.001). With the addition of racial resentment, guilt’s unique outcomerelated variance becomes indistinguishable from 0, which suggests that it largely overlapped
with that of racial resentment.
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Table 6.21 The residualized effects of white moral shame, image shame, guilt, and racial resentment on primary outcome
variables

Moral
Shame
Image
Shame
Guilt
Racial
Resentment
(r)

Pro-Black
Immigration
Policies
Levels
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
0.254*** 0.146** 0.393*** 0.399***
(0.032) (0.042) (0.039) (0.085)
-0.155*** -0.140*** -0.176*** -0.211***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.035) (0.036)
0.052
0.087* 0.101*
-0.005
(0.033) (0.035) (0.043) (0.055)
---

0.312***
(0.024)

---

0.418***
(0.033)

Decriminalize
Non-European
Outgroup vs.
Racial Justice Pro-Immigration
Border Crossings
Immigration
Ingroup Warmth
Advocacy
Advocacy
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
0.318*** 0.198** 0.276*** 0.318*** 0.391*** 0.673*** 0.125* 0.113†
0.053
0.051
(0.037) (0.065)
(0.046)
(0.088)
(0.041) (0.000) (0.051) (0.067) (0.050) (0.067)
-0.073* -0.131*** -0.135*** -0.150*** -0.164*** -0.114** -0.080 -0.062 -0.071 -0.038
(0.034) (0.036)
(0.038)
(0.041)
(0.032) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.044)
0.073†
-0.051
0.086†
0.033
0.081*
0.159*
0.047
0.063
0.032
0.104†
(0.039) (0.048)
(0.075)
(0.060)
(0.036) (0.068) (0.046) (0.057) (0.047) (0.084)
---

0.346***
(0.028)

---

0.430***
(0.039)

---

0.416***
(0.040)

---

0.007
(0.038)

---

0.035
(0.352)

0.709*** 0.723*** 0.415*** 0.459*** 0.469*** 0.527*** 0.277*** 0.298*** 0.413*** 0.391*** 0.360*** 0.371*** 0.348*** 0.339***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.027) (0.031) (0.027) (0.027)
(0.032)
(0.036)
(0.027) (0.036) (0.043) (0.045) (0.042) (0.043)
N
937
936
936
937
936
937
936
935
936
935
Robust X2 265.740 1424.755 254.690 1396.706 264.615 1413.877 253.142 1385.056 277.357 1430.199 247.0 1401.280 245.681 1399.591
R2
0.594
0.668
0.367
0.589
0.332
0.456
0.178
0.398
0.356
0.817
0.154
0.159
0.130
0.131
Note. Cell entries are standardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
General
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Overall, whereas most of the effects of the 4 factors on pro-black policy support are
overlapping or attributable to the general factor, their effects on support for increasing
immigration are more evenly distributed between shared (ß=0.459, p < 0.001) and unique
variances.
The pattern of results in the ‘Decriminalized Border Crossings’ model is both like that of
the previous ‘Immigration Levels’ model and also accords with what was observed earlier in the
conventional ordinal logit model. I thus skip ahead to the ‘Non-European Immigration’ model
whose results were somewhat at odds with those reported in the earlier OLS model. These latter
results indicated that, while moral shame was a significantly positive predictor of favoritism
towards non-European immigrants, its effects became indistinguishable from 0 when adjusting
for racial resentment. But the results of the corresponding model (b) in Table 6.21 suggest that
OLS may have mistakenly attributed moral shame’s unique outcome-related variance to racial
resentment. Specifically, once their overlapping variance is absorbed into the general factor
(ß=0.298, p < 0.001), moral shame’s unique variance remains significantly predictive of
admitting more non-European than European immigrants (ß=0.318, p < 0.001). The effects of
guilt, however, is significantly smaller and never reaches conventional levels of significance in
either model.
Turning to the ‘Outgroup vs. Ingroup Warmth’ model, we see that the pattern of results is
substantially like those from conventional OLS. However, whereas adjusting for racial
resentment nearly halved moral shame’s coefficient in the earlier model, its inclusion here
actually dramatically enhanced the effects of the latter’s outcome-related variance (ß=0.673, p <
0.001). Further, whereas guilt was not significantly predictive in the earlier model, its effects (ß
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0.159, p=0.020), now reach conventional levels of significance in the current model, though they
are still significantly smaller than those of moral shame.
Relative to the previous models, the results of last two — i.e., those with the ‘donation’
outcome variables — appear to diverge the most from what was observed earlier. Recall that, in
the SUREG models, moral shame and guilt were found to be equally strong predictors of
donations to the racial justice advocacy group, while the latter was found to be a stronger
predictor of donations to the pro-immigration group. These results are generally overturned in
the current models. Specifically, referring to column (b), none of the four factors retained unique
variance that significantly influenced donations to the racial justice organization, though the
variance in moral shame (ß=0.113, p=0.090) was significantly predictive at the p < 0.1 level. If
these results are to be trusted, what was previously reported as the independent effects of moral
shame and guilt now appears to be mostly attributable to what they share (ß=0.371, p < 0.001).
The same is true with respect to their effects on ‘pro-immigration’ donations. Here too, only the
general variance (ß=0.339, p < 0.001) is significantly predictive of contributions.
In sum, examining the influence of the non-shared shared variance in each of the
emotions served to both affirm and contradict the results of the earlier regression models. In the
first case, both moral shame and guilt — though more so the former than the latter — had unique
variance that was significantly predictive of pro-black policy support. In addition, and as in
recent theory, the unique variance in moral shame was consistently a stronger predicter than that
in guilt for permissive immigration policies as well as favoritism towards non-white immigrants
and racial/ethnic outgroups in general. And, while not mentioned above, the unique variance in
image shame was a consistently negative predictor of every outcome variable under study, which
also lends itself to recent theory. On the other hand, the results indicated that most of the effects
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of the three emotions (and racial resentment) on pro-black policy support were shared. This was
even more the case when it came to the two donation outcomes, relationships of which were
almost entirely attributable to the general factor. I discuss the implications of these results in the
discussion section.
6.3.7.2

Replication

To what extent are the relationships between ingroup-critical emotions and pro-outgroup
policies an artifact of the current dataset? Given that the data used in this chapter was gathered
from an online and predominantly left-leaning sample, can we be confident that these
relationships would also obtain in other data? Previous studies, including most recently by
Agadjanian et al. (2021) and Chudy, Piston, and Shipper (2019), have established significant
relationships between white guilt and pro-black policy orientations. Thus, we can be more
confident that such a relationship is genuine. On the other hand, and to the best of this author’s
knowledge, the analyses in this chapter constitute the first attempt at extending this relationship
to pro-immigration and pro-outgroup/anti-ingroup sentiments. And while significant
relationships were reported in the current sample, whether they’d replicate in other data remains
to be seen.
I briefly attempt such a replication in the analyses below. The replication data 137 comes
from a March 2021 YouGov survey commissioned by the Cato Institute, which was generously

137

An earlier version of this chapter relied on data from the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES)
Team Module of Indiana University and he 2016 American National Elections Studies (ANES) Pilot survey. The
problem with these data is that they only include measures of guilt; and these guilt measures are different from the
administered in my Prolific study. As this chapter has shown, guilt is a much weaker predictor of immigration
attitudes than moral shame. And if the latter is not included in a model of immigration attitudes, any effects of guilt
are likely to reflect the stronger predictive influence of shame. Fortunately, the 2021 YouGov survey—which was
conducted after the initial draft of this chapter was written—included 3 of the 4 measures of moral shame that
featured in my Prolific study. Accordingly, I opted to consign the original (CCES, ANES) replication analyses to the
appendix while substituting analyses of the YouGov data.
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shared with me by the author of the survey’s questionnaire 138. This nationally representative
survey (N=2,600) includes a sample of 1,486 non-Hispanic white respondents. Most importantly,
it fielded 3 of the 4 moral shame items that featured in my Prolific study. It also included a 2item measure of racial resentment, racial/ethnic group feeling thermometers, a large array items
measuring immigration attitudes (including preferred levels of immigration), and a two-item
measure of dispositional compassion, which will allow me to examine whether or to what extent
that effects of shame on pro-immigration attitudes are actually attributable to more general
feelings of sympathy for those in need. Finally, the survey included the standard 4-item social
conformity (vs. personal autonomy) scale, which many researchers use to measure authoritarian
predispositions. Given previously documented relationships between this scale and antiimmigration orientations, I feel it is important to investigate whether or to what extent it accounts
for moral shame’s pro-immigration influence.
A comparison of the descriptive statistics of the Prolific and YouGov samples is provided
in Table 6.22. As is clear, the latter sample is far more politically balanced than the former.
Relative to their Prolific counterparts, non-Hispanic YouGov respondents were more likely to
identify as Republican (44.9% vs. 24.1%) and conservative (46% vs 21.9%), less likely to have
earned a Bachelor’s degree or higher (31% vs. 54.6%), and were considerably older (Mean=50.7
vs. 34.2). Thus, these data offer an adequate test of whether the effects of moral shame reported
earlier similarly obtain in samples with greater external validity.
Table 6.22 Comparison of sample demographics
% Democrat
% Republican
% Liberal
% Conservative
% Male
138

YouGov White Prolific White
Sample
Sample
38.7%
64.7%
44.9%
24.1%
24.6%
63.8%
46.0%
21.9%
48.9%
47.0%

These data are available upon request.
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% BA+ Degree
Mean Age
N

31%
50.7 (17.7)
1,486

54.6%
34.2 (12.5)
937

N
Range
Moral Shame (α=0.917, Mean=2.95, SD=1.44)
When I think of the manner in which black people have been treated, sometimes
1,480
1-5
I think that we white Americans are racist and mean.
My racial group’s treatment of black people makes me feel somewhat ashamed
about what it means to be white.
1,482
1-5
I feel ashamed for the racist tendencies of white people
1,483
Racial Resentment (α=0.783, Mean=2.70, SD=1.33)
Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it
difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
1,485

Mean

SD

3.01

1.54

2.85

1.52

1-5

3.09

1.55

1-5

3.10

1.54

Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked
1,484
1-5
2.50 1.40
their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. (r)
Dispositional Compassion (α=0.631, Mean=3.44, SD=0.98)
How accurate are the following statements at describing yourself?
I suffer from others' sorrows.
1,485
1-5
3.03 1.18
I feel sympathy for those who are worse off than myself.
1,484
1-5
3.84 1.11
Social Conformity/Authoritarianism (α=0.589, Mean=0.45, SD=0.32)
Which do you think is more important for a child to have?
Obedience or self-reliance
1,486
0-1
0.31 0.46
Be considerate or well behaved
1,486
0-1
0.34 0.47
Independence of respect for elders
1,486
0-1
0.62 0.49
Curiosity or good manners
1,486
0-1
0.55 0.55
Immigration Attitudes
In your view, should immigration to the U.S. be kept at its present level,
1,485
1-5
2.78 1.17
increased, or decreased?
After the pandemic, would you favor or oppose eliminating all restrictions on
1,486
1-4
1.90 0.98
immigration and allow anyone to move to US who wants to?
Do you think it is acceptable or unacceptable for people to illegally immigrate to
1,482
0-1
0.23 0.42
the United States?
Non-White vs. White Feeling Thermometer Differentials (α=0.925, Mean=3.10, SD=23.16)
Whites - Blacks
1,476 -100-100 1.71 24.87
Whites - Hispanics
1,477 -99-100 3.91 24.42
Whites - Asians
1,477 -96-100 3.67 25.21
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Table 6.23 above presents the list of primary predictor and outcome variables used in the
forthcoming analysis. As in the Prolific analysis, racial resentment 139 is reverse-coded so that
higher scores denote greater racial liberalism. I then average its constituents items together to
form a composite index (α=0.783), which I standardize to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation
of 1. The same is done with respect to the three moral shame (α=0.917) and the two dispositional
empathy items (α=0.631). For the measure of authoritarianism, I extract a dominant principal
component factor, which accounts for 45% of the variance in the 4 dummy-coded constituent
items. Finally, for simplicity’s sake, I dichotomize the three immigration items such that liberal
responses (i.e., ‘Increased’, ‘Favor’, Acceptable’) are coded as ‘1’ and all other responses as ‘0’.
White vs. non-white warmth (and ‘anti-whiteness’) is measured the same way it was in the
Prolific analysis—i.e., as the average of differences between ratings of whites vs. blacks,
Hispanics, and Asians.
Because all of the pro-immigration outcome variables are dichotomous, I model them
with binary logistic regression. The results of these models 140 are shown in Table 6.24 below.
Due to the length of this chapter, I will keep the analysis of these results as brief as possible and
provide only a general summary.

139

The strength of the correlation (r=0.753) between racial resentment and moral shame is almost identical to what
was observed in the Prolific sample (r=0.725), which offers further evidence that they are indeed highly overlapping
constructs.
140
To keep sample sizes consistent across models, I include only respondents with complete data on all variables.
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Table 6.23 Effects of white moral shame on pro-immigration policy preferences
Increase immigration levels

Moral Shame

(a)
5.03***
(0.504)

Racial
Resentment (r)

---

Authoritarianism

---

Empathy

---

Demographic
/Background
Controls

---

(b)
(c)
(d)
3.31*** 2.39*** 2.24***
(0.420) (0.305) (0.322)
2.87*** 2.18***
--(0.351) (0.283)
0.814*
0.891
--(0.072) (0.083)
0.817* 0.844*
--(0.065) (0.071)
√

---

√

Eliminate all restrictions on
Acceptable for people
immigration after COVID
to illegally immigrate
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
3.22*** 2.29*** 2.02*** 1.82*** 3.74*** 2.53*** 2.02*** 1.88***
(0.242) (0.233) (0.217) (0.216) (0.327) (0.287)
(0.240) (0.248)
1.98*** 1.59***
2.24*** 1.78***
--------(0.211) (0.188)
(0.259) (0.235)
0.999
1.07
0.731*** 0.752**
--------(0.079) (0.092)
(0.062) (0.073)
0.789** 0.812
0.742*** 0.808*
--------(0.059) (0.063)
(0.062) (0.069)
---

√

---

√

---

√

---

√

0.223*** 1.04*** 0.222*** 0.685 0.284*** 7.80*** 0.299*** 6.65*** 0.196*** 11.69 *** 0.191*** 8.23***
(0.021)
(1.04) (0.022) (0.313) (0.021) (3.62) (0.023) (3.06) (0.017) (0.021)
(0.018) (4.11)
Pseudo R2
0.268
0.349
0.343
0.377
0.173
0.252
0.206
0.265
0.195
0.294
0.260
0.341
N
1,471
1,472
1,468
Note. Cell entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Constant
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Overall, moral shame remains a statistically and substantively meaningful predictor of
each pro-immigration outcome regardless of model specification. Figure 6.11 graphs the
predicted probabilities of each outcome at various levels of moral shame. In model B, which
holds all background/demographic controls to their medians/modes 141, a respondent placing 1
standard deviation below moral shame has just a 3.4% (95% CI=1.3%, 5.4%) chance of
supporting increased levels of immigration, a roughly 8% (95% CI=4.1%, 11.9%) chance of
supporting the removal of all immigration restrictions, and a 3.5% (95% CI=1.4%, 5.5%) chance
of reporting that it is ‘acceptable’ for people to immigrate illegally. At 1 standard deviation
above, these odds jump to 27.5% (95% CI=17.7%, 37.4%), 31.1% (95% CI=21.5%, 40.1%), and
18.6% (95% CI=10.9%, 26.4%), respectively. Furthering adding and holding racial resentment,
authoritarianism, and compassion to their means (model D) leads to a modest attenuation of
these figures. In all, the effects of moral shame on these outcomes are least nominally larger than
every other predictor. And considering that moral shame could not be statistically ‘cleansed’ of
its image-shame-related variance 142, they may even be understated in these data.

Figure 6.11 Predicted probabilities of different pro-immigration responses at varying levels of white moral
shame
141

Which translates to a respondent that is female, 50.7 years of age, attended ‘some college’, and self-identifies as
ideologically ‘moderate’ and politically ‘independent’.
142
Unfortunately, the YouGov survey did not include the ‘image shame’ items.
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A final set of models—one OLS and the other binary logit—attempts to replicate moral
shame’s positive associations with white vs. non-white warmth differentials and anti-white
(whites < 50, racial/ethnic outgroups > 49) feeling thermometer scores. Results from these
models are shown in Table 16B. Starting with the warmth differential (OLS) models, we see that
net of all background/demographic controls (column b), a standard deviation increase in moral
shame predicts 5.9 points (p < 0.001) more warmth on average towards racial/ethnic minority
groups relative to fellow whites 143. While further adjusting (column d) for racial resentment,
authoritarianism, and dispositional compassion moderates this coefficient 144, it remains
significant and continues to be at least nominally larger than that of every other predictor.
Table 6.24 Effects of white moral shame on non-white vs. white warmth (left) and the
probability of an ‘anti-white’ feeling thermometer score
Non-White vs. White Warmth (OLS)
‘Anti-White’ Score (Logit)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
8.10*** 5.91*** 3.43*** 3.64*** 5.51*** 4.17*** 3.24*** 3.65***
Moral Shame
(0.614) (0.848) (0.897) (0.989) (1.59) (1.21) (1.08) (1.15)
Racial
4.04*** 3.46***
1.56†
1.23
--------Resentment (r)
(0.897) (0.958)
(0.373) (0.292)
-4.13*** -3.00***
0.764
0.842
Authoritarianism
--------(0.640) (0.665)
(0.132) (0.161)
1.91** 1.72**
1.20
1.24†
Compassion
--------(0.615) (0.625)
(0.147) (0.156)
Demographic
/Background
--√
--√
--√
--√
Controls
2.85*** -9.08*** 2.77*** -5.21 0.020*** 0.50** 0.019*** 0.038**
Constant
(0.595) (3.94) (0.604) (3.92) (0.006) (0.052) (0.006) (0.040)
Adjusted/
0.124
0.181
0.188
0.213
0.178
0.248
0.207
0.259
Pseudo R2
Note. N=1,461 in all models. Cell entries from the OLS models are unstandardized coefficients with robust
standard errors in parentheses. Cell entries in logit models are odds ratios with robust standard errors in
parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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As was the case in the Prolific sample, these effects (column b) are qualified by significant shame x party (p <
0.001) and shame x ideology (p < 0.001) interactions. They are significantly stronger for white Democrats (ß=12.69,
p < 0.001) and liberals (ß=16.62, p < 0.001) than for white independents (ß=5.80, p < 0.001), moderates (ß=5.96, p
< 0.001), Republicans (ß=1.72, p=0.122), and conservatives (ß=2.11, p=0.066).
144
To continue from the footnote above, moral shame’s effects here (column d) remain strongest among white
Democrats (ß=9.51 p < 0.001) and liberals (ß=13.68 p < 0.001) and weakest among white Republicans (ß=0.065,
p=0.962) and conservatives (ß=0.829, p=0.507).
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Consistent with the Prolific results, the results from the ‘anti-white’ logit models once again
show moral shame to be the strongest predictor of assigning a ‘cool’ or below-midpoint score to
whites and neutral to ‘warm’ scores to all other racial/ethnic groups 145. Holding all
background/demographic variables to their means/medians (column b), a respondent placing 1
standard deviation below the mean of moral shame (OR=4.17, p < 0.001) is expected to have just a
0.6% chance (95% CI=-0.2%, 1.3%) of reporting an ‘anti-white’ thermometer score. These odds
climb to 9.3% (95% CI=2.5%, 16.0%) for those placing 1 standard deviation above.

Figure 6.12 Predicted probabilities of an ‘anti-white’ feeling thermometer score at varying levels of moral
shame

In column (d), we see that further adjusting for racial resentment (OR=1.24, p=0.368),
authoritarianism (OR=0.840, p=0.367), and compassion (OR=1.25, p=0.083) attenuates these
effects (OR=3.65, p < 0.001) only moderately. In addition, as in the earlier Prolific model, only the
effects of moral shame and age (OR=0.976, p=0.003) are significantly predictive of anti-white

145

‘Anti-white’ feeling thermometer scores were given by only 5.3% (N=78) of white respondents. This figure
reaches 12.8% among white liberals, which is almost identical to the (record high) share observed in the 2020 wave
of the ANES.
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scores. And despite its reputation as the most powerful predictor of all things race, the
(insignificant) effects of racial resentment on this outcome are once again dwarfed by those of
moral shame.
6.4

Discussion
On balance, the results of the analyses in this chapter are generally in alignment with

most of this dissertation’s earlier predictions. At the same time, they raise a number of
interesting questions that will have to be left for future research. In what follows, I discuss and
weigh the evidence for each hypothesis.
6.4.1

Ingroup-critical emotions and pro-black policy support

Hypothesis 1 predicted that both moral shame and guilt would independently predict
support for pro-black policies. The theoretical reasoning was that, though moral shame should
motivate broader pro-sociality than guilt, both should be implicated in support for policies that
compensate outgroup victims of specific ingroup wrongdoings. The results of the analyses in
section 6.3.2 clearly supported this prediction. Moral shame and guilt were found to be similarly
strong predictors of pro-black policy support. What is more, the effects of these variables
remained statistically and substantively significant net of a host of potential confounds, including
racial resentment, social dominance, and political orientation. And their combined effects were
both larger than any other variable in the model and were also not conditional on political
orientation. Together, these results suggest that models of white racial policy attitudes that
neglect to include measures of ingroup-critical emotions are overlooking an important source of
variation.
At the same time, these results are also qualified by what was later learned via the
bifactor regressions. When the emotion variables were stripped of their shared variance, only the
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unique variance in moral and image shame significantly predicted pro-black policy support.
Even so, the majority of the effects across all emotions were found to be driven by a common
factor. The point then is not that guilt is irrelevant to pro-black policy support, but that almost all
of its influence is shared with other emotions. Theoretically speaking, this is unsurprising given
the scholarly understanding of guilt and moral shame as distinct but typically overlapping
emotions. This finding also has implications for future research. As far as I am aware, the
analyses in this chapter were the first to explicitly model the effects of both guilt and moral
shame on pro-black policy attitudes. Though limited, all previous political science research on
this topic either only considered to the effects of guilt or conflated guilt with shame. A
consequence of this is that effects attributed to guilt may actually be attributable to moral shame
and/or a shared general factor. This is likely to result in biased parameter estimates that
understate or not do not accurately reflect the true relationship between racial policy preferences
and ingroup-critical emotions.
6.4.2

Ingroup-critical emotions and immigration liberalism

A second hypothesis predicted that moral shame, more than guilt, would positively affect
support for increased immigration. In the end, this prediction was largely born out in the data. As
expected, in the main analyses, moral shame indeed proved to be a strong and significantly
positive predictor of support for higher levels of immigration. However, in all but the final
model, the latter’s association with guilt was significantly positive at least at the p < 0.1 level.
Still, the effects of guilt were consistently--and at times substantially--weaker than those of
moral shame, though the difference between the two did not always reach conventional levels of
significance. When combined, though, the effects of moral shame/guilt on support for increasing
immigration were at least nominally larger than those of every other predictor. Importantly, their
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influence was also found to be strongest on movement out of the ‘kept the same’ and into the
‘increase a moderate amount’ and ‘increase a lot’ response categories. Thus, the higher a
respondent’s level of moral shame/guilt, the less likely he/she was to support sustaining existing
levels of immigration and the more likely he/she was to support more than modest increases in
immigration. Interestingly, the strength of these effects did not significantly vary by political
orientation.
Subsequent models examined whether the pro-immigration effects of ingroup-critical
emotions were unique to legal immigration or whether they similarly affected support for
permissive policies towards illegal immigration. In the end, the results were in line with the latter
conclusion. As was the case in the legal immigration levels models, both moral shame and guilt
significantly positively predicted favoring the decriminalization of illegal border entry—though
this was true of the latter only in the baseline and SDO models. And, once again, the effects of
the former were also significantly to marginally significantly stronger than the latter. Most
importantly, the combined effects of both remained significant across all models. Similar to
before, the marginal odds indicated they also had the greatest influence on ‘favor strongly’
responses.
Later bifactor regressions generally corroborated these findings. Once their shared
variance was removed, the effects of the unique variance in moral shame on both support for
higher levels of legal immigration and decriminalizing illegal border entries were significantly
positive, and relatively large in the case of the former. In contrast, the effects of guilt’s unique
variance were both significantly smaller and not consistently distinguishable from 0.
In light of the politically unbalanced sample and the fact the current chapter marked the
first study to assess the effects of ingroup-critical emotions on immigration attitudes, I attempted
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to replicate some of these relationships on a nationally representative sample. This attempt was
largely successful. As in the Prolific sample, moral shame was again found to be a robust
predictor of supporting increased immigration. It also emerged as the strongest predictor of
supporting the elimination of all immigration restrictions and tolerating illegal immigration.
These relationships persisted net of controls for racial resentment, authoritarianism, compassion,
and political orientation. Accordingly, we can be confident that the Prolific findings are not
merely artifacts of a demographically unrepresentative sample.
6.4.3

Ingroup-critical emotions and pro-outgroup bias

Two hypotheses were formulated for the purpose of examining the effects of ingroupcritical emotions on pro-outgroup orientations. The first predicted that the pro-immigration
effects of moral shame would be race-conscious as opposed to universalist or color-blind.
Specifically, moral shame (but not guilt) was expected to predict a preference for admitting
immigrants from non-European vs. European countries. This prediction was generally supported.
In both the baseline model and when adjusting for political orientation and
demographic/background covariates, moral shame significantly increased the percent of
immigration admissions that a respondent would allocate to non-European vs. European
countries. While the effects of guilt on this tendency were in the positive direction, they never
reached conventional levels of significance. Later it was discovered that the combined effects of
these variables were moderated by partisanship. Specifically, they were found to be relatively
stronger for and were only consistently significant among Democrats. Given the public’s likely
association of non-white immigrants with the Democratic Party coalition, this could suggest that
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the effects of ingroup-critical emotions on these allocation decisions are bounded by
considerations of political power 146.
The bifactor regression models generally upheld the above results. Whereas the unique
variance in moral shame significantly positively predicted favoring non-European over European
immigrants, that in guilt did not. Furthermore, whereas the effects of moral shame in the
conventional OLS model became indistinguishable from 0 when adjusting for racial resentment,
they remained sizeable and significant in the bifactor model. Once again, given the strong
collinearity between moral shame and racial resentment (which will be further discussed below),
it’s possible that OLS mistakenly attributed all of the former’s outcome-related variance to the
latter. This underscores the value of bifactor models for computing cleaner parameter estimates
of highly collinear predictors.
A second hypothesis of the ‘pro-outgroup’ variety anticipated that moral shame, more
than guilt, would predict greater relative warmth towards racial/ethnic outgroups vs. whites. The
results from the main analyses, which were later partially 147 replicated on the YouGov sample,
fully supported this proposition. Across all models, higher levels of moral shame corresponded
to significantly greater relative warmth towards racial/ethnic minorities vs. whites. In contrast,
though in the positive direction, the effects of guilt never approached significance and were
consistently significantly to marginally significantly (i.e. p < 0.1) smaller than those of moral
shame. With the exception of the (anti)dominance SDO dimension, moral shame as well as the
combined moral shame/guilt index proved to be the strongest predictors of rating racial/ethnic
minorities more warmly than whites. Indeed, in the final model, they were even stronger than

146

In other words, if Republicans perceive that greater numbers of non-white immigrants will ultimately reduce or
threaten their party’s political clout, the influence of other racial-group-based moral considerations is likely to be
weaker.
147
I say ‘partially’ because the YouGov dataset lacked a measure of guilt.
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racial resentment, which was no longer significant. The strength of these effects, however, was
conditioned by political orientation such that they were stronger for white democrats (liberals)
than for independents (moderates) and Republicans (conservatives).
That the effects of moral shame on pro-outgroup warmth were both the strongest of the
three emotions as well as stronger than those of racial resentment was further supported in the
bifactor regression. While the unique variance in both moral shame and guilt significantly
predicted pro-outgroup warmth, the effects of the former were significantly larger. When the
unique variance in racial resentment was added to the model, this difference further widened.
The unique effects of moral shame were also larger than those of racial resentment, though this
difference only reached significance at the p < 0.1 level.
But rather than merely predicting greater relative warmth towards racial/ethnic
outgroups, other models, which were replicated on the YouGov sample, showed moral shame to
be a strong and significantly positive independent predictor of outright negativity towards
whites. Indeed, across all models, the greater a respondent’s moral shame, the greater the
likelihood that he/she rated whites in the negative or ‘cool’ region and non-whites in the neutral
or warm region of the feeling thermometer scale. Neither racial resentment nor any of the two
SDO dimensions independently predicted this outcome. Overall, the effects of moral shame on
this outcome were stronger than every other predictor in the model. These theoretically expected
findings are important in that they suggest that moral shame does not merely encourage greater
sympathy or identification with racial/ethnic outgroups, but that it also motivates moral
disapproval if not rejection of one’s racial ingroup.
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6.4.4

Ingroup-critical emotions and pro-outgroup behavior

Another set of hypotheses predicted that moral shame and guilt would differentially
predict engaging in pro-outgroup behavior. First, it was expected that both moral shame and guilt
would independently predict monetary donations to a racial justice advocacy group. The results
of the main analyses completely supported this prediction. Across all models, the effects of
moral shame and guilt on contributions were both significantly positive and virtually equal in
magnitude. In fact, apart from those of ideology, the effects of no other variables reached
conventional levels of. The effects of moral shame and guilt were also larger in size than those of
any other variable. However, these results proved to be generally at odds with what was
subsequently found in the bifactor models. The latter results indicated that nearly all of the
independent positive effects of moral shame and guilt were, in fact, attributable to a common
factor. On one hand, one might interpret this as invalidating the hypothesis in question. But, to
the contrary, that the assumed independent effects of moral shame and guilt on racial justice
donations were entirely absorbed in the general factor implies that their effects were overlapping
and thus indistinguishable from one another. To be clear, evidence against the current hypothesis
would entail finding that the unique effects of one were significantly different from the unique
effects of the other. In the end, though, this is not what was observed.
A second hypothesis expected to find that moral shame, more than guilt, would predict
monetary donations to a pro-immigration advocacy group. This prediction was not borne out in
the data. In the main analyses, the positive effects of moral shame on this outcome only reached
significance in the baseline model, while those of guilt were nominally larger and remained both
statistically and substantively meaningful across all models. However, that the combined effects
of moral shame and guilt were significant and greater in size than the individual coefficient of
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the latter suggested a higher degree of overlap in the effects of the two variables. This inference
was later supported in the bifactor regression, which showed that the effects of both variables
were, as in the previous case, almost entirely attributable to the general factor. Why no support
was found for this hypothesis is unclear. One possibility is that the theory that motivated it is
either wrong or in need of revision. Another admittedly speculative but not implausible
possibility is that monetary donations are actually a token or relatively undemanding form of
pro-outgroup behavior. The implication here is that moral shame (but not guilt) would, in fact,
emerge as a unique predictor of pro-outgroup behavior that incurs a greater personal investment.
6.4.5

Ingroup-critical emotions and racial resentment

While this chapter was primarily concerned with the effects of ingroup critical emotions,
their close relationship with racial resentment can’t be ignored. Racial resentment was found to
be strongly correlated with moral shame 148 (r=0.73) and, if to a lesser degree, with guilt (r=0.62).
In many of the main analyses, it was clear that the former two (colinear) variables were
competing for outcome variance, which would explain why the effects of one was, at times,
reduced to insignificance in the presence of the other. This raised the question: are racial
resentment and moral shame (and perhaps guilt) one and the same? Or are they distinct but
significantly overlapping constructs?
While the data was less than dispositive on these questions, they appear to point towards
the latter account. First, an exploratory factor analysis showed that the items comprising the
racial resentment scale loaded separately from those constituting the moral shame and guilt
scales. A confirmatory factor analysis was next conducted, the results of which supported the
superiority of a 3-factor over a single-factor model. However, a general factor model was also

148

Though on shorter scales, the relationship observed in the YouGov sample was even slightly stronger (r=0.75).
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fitted, which ultimately revealed that that only around 15% of the reliable variance in the
indicators of racial resentment could be uniquely attributed to their group factor. Although this
degree of unique variance was larger than what was found in moral shame and guilt, it is still too
low for concluding with high confidence that racial resentment inhabits a distinct attitudinal
dimension. A subsequent bifactor model also showed that the degree of unique variance varied
across the four racial resentment indicators. At the low end, for instance, just 20% and 25% of
the reliable variance in the ‘blacks have gotten less than they deserve’ and ‘generations of
slavery and discrimination’ indicators, respectively, could be uniquely attributed to their
respective group factor. For the remaining two indicators, these figures were 39% and 40%.
That much of the variance in racial resentment is shared with moral shame and guilt
could have important implications for how the scale is interpreted. First, absent controlling for
them, any relationship between racial resentment and racial policy preferences is likely to at least
partly reflect the influence of moral shame and/or guilt. This would help explain why some
studies, including the recent Agadjanian et al. (2021), find that racial resentment is a stronger
predictor of pro-black favoritism than anti-black prejudice. As several of the analyses in this
chapter have shown, moral shame is the strongest predictor of such favoritism when it comes to
feeling thermometer differentials. Thus, it stands to reason that moral shame is implicated in
racial resentment’s relationship with whites’ attitudes towards blacks and other whites. The same
is likely to be true of racial resentment’s relationship with immigration attitudes. Though this
relationship been previously documented, its meaning is unclear. A conventional interpretation is
that racial resentment reflects a “broader syndrome against non-white ethnic/racial groups”,
which, because they are disproportionately non-white, affects attitudes towards immigrants
(Miller, 2018, p.9). However, if racial resentment and moral shame are both strongly correlated
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and similarly predictive of immigration attitudes, this interpretation is incomplete or misleading.
As racial resentment’s effects on white immigration attitudes may not simply reflect prejudice
towards racial/ethnic outgroups, but it may additionally or more so reflect shame-motivated
negativity towards other whites. Second, as was shown in the previous two chapters, white
scores on the racial resentment scale vary across time, including in response to high-profile
racialized events (e.g. The death of George Floyd). Given their strong intercorrelations, it
follows that decreases in white racial resentment generally coincide with increases in moral
shame and guilt. If true, this would constitute compelling evidence in favor of my ‘group-based
moral emotions’ account of white racial attitudes 149.
6.4.6

Ideological differences in the expression of ingroup-critical emotions

An alternative interpretation of racial resentment’s close relationship with ingroupcritical emotions is the latter follow from the former. As I explained in chapter 3, this is because
the expression of ingroup-critical emotions is conditional on both the perceived responsibility for
as well as the perceived legitimacy of racial inequality. And perceptions of responsibility and
legitimacy, in turn, will be largely a function of one’ attributions of racial inequality—i.e. the
extent to which one attributes it to systemic (e.g. racial discrimination and bias) or to endogenous
factors (cultural deficits, illegitimacy rates, biological differences etc.). Thus, to the extent that
racial resentment captures these differing attributions, it should logically precede the expression
of ingroup-critical emotions. And because white liberals are more likely to attribute black-white
inequality to racial discrimination and bias than conservatives, it follows that this difference

149
Unfortunately, whereas we have one for racial resentment, we lack the necessary time series of moral shame to
test this account. But given that it is an important predictor of white racial attitudes, research organizations that
survey public opinion across time (ANES, General Social Survey etc.) should consider adding measures of ingroupcritical emotions into their standard questionnaires.

321
accounts for their differing levels of moral shame and guilt. In other words, racial resentment
should at least partially mediate the relationship between ideology and ingroup-critical emotions.
A section in this chapter sought to test whether the data was consistent with the above
assumptions. First, factor analyses were conducted to examine the extent that racial resentment
and attributions of racial inequality were statistically distinguishable. Findings from an initial
exploratory factor analysis showed that two of the very racial resentment items that were found
in previous research (i.e., Tarman & Sears, 2005) to load on a separate ‘structural attributions’
factor did, in fact, load more or equally strongly on a factor that was shared with explicit
measures of discrimination-based attributions. A subsequent confirmatory factor analysis
confirmed that a model in which these two items loaded on this group factor had a superior fit to
one in which they loaded together with the remaining two racial resentment items. In the end,
though, the difference was moot, as the results of a general factor model showed that virtually all
of the variance in each group factor was attributable to a common dimension. On the basis of
these results, all of the items were combined into a factor-weighted index. Next, I estimated a
series of linear models that began by regressing moral shame and guilt onto self-reported
ideology and, thereafter, onto the modified racial resentment index. As expected, the latter
accounted for nearly all of the baseline liberal-conservative differences in moral shame as well as
all of the differences in guilt. In contrast, social dominance orientation—another theoretically
plausible mediator—explained a much smaller share of these differences; and a negligible share
when entered together with racial resentment.
While the above findings are consistent with expectations, they are also purely
suggestive--and this fact can’t be overstated. For instance, it’s possible that the causal order (if
there is one) runs in the other direction such that liberals’ feelings of moral shame and guilt
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inspire ‘woke’ responses to the racial resentment items. Though this wouldn’t make theoretical
sense—moral shame and guilt are unlikely to cause one’s attributions of inequality or
perceptions of racial discrimination—the point is that there is no way to properly adjudicate
between these and many other possible pathways with cross-sectional survey data. In fact, moral
shame/guilt and racial resentment could be so intertwined that it might even be difficult, if not
impossible, to tease them apart experimentally 150. In these circumstances, the best a researcher
can do is offer evidence that accords with a theoretically-supported model while leaving the door
wide open for alternative accounts.
6.5

Conclusion
Whereas such relationships were only implied or theoretically assumed in previous

chapters, the current chapter finally brought evidence attesting to importance of ingroup-critical
emotions for understanding white racial attitudes. Specifically, white guilt and moral shame—
along with the factor they share—proved to be strong and unique predictors of support for racebased equity policies, including reparations, affirmative action, and special government
assistance for blacks. This was the case even in the presence of other variables, such as racial
resentment and SDO, that scholars have long considered to be central determinants of whites’
racial policy preferences. In fact, in some cases, the effects of ingroup-critical emotions were
even stronger than those of these other variables. More importantly, they weren’t limited to
policies that implicate black American. Moral shame, in particular, was found to also strongly
influence attitudes towards immigration and racial/ethnic outgroups more generally. The more
that white respondents felt ashamed of their racial ingroup’s treatment of blacks, the more they

150

Simply put, if both racial resentment and moral shame/guilt generally move in unison, determining whether one
‘causes’ the other becomes a serious challenge. An alternative is to experimentally manipulate people’s attributions
of racial inequality (rather than using racial resentment as a rough proxy thereof) and examine whether this effects
between-condition differences in ingroup-critical emotions.
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supported increasing legal immigration and relaxing restrictions on illegal immigration.
Revealingly, the findings also suggested this greater desire for more and easier immigration
wasn’t race-neutral. The more moral shame a respondent reported, the more likely he/she was to
favor immigration from non-European vs. European countries. Likewise, the greater a
respondent’s feelings of moral shame, the more likely he/she was to rate racial/ethnic outgroups
more warmly than other whites. And rather than merely predicting greater relative warmth
towards the former, the findings also showed that moral shame increased the likelihood of being
outright ‘cool’ towards the latter.
Taken together, the findings in this chapter speak to one of the central theoretical
arguments in this dissertation: whites’ orientations towards racial/ethnic outgroups, including
support for policies that exclusively or disproportionately benefit them, are intimately related to
their orientations towards their own racial ingroup. More specifically, how whites feel about or
appraise the moral status of their ingroup is an important determinant of their attitudes towards
racial/ethnic outgroups. Or, in practical terms, whites’ opposition to or support for affirmative
action and higher levels of immigration is not only a shaped by their feelings towards blacks and
Hispanics but also—if not more so—by their feelings towards other whites. With few
exceptions, political scientists have given outsized focus to the former and have generally
overlooked the importance of the latter. The findings in this chapter will hopefully serve as a
corrective to this blind spot.
At the same time, the work in this chapter is hardly unimpeachable. While I will leave a
thorough review of its limitations to the final chapter, the findings here rest on cross-sectional
data, and thus can’t be interpreted as causal. On this point, it should be noted that the barrier to
causal inference here is less the non-excludability of reverse causation (insofar as ingroup-

324
critical emotions are unlikely to be ‘caused’ by support for affirmative action or greater
immigration) and more the non-excludability of confounding variables. Theoretically plausible
confounds like racial resentment, SDO, and political orientation may have been controlled for,
but they hardly exhaust the universe of possible variables whose omission would create the
illusion of a causal relationship between ingroup-critical emotions and racial policy preferences.
Addressing this causal hurdle requires experimental evidence, the search for which is the object
of the next and final empirical chapter.
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7

WHITE SHAME, GUILT, AND RACIAL LIBERALISM IN THE LABORATORY

7.1

Introduction
To this point, this dissertation has produced only indirect and suggestive evidence of the

importance of collective shame and guilt for white racial liberalism. Chapter 4 showed that
increases in white racial liberalism follow increases in the extent that news media implicates
whites in the historical and continued disadvantage of African Americans. Chapter 5 expanded
on these findings by showing that the death of George Floyd occasioned increases in white racial
liberalism and whites' negativity towards other whites; and that these increases were partially
mediated by an upsurge in racial equalitarian media coverage. Finally, the previous chapter
documented strong relationships between white moral shame and guilt, on one hand, and prooutgroup/anti-ingroup attitudes and policy preferences, on another.
The current chapter seeks to provide a direct experimental test of some of the central
pillars of this dissertation’s overarching theory. Specifically, and using data gathered from a
large survey experiment of white Americans, I test whether a) exposure to racial equalitarian
news media heightens feelings of white moral shame and guilt, and whether b) increases in these
moral emotions, in turn, inspire the expression of pro-outgroup attitudes and policy orientations.
This chapters begins with an introduction and discussion of the experimental design,
including the potential challenges of conducting priming studies in the current media and
political environment. I then proceed with a discussion of the survey sample and, thereafter, a
review of the variables that feature in this study’s analyses. Analyses of results follow and are
divided into sections that correspond to this study’s primary and secondary hypotheses.
Specifically, I begin each analysis with a test of the experimental treatment’s main effects on
primary outcome variables. I then pivot to tests of conditional hypotheses, which concern
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whether the effects of the treatment on attitudinal outcomes vary as a function of political
ideology and/or party identification. A final section of analyses tests this study’s mediational
hypotheses, which deal with the question of whether the treatment on pro-outgroup attitudes and
policy preferences are conveyed through moral shame and/or guilt. This chapter concludes with a
discussion of main findings and suggestions for future research.
7.2

Experimental design
7.2.1

Considerations/Challenges

At the outset, it’s worth noting that the deck is likely to be stacked against observing any
significant experimental effects. In the previous chapter, I raised the possibility that white racial
attitudes, particularly those of Democrats and liberals, had already shifted so much in the liberal
direction that there might be little room for significant additional movement. Significant
movement in the liberal direction was observed in response to the Floyd incident, but it was
generally modest in scope. And though we are now roughly a year past the Floyd incident and
attendant mass protests, there’s little reason to expect things to be any different. For instance, a
recent Axios/Ipsos survey, which was conducted just a month before this chapter’s experimental
data was gathered, found that 90% of white Democrats (vs. 35% of Republicans) agreed that the
(Floyd-related) events of the past year had made “[them] realize there is still a lot of racism” in
the US. Sixty-four percent of surveyed Democrats (vs. 30% of Republicans) also indicated that
they had personally taken actions “to better understand racial issues in America”, including
reading articles and videos (55% vs. 21.5% of Republicans), discussing the topic with friends
and family (51.9% vs. 25.1% of Republicans), and watching documentaries or films (40.8% vs.
12.5% of Republicans). Given this greater awareness, and given that racial justice rhetoric has
only become further entrenched in the messaging of news media, political elites, and
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corporations in the post-Floyd period (to say nothing of ongoing cultural battles over the
teaching of ‘critical race theory’ in public schools), white racial attitudes may even be less
sensitive to ‘woke’ stimuli today. Indeed, reminders of ‘white privilege’, ‘systemic racism’, and
‘white supremacy’ are practically unavoidable in the current information environment.
A potential consequence of this is that white-critical moral considerations—or strategies
to resist or reject them--might already be so cognitively available and accessible that
experimentally priming them becomes superfluous. Merely asking about race be may be
sufficient for eliciting ingroup-critical moral considerations and emotions among white liberals
and Democrats 151. White Republicans and conservatives, meanwhile, may now associate (and
thus readily dismiss) any ingroup-critical messaging with ‘critical race theory indoctrination’ or
the New York Times’ 1619 Project, which have become salient talking points on the political
Right.
Though likely ceiling effects make conducting an experimental priming study under these
conditions less than ideal, I do not have the option of traveling back in time a few years to the
pre- or earlier years of the Great Awokening period. Instead, I have settled for designing an
experiment that (hopefully) delivers sufficient power for detecting even very small (d=0.15)
differences between experimental groups.

151

Consider that in the cross-sectional data featured in the previous chapter, the mean response among white liberals
and Democrats to the moral shame and guilt items fell between the ‘somewhat agree’ and ‘agree’ categories.
Conceivably, an experimental prime would thus need to be powerful enough to move the mean of this subgroup
towards a ‘strongly agree’ response.
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7.2.2

Data

Data for the current experiment was gathered from a survey 1,314 152 of US-born nonHispanic white American respondents between June 14 153 and July 9, 2021 154 via the crowdsurvey platform Prolific. Of this sample, 28 respondents opted out of the survey prior to
completing post-treatment measures. They were thus excluded from all analyses, which reduced
the working sample to 1,286 participants. Participants were paid at a rate of $8 per hour of their
time, though the median completion time was just shy of 15 minutes. Table 7.1 below details the
demographic and political composition of the sample. As is clear, this is not a nationally
representative sample of the non-Hispanic white American population. Rather, it is one that is
predominantly left-leaning, college educated, and younger. As such, it must be noted that none of
the findings in this study can be confidently generalized to the broader white American
population. But while lacking external validity, this sample is nonetheless sufficient for

152
The original sample actually consisted of 1,543 respondents. These additional 229 respondents are those that
were assigned to what was intended to be an ‘anti-guilt/shame’ stimulus condition. However, this 3rd condition was
ultimately discontinued due to, inter alia, its length and complexity, which resulted in an attrition rate that was
roughly 3 times higher (p < 0.001) than that observed in the two other conditions. A further discussion of this
decision and its consequences is provided in Appendix D.2.
153
All primary hypotheses were pre-registered via aspredicted.org on June 14, 2021. A copy of this pre-registration
report can be found in the Appendix D.1.
154
This protracted recruitment period largely reflects the difficulty I had in sampling sufficient numbers of right-wing
respondents. Because several of this study’s hypotheses call for interacting the treatment with political orientation, I strove to
recruit relatively even numbers of Democrats and Republicans so as to achieve sufficient power154. To this end, two versions
of the same study were advertised on Prolific—one that was made exclusively available to respondents listing Democratic
Party affiliation in their account profiles, and another that was exclusively available to those indicating Republican Party
affiliation. Each study was capped at 800 respondents. Unfortunately, and despite my best efforts, this sampling strategy
confronted a reality in which eligible Democrats outnumbered eligible Republicans by a factor of five. A consequence of this
is that the quota for Democrats was reached within just a couple of days, whereas the completion rate for Republicans
languished at 35% (280/800) even more than a week after the study was posted. This forced me into choosing between
waiting indefinitely for all of the Republican slots to be filled—and delaying my dissertation work in the process—or making
the remainder available to US-born non-Hispanic whites of any (including ‘none’ or ‘other’) party affiliation. I opted to wait
an additional week, during which time the Republican completion rate reached 45%. But, given the glacial pace at which
slots were being filled, I thereafter decided to widen the survey eligibility to include non-Republicans. The upshot was a final
sample that was predominantly Democrat/liberal, but which also featured a sizeable minority of Republicans and
conservatives.

329
conducting initial tests of some of my theory’s central implications. I leave it to future research
to determine whether the results of these tests are more broadly applicable.
Table 7.1 Sample demographics
Percent Democrat
Percent Republican
Percent Liberal
Percent
Conservative
Percent Male
Percent with BA+
Degree
Average Age
N

7.2.3

70.1%
24.8%
66.2%
22.1%
42.1%
54.9%
35.69
(SD=12.8)
1,314

Procedure, experimental stimuli, and variables

The purpose of the study was described 155 as an attempt to “gain a better understanding
of people’s evaluations of and engagement with online articles”. Additionally, respondents were
told that the researchers were separately interested in “testing new measures of social attitudes
for use in future research”. Next, respondents completed a battery of demographic and political
background measures. Thereafter, they were randomly assigned to one of two conditions 156: a
guilt/shame stimulus condition and a neutral stimulus condition. After reading the assigned
stimulus article, respondents were given a number of filler questions 157, including items asking
them to rate the article along several general criteria (e.g. clarity, easy to follow, informative)
and an attention check 158. They were then told they’d next be asked a series of questions about
“some of the social and political attitudes” they may hold, some of which may or may not be

155

The adoption of this cover story was motivated by a concern for potential demand effects, the risk of which are
likely to increase if respondents are able to divine the true purpose and intent of the study.
156
As was noted in footnote 5, the initial design featured a third ‘anti-guilt/shame’ stimulus condition. An
explanation as to why this condition was ultimately abandoned can be found in the Appendix B.
157
These filler questions were included in the hope of bolstering the cover story’s credibility.
158
89.9% of participants in the neutral condition vs. 87.2% of those in the guilt/shame condition correctly answered
the attention check. And the difference between these two rates was not distinguishable from 0 (p=0.126).
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directly related to the articles they were assigned to read. Respondents were also told that the
purpose of any article-related questions they encounter was to “gain a better understanding” of
the responses they gave to the filler questions; and that other article-unrelated questions were
asked for the “purpose of testing and validating new survey measures of social attitudes” 159.
After clicking the ‘next’ button, respondents completed measures of white moral shame and
guilt. These items were followed by measures of this study’s primary outcome variables,
including support for different pro-black policies, support for increasing immigration,
preferences for immigration from Europe vs. other regions, warmth towards whites vs. non-white
minority groups, and monetary contributions to anti-racist and pro-immigration advocacy groups.
The survey concludes by debriefing respondents as to the actual nature and purpose of the study.
7.2.3.1

White guilt/shame stimulus

Those placed in the guilt/shame condition were shown and asked to read an editorial
article recently published by the Los Angeles Times Editorial Board, which was titled ‘A century
after the Tulsa massacre, we have yet to atone for America’s Racism’. The 957-word article
recounts a number of historical cases of white supremacist violence against non-whites, but
focusses in particular on the anti-black Tulsa race massacre of 1921. It notes that the US
economy was built on the backs of African slaves and discusses how, throughout American
history, white Americans have used violence and discrimination to thwart the social mobility and
integration of blacks and other non-whites. It argues that the legacy of white supremacy is still
apparent in America today, such as in the “ongoing deplorable levels of police killing oftenunarmed Black Americans”. Importantly, it contends that white Americans still benefit from this

159

These explanations were included so that respondents in the neutral stimulus condition would be less likely to
wonder why they were being asked race-related questions that had nothing to do with the assigned stimulus. The
idea was to reduce the possibility that these respondents would become aware that they were in the control group.
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legacy in a society in which “Black Americans have less access to healthcare, face more hurdles
accumulating wealth and accessing capital, often are educated in de facto segregated schools,
and face harsher police scrutiny and more severe criminal penalties”.
This article was selected for its consistency with Chapter 4’s operationalization of racial
equalitarian media. Specifically, the article a) highlights the persistent disadvantages of African
Americans relative to white Americans, and b) attributes these outcome disparities to the history
and continued effects of white racism. Theory suggests that these attributes will prime negative
moral appraisals of whites and, in turn, trigger feelings of collective shame and guilt.
7.2.3.2

Neutral stimulus

Respondents assigned to the neutral stimulus condition were shown and asked to read a
1,268-word article on the cost and regulations of interstate logo signs, which was taken from the
website Jalopnik. Its selection was largely based on a desire to field a stimulus that was as
politically neutral as possible.
7.2.3.3

White moral shame and guilt

Measures of white moral shame 160 and guilt are identical to those used in the previous
chapter. The only difference is that each of these emotions is now measured with 3 items
(specifically, those that showed the highest factor loadings in the Chapter 6) rather than the
original 4. This decision was made in order to shorten the length of the survey (and thus the cost)

160

The measure of ‘image shame’ that featured in the previous chapter was not included in the current study. This is
for two reasons. First, testing the effects of the treatment on moral shame should not require statistical adjustments
for image shame. If the treatment is effective, between-condition differences in moral shame will be apparent
regardless. Moreover, statistically adjusting a post-treatment variable with another post-treatment variable is
methodologically questionable and is likely to denature or confound the treatment’s effects on moral shame. Second,
moral shame, not image shame, is the theoretical object of interest in this dissertation. Image shame is only relevant
to the extent that adjusting for it helps to isolate the pro-social effects of moral shame on relevant outcome variables.
Outside of cross-sectional analysis, its utility is questionable and does not warrant increasing the length (and cost) of
the survey for the sake of its inclusion.
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as much as possible. Question wording and descriptive statistics for all 6 items are shown in
Table 7.2 below. For use in analyses, I create summary measures of each emotion by averaging
across each 3-item battery (αShame=0.923, αGuilt=0.955). I them normalize each scale to a standard
deviation of 1 and a mean of 0.
Table 7.2 Measures of white moral shame and guilt
Moral Shame
When I think of the manner in which black people have been treated, I sometimes
think that we white Americans are racist and mean.
My racial group’s treatment of black people makes me feel somewhat ashamed
about what it means to be white.
I feel ashamed for the racist tendencies of white people
Guilt
I feel guilty about the social inequalities between white and black people.
Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for the behavior of white Americans
towards black people
I feel guilty for the manner in which black people have been treated by white
Americans

Mean
5.03

SD
1.78

5.09

1.83

4.80

2.00

5.20
4.73
4.69

1.89
1.89
1.93

4.67

2.05

4.82

1.95

Note. N=1,286 across all items

7.2.3.4

Pro-black policy preferences

The pro-black policy index used in the current study is constructed from the same three
7-point Likert items (i.e., support for giving affirmative action to blacks in the job market,
support for giving blacks special group-based federal assistance, and support for giving cash
reparations to blacks) that featured in the previous chapter 161. Question wording and descriptive
statistics for each of the three items are shown in Table 7.3. While the analysis will examine the
treatment’s effects on each item individually, it will also test its effects on the composite of the

161
These three items were again adopted for consistency’s sake. However, in retrospect, the wording of two of these
items (e.g. ‘..wrong because it discriminates against whites’; ‘…should not be giving special treatment to blacks’)
has the potential to weaken the effects of the treatment, and thus their usage was ill-advised. For instance, priming
considerations of unfairness or discrimination against whites may detract from the guilt/shame stimulus’ focus on
white racism and moral responsibility. It could be argued, then, that these outcome measures offer a very
conservative test of the treatment’s effects on pro-black policy support.
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three. I generate this composite index by averaging across the three items (α=0.892). In some
analyses, I include a standardized or z-scored version of this index that is fixed to a mean of 0
and a standard deviation of 1.
Table 7.3 Measures of pro-black policy support
Pro-Black Policy Index
Some people say that because of past discrimination, Black people should be given
preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and
promotion of Black people is wrong because it discriminates against whites. What
about your opinion -- are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of
Black people? (1=Oppose strongly, 7=Favor strongly)
Some people think that Black people have been discriminated against for so long
that the government has a special obligation to help improve their living standards.
Others believe that the government should not be giving special treatment to Black
people. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your
mind on this? (1=I strongly feel that our government SHOULD NOT be giving
special treatment to blacks; 7=I strongly feel that our government SHOULD help
Black people)
To what extent do you favor or oppose the United States federal government paying
reparations for slavery and racial discrimination in this country by making cash
payments to Black Americans who are descendants of slaves? (1=Oppose strongly,
7=Favor strongly)

Mean
4.34

SD
1.84

3.99

1.90

4.93

2.00

4.09

2.18

Note. N=1,286 across all items

7.2.3.5

Immigration policy preferences

Immigration policy preferences are measured with two items. The first is the same 7point measure of desired immigration levels that was used in the previous chapter. A second asks
respondents to specify the share (%) of annual immigration admissions that they think should be
allocated to each of 5 geographic regions: Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and
Africa. Preference for European (vs. non-European) immigration is then operationalized in two
ways. The first, which is similar to the approach taken in the previous chapter, is the percent of
immigration admissions that respondents allocate to Europe 162. The second utilizes the fact that

162

Recall that in the previous chapter, this variable was measured with a question asking respondents to specify the
share of immigrants they’d admit from European vs. non-European countries. A potential drawback of this measure
is that forcing respondents to choose between European vs. non-European countries increases social desirability
pressures (i.e., respondents might be disinclined to favor European vs. non-European immigrants for fear of being
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respondents are being asked to allocate immigration admissions to 5 different regions while
being told to assume that the desire to immigrate is invariant across them. A ‘region-indifferent’
or equitable allocation is thus one that apportions 20% of admissions to each of the five regions.
In contrast, those whose allocations are biased against or in favor of a given region(s) can be
expected to allocate less or more than 20% of admissions to a given region. On the basis of these
parameters, I transform each 0-100 scale into 3-point scales wherein respondents who allocate
less than 20% of admissions to a given region are coded as ‘1’, those who allocate exactly 20%
as ‘2’, and those who allocate more than 20% as ‘3’. Item wording and descriptive statistics are
provided in Table 4.
Table 7.4 Measures of immigration preferences
Immigration Levels
Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to
the United States to live should be increased, decreased, or kept the same as it is
now? (1=Decreased a lot, 7=Increased a lot)

Mean

SD

4.72

1.58

Immigration Allocations
Regardless of whether you think the level of immigration should be decreased, increased, or
kept the same, what percent of the total number of immigrants admitted to the US every year
do you think should be allocated to immigrants from each of the following regions?
Assume that the demand for immigration into the US is constant across these regions; that is,
the number of people who'd like to immigrate to the US is the same in every region. Please
enter a numerical figure (0-100) into each of the boxes below indicating the percent of all
immigration admissions you would allocate to each of the regions below. Note that the figures
you provide below MUST sum to 100. Also, note that you are NOT required to allocate
admissions to every region listed below. If you prefer not to admit immigrants from a given
region, you would enter '0' into the corresponding box below.
Latin America (0-100)
< 20%
20%
> 20%
Asia (0-100)
< 20%
20%
> 20%
Middle East (0-100)
< 20%
20%

21.29 8.72
14.1%
64.4%
21.5%
19.90 6.47
16.6%
68%
15.4%
17.02 6.97
31.3%
63%

perceived as prejudiced against non-whites). I thus opted for a revised measure that captures pro/anti-European
immigration bias in a more subtle or indirect fashion.
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> 20%
Europe (0-100)
< 20%
20%
> 20%
Africa (0-100)
< 20%
20%
> 20%

5.7%
22.89 13.15
16.1%
62%
21.9%
18.90 6.45
20.7%
67.5%
11.8%

Note. N=1,286 across all items

7.2.3.6

Racial ingroup vs. outgroup warmth

As in the previous chapter, racial ingroup vs. outgroup warmth (M=-4.46, SD=23.61) is
measured as the average difference between respondents’ feeling thermometer ratings (0-100) of
whites (M=67.7, SD=23.16) vs. ratings of blacks (M=71.6, SD=22.6), Hispanics (M=71.6,
SD=22.5), and Asians (M=73.2, SD=21.6). In addition to examining the average of these
differences, the analyses will also look at the effects of the treatment on each individual dyad.
7.2.3.7

Pro-outgroup behavior

To examine whether the expected pro-outgroup effects of the guilt/shame treatment
additionally rear themselves in altruistic pro-outgroup behavior, I include measures of monetary
donations to anti-racist and pro-immigration organizations that are mostly identical to those used
in the previous chapter. The sole difference is that whereas possible donations to each advocacy
organization was capped at $10 in the previous study, they are now capped at $20 in the current
experiment.

Table 7.5 Measures of pro-outgroup behavior
Here are two organizations that work to advance different social causes.
Crossroads Antiracism is a non-profit advocacy organization committed to dismantling
systemic racism and building anti-racist multicultural diversity within institutions and
communities. This mission is implemented primarily by training institutional transformation

Mean

SD
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teams, helping them analyze racism and develop and implement strategies to dismantle racism
within their structures
The American Immigration Council is a non-profit advocacy organization committed to
overturning strict immigration laws and defending the rights of undocumented immigrants.
This mission is implemented through litigation, research, legislative and administrative
advocacy, and public outreach.
As non-profit organizations, both are financially dependent on individual donations to fund
their operations. We'd like to give you the opportunity to make a contribution of up to twenty
dollars to one or each of these organizations. Please use the sliding scales below to indicate
how much you'd be willing to contribute. If you ARE interested in contributing, we will record
your contribution and follow up with more information at the conclusion of the survey. If
you ARE NOT interested in contributing to an organization(s), you can leave the slider(s) at 0.
Crossroads Anti-Racism (0-20)
The American Immigration Council (0-20)
Summed Index (0-40)
Note. N=1,286 across all items

7.2.3.8

5.25
4.90
10.15

6.83
6.59
12.76

Control variables

In theory, random assignment should equalize experimental groups on all known and
unknown pre-treatment variables. However, this equalization is often imperfect. Occasionally,
randomization will even result in groups that are statistically significantly imbalanced or
different on one or more pre-treatment variables purely by chance (Rosenbaum, 2002). Such
imbalances—even when small and/or statistically insignificant—can result in biased estimates of
treatment effects, particularly when a covariate is outcome-predictive (Altman, 1985). For
instance, if a treatment is intended to elicit a politically liberal response, and the treatment group
is more liberal on-average than the control group, then estimates of observed between-group
differences in post-treatment responses may be partly or even mostly capturing the effects of this
ideological imbalance. Given the problems such imbalances pose to causal inference,
experimental researchers often adjust for pre-treatment covariates in models of treatment effects
so as to obtain estimates that are at once maximally efficient and minimally biased. I too adopt
this practice in the current study, though I also report the raw or unadjusted estimates in a
separate column.
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As the comparison of means in Table 7.6 indicates, pre-treatment covariates are generally
(but by no means perfectly) balanced across the two stimulus conditions. For instance, while
those in the guilt/shame group are somewhat more liberal, more identified with the Democratic
party, and less educated than those receiving the neutral stimulus, none of these differences reach
significance at even the 90% threshold. Only differences in the proportion of respondents
residing 163 in the Midwest (p=0.043) and West (p=0.010)—which is highest and lowest,
respectively, among those in the guilt/shame condition—are significant at conventional levels.
But, as noted earlier, even statistically insignificant imbalances can add ‘noise’ to estimates of
treatment effects; hence, I control for all covariates listed below.
Table 7.6 Pre-treatment covariate means by study condition
Scale
Neutral Guilt/Shame
1=Very liberal,
3.02
2.92
Ideology
7=Very
(0.071)
(0.072)
conservative
1=Strong
Democrat,
2.97
2.83
Party-ID
7=Strong
(0.084)
(0.086)
Republican
35.81
35.64
Age
N/A
(0.505)
(0.506)
1=High school
Percent with BA+
or less,
56.74
53.82
Degree
4=Graduate
(1.96)
(1.96)
degree
0=Female,
0.419
0.427
Proportion Male
1=Male
(0.019)
(0.020)
Proportion
0.200
0.172
Northeast
(0.015)
(0.015)
Proportion
0.216
0.264*
Midwest
(0.017)
(0.017)
Region
Proportion
0.377
0.412
South
(0.019)
(0.019)
Proportion
0.208
0.153*
West
(0.015)
(0.015)
Note. Cell entries are means with robust standard errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

163

Region of residence was derived using the GPS coordinates of respondents’ locations. These coordinates
are automatically recorded by Qualtrics, the survey platform I used to distribute the survey.
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7.3

Results/Analysis
7.3.1

Main effects on white moral shame and guilt

Hypothesis 11 predicted that whites exposed to racial equalitarian media content would
express significantly higher levels of moral shame and guilt than those exposed to a neutral
stimulus. Table 7.7 below tests this proposition by regressing z-scored measures of these
emotions on the dichotomous guilt/shame vs. neutral treatment variable. Columns (a) present the
raw or unadjusted effects of the treatment on each emotion, while the models in both columns (b)
and Figure 7.1 adjust these estimates for ideology, party identification, age, sex, education, and
region. Overall, the results fully accord with theoretical expectations. In columns (a), we see that
respondents who received the guilt/shame treatment scored close to 0.2SD higher on moral
shame (ß=0.184, p < 0.001) and roughly 0.14SD higher on guilt (ß=0.136, p=0.010) than those
assigned to the neutral stimulus condition 164. As expected, and as reflected in their lower
standard errors, adjusting for pre-treatment covariates increases the precision of these estimates
(ßShame=0.155, p < 0.001; ßGuilt=0.110, p=0.012).
Table 7.7 Raw (a) and adjusted (b) treatment effects on white moral shame and guilt
Moral Shame
Neutral stimulus
(N=645)
Guilt/Shame
stimulus (N=641)

(a)

(b)

Guilt
(a)

(b)

0.184*** 0.155***
0.136*
0.110*
(0.051)
(0.039)
(0.053)
(0.044)
0.154***
1.10***
0.146**
1.05***
Constant
(0.036)
(0.078)
(0.037)
(0.091)
Adjusted R2
0.009
0.435
0.004
0.344
Note. Cells are unadjusted (column a) and unadjusted (column b) standardized beta coefficients with robust
standard errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

164

Though somewhat different in size, differences in the coefficients for shame and guilt are indistinguishable from
0 (p=0.108).
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Figure 7.1 Adjusted white moral shame and guilt by study condition

7.3.1.1

Interactive effects on white moral shame and guilt

Secondary hypothesis H11A anticipated the treatment’s effects on shame and guilt would
be stronger for white liberals and Democrats than for conservatives and Republicans, while a
competing hypothesis (H11B) expected the reverse. I test these competing predictions by
interacting the treatment dummy with collapsed 3-point measures of ideology and party
identification 165. Table 7.8 reports the unadjusted (a) and covariate-adjusted (b) average marginal
effects of this interaction. In the end, neither H11A nor H11B find support in the data. First,
while the effects of the treatment on moral shame does not reach significance among
conservatives (ß=0.148, p=0.146), their magnitude is statistically indistinguishable (p=0.971)
from that of the effects among liberals (ß=0.144, p=0.001). The same holds true when comparing
the effects among Democrats (ß=0.173, p < 0.001) and Republicans (ß=0.184, p=0.043).

165

While I report them nonetheless, the reader should note that the estimates for the tiny sample (N=60) of nonleaning independents are highly unreliable. I thus do not spend much time discussing the results for this group.
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Unexpectedly, the largest increases in shame are actually observed among self-identified
moderates 166 (ß=0.303, p=0.027), though they do not clearly differ statistically from those among
liberals (p=0.265) or conservatives (p=0.362).
Table 7.8 Average treatment effect by ideology and party identification
Moral Shame
Guilt
Guilt/Shame
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
Condition
Liberal
0.122** 0.133** 0.104* 0.116*
(N=432)
(0.044)
(0.041) (0.052) (0.050)
Moderate
0.241†
0.240†
0.094
0.091
(N=77)
(0.142)
(0.134) (0.150) (0.141)
Conservative
0.165
0.163
0.103
0.098
(N=132)
(0.103)
(0.101) (0.107) (0.104)
Democrat
0.144** 0.150*** 0.128* 0.136**
(N=459)
(0.046)
(0.042) (0.054) (0.049)
Independent
0.182
0.090
-0.019
-0.102
(N=31)
(0.244)
(0.224) (0.258) (0.248)
Republican
0.180†
0.182*
0.082
0.083
(N=151)
(0.098)
(0.090) (0.103) (0.096)
Note. Cells are unadjusted (column a) and unadjusted (column b) average marginal effects
with robust standard errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Figure 7.2 Average treatment effect by ideology and party identification

166

This could merely be suggest a lack of power to detect between-condition differences among smaller-N
subgroups.
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All of what was said above with respect to the interactive effects on shame similarly
applies to those on guilt. While largest and only reaching significance among liberals (ß=0.122,
p=0.019) and Democrats 167 (ß=0.144, p=0.005), none of the treatment’s effects on guilt
significantly differ across ideological and partisan subgroups.
7.3.2

Main effects on pro-black policy support

Hypothesis 12 predicted that exposure to the guilt/shame stimulus would inspire greater
support for compensatory and equity-oriented pro-black policies. By my theory, this is because
support for such policies constitutes a means of coping with or alleviating the feelings guilt
and/or shame that attend membership in a morally-tainted ingroup. In the case of collective guilt,
supporting reparative pro-black policies allows ingroup members to feel as if they’re doing
something (and thereby feel better about themselves) to atone for their ingroup’s historical and/or
continued mistreatment of blacks, which they perceive themselves as unjustly benefiting from.
In the case of moral shame, support for such policies additionally serves as a means of morally
distinguishing or distancing oneself from an ingroup that is perceived to be morally defective.
The models in columns (a) of Table 7.9 test H12 by regressing each of the three 7-point
racial policy items along with the combined index on the treatment variable. Columns (b) again
adjust the results for differences in pre-treatment covariates. Overall, we see that the treatment
resulted in statistically significant increases in support for all three racial policy items.
Specifically, and adjusting for covariates, participants in the guilt/shame condition were
significantly more likely to favor affording blacks preferential hiring and promotions in the job
market (ß=0.235, p=0.008), special group-based government assistance (ß=0.322, p < 0.001),

167

This could merely be suggest a lack of power to detect between-condition differences among smaller-N
subgroups.
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and monetary reparations for historical slavery and discrimination (ß=0.274; p=0.007). As shown
in the bottom three rows, all these increases were also relatively similar in magnitude, ranging
from just under a 6.8 percentage point bump (40.3%  47.1%) in support for affirmative action
to a 7.5 point climb (43.5%  51%) in support for cash-based reparations. Interestingly, whereas
increases in support for this latter policy mostly stem from significant declines in ‘neutral’
responses, the majority of the increases in support for affirmative action and race-based
government assistance (64.4%  71.7%) are a function of significant declines in ‘oppose’
responses. In other words, and generally speaking, the treatment was more likely to pull
respondents away from one side (i.e. ‘oppose’) of the scale to the other, rather than nudge them
out of positions of neutrality or ambivalence.

Table 7.9 Unadjusted and adjusted treatment effects on pro-black policy support

Neutral stimulus
(N=645)
Guilt/Shame
stimulus (N=641)

Affirmative
Action

Race-based
Government
Assistance

Reparations

Index
(Z-Scored)

(a)

(a)

(a)

(a)

(b)

(b)

(b)

(b)

0.263* 0.235** 0.373** 0.324*** 0.293* 0.265** 0.158** 0.140***
(0.105) (0.085) (0.111) (0.086) (0.121) (0.098) (0.052) (0.039)
3.86*** 5.20*** 4.75*** 6.42*** 3.95*** 6.55*** 0.162*** 1.11***
Constant
(0.075) (0.185) (0.081) (0.181) (0.086) (0.211) (0.037) (0.083)
Adjusted R2
0.004
0.365
0.008
0.422
0.004
0.365
0.006
0.457
+7.11* +6.80** +8.35** +7.31** +7.91** +7.52**
% Favor
----(2.76)
(2.40) (2.59) (2.13)
(2.78) (2.44)
-0.344 -0.728 -2.74 -3.10† -4.57* -5.08*
% Not sure/Neutral
----(2.22)
(2.21) (1.68) (1.65)
(1.99) (1.99)
-6.77* -6.07* -5.62* -4.21*
-3.34
-2.44
% Oppose
----(2.68)
(2.34) (2.30) (1.89)
(2.70) (2.33)
Note. Cell entries in column (a) and column (b) are the unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted
differences between conditions on 7-point measures of policy support (top) and in terms of changes across
collapsed response categories (bottom). Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Figure 7.3 Adjusted mean response to 7-point racial policy measures by study condition

Figure 7.4 Adjusted share (%) of ‘favor’ responses by study condition

The final column of Table 7.9 reports the unadjusted and adjusted effects of the treatment
when all three racial policy items are averaged and combined to form a singular index. Holding
pre-treatment covariates constant, we see that the effects of the treatment amounted to a 0.14SD
(p < 0.001) increase in support on average across the three policy items. These effects are thus
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modest but discernable. Incidentally, they are also strikingly similar in magnitude to those
observed on post-Floyd white racial liberalism in Chapter 5—a point I will return to in the
discussion.
7.3.2.1

Interactive effects on support for pro-black policies

Are the effects of the treatment on pro-black policy support conditional on ideology or
partisanship? Secondary hypothesis H12A predicted that the effects would be stronger for white
liberals and Democrats than conservatives and Republicans, while H12B expected to find the
reverse. To test these competing accounts, I once again interact the treatment variable with
ideology and party identification. Table 7.10 reports the unadjusted (a) and adjusted (b) average
marginal effects of the treatment for each political subgroup. The general pattern of results
resembles what was observed the previous interaction models. More specifically, though the
effects of the treatment on each individual policy item and on the combined policy index are only
significant among liberals and Democrats (and independents), their size do not significantly
differ between any of the political subgroups. For instance, the adjusted effects on support for
affirmative action are stronger for liberals (∆=0.249, p=0.017) and Democrats (∆=0.289,
p=0.005) than conservatives (∆=0.137, p=0.461) and Republicans (∆=0.098, p=0.165), but
neither of these differences are distinguishable from 0 (liberals vs. conservatives: p=0.599;
Democrats vs. Republicans: p=0.327). Had such differences consistently favored either set of
groups over the other, we’d have some reason to suppose that they are genuine but perhaps not
detectable due to lack of statistical power. However, when it comes to race-based government
assistance, the direction of the effect differences reverses—i.e., they are nominally stronger for
white conservatives (∆=0.381, p=0.098) and Republicans (∆=0.394, p=0.058) than for liberals
(∆=0.269, p=0.003) and Democrats (∆=0.251, p=0.006). More consistent are the effects among

345
self-identified moderates (and pure independents), which are again generally the strongest of all
subgroups. However, the estimates are too uncertain to conclude as much with any confidence.
Table 7.10 Average treatment effect on support for pro-black policies by ideology and
party identification
Affirmative Action

Government
Assistance

Reparations

Index (Z-Scored)

Guilt/Shame
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
Condition
Liberal
0.193†
0.249*
0.238*
0.269**
0.187
0.247*
0.105*
0.130**
(N=432)
(0.112)
(0.110)
(0.095)
(0.090)
(0.131)
(0.122)
(0.049)
(0.045)
Moderate
0.221
0.326
0.379
0.488
0.337
0.358
0.159
0.199
(N=77)
(0.258)
(0.247)
(0.326)
(0.299)
(0.307)
(0.299)
(0.137)
(0.125)
Conservative
0.186
0.137
0.403†
0.381†
0.237
0.212
0.140
0.124
(N=132)
(0.191)
(0.186)
(0.240)
(0.230)
(0.212)
(0.202)
(0.099)
(0.094)
Democrat
0.243*
0.289**
0.219*
0.251**
0.221†
0.284*
0.116*
0.140**
(N=459)
(0.111)
(0.102)
(0.096)
(0.090)
(0.129)
(0.118)
(0.049)
(0.044)
Independent
0.207
0.106
1.18*
1.02*
1.05*
0.783
0.415*
0.325
(N=31)
(0.353)
(0.366)
(0.508)
(0.499)
(0.508)
(0.520)
(0.205)
(0.206)
Republican
0.112
0.098
0.388†
0.394†
0.102
0.115
0.102
0.103
(N=151)
(0.178)
(0.165)
(0.221)
(0.208)
(0.200)
(0.180)
(0.092)
(0.083)
Note. Cell entries in column (a) and column (b) are the unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted average
marginal effects from treatment x ideology and treatment x party-ID interaction terms. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Figure 7.5 Adjusted average treatment effect on pro-black policy support by ideology and party identification

Figure 7.6 present the results in terms of average changes in the percent in each subgroup
giving a ‘favor’ response to each of the three policy items. Arrayed as such, we see that several
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of the coefficients for subgroups that were not significant in Table 7.10 now reach significance.
For instance, among political moderates, net support significantly increased by 12.3 (p=0.034)
percentage points in the case of support for affirmative action points in the case of support for
government assistance, and by 16.5 points (p=0.017) when it comes to support for cash
reparations. Among conservatives and Republicans, we observe sizeable and statistically
significant increases in support for government assistance (∆Conservative=+12.48, p=0.016,
∆Republican=+13.57, p=0.005), but more modest and insignificant increases in support for
affirmative action (∆Conservative=+1.16, p=0.781, ∆Republican=+3.52, p=0.328) and cash reparations
(∆Conservative=+6.09, p=0.166, ∆Republican=+3.48, p=0.374).

Figure 7.6 Adjusted treatment effects on percent change in ‘favor’ responses by ideology and party
identification

The results for liberals and Democrats can be somewhat misleading, as these groups
generally began the survey with varyingly high levels of support for all three policies. For
instance, overwhelming majorities of liberals (83.9%) and Democrats (81.8%) in the neutral
stimulus group supported special government assistance for blacks, and these rates rose by only
3.6 (p=0.134) and just under 4 points (p=0.096) among their guilt/shame condition counterparts.
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Clearly, these are noticeably smaller increases than those observed among moderates,
conservatives, independents, and Republicans; and some of these differences even approach
conventional levels of significance (Liberal vs. Moderate: p=0.056; Liberal vs. Conservative:
p=0.117; Democrat vs. Republican: p=0.072; Democrat vs. Independent: p=0.083). However,
such comparisons obscure the fact that, owing to their higher levels of baseline support, change
among liberals and Democrats occurred more within than between response categories. For
instance, ‘slightly favor’ responses were 4.2 (p=0.126) and 2.8 (p=0.292) points lower and
‘strongly favor’ responses 7.7 (p=0.013) and 6.8 (p=0.022) points higher among guilt/shame
condition liberals and Democrats, respectively. In contrast, none of the other groups saw declines
in any of the three ‘favor’ categories, which indicates that the larger respective increases therein
were entirely a function of movement out of the ‘oppose’ and ‘neutral’ categories. How about the
other two policies? While much higher than for all other subgroups, baseline liberal and
Democratic support for affirmative action (55.5%, 53.4%) and reparations (58.9%, 55.8%) was
considerably lower than it was for government assistance. Consequently, we see larger increases
in ‘favor’ responses among liberals and Democrats in the guilt/shame condition: +7.4 (p=0.022,
0.017) points in the case of affirmative action, and 5.9 (p=0.067) and 8 (p=0.009) points with
respect to government assistance and reparations.
In sum, no clear support is found for either of the two competing hypotheses. Treatment
effects on attitudes towards affirmative action and reparations were stronger for liberals and
Democrats than for conservatives and Republicans, but these differences never approach
conventional levels of significance. They also reverse direction in the case of attitudes towards
government assistance such that the effects were stronger for conservatives and Republicans. But
neither were these differences distinguishable from chance. All told, the effects of the treatment
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were found to be generally stronger for moderates and independents, though the imprecision of
these estimates renders them questionable.
7.3.3

Main effects on pro-outgroup attitudes and policy orientations

To this point, the analysis has examined the liberalizing effects of the guilt/shame
stimulus on attitudes and policies that exclusively implicate African Americans. Hypotheses
H13-H15, however, expect these effects to extend to outgroup-oriented attitudes and policies
more broadly, including those related to immigration. The theoretical reasoning, which will be
further tested in later mediation models, is that feelings of moral shame over white Americans’
treatment of blacks encourage a) pro-sociality towards racial/ethnic outgroups that are seen as
‘parallels’ to blacks (i.e., those perceived to also suffer directly or indirectly from white racism),
and b) the adoption of attitudes that serve to morally distinguish an individual from his/her
‘benighted’ ingroup majority (i.e., those perceived as committed to preserving the social and
political dominance of white Americans).
7.3.3.1

Effects on preferred immigration levels

First, H13 predicted that those receiving the guilt/shame treatment would favor higher
levels of immigration into the US. The model shown in the first column in Table 7.11 below tests
this prediction by regressing the 7-point measure of preferred immigration levels onto the
treatment variable. While in the expected (i.e., positive) direction, the unadjusted coefficient
(ß=0.126, p=0.154) reported in column (a) is both very small (+0.074SD) and statistically
insignificant. The bottom three rows present the results in terms of percentage changes in the
three collapsed response categories. They indicate that the treatment led to a roughly 4.7 point
(p=0.092) rise in the percent supporting at least some increase in existing immigration levels,
though this difference is only significant at the p < 0.1 level. Column (b) shows that it also

349
shrinks (ß=3.57) and is no longer even p < 0.1 significant (p=0.137) when adjusting for baseline
covariates. These results can offer only limited support for H13.
Table 7.11 Unadjusted and adjusted treatment effects on preferred immigration levels
Preferred
Immigration Levels
Neutral
stimulus
(N=645)
Guilt/Shame
stimulus
(N=641)

(a)

(b)

0.126
(0.088)

0.076
(0.070)

4.66***
6.31***
(0.065)
(0.156)
Adjusted R2
0.001
0.390
-2.70
-1.22
% Decreased
(2.00)
(1.77)
% Kept the
-1.98
-2.36
same
(2.58)
(2.50)
4.69†
3.57
% Increased
(2.78)
(2.40)
Note. Cell entries in column (a) and column (b) are the unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted differences
between conditions on the 7-point measure of preferred immigration levels (1=Decreased a lot, 7=Increased a lot)
and in terms of changes across collapsed response categories (bottom). Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Constant

Figure 7.7 Adjusted average response to 7-point measure of preferred immigration levels (left) and adjusted
support for increasing immigration (right) by study condition
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7.3.3.1.1 Interactive effects on preferred
immigration levels
Table 7.12 reports the results of ideology/party x treatment interaction models that
examine whether the effects on preferred immigration levels are conditional on political
orientation. The first model uses the complete 7-point immigration levels scale as the outcome
variable. Hypothesis 13A, which expects the average effects to be stronger for liberals and
Democrats, receives no support in the results. In fact, we observe virtually no change in the
preferences of these groups (∆Liberal=0.005, p=0.947; ∆Democrat=0.046, p=0.554). On the other
hand, and lending some support to hypothesis H13B, we see relatively stronger but still
insignificant marginal effects on the preferences of conservatives (∆=0.235, p=0.176) and
Republicans (∆=0.184, p=0.161).
Table 7.12 Unadjusted and adjusted average treatment effects on preferred immigration
levels by ideology and party identification
Immigration Levels
(∆7-point)

Increased
(∆%)

Kept the same
(∆%)

Decreased
(∆%)

Guilt/Shame
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
Condition
Liberal
-0.013
0.005
-0.490
-0.135
1.61
0.960
-1.12
-0.825
(N=432)
(0.086)
(0.080)
(3.18)
(3.02)
(3.02)
(2.95)
(1.46)
(1.54)
Moderate
0.102
0.154
12.64†
13.91†
-17.62*
-16.92*
4.97
3.00
(N=77)
(0.231)
(0.224)
(7.53)
(7.48)
(7.97)
(8.10)
(6.41)
(6.10)
Conservative
0.285
0.235
9.21†
8.08†
-3.06
-2.41
-6.15
-5.66
(N=132)
(0.184)
(0.173)
(4.73)
(4.64)
(5.72)
(5.79)
(5.90)
(5.59)
Democrat
0.022
0.046
1.15
1.71
0.327
-0.391
-1.47
-1.32
(N=459)
(0.085)
(0.077)
(3.11)
(2.93)
(2.96)
(2.86)
(1.47)
(1.51)
Independent
0.062
-0.133
17.80
12.72
-26.36*
-24.46*
8.57
11.74
(N=31)
(0.367)
(0.375)
(11.93)
(12.32)
(12.44)
(12.34)
(10.55)
(10.48)
Republican
0.237
0.184
7.15†
6.63
-2.84
-3.38
-4.31
-3.25
(N=151)
(0.173)
(0.161)
(4.33)
(4.27)
(5.47)
(5.43)
(5.53)
(5.24)
Note. Cell entries in column (a) and column (b) are the unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted average
marginal effects from treatment x ideology and treatment x party-ID interaction terms. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

In terms of percentage changes in response categories, support for increasing immigration
was roughly 8.1 (p=0.082) and 6.6 (p=0.120) points higher among guilt/shame condition
conservatives and Republicans, respectively. However, only the first of these figures reaches
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significance at the p < 0.1 level, and neither are clearly distinguishable (Liberal vs. Conservative:
p=0.136; Democrats vs. Republicans: p=0.340) from the (null) changes observed among liberals
(ß=-0.125, p=0.964) and Democrats (ß=1.71, p=0.559). Unexpectedly, and as was the case in the
analyses of pro-black policy preferences, the greatest degree of change in the ‘increase’ category
is found among moderates (and independents). For this group, support for increasing
immigration levels was just under 14 percentage points higher (p=0.063) in the guilt/shame than
the neutral condition. While this difference falls short of conventional levels of significance,
averaging it with that observed among conservatives results in a combined coefficient (ß=11.00,
p=0.012) that is both statistically different from zero and also significantly different (p=0.037)
from the coefficient for liberals.

Figure 7.8 Unadjusted support for increasing immigration levels by ideology and party identification

Taken together, these results offer only limited support for primary hypothesis H13 and
secondary hypotheses H13A-B. The main effects on support for increasing immigration—
whether measured along the full 7-point scale or in terms of changes in the ‘increase’ category—
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are in the expected direction, but not statistically different from zero. Results from the interaction
models further showed that the effects on supporter were stronger for conservatives and
Republicans than for liberals and Democrats—which is consistent with H13B-- but the
differences in these coefficients are not statistically significant. It is only when the coefficients
for conservatives are combined with those of moderates—a practice that was not preregistered—that the differences with liberals become significant.
7.3.3.2

Effects on preferences for European vs. non-European immigration

Hypothesis 14 further predicted that the guilt/shame treatment would inspire a preference
for non-European over European immigration. The models in Table 7.13 test this prediction in
terms of the percent of all immigration admissions that participants allocated to Europe vs. 4
other regions. The unadjusted results in column (a) of the Europe model indicate that the
treatment effected a modest but statistically significant (p=0.032) 1.6-point (-0.1SD) decrease in
allocations for immigrants from Europe. Adjusting for baseline covariates slightly moderates this
coefficient (ß=-1.21, p=0.073), which is now only significant at the p < 0.1 level. Figure 7.9
graphs the covariate-adjusted allocations to each region by study condition. As shown, though
those in the treatment group still allocated more admissions to Europe on average than to other
regions, this bias is somewhat attenuated. Notably, Europe was the only region to see a reduction
in allocations. Allocations to Asia remained more or less the same (ß=-0.015, p=0.966), while
those to Latin America (ß=0.473, p=0.322), the Middle East (ß=0.218, p=0.362), and Africa
(ß=0.535, p=0.134) saw small but statistically insignificant upticks.
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Table 7.13 Unadjusted and adjusted treatment effects on share (0-100%) of immigration
admissions allocated to Europe vs. non-European geographic regions
Europe
Neutral
stimulus
(N=645)
Guilt/
Shame
stimulus
(N=641)
Constant
Adjusted
R2

Asia

Latin America

Middle East

Africa

(a)

(b)

(a)

(b)

(a)

(b)

(a)

(b)

(a)

(b)

-1.57*
(0.732)

-1.21†
(0.674)

-0.018
(0.361)

-0.015
(0.355)

0.666
(0.486)

0.473
(0.477)

0.272
(0.389)

0.218
(0.362)

0.650†
(0.359)

0.535
(0.357)

23.67*** 18.44*** 19.91*** 18.39*** 20.96*** 21.26*** 16.88*** 21.31*** 18.58*** 20.60***
(0.540) (1.55) (0.266) (0.795) (0.339) (0.980) (0.290) (0.290) (0.359) (0.741)
0.003

0.124

-0.000

0.003

0.001

0.042

-0.000

0.072

0.003

0.047

5.23*
5.13*
0.570
0.450
-2.56
-1.94
-3.07
-2.78
-1.74
-1.38
(2.05)
(2.03)
(2.07)
(2.05)
(1.94)
(1.86)
(2.59)
(2.48)
(2.26)
(2.20)
-1.01
-1.69
-0.976
-1.06
0.712
0.392
0.081
-0.261
-3.93
-4.31†
20%
(2.71)
(2.67)
(2.60)
(2.56)
(2.67)
(2.64)
(2.69)
(2.63)
(2.61)
(2.56)
-4.22†
-3.43
0.407
0.608
1.84
1.55
2.99*
3.04*
5.67*
5.70**
> 20%
(2.31)
(2.18)
(2.01)
(2.00)
(2.29)
(2.32)
(1.29)
(1.33)
(1.80)
(1.82)
Note. Cell entries in first row of column (a) and column (b) are the unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted
differences between conditions in the percent of immigration admissions allocated to a respective region. Cell
entries in the bottom three rows indicate percentage changes in allocation type (i.e., biased against, equitable, biased
in favor). Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
< 20%

Figure 7.9 Adjusted immigration allocations (0-100%) by study condition

The bottom three rows of Table 7.13 offer an alternative means of understanding these
results. Recall that because participants must allocate admissions to 5 regions, and are also
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instructed to imagine that the desire to immigrate to the US was invariant across them, a regionindifferent or equitable allocation is one that grants 20% of admissions to each region. In
contrast, those that grant less or more than 20% of admissions can be said to either be biased
against or in favor of a given region. Accordingly, and in the case of Europe, we see that the
share of respondents allocating less than < 20% of admissions was just more than 5 percentage
points (ß=5.13, p=0.012) higher in guilt/shame condition--an increase that is small but reaches
significance at the p < 0.05 level. Coincidentally, we also see statistically significant 5.7
(p=0.002) and 3-point (p=0.022) increases in the share giving more than 20% of admissions to
Africa and the Middle East, respectively. Increases of this sort are also observed for Latin
America, but they are smaller (ß=1.55, p=0.504) and not distinguishable from chance.

Figure 7.10 Adjusted share (%) in allocation category by study condition

Taken as a whole, the results are broadly consistent with H14. Those in the guilt/shame
condition admitted slightly lower rates of immigrants from Europe and slightly higher rates from
Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. Subsequent analysis further revealed that these
changes resulted from small but significant increases in the share of participants whose
allocations were biased against immigrants from Europe, on one hand, and significant increases
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in allocations that were biased in favor of immigrants from Africa and the Middle East, on
another. These changes, however, tended to be very modest.
7.3.3.2.1 Interaction effects on immigration
allocations
Do the proceeding results vary by political orientation? Hypothesis 14A predicted that the
treatment would effect a greater bias against (in favor of) European (non-European) immigration
among liberals and Democrats, while H14B expects these effects to be stronger for conservatives
and Republicans. Once again, the results of the ideology/party-ID x treatment interaction models
reported in Table 7.14 do not clearly support either of these predictions. Small but statistically
significant declines in allocations to Europe are observed among liberals (∆=-1.23, p=0.036) and
Democrats (∆=-1.34, p=0.021), while somewhat larger and smaller statistically insignificant
declines are found among conservatives (∆=-1.81, p=0.416) and Republicans (∆=-0.916,
p=0.660), respectively. However, in neither case are the differences between these opposing
political categories distinguishable from chance (Liberal vs. Conservative: p=0.801; Democrat
vs. Republican: p=0.844).
Table 7.14 Adjusted average effects of treatment on immigration allocations by ideology
and party identification
Europe
Asia
Latin America Middle East
Africa
Guilt/Shame
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
Condition
Liberal
-1.11† -1.23* -0.235 -0.248 0.783 0.802 0.066 0.144 0.501 0.537
(N=432) (0.591) (0.589) (0.371) (0.371) (0.557) (0.565) (0.369) (0.361) (0.384) (0.391)
Moderate -0.800 -0.845 2.00† 2.16* -1.43 -1.25 -0.478 -0.631 0.701 0.567
(N=77)
(2.37) (2.36) (1.08) (1.09) (1.23) (1.21) (1.11) (1.09) (1.00) (1.02)
Conservative -1.94 -1.81 -0.493 -0.587 1.09 0.917 0.754 0.871 0.590 0.611
(N=132)
(2.24) (2.24) (1.04) (1.05) (1.25) (1.24) (1.15) (1.14) (0.965) (0.968)
Democrat -1.38* -1.34* -0.068 -0.073 0.748 0.668 0.044 0.097 0.658† 0.651†
(N=459) (0.598) (0.579) (0.354) (0.351) (0.532) (0.529) (0.358) (0.349) (0.376) (0.383)
Independent -1.62 -0.224 1.40
1.26
-1.58 -1.90 1.36
0.902 0.434 -0.035
(N=31)
(3.73) (3.62) (1.91) (1.94) (2.86) (2.89) (1.73) (1.78) (1.68) (1.62)
Republican -1.11 -0.916 -0.133 -0.147 0.560 0.347 0.299 0.356 0.383 0.360
(N=151)
(2.13) (2.08) (0.979) (0.959) (1.09) (1.07) (1.08) (1.02) (0.889) (0.881)
Note. Cell entries in column (a) and column (b) are the unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted average
marginal effects from treatment x ideology and treatment x party-ID interaction terms. Robust standard errors
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are in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Table 7.15 presents the results in terms of changes in the share of each group that allocate
admissions equitably across regions (20%) or in a way that is either biased against (< 20%) or in
favor of (> 20%) a given region(s). We see that much of the increase in anti-Europe allocations
that was observed earlier is actually driven by liberals and Democrats. Specifically, the share of
liberals and Democrats that allocated less than 20% of admissions to Europe were a statistically
significant 6.3 (p=0.021) and 7.1 (p=0.006) points higher, respectively, in the guilt/shame
condition. In contrast, these figures were just 1.1 (p=0.743) and 1.3 (p=0.693) points among
conservatives and Republicans, respectively—smaller, but still not significantly so (liberals vs.
conservatives: p=0.144, Democrats vs. Republicans: p=0.168). Concurrently, the share of
liberals and Democrats granting allocations favorable to Africa, respectively, jumped by 6.6
(p=0.004) and 7 (p=0.001) points, and those favorable to the Middle East by 4.1 (p=0.017) and
3.5 (p=0.030) points. Increases in these (i.e., > 20%) allocations among conservatives
(∆Africa=0.514, p=0.884; ∆MiddleEast=1.35, p=0.560) and Republicans (∆Africa=4.07, p=0.260;
∆MiddleEast=3.18, p=0.166) tended to be smaller (though not significantly so) and not
distinguishable from 0.
In sum, and offering some support for hypothesis H14A, these results do show that the
treatment occasioned a larger anti-Europe/pro-non-Europe admissions bias among liberals and
Democrats than conservatives and Republicans. However, estimates of these differences are
much too uncertain for concluding them to be genuine.
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Table 7.15 Adjusted average changes in allocation type by ideology and party identification
Europe
Asia
Latin America
< 20% 20% > 20% < 20% 20% > 20% < 20% 20% > 20%
Liberal
6.31* -3.73
-2.58
3.25 -5.27† 2.02 -4.25* 0.955 3.30
(N=432)
(2.73) (3.21) (2.27) (2.43) (3.02) (2.24) (1.86) (3.17) (2.93)
Moderate
6.51
-6.65 0.144 -0.829 -1.22 9.51
7.29 -8.20 0.913
(N=77)
(4.71) (7.91) (7.35) (5.35) (7.66) (6.55) (6.69) (7.73) (5.64)
Conservative 1.10
7.63
-8.74
-2.56 11.49* -8.93† -1.65 3.62 -1.97
(N=132)
(3.37) (5.84) (5.87) (5.07) (5.86) (4.85) (5.26) (5.92) (4.79)
Democrat 7.11** -4.51
-2.60
3.12 -6.44* 3.32 -2.17 -1.37 3.54
(N=459)
(2.56) (3.11) (2.29) (2.34) (2.95) (2.22) (1.88) (3.08) (2.78)
Independent -6.60 16.71 -10.11 -12.69 22.57* -9.88 -5.06 19.71† -14.65†
(N=31)
(8.56) (12.04) (10.48) (8.70) (11.48) (9.64) (9.92) (11.58) (8.68)
Republican
1.32
2.21
-3.52
-3.69
8.37 -4.69 0.364 0.647 -1.01
(N=151)
(3.34) (5.59) (5.51) (4.64) (5.56) (4.66) (4.94) (5.61) (4.63)
Middle East
Africa
Liberal
-3.18 -0.959 4.13*
-2.06 -4.60 6.66**
(N=432)
(2.86) (3.14) (1.72)
(2.43) (3.04) (2.29)
Moderate
2.00
-1.96 -0.048
0.453 -9.88 9.43†
(N=77)
(7.65) (7.92) (3.61)
(6.51) (7.46) (5.11)
Conservative -4.19
2.83
1.35
-0.730 0.216 0.514
(N=132)
(5.86) (5.80) (2.32)
(5.78) (5.90) (3.53)
Democrat
-2.34
-1.15 3.48*
-1.34 -5.68† 7.02**
(N=459)
(2.82) (3.06) (1.60)
(2.39) (2.96) (2.19)
Independent -18.89† 23.56* -4.67
-8.77 12.36 -3.59
(N=31)
(11.18) (11.80) (7.32)
(10.54) (11.40) (5.79)
Republican -0.171 -3.01
3.18
0.573 -4.64 4.07
(N=151)
(5.55) (5.52) (2.29)
(5.30) (5.56) (3.61)
Note. Cell entries are (baseline-covariate-) adjusted average effects on percentage changes in allocation type from
treatment x ideology and treatment x party-ID interaction terms. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

7.3.3.3

Main effects on racial ingroup vs. outgroup warmth

For the same reasons that H14 expected the treatment to elicit an anti-European/pro-nonEuropean bias in immigration allocations, H15 predicted that a similar bias would manifest in
how warmly participants rate members of their (white) racial ingroup relative to members of
non-white outgroups. Table 7.16 presents unadjusted and adjusted results from a series of
regression models in which differences in warmth towards whites vs. blacks, Hispanics, and
Asians are regressed onto the treatment variable. Figure 7.11 graphs the adjusted margins of
these results. Overall, the data give clear support to H15. In each case, we see that the treatment
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led to statistically significant enlargements of baseline warmth differentials that already favored
non-whites over whites. While the gap between warmth towards whites vs. blacks (ß=-3.25,
p=0.012) increased the most on average, the size of this increase is not significantly different
from that observed between whites vs. Hispanics (ß =-3.15, p=0.016) or whites vs. Asians (ß=2.57, p=0.036). Interestingly, these changes were less driven by participants ratings whites less
warmly (ß=-0.574, p=0.647), and more driven by increases in warmth towards blacks (ß=2.67,
p=0.028), Hispanics (ß=2.58, p=0.033), and Asians (ß=1.99, p=0.087).
Table 7.16 Unadjusted and adjusted treatment effects on racial ingroup vs. outgroup
warmth differentials
Whites vs.
Blacks

Whites vs.
Hispanics

Whites vs.
Asians

Whites vs.
non-Whites
(Average)

Neutral stimulus
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
(N=645)
Guilt/Shame stimulus -3.63** -3.25* -3.27* -3.15*
-2.81* -2.57* -3.27*
-2.99*
(N=641)
(1.40) (1.28) (1.41)
(1.30)
(1.32) (1.22)
(1.31)
(1.20)
-2.14* -23.32 -2.21* -24.37*** -4.13*** -23.37 -2.83** -23.69***
Constant
(1.05) (3.12) (1.02)
(3.12)
(0.973) (2.96) (0.963)
(2.92)
Adjusted R2
0.004
0.186
0.004
0.181
0.003
0.177
0.004
0.199
Note. Cell entries in first row of column (a) and column (b) are the unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted
coefficients for the effects of the treatment on whites vs. non-whites feeling thermometer (0-100) warmth differentials.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Figure 7.11 Adjusted racial ingroup vs. outgroup warmth differentials by study condition
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7.3.3.3.1 Interaction effects on racial
ingroup vs. outgroup warmth
Like others before it, secondary hypothesis H15A predicted that the treatment would
have stronger effects on the white vs. non-white feeling thermometer ratings of liberals and
Democrats than of conservatives and Republicans. H15B expected to find the opposite pattern of
results. Table 7.17 reports the average marginal effects of the treatment on the various warmth
differentials for each political subgroup. Once again, the results do not clearly support either of
the two competing hypotheses. With only one minor exception (whites vs. Hispanics among
liberals), the coefficients for liberals and Democrats are never even nominally larger than those
observed for conservatives and Republicans. To the contrary, and offering some support for
H15B, the coefficients are almost always larger for the latter than the former two subgroups. For
instance, the effect of the treatment on white vs. non-white warmth differentials was over one
point larger among conservatives (∆=-4.06, p=0.065) and Republicans (∆=-3.74, p=0.085) than
liberals (∆=-2.71, p=0.085) and Democrats (∆=-2.51, p=0.093).
Table 7.17 Unadjusted and adjusted average treatment effects on racial ingroup vs.
outgroup warmth by ideology and party identification

Guilt/Shame
Condition
Liberal
(N=432)
Moderate
(N=77)
Conservative
(N=132)
Democrat
(N=459)
Independent
(N=31)
Republican
(N=151)

Whites vs.
Non-Whites
(Average)

Whites vs.
Blacks

Whites vs.
Hispanics

Whites vs.
Asians

(a)

(b)

(a)

(b)

(a)

(b)

(a)

(b)

-2.49
(1.70)
-2.85
(3.24)
-4.84†
(2.63)
-2.52
(1.68)
-7.70
(5.11)
-4.56†
(2.47)

-3.00†
(1.64)
-1.74
(3.36)
-5.02†
(2.63)
-2.74†
(1.57)
-5.02
(5.19)
-4.20†
(2.43)

-2.54
(1.74)
-5.93†
(3.56)
-1.88
(2.47)
-2.57
(1.72)
-8.74†
(5.01)
-3.07
(2.40)

-3.19†
(1.67)
-4.87
(3.70)
-2.18
(2.48)
-2.96†
(1.61)
-6.00
(5.34)
-2.96
(2.40)

-1.40
(1.64)
-2.68
(2.94)
-4.79*
(2.38)
-1.55
(1.61)
-6.03*
(2.34)
-4.39†
(2.38)

-1.93
(1.59)
-1.93
(3.00)
-5.00*
(2.32)
-1.85
(1.51)
-3.59
(2.85)
-4.05†
(2.34)

-2.14
(1.63)
-3.82
(3.02)
-3.84†
(2.21)
-2.21
(1.61)
-7.49*
(3.69)
-4.01†
(2.19)

-2.71†
(1.57)
-2.85
(3.14)
-4.06†
(2.20)
-2.51†
(1.50)
-4.87
(3.98)
-3.74†
(2.17)
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Note. Cell entries in columns (a) and (b), respectively, are adjusted and unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted
average effects on racial ingroup vs. outgroup feeling thermometer (0-100) warmth differentials from treatment x ideology
and treatment x party-ID interaction terms. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

As the unadjusted margins in Figure 7.12 suggests, this is likely due to the fact that warmth
ratings among liberal and Democratic participants were already considerably biased in favor of
non-Whites, whereas conservatives and Republicans expressed a clear bias in favor of whites. Be
this as it may, in neither case is the difference in the size of effect distinguishable from 0 (liberals
vs. conservatives: p=0.612; Democrats vs. Republicans: p=0.642).

Figure 7.12 Unadjusted racial ingroup vs. outgroup warmth differentials by study condition, ideology, and
party identification

In sum, while the pattern of findings is overall more aligned with H15B than H15A, the
uncertainty of the estimates does not allow me to conclude with any confidence that the effects
were genuinely stronger for conservatives and Republicans than liberals and Democrats.
7.3.4

Main effects on donation behavior

All of the analyses thus far have only looked at the effects of the treatment on racial
attitudes. However, hypothesis 16 expects these effects to also influence participant behavior;
namely, the extent that they donate money to advocacy organizations that advance policies that

361
ostensibly benefit racial/ethnic outgroups. Table 7.18 considers the effects of the treatment on
monetary contributions ($0-$20) to anti-racism and pro-immigration advocacy groups. We see
that not only are the effects of the treatment on the size of donations to each organization very
small (roughly half a dollar) and statistically insignificant, they are also in the negative direction
(ßAnti-Racism=-0.469, p=0.211; ßPro-Immigration=-0.557, p=0.119).
Table 7.18 Unadjusted and adjusted treatment effects on monetary donations
Anti-Racism
Organization
Neutral
stimulus
(N=645)
Guilt/Shame
stimulus
(N=641)
Constant

Pro-Immigration
Organization

Total

(a)

(b)

(a)

(b)

(a)

(b)

-0.473
(0.381)

-0.469
(0.374)

-0.576
(0.367)

-0.557
(0.357)

-1.05
(0.711)

-1.03
(0.693)

5.49***
(0.270)
0.000

8.28***
(0.876)
0.062

5.19*** 8.17*** 10.68*** 16.44***
(0.263) (0.882) (0.504)
(1.68)
0.001
0.076
0.001
0.075

Adjusted R2
Change in
-2.97
-2.90
-4.84†
-5.00†
-3.89
-3.87
Percent
(2.79)
(2.74)
(2.78)
(2.72)
(2.79)
(2.75)
Donating
Note. Cell entries in first row of column (a) and column (b) are the unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted
between between-condition differences in monetary donations (0-20$) to each respective advocacy organization.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Figure 7.13 Adjusted average donation (top) and donor rate (bottom) by study condition

Structuring the results in terms of changes in the percent that donated a non-zero sum of
money does not alter this conclusion. The rate of donations to the anti-racism and pro-
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immigration groups in the guilt/shame condition was 2.9 (p=0.291) and 5 (p=0.066) points lower
than in the neutral condition, though only the latter difference approaches conventional levels of
significance. Taken as a whole, the results provide no support for hypothesis H16. If anything,
they suggest that the treatment actually worked to modestly discourage donations to activist
organizations.
7.3.4.1

Interaction effects on donation behavior

While the primary hypothesis finds no support in the data, it’s still possible that the
effects of the treatment on donation behavior are conditional on political orientation. This
possibility, which follows from secondary hypotheses H16A-B, is put to the test in Table 7.19.
Table 7.19 Unadjusted (a, aa) and adjusted (b, bb) average treatment effects on monetary
donations (a, b) and share of donors (aa, bb) by ideology and party identification
Anti-Racism
Organization

Pro-Immigration
Organization

Total

Guilt/Shame
(a)
(b)
(aa)
(bb)
(a)
(b)
(aa)
(bb)
(a)
(b)
(aa)
(bb)
Condition
Liberal
-0.888† -0.781 -5.56 -4.88 -0.889† -0.763 -6.71* -6.09† -1.78† -1.54† -7.04* -6.51†
(N=432) (0.491) (0.495) (3.43) (3.44) (0.476) (0.477) (3.43) (3.44) (0.920) (0.924) (3.41) (3.42)
Moderate 0.995 1.25
5.96
8.10 -0.141 0.165 2.12
4.54 0.854 1.41
5.96
8.40
(N=77)
(1.10) (1.10) (8.02) (8.00) (0.974) (0.953) (7.86) (7.78) (1.96) (1.94) (8.03) (8.07)
Conservative -0.492 -0.586 -2.93 -3.74 -0.282 -0.394 -5.85 -6.61 -0.775 -0.980 -2.51 -3.12
(N=132) (0.590) (0.571) (5.57) (5.42) (0.605) (0.564) (5.52) (5.32) (1.13) (1.07) (5.69) (5.54)
Democrat -0.620 -0.524 -4.16 -3.67 -0.773 -0.665 -5.69† -5.33 -1.39 -1.19 -5.54† -5.09
(N=459) (0.476) (0.480) (3.32) (3.33) (0.462) (0.461) (3.31) (3.31) (0.891) (0.892) (3.31) (3.31)
Independent 1.97
1.87 20.80† 20.15 1.89
1.78 21.25† 20.46† 3.87
3.65 20.80† 21.06
(N=31)
(1.62) (1.63) (12.25) (12.28) (1.27) (1.28) (11.65) (11.79) (2.71) (2.75) (12.25) (12.37)
Republican -0.827 -0.723 -5.78 -5.08 -0.758 -0.678 -9.10† -8.91† -1.58 -1.40 -5.56 -5.00
(N=151) (0.583) (0.555) (5.34) (5.22) (0.568) (0.540) (5.26) (5.10) (1.10) (1.04) (5.40) (5.30)
Note. Cell entries in columns (a) and (b), respectively, are adjusted and unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted
average effects on monetary donations from treatment x ideology and treatment x party-ID interaction terms. Cell entries in
columns (aa) and (bb), respectively, represent percentage changes in the share of participants that donated at least some
non-zero amount of money. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

The results can be summarized as follows. When it comes to the size (columns a-b) of
monetary contributions to each organization, the effects of the treatment are negative and
statistically insignificant for all political subgroups except moderates and independents, for
whom the effects are positive and generally insignificant. The negative effects on donations were
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somewhat stronger for liberals (∆Anti-Racism=-0.781, p=0.115; ∆Pro-Immigration=-0.763, p=0.110;
∆Total=-1.54, p=0.095) than conservatives (∆Anti-Racism=-0.586, p=0.305; ∆Pro-Immigration=-0.394,
p=0.564; ∆Total=-0.980, p=0.358), and for Republicans (∆Anti-Racism=-0.723, p=0.193; ∆ProImmigration=-0.678,

p=0.210; ∆Total=-1.40, p=0.180) than Democrats (∆Anti-Racism=-0.524, p=0.275;

∆Pro-Immigration=-0.665, p=0.149; ∆Total=-1.19, p=0.182), but none of these differences approach
statistical significance. This remains the case for changes in the rates of donors (columns aa-bb).
Specifically, though the share of liberals and Democrats donating to at least one organization
was 6.5 (p=0.057) and 5.1 (p=0.124) points lower in the guilt/shame condition, respectively,
these declines were not significantly different from those observed among conservatives (∆=3.12, p=0.573) and Republicans (∆=-5.00, p=0.573).

Figure 7.14 Average total donation by study condition, ideology, and party identification

In sum, neither primary hypothesis H16 nor one its two competing secondary hypotheses
finds support in these data. Both the main effects as well as those observed among the dominant
political subgroups were negative and not significantly significant. While the expected positive
effects were observed among moderates (and independents), their estimates are too uncertain to
be in any way conclusive.
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Figure 7.15 Average treatment effects on size (top) and rate (bottom) of total donations/donors by study
condition, ideology, and party identification

7.3.5

Tests of mediation

The next series of hypotheses to be tested are mediational. Specifically, hypotheses
H12C-H16C predicted that the effects of the treatment on each outcome variable would be at
least partially mediated through moral shame and/or guilt. However, because the main effects of
the treatment on several outcomes were not significant, I focus only on those that were; namely,
support for pro-black policies, immigration allocations to Europe, and warmth towards whites vs.
non-whites.
I begin with H12C, which expects the effects of the treatment on support for pro-black
policies to be mediated by both moral shame and guilt. The theoretical reasoning here is that,
despite stemming from different negative moral appraisals, the pro-social effects of each of these
emotions overlap when it comes to rectifying ingroup harms against specific or directly affected
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outgroups. I conduct a test of this proposition with a series of Seemingly Unrelated Regression
(SUR) equations. The first two equations constitute the models for the hypothesized mediators
wherein moral shame and guilt are each regressed on the treatment and pre-treatment covariates.
The third equation features the pro-black policy index as the outcome variable, which is then
regressed onto the treatment, moral shame, guilt, and pre-treatment covariates. Standardized
coefficients from these equations are shown in the H12C diagram of Figure 7.16. When all other
variables are held constant, we see that the effects of the treatment (ß=0.056, p=0.072) on problack policy support are both moderated and no longer significant at the p < 0.05 level, while
those of moral shame (ß=0.376, p < 0.001) and guilt (ß=0.241, p < 0.001) are both significantly
positive.

Figure 7.16 Path coefficients from SUREG models
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On their face, these results are indicative of partial mediation. To validate this inference, I
calculate the direct, indirect and total effects of the treatment using Stata’s ‘nlcom’ command. As
is recommended in cases of non-normally distributed data (see Preacher & Hayes, 2008), I obtain
bootstrapped standard errors for these estimates from 10,000 replications. The results are
displayed in column (a) of Table 7.20.
Table 7.20 Direct, indirect, and total treatment effects on pro-black policy support
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
0.056†
0.050 0.085** 0.060†
Direct Effect
(0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031)
Indirect
0.058*** 0.090***
via
--(0.016) (0.023)
Shame
Indirect
0.026*
0.055*
via
--(0.012)
(0.022)
Guilt
Indirect
0.080**
via
------(0.024)
Shame/Guilt
Total
0.140*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.140***
Effect
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038)
Proportion
0.603
0.643
0.390
0.572
Mediated
Proportion
Mediated by 0.415
------Shame
Proportion
Mediated by 0.188
------Guilt
RMSE
0.545
0.558
0.569
0.547
AIC
6686.695 4894.153 5239.524 5076.949
BIC
7037.527 5126.321 5471.692 5309.117
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Consistent with H12C, roughly 60% of the treatment’s total effects on pro-black policy
support are conveyed through both moral shame (ßIndirect=0.058, p < 0.001; Proportion
mediated=0.415) and guilt (ßIndirect=0.026, p=0.020; Proportion mediated=0.415), though the
former mediates twice as much of the effects as the latter. Columns (b)-(d) report the results for
alternate model specifications wherein guilt (b) and shame (c) are removed as mediators, and
when both are combined to form a single mediator (d). While the current specification (a) has the

367
lowest the average error (RMSE=0.545), a between-specification comparison of the information
criterion (AIC=4894.153, BIC=5126.321) actually favor the model (b) in which guilt is dropped
as a mediator. In this latter specification, the direct effects of the treatment no longer approach p
< 0.05 significance, and shame alone carries just under 65% of the total effect. To contrast, when
shame is dropped as a mediator, the direct effects of the treatment are significant at the p < 0.01
level while 39% of the total effects are channeled through guilt. Taken as a whole, although the
results of the original model are consistent with H12C, it appears that little is lost—and some
parsimony even gained—when the indirect effects are made to exclusively run through shame.
The next mediation model offers a test of H14C, which predicted that shame, but not
guilt, would mediate the negative effects of the treatment on the share of immigration admissions
allocated to Europe. To briefly review, the theoretical logic here is that, insofar as its underlying
moral appraisals tend to be narrowly focused on the ingroup’s actions (as opposed to its moral
character as a whole), the pro-social effects of guilt are expected to be limited to compensating
only those outgroups that were or are directly affected by an ingroup’s harmful behavior. In
contrast, the pro-social effects of shame extend more broadly, as they stem from negative and
totalizing appraisals of an ingroup’s moral essence, which, in turn, inspires a desire for moral
separation and the weakening of the ingroup’s (negative) influence altogether.
Referring back to the bottom-left diagram in Figure 7.16, we see that when all other
variables are held constant, the direct negative effects of the treatment are no longer significant at
even the p < 0.1 level. Further, and offering initial support for H14C, the predictive effects of
moral shame (ß=-0.177, p < 0.001), but not of guilt (ß=-0.067, p=0.121), are significantly
negative. This suggests whatever indirect effects on this outcome exist, they are likely to run
through moral shame. The corresponding mediation results, which are reported in Table 7.21,
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corroborate this assessment. Only the treatment’s indirect negative effects through shame
(ßIndirect=-0.027, p=0.017) are distinguishable from zero. In contrast, those that run through guilt
(ßIndirect=-0.007, p=0.232) are both miniscule and insignificant. Overall, just over 45% of the
treatment’s total effects on allocations to Europe are indirect, with 35.5% of this share running
through shame and 9.6% running through guilt. As before, and comparing across specifications,
the information criterion (AIC=5692.265, BIC=5924.433) favor dropping guilt as a mediator
(column b). When this is done, the direct effects of the treatment are further moderated (ßDirect=0.041, p=0.326) while shame alone now shoulders 47.1% of the total effect. Though all of these
results accord with H14C, that the total effect (ßTotal=-0.077, p=0.074) of the treatment only
reaches p < 0.1 significance renders their reliability uncertain.
Table 7.21 Direct, indirect, and total treatment effects on European immigration
allocations
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
-0.042
-0.041 -0.056 -0.046
Direct Effect
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Indirect
-0.027* -0.036**
via
----(0.011) (0.011)
Shame
Indirect
-0.007
-0.021*
via
----(0.006)
(0.009)
Guilt
Indirect
-0.031**
via
------(0.010)
Shame/Guilt
Total
-0.077† -0.077† -0.077† -0.077†
Effect
(0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043)
Proportion
0.451
0.471
0.268
0.405
Mediated
Proportion
Mediated by 0.355
----Shame
Proportion
Mediated by 0.096
----Guilt
RMSE
0.760
0.761
0.764
0.761
AIC
7540.751 5692.265 5996.028 5927.488
BIC
7891.583 5924.433 6228.196 6159.656
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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A third and final mediation model tests hypothesis H15C, which expects that at least
some of the effects of the treatment on rating non-white groups relatively warmer than whites
run through moral shame. The standardized path coefficients shown in the bottom-right diagram
of Figure 7.16 offers preliminary support for this prediction. First, when shame and guilt join the
model, the effects of the treatment are reduced to insignificance (ß=-0.065, p=0.168). Second,
whereas the effects of shame (ß=-0.341, p < 0.001) are significantly negative and moderate in
size, those of guilt (ß=-0.062 p=0.187) are much smaller and not distinguishable from chance.
This pattern of results strongly suggests that at least some of the effects of the treatment on white
vs. non-white warmth differentials run through moral shame.
Table 7.22 Direct, indirect, and total treatment effects on racial ingroup vs. outgroup
warmth
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
-0.065
-0.063 -0.092† -0.074
Direct Effect
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Indirect
-0.053** -0.061***
via
----(0.016) (0.017)
Shame
Indirect
-0.007
-0.032*
via
----(0.006)
(0.013)
Guilt
Indirect
-0.051**
via
------(0.016)
Shame/Guilt
Total
-0.124* -0.124* -0.124* -0.124*
Effect
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Proportion
0.479
0.491
0.261
0.408
Mediated
Proportion
Mediated by 0.424
------Shame
Proportion
Mediated by 0.055
------Guilt
RMSE
0.830
0.830
0.843
0.832
AIC
7764.785 5915.63 6247.54 6158.797
BIC
8115.617 6147.798 6479.708 6390.966
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

The mediation results reported in Table 7.22 above show that this is indeed the case.
Approximately 42.4% of the treatment’s total effects (ßTotal=-0.124, p=0.013) are channeled
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through shame (ßIndirect=-0.053, p=0.001), whereas just a paltry and insignificant 5.5% are
mediated through guilt (ßIndirect=-0.007, p=0.272). Once again, the information criterion
(AIC=5915.63, BIC=6147.798) in column (b) suggest that dropping guilt as a mediator better fits
the data. By this specification, just under half (49.1%) of the treatment’s total effects run
through shame (ßIndirect=-0.061, p < 0.001). Taken together, these results perfectly align with the
prediction of H15C.
7.3.6

Exploratory/Unregistered analyses

Some research finds that reminding white Americans of their declining majority status
can trigger greater racial and immigration conservatism as well as fear of and anger towards
racial/ethnic minorities, on one hand, and greater sympathy towards other whites on another
(Outten et al. 2011; Craig & Richeson, 2014a, 2014b; Major et al., 2016). This raises an
interesting question: how might whites react to the prospect of a majority-minority America after
being primed with feelings of guilt and shame over their ingroup’s racist legacy? While no
predictions were formally pre-registered, my theory would expect that feelings of moral shame
would lead some whites to actually embrace the fall of their ingroup’s dominant social status.
And this is because moral shame follows from globally appraising an ingroup’s status as
essentially immoral and the source of others’ oppression. By this logic, white decline promises
the coming of a less racist and more just and equitable social order.
To explore the above question, a subset of participants 168 (N=481) were asked to indicate
how sad they feel “that America is projected to lose its white majority by the year 2042” on a 7-

168

For purely exploratory purposes, this item was belatedly added to the survey questionnaire during the final weeks
of data gathering. Importantly, because it was administered only after all of the racial and immigration policy-related
questions were completed, its inclusion could not have biased responses to other post-treatment items.
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point scale 169 (Mean=3.97, SD=1.32) ranging from ‘Very sad’ (1) and ‘Very happy’ (7), where
the neutral category (4) is ‘Neither sad nor happy’. If the theoretical reasoning given above has
merit, it is expected that a) the guilt/shame stimulus will lead to increases in ‘happy’ responses,
and b) these increases will be mediated by moral shame more than guilt. I test the first of these
(unregistered) predictions by regressing the ‘sadness-happy’ scale onto the treatment dummy and
pre-treatment covariates. To better examine whether the treatment effected changes across
response categories, I also created and regressed dummy variables corresponding to each of the
three response types 170 (i.e. Sad, Neither sad nor happy, Happy). The unadjusted (a) and adjusted
(b) results from these models are displayed in the first row of Table 7.23. First, the treatment led
to a small 0.129SD increase (ß=0.174 p=0.148) in the ‘happy’ direction that slightly grows
(0.146SD) and approaches conventional levels of significance (ß=0.196, p=0.076) when
adjusting for pre-treatment covariates. The results from the dummy response models, which are
visualized in Figure 7.17, show that this adjusted change consists of a roughly 5.4 percentage
point (p=0.088) increase in ‘happy’ responses, which was mostly driven by decreases in ‘neither
sad nor happy’ responses (ß=-4.01, p=0.348).
Table 7.23 Unadjusted and adjusted treatment effects on majority-minority sentiments
7-point scale
(a)
Guilt/Shame stimulus 0.174
(N=236 vs. 245)
(0.120)
3.89***
Constant
(0.087)
Adjusted R2
0.002
Liberal
0.105
(N=155 vs. 152)
(0.140)

Sad
(∆%)

(b)
(a)
(b)
0.196†
-2.23
-1.36
(0.110) (3.51)
(3.30)
4.93*** 19.18*** 4.21
(0.266) (2.52) (7.43)
0.186
-0.001 0.148
0.166
2.10
1.68
(0.138) (3.03) (3.17)

Neither sad nor
Happy
happy
(∆%)
(∆%)
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
-1.26
-4.01
3.50
5.37†
(4.32)
(4.28)
(3.32)
(3.15)
66.94*** 56.20*** 13.88*** 39.59***
(3.01)
(10.42)
(2.21)
(8.17)
-0.002
0.053
0.000
0.134
-7.11
-8.53
5.01
6.85
(5.28)
(5.23)
(4.84)
(4.69)

169
This measure was taken from a survey of white Americans that was conducted by a research collaborator at
Michigan State University.
170
In terms of the rates of these differing responses, 18.1% of participants (7.5% of liberals vs. 38.7% of
conservatives) reported feeling ‘sad’, 66.3% (69.4% of liberals vs. 59.4% of conservatives) reported feeling ‘neither
happy nor sad’, and 15.6% (23.1% of liberals vs. 1.9% of conservatives) reported feeling ‘happy’.

372
Conservative
0.237
0.246
-8.44
-8.46
9.51
8.29
-1.07
0.176
(N=73 vs. 82)
(0.191) (0.199) (7.84)
(7.92) (7.90)
(8.19)
(2.19)
(3.06)
Democrat
0.127
0.166
0.902
1.36
-6.14
-8.47†
5.24
7.11
(N=153 vs. 158)
(0.139) (0.134) (3.10) (3.11) (5.25)
(5.12)
(4.78)
(4.57)
Republican
0.250
0.243
-7.70
-6.20
7.59
4.68
0.111
1.52
(N=83 vs. 87)
(0.186) (0.190) (7.38) (7.35) (7.48)
(7.48)
(2.34)
(2.65)
Note. Cell entries in the first row of columns (a) and (b) are the unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted differences
between conditions on the 7-point measure of sadness/happiness towards the decline of America’s white majority and in
the percent of participants falling in each collapsed response category. Cell entries in the bottom four rows of columns (a)
and (b) are the unadjusted and (baseline-covariate-) adjusted average margins from treatment x ideology and treatment x
party-ID interaction terms. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Figure 7.17 Adjusted share of participants in each response category by study condition

Results in the bottom 4 rows of Table 7.23 are from models that interact the treatment
with measures of ideology and party identification, respectively. They indicate that the treatment
had a slightly larger—but not significantly so--effect on the responses of conservatives (ß=0.246,
p=0.217) and Republicans (ß=0.243, p=0.201) than on those of liberals (ß=0.166, p=0.231) and
Democrats. However, the results from the dummy response models show that the nature of these
changes varied across these groups. White liberals and Democrats became more likely to give a
‘happy‘ response (ßLiberal=6.85, p=0.144; ßDemocrat=7.11, p=0.120) and less likely to give a
‘neither sad nor happy’ response (ßLiberal=-8.53, p=0.103; ßDemocrat=-8.47, p=0.099). In contrast,
white conservatives and Republicans were more likely to move from a ‘sad’ (ßConservative=-8.46,
p=0.286; ßRepublican=-6.20, p=0.400) to a ‘neither sad nor happy’ response (ßConservative=8.29,
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p=0.312; ßRepublican=4.68, p=0.532) than move from either of these two categories to a ‘happy’
response (ßConservative=0.176, p=0.954; ßRepublican=1.52, p=0.567). While an interesting pattern, it’s
important to emphasize that almost none of these changes approach conventional levels of
significance.

I next fit a series of mediation models to examine whether or to what extent the modest
effects of the treatment on responses to the sadness-happiness scale are conveyed through moral
shame and/or guilt. Note that apart from a different outcome variable, the specifications of these
mediation models are identical to those fitted earlier. As before, I obtain bootstrap standard
errors from 10,000 replications. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 7.24 below.
Table 7.24 Direct, indirect, and total treatment effects on majority-minority sentiments
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
0.091
0.093
0.152
0.118
Direct Effect
(0.106)
(0.105)
(0.109)
(0.107)
Indirect
0.120** 0.103**
via
----(0.045)
(0.037)
Shame
Indirect
-0.014
0.045†
via
----(0.019)
(0.027)
Guilt
Indirect
0.078*
via
------(0.034)
Shame/Guilt
Total
0.196†
0.196†
0.196†
0.196†
Effect
(0.110)
(0.109)
(0.110)
(0.109)
Proportion
0.537
0.525
0.227
0.397
Mediated
Proportion
Mediated by 0.611
------Shame
Proportion
Mediated by -0.074
------Guilt
RMSE
1.11
1.11
1.14
1.12
AIC
3262.262 2526.701 2682.049 2634.712
BIC
3533.694 2706.264 2861.611 2814.274
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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As anticipated, column (a) shows a significant positive indirect effect via moral shame
(ß=0.120, p=0.007) and an insignificant negative indirect effect via guilt (ß=-0.014, p=0.447).
This negative indirect influence through guilt is likely due to its (spuriously) positive effects
being entirely confounded by moral shame. Indeed, when moral shame is dropped from the
model (column c), the indirect effects (ß=0.045, p=0.096) via guilt are positive and approach
significance. Further, and similar to what was observed in most of the earlier mediation analyses,
the fit statistics indicate that a model in which moral shame is the lone mediator (column b) is
superior to all others. By this specification (column b), roughly 53% of the treatment’s total
effects (or 0.77SD of the total 0.146SD increase) are conveyed through moral shame.
In sum, and conforming to earlier expectations, the treatment led to a small increase in
the share of those that report feeling ‘happy’ about the decline of America’s white majority. This
effect, however, only reached significance at the p < 0.1 threshold. But given that effects of
comparable size (i.e., 0.1-0.15SD) emerged as significant for other outcomes, this is likely to be
at least partly due to the reduced power of a smaller sample. In other words, though the effects
are small, they are unlikely to be zero. Finally, a mediation analysis indicated that a majority
share of these small treatment effects was conveyed through moral shame. In contrast, the
indirect effects via guilt were negligible and became insignificantly negative in the presence of
moral shame.
7.4

Discussion
Many of the findings presented above are concordant with theoretical expectations. First,

the results showed that, relative to a neutral stimulus, exposure to racial equalitarian media
content led to significantly higher levels of moral shame and guilt. Subsequent analyses also
found that this exposure elicited significantly greater support for pro-black policy preferences.
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Notably, this was despite the fact that the wording of these policy measures explicitly primed
considerations of discrimination against whites. But the effects of the treatment did not end with
attitudes towards pro-black racial policies. They also extended to how warmly participants rated
whites vs. non-whites as well as the share of immigration admissions they allocated to Europe
vs. non-European countries. In the first case, the guilt/shame treatment effectively exacerbated
participants’ pre-existing tendency towards ratings members of non-white minority groups more
warmly than fellow whites. And there was no exception to this pattern: warmth towards blacks,
Hispanics, and (if lesser so) Asians all went up, while that towards whites slightly dipped. In the
second case, the treatment led to a significant drop in the share of all immigration admissions
that were apportioned to Europe. Further analysis showed that this effect was driven by increases
in the share of participants whose allocation decisions were at once biased against Europe and
biased in favor of immigration from Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. That allocations
to Asia changed relatively little is potentially of theoretical significance 171, given that Asian
Americans are among those widely perceived as suffering minimal levels of racial discrimination
and social disadvantage, whereas black (Africa) and Muslim Americans (the Middle East) are
widely perceived to suffer the greatest 172. Finally, an exploratory analysis showed that the
treatment also occasioned a small increase in the share of participants that report being ‘happy’
about the eventual demise of America’s white majority. However, and likely because the
analysis was underpowered relative to others, this increase was only significant at the p < 0.1
threshold.

171
Recall that moral shame is theorized to motivate pro-sociality towards outgroups whose experiences are
perceived as analogous to those of blacks. Accordingly, to the extent that Asians are perceived to as relatively
advantaged, they are less likely to fit the ‘black analogy’.
172
See Appendix C for survey data on public perceptions of discrimination against various social groups and ratings
of group advantage/disadvantage.
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To be sure, all of these effects highlighted above were very modest—ranging from
changes of 0.07SD to 0.16SD. And yet their size is also remarkably similar to that of the ‘Floyd
effects’ observed in Chapter 5. In other words, the magnitude of the media’s effects on white
racial attitudes in the current experimental context more or less converge on what was observed
in a natural context. But whereas such a test was not possible in Chapter 5, the current study was
able to get at whether and to what extent the media effects on outcome variables exerted
themselves through shame and/or guilt. On this score, the results of all of the mediation models
conducted accorded almost perfectly with theoretical expectations. Specifically, the treatment’s
indirect effects through both shame and (if to a lesser degree) guilt accounted for clear a majority
of its total effects on support for pro-black policies. Further, shame, but not guilt, significantly
mediated just under half of the treatment’s effects on broader outgroup-oriented attitudes and
policy preferences; namely relative warmth towards whites vs. non-whites and immigration
allocations to Europe vs. non-Europe. This latter finding is particularly revealing, given that the
measures of shame only explicitly referenced white and black Americans. Lastly, though purely
exploratory, moral shame was found to mediate just over half of the treatment’s total positive
effect on responses to the majority-minority item.
While the findings reviewed above constitute the first pieces of direct evidence in support
of this dissertation’s group-based moral emotions account of white racial attitude change, an
additional set of findings either run counter to or offer only weak support for several of this
theory’s predictions. First, no clear evidence emerged that the treatment inspired greater support
for increasing US immigration levels. What little increase was observed (approximately +3.6
percentage points) was not distinguishable from random variation. A possible exception to this
pattern was found among non-liberals, and among moderates in particular. Whereas liberal
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support for increasing immigration showed no change between conditions, support among
moderates and conservatives jumped 13.9 and 8.1 points, respectively, in the guilt/shame
stimulus group. These increases approach significance individually and become significant when
averaged together. And though these results do not constitute strong support for the primary
hypothesis in question, they potentially help to explain the null main effects. Specifically,
baseline support for increasing immigration among liberals and Democrats was already both
fairly high and much higher than among moderates and conservatives. And because the former
two groups comprise the overwhelming majority of the sample, one would expect the main
effects of the treatment on support to be at least somewhat attenuated. Of course, other
explanations 173, which will be discussed in the concluding chapter, are possible as well.
A second set of findings—those concerning the treatment’s effects on donation
behavior—were not only insignificant, but were also in the opposite direction of what was
predicted. Specifically, though the treatment was expected to increase the size of donations to
anti-racist and pro-immigrant advocacy groups, it instead effected small decreases both overall
and for all subgroups apart from moderates and independents. While these decreases were not
significant overall, they did approach significance among liberals. The reasons for this pattern of
results are not immediately clear. One possible interpretation is that the pro-social effects of the
treatment are limited to personally-costless moral-attitudinal signaling. If this is indeed the case,

173

An immediate explanation for these null effects is that the alternative hypothesis and underlying theory is wrong,
perhaps because the liberalizing effects of media exposure on racial attitudes are issue or group-specific rather than
general. This account is plausible, but is also hard to square with the fact that significant effects were observed in
both the cases of immigration allocations and all (i.e., the effects were not limited to feelings towards whites vs.
blacks) white vs. non-white feeling thermometer differentials. Assuming the alternative hypothesis is, in fact,
correct, another possibility is that the single 7-point measure of preferred immigration levels did not allow for a
detectable degree of between-condition variation. And yet this account is dubious on the grounds that significant
between-condition differences were observed on each of three 7-point pro-black policy items. A third (but by no
means final) possibility is that, unlike the outcome variables for which significant differences were observed, the
measure of preferred immigration levels makes no explicit mention of any racial/ethnic outgroup beneficiaries.

378
though, it begs the question why the effects were positive (albeit insignificant) among moderates
(and independents). Another interpretation, which has some support in the literature (Rothschild
& Keefer, 2017), is that the attitudinal measures afforded ‘ashamed’ and/or ‘guilty’ participants
an opportunity for moral self-affirmation. In other words, the endorsement of pro-outgroup or
policy preferences served to assuage participants’ sense of moral complicity in a perceived
systemically racist society. Thus, participants may have felt less of a need to affirm their moral
virtue by the time they reached the measures of donation behavior. This account is admittedly
post-hoc, but it can nevertheless be easily tested in future research by situating the donation
measures immediately or soon after the treatment. A third and more direct interpretation is that
soliciting donations to obscure organizations is a poor and unreliable means of measuring
personally-costly pro-social behavior 174. Future researchers should thus consider alternative
measures of this outcome. Whatever the case, the existing data do not allow me to test any of this
speculation. All that can be here is that, for whatever reason, the results ran counter to theoretical
expectations.
Finally, none of the conditional hypotheses found clear support in the data. With few
exceptions, the effects of the treatment on all outcomes only reached significance for liberals and
Democrats, but this likely has more to do with lack of power than the presence of zero
coefficients among conservatives and moderates. To begin, the effects of the treatment on moral
shame and guilt did not significantly differ between liberals/Democrats and
conservatives/Republicans. Second, though the effects on two of the three pro-black policy items
were larger for liberals/Democrats than conservatives/Republicans, none of these differences

174

For instance, participants may have felt wary about the donating money to organizations they know little about.
They may also have been leery about having to potentially disclose personal financial information to a stranger.
However, this account cannot explain why the effects of the treatment on donations were in the negative direction.
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were distinguishable from chance. Similarly, the effects of the treatment on support for
increasing immigration were stronger for conservatives/Republicans than liberals/Democrats, but
not significantly so. Further, no obvious or consistent pattern was found in the case of
immigration allocations. The negative effects on allocations to Europe were slightly stronger (but
not themselves significant) for conservatives than liberals, and slightly stronger for Democrats
than Republicans. Liberals/Democrats saw larger increases than conservatives/Republicans in
rates of anti-European/pro-non-European allocations, but none of these differences approached
significance.
That political orientation was not found to clearly or meaningfully condition the effects
of the treatment is both somewhat surprising and also seemingly conflicts with what was
observed in the context of the ‘Floyd effect’. On the other hand, and especially in comparison to
the data used in the Floyd analysis, the conservative/Republican sample in the current study may
have been too small for detecting politically-conditioned differences in treatment effects.
Assuming this chapter’s estimates of these differential effects (or lack thereof) are reliable, it
could also be that Prolific white conservatives and Republicans are qualitatively different—
perhaps more liberal—than their counterparts in the broader population 175. Alternatively, given
that it arguably portrayed a case (the Tulsa riots) in which black attempts at individual agency
and economic self-reliance were sabotaged by white racism, it’s also possible that guilt/shame
stimulus article resonated across ideological and partisan lines. I will return to and further
entertain these and other possibilities in the concluding chapter.

175

Some evidence for this was found when comparing the average 7-point ideology scores of conservatives (M=5.88
vs. 6.14) and Republicans (M=5.43 vs. 5.67) in the current sample to those in the most recent wave of the
Cooperative Election Study.
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7.5

Conclusion
Until this chapter, this dissertation provided only suggestive evidence for its group-based

moral emotions model of white racial attitudes. What’s long been missing is direct evidence that
media can affect white racial liberalism via its activation of collective shame and guilt. While not
without their limitations—all which will be covered at length in the final chapter-- the
experimental findings of this chapter finally delivered it. First, participants who read a
mainstream news editorial underscoring whites’ moral complicity in the origin and persistence of
black disadvantage reported significantly higher levels of moral shame and guilt than those who
read a neutral stimulus. They also expressed significantly greater support for various pro-black
policies, admitted significantly fewer (more) immigrants from European (non-Europe), and rated
members of non-white minority groups significantly more warmly than fellow whites. Second
and perhaps most important, moral shame and guilt were found to mediate most of the editorial’s
effects on pro-black policy support, and a bit under half of its effects on immigration admissions
and ingroup vs. outgroup feeling thermometer ratings.
Despite the importance of these findings for this dissertation’s thesis, that they ultimately
rest on numerical responses to imperfect measures of complicated social processes and attitudes
should not be forgotten. Put otherwise, there is potentially a vast gulf between what the
researcher thinks (or wants to believe) is going on in the data and what is actually going on in the
minds from which they are gathered. Did the treatment article genuinely cause participants to
actually feel ashamed and/or guilty of their racial group membership? Were these emotions and
related moral considerations actually informing their responses to measures of racial policy
preferences? What went through the minds of those that rated blacks and Hispanics more warmly
than whites? Do such individuals actually harbor shame-inspired antipathy towards other whites?
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Needless to say, none of these questions can be answered with regression models. Instead, the
coming chapter will shift to a qualitative approach to go where the data cannot.

8
8.1

THE (NOT-)GUILTY AND (UN)ASHAMED IN THEIR OWN WORDS

Introduction
The current chapter takes a deep dive into the feelings, thoughts, and considerations that

informed responses to the attitudinal measures of the previous quantitative chapter. More
specifically, it attempts to shed qualitative light on the following basic theoretical question: to
what extent are group-based moral appraisals of responsibility and feelings of shame and guilt
for past and current racial group inequities reflected in the written remarks of white survey
participants? Alternatively, to what extent—and using which theoretical strategies—did
participants express resistance to these appraisals? Second, this chapter also seeks answers to two
quantitative (or mixed-method-oriented) questions: did the guilt/shame treatment affect the
frequency of different comment types? Are these comments correlated with some of the
quantitative measures of the previous chapter?
To some extent, all of the proceeding questions bear on the validity of the findings of the
previous chapter. For if the intent of that study was to encourage ingroup-critical moral
appraisals and to elicit feelings of collective shame and guilt, but none of these phenomena are at
all apparent in how participants describe their own experiences with the study nor in the
explanations of the answers they gave, we’d have reason to question whether its results were
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genuinely born from the causal mechanism that this dissertation proposes. Thus, it is important to
go behind the numbers and determine whether the written sentiments of participants match
theoretical expectations.
This chapter will begin with a brief discussion of the basic theoretical expectations that
inform subsequent analyses. It will then introduce the sample from which the data featured in
these analyses was gathered as well as this study’s observational procedures. Next, it will take
readers on an extensive tour of sampled comments, all of which correspond to two overarching
themes of theoretical interest. Following this qualitative showcase, quantitative data from the
previous chapter is added to a) test whether the guilt/shame stimulus affected comment themes,
and b) examine the correspondence between comment themes and quantitative outcome
variables. This chapter concludes with a summary and discussion of main findings.
8.2

Theoretical expectations
As will become clearer below, the very general and voluntary open-response item utilized

in this chapter’s analysis does not easily lend itself to conventional hypothesis testing. This being
said, several general theoretical expectations can be submitted. First, it is expected that some
commenters will engage in negative group-based moral appraisals of whites; that is, they will
view whites as a whole as perpetrators of harm against non-whites and/or blame white people for
the disadvantages of blacks and other ‘people of color’. Consequently, at least some entries are
also expected to express feelings of collective shame and guilt over the authors’ association with
whiteness. Furthermore, much as the guilt/shame stimulus was found to elevate ingroup-critical
emotions, we would also expect the frequency of thematically-related (i.e. ‘ingroup-critical’)
entries to be greater in the guilt/shame than the neutral stimulus condition. On the other hand, to
the extent that ingroup-critical stimuli (be they the survey questions themselves and/or the
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treatment article) threatens participants’ moral identities, we would expect that a meaningful
share of entries will be defensive or counter-argumentative in orientation. And because ingroupcritical cues are expected to be most pronounced in the guilt/shame condition, the frequency of
defensive comments is also expected to be greater in this condition than in the neutral stimulus
group 176. Finally, if scores on quantitative measures of shame and guilt genuinely reflect these
emotions and their underlying negative group-based moral appraisals, it follows that ‘ingroupcritical’ commenters will score higher and ‘defensive’ commenters lower on these variables.
8.3

Data/Methodology
The data used in this analysis consists of responses to a voluntary open-ended question

that was included at the very end of the survey experiment of the previous chapter. The wording
of this question 177 was as follows:
“We'd like to get a better understanding of the thoughts and considerations that inform
people's survey responses. In this survey, you were asked a number of sensitive questions
dealing with race, immigration, and other matters. As researchers, we know we are
limited in what we can learn based on the questions we ask. If you're willing, and in the
space provided below, please write a few sentences or a short paragraph describing some
of the thoughts, feelings or considerations you had as you answered the questions in this
survey. If you are not interested in submitting such an entry, you can proceed to the end
of the survey by clicking the 'arrow' button.”

176

Of course, given that my theory predicts that whites with stronger equalitarian orientations react more favorably
to ingroup-critical stimuli than those with weaker orientations, interaction effects by political leanings are also
possible. In this case, they would entail that increases in ‘defensive’ comments will be largely driven by
conservatives and Republicans, while increases in ‘ingroup-critical’ comments will be largely driven by liberals and
Democrats.
177
As should be clear, respondents were not asked to respond to or write about any specific questions or topics.
Thus, the substance of submitted comments was entirely at the discretion of the respondent. In some ways, this is a
strength rather than a weakness, as it entails that comments will be more likely to reflect the genuine thoughts and
sentiments that were most salient in the minds of authors during the course of the study. On the downside, this
design makes it difficult to test specific hypotheses regarding why participants answered certain survey questions in
a given way. It also entails that many comments will likely be unrelated to or won’t engage the questions the
researcher is actually interested in.
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Of the 1,286 eligible respondents, 481 (37%) submitted written entries. Table 8.1
compares the means of non-commenters and commenters on pre-treatment covariates. Overall,
commenters were significantly less liberal/more conservative, more weakly aligned with the
Democratic party, and older than non-commenters. Differences on none of the other variables are
distinguishable from zero.
Table 9.1 Differences of means tests: commenters vs. non-commenters
Ideology Party-ID

Prop.
BA+

Age

Prop.
Prop.
Prop. Prop. Prop.
Male Northeast Midwest South West

Non2.87
2.77
0.556
33.74
0.435
0.199
commenter
(0.063) (0.074) (0.175) (0.420) (0.017) (0.014)
(N=805)
Commenter 3.14** 3.10** 0.547 39.06*** 0.401
0.164
(N=481) (0.083) (0.098) (0.227) (0.619) (0.022) (0.017)
Note. Cell entries are means with robust standard errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

0.224 0.393 0.184
(0.150) (0.017) (0.014)
0.266 0.397 0.173
(0.020) (0.022) (0.017)

For the purposes of this analysis, all 481 written responses were read and manually
coded 178 into three general thematic categories, including one sub-category: 1.Ingroup-critical,
2.Expressions of ingroup-critical emotions (sub-category of ‘Ingroup-critical’), 3. Defensive, and
4. Other/Unrelated. Table 9.2 shows the criteria by which comments were selected and coded
(which will be further discussed below) as well as the frequency of each comment theme--both
as the percent of all comments and also as the percent of all comments within a given political
subgroup. Overall, a small majority (53.8%) of comments—i.e., those in the ‘Other/Unrelated’
category 179--did not speak to or instantiate any of the ingroup-focused themes. However, given

178

As I note in the discussion, my lack of a test of (intercoder) reliability calls into question the meaningfulness of
results from the quantitative analyses I conduct in later sections. As such, these analyses are purely exploratory.
179
Comments in this ‘other/unrelated’ category generally consisted of very brief (typically one sentence)
compliments (e.g. “It was a very interesting study”) or criticism (e.g. “I am personally sick of all the surveys on
racism!!!”) of the survey, explanations of positions on immigration and race-related policies, acknowledgements
(e.g. “I think that racism has been and is still a problem in our country.”) and expressions of regret (e.g. “I think
slavery was very wrong”) for the history and/or persistence of racism in US society, and remarks that were either
very vague (e.g. ‘I considered the current state of the world while answering these questions’) or hard to
meaningfully interpret (e.g. “I saw it as an avenue to say about the discrimination amongst we the whites and with
the black people”).
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that participants were not asked any specific thematic questions, this is to be expected.
Unsurprisingly, the share of ‘ingroup-critical’ comments was greatest among liberals (31.5%)
and Democrats (31.3%)—as were expressions of ingroup-critical emotions (9.6%, 10.9%)--while
the share of ‘defensive’ comments was greatest among conservatives (48.3%) and Republicans
(48.5%).

Table 9.2 Comments frequencies as the percent of all comments and as the percent of
comments submitted by different white political subgroups
Selection Criteria

Ingroupcritical

Expressions
of ingroupcritical
emotions

-Faults white
people/racism for others’
disadvantages
-Holds white people
responsible or
addressing
racial inequality
-Negatively
essentializes or generalizes
about
white people
-Views white people as
beneficiaries of racism
-Expresses resentment of
frustration with
white people

-Conveys feelings of
collective shame, guilt,
and/or ingroup-directed
anger
-Rejects negative
generalizations of whites
-Rejects blaming whites
for others’ disadvantages
-Denies association
with historical and/or
contemporary ingroup
Defensive wrongdoings
-Denies ‘white privilege’
-Disputes or
downplays role
of racism in explaining
black disadvantage
-Negatively essentializes
or generalizes about blacks

All
Comments

Lib.

Mod.

Cons.

Dem.

Repub.

21.2%

31.5%

12.3%

0.8%

31.3%

2.2%

7.3%

9.6%

9.6%

0.0%

10.9%

0.0%

25.0%

11.3%

42.5%

48.3%

12.8%

48.5%
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and/or other non-white
racial groups
-Technical/survey-related
criticism or compliments
-Elaborates position on
racial/immigration policy
Other/
-Vague/uninterpretable
Unrelated statements
-Acknowledges/regrets
persistence of racism
-Affirms human equality
N

53.8%

57.2%

45.2%

50.9%

55.9%

49.3%

481

292

73

116

313

138

With the exception of the ‘other/unrelated’, each of these comment categories will now
be further introduced and explicated below 180. But before proceeding, it’s important for me to
stress that this chapter takes no normative stance on the appropriateness or desirability of any of
the comments it reviews. Ultimately, whether ‘ingroup-critical’ or ‘defensive’ comments
advance the more morally ‘correct’ position is a subjective value-based question that is irrelevant
to the purpose at hand.
8.4

Comment Typology
8.4.1

The ‘Ingroup-critical’ (N=102)

A little more than 21% of all open-response entries were classified as ‘ingroup-critical’.
Entries of this sort include those that engaged in negative moral appraisals or essentializations of
white Americans, faulted white Americans for the disadvantages of blacks and other ‘people of
color’, asserted whites’ (including their own) moral responsibility for rectifying the harms of
historical and contemporary racism, and/or expressed group-based feelings of shame and/or
guilt. The comments below exemplify responses of this genre:

180

Where necessary, presented comments are corrected for spelling and grammar. Further, some comments are very
long and/or multifaceted in the sense that, in addition to speaking to the themes of interest, they discuss things (e.g.
technical comments, immigration policy) that would, in isolation, be coded into the ‘other/unrelated’ category. In
these cases, I show only the thematically-relevant portion of the comment.
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“I believe that white people in general have gotten so many unfair advantages over the years that
it is time to give back and make reparations to the groups of people that we have taken
advantage of. I think educating people in the true history of the US is the only way to get more
people to understand just how much we have harmed others.”
-36-years-old, Female, Lean Democrat, Liberal
“I know that racism has been a problem for a long time but the article gives specific examples of
how it has persisted in our society which makes me feel like I am better prepared to tackle the
issue. I want to help fight racism since I am a part of the group that has caused it…”
-19-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal
“…I feel like white people are responsible for the harm they have caused to black people
and for every other minority that we have harmed and I feel that that responsibility should be
taken seriously without infantilizing the people we are meant to make amends to and to work
towards finding solutions so there may be more equality in the future.”
-26-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal
“Honestly, as white Americans, I feel like generally we have walked over, sabotaged, and
generally fucked over any and every other group of people that has come before and
alongside us. Native Americans, Africans, Asians; we’ve always made sure that we come out on
top no matter who we have to beat down to get to the top. It is very sad.”
-28-years-old, Male, Weak Democrat, Slightly liberal
Two notable theoretical elements are common among entries of this category. First, and
as underscored in bold, the authors clearly categorize themselves as belonging to a racial (i.e.,
white) ingroup. Although fairly basic, this is significant in that intergroup emotions theory holds
that self-categorization into a common ingroup is a natural pre-requisite for engaging in groupbased moral appraisals. In the present case, though the authors may not view themselves as
actively perpetrating or directly responsible for harms committed against non-white ‘others’,
their self-categorizations into a white collective seemingly inspires a sense of ‘responsibility by
association’. In other words, they view themselves and other whites as both sharing and unjustly
benefiting from a common (im)moral legacy and demeanor. Thus, those that the authors are
interested in helping are not merely the disadvantaged, they are those that ‘we’ (i.e., white
people) have disadvantaged and harmed. Indeed, some even make a point of clarifying that
though they may not be individually ‘racist’ themselves or have directly injured others, they are
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nonetheless white and thus benefit from a white supremacist social order, which they feel
compelled to rectify:
“My main thought is that even though I may not be "racist", I participate in racist systems and
directly benefit from them. Thus, as a person who is given power and privilege by such a
system, it's my responsibility to use that power to work towards rebuilding those systems as less
racist. In essence, it's not enough to be "not racist"; it is morally imperative to be actively antiracist - or else nothing will change.”
-20-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Very liberal
“I do not consider myself racist at all, but I do realize that my ancestors made life hell for
people of color. I also realize the government and the way the nation is heavily benefits white
people. I absolutely think we should focus resources into black neighborhoods to help uplift
them.”
-29-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Liberal

Interestingly, some participants are cognizant of the fact and even fear that addressing
past and/or ongoing racial injustices, such as via race-based affirmative action policies, may
entail a personal cost. They nonetheless rationalize it as a kind of collective comeuppance. For
instance, one commenter writes:
“I believe that African-American voters and citizens are still suffering the discriminations of past
generations, not to mention ongoing discrimination today; I believe that governmental efforts
including hiring preference for African-American applicants is the beginning of a process to
improve the long-standing inequality. I do feel fear about my ability to compete in a
professional world where I am at an explicit disadvantage, but I realize that I have to let go
of that fear and recognize that many Black applicants have felt and suffered that
disadvantage for decades.”
-38-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal

While acknowledging whites’ moral culpability for the conditions of disadvantaged
racial/ethnic minorities, other participants express being torn between wanting to help such
groups and not wanting to pay a personal penalty. For some, this concern for personal interests
seemingly begets feelings of guilt:
“I know that white people are at fault for all of the systematic racism and disadvantages that
people of color suffer. I am fearful of losing my own job and my child not being able to get a job
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or losing scholarships, academic placement, to someone else. I understand that they need help,
but I am fearful of missing out if that makes sense even though I feel guilty about it.”
-27-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal

All told, ‘ingroup-critical’ commenters firmly believe (even if they feel conflicted over
what to do about it) that their racial ingroup is the dominant source of racism in the US as well as
the primary cause of black and/or others’ disadvantage As one commenter explained, any other
appraisal borders on or constitutes racism:
“I don't have a ton of input on most of the topics but I will touch on one: Inequality between
black Americans and other races (specifically whites). You basically have to either A: Admit
that white people have discriminated against black Americans or B: Say that you believe
that Black Americans are somehow inferior. I'm in the ‘A’ camp on this one.”
-39-years-old, Male, Liberal, Lean Democrat.
One commenter is thus hopeful that the decline of the country’s white majority will
occasion a better future:
“The thought of whites not being the majority one day is promising as I hope racism will
decrease.”
-26-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal
8.4.1.1

Expressions of ingroup-critical emotions (N=35)

Just over 7% of all commenters, including more than a third (34%) of those in the
‘ingroup-critical’ category, expressed feelings of shame, guilt, and/or anger over or towards their
racial ingroup. As the theoretical literature on shame would predict, a dominant theme across
many of these entries is a negative global moral appraisal of the ingroup, including an
essentialization of white people as uniquely evil or immoral. For many, being associated with a
group they perceive as inveterately bringing harm to others is a source of shame and anger; and,
for some, existentially so. The following comments epitomize these sentiments:
“As a white person seeing the racism in America today and trying to understand the history of it,
makes me angry and ashamed of existing and being white. Just the fact that one group can
hurt so many other people is disgusting to me.”
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-18-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Very liberal
“White people have been liars since the beginning. It’s awful. I feel awful. Why is this race
like this?”
-21-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Moderate

For some participants, the shame and anger they feel over their affiliation with a ‘racist’
racial group influenced their responses to the racial group feeling thermometers of the previous
chapter. As one commenter explained:
“It was tough for me to do the rating about how much I feel warmly to a certain group. I was torn
between wanting group not to matter and feeling betrayed by my fellow white people, which
ultimately led me to rank my feeling toward them as much colder.”
-24-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Very liberal
Another commenter similarly expresses feeling ‘betrayed’ by the behavior of other
whites:
“Reading about what people from my race have done to others feels like a betrayal. Imagine
thinking one group of people is superior than others. It couldn’t be me thinking that way and I
am disappointed that some people tend to still have this mindset.”
-34-years-old, Female, Lean Democrat, Moderate
As is evident in the preceding entry, a number of commenters reported feeling shame as a
direct result of the guilt/shame stimulus article:
“Reading the article earlier made me feel truly ashamed of the behavior of white people
and how they treat minorities. It makes me feel sick to my stomach to think that my ancestors
could have had any part in killing native Americans or owning slaves.”
-36-years-old, Female, Lean Democrat, Slightly liberal
“Reading most of it made me feel ashamed. I know white privilege exists and I’m not proud of
it. What is worse, people who deny it or people who are proud of it. I wonder about things like
that.”
-52-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Liberal
“My heart hurts and I think it is a disgrace how we have behaved.”
-61-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal
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Speaking to the expected influence of the media environment on ingroup-critical
emotions, another participant mentioned the embarrassment and guilt she feels from the frequent
circulation of videos documenting instances of white people acting bigoted:
“I think that as a middle-class white woman in America I have a hard time seeing people in my
same racial group treat [people of color] with such disrespect. It's like every time I turn
around there is a video of someone being racist towards a [person of color] and it's not only
embarrassing it's shameful. I am not racist nor would I ever disrespect anyone the way that
these people have but I still feel the guilt of knowing that they are being mistreated so much
by people like me.”
-28-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Slightly liberal
Though not explicitly referencing media exposure, other commenters similarly report
feelings of guilt and/or shame from seeing white people mistreat other non-whites 181. For
instance, one participant briefly noted that the survey “did a great job addressing the guilt I feel
as a white person when seeing [people of color] being treated so horribly”.
In many cases, such as in the previous two entries, it’s not clear whether participants are
using ‘guilt’ and ‘shame’ interchangeably. Of course, it would be unreasonable to expect the
average person to appreciate the academic distinction between the two. A couple of participants,
however, were sensitive to it. For instance, the respondent below clarifies that she feels more a
sense of ‘collective shame’ than ‘personal guilt’:
“My feelings on race are hard to describe, but overall my thoughts are that I personally am not
responsible for what my ancestors did to the ancestors of Black Americans, but I have been born
into a world shaped by their actions and have to live with those consequences, just as Black
people have to live with the consequences of being born into a world where they are treated
differently because of what family they were born into. I don't feel a personal "guilt" in the
sense that I personally did anything racist or wrong, but I do feel a sense of collective
shame about what has happened in the past and continues to happen today.”
-33-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Very Liberal

181

Obviously, barring first-hand experiences of observing white people mistreat ‘people of color’, these

sentiments can only have been informed by what participants see in the media.
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Another describes her feelings as a kind of ‘embarrassed accountability’, which actually
closely resembles recent scholarly conceptions of shame:
“I very much feel ashamed and angry about the things that white people do against nonwhite individuals. I feel responsible for helping improve relationships/conditions. However, I
don't feel guilt because I have not directly acted negatively to these groups. In life, I only
feel guilty about things that I have directly done - things that were in my control. That's not
to say that I condone any of the actions by whites (my feelings are very much the opposite), it's
just that I think we need a different way to describe that embarrassed accountability about
actions perpetrated by whites against others.”
-31-years-old, Male, Lean Democrat, Very liberal
Similarly, a second participant reports feeling more ‘embarrassed’ than guilty:
“I thought of stories recently told to me by my colleagues, who are not white. I know and they
know I'm not responsible for the shenanigans they've had to deal with, but I'm embarrassed
more than guilty about situations they and their children have to deal with that I don't.”
-31-years-old, Female, Lean Democrat, Moderate
In these and other cases, participants clearly understood ‘guilt’ in terms of personal
involvement or responsibility for immoral actions, whereas they conceive of ‘shame’ as the
embarrassment they feel from their association with the racist tendencies of fellow ingroup
members. Owing to their whiteness, this is an association that they cannot entirely escape even if
belonging to an opposing political camp. Thus, one 68-year-old ‘strong Democrat’ woman writes
that she “feels ashamed to be a white American” and is “[disgusted] with white trash Americans
that the current-day Republicans have unleashed on our society.” And lest one suppose such
feelings are purely or invariably partisan in nature, one commenter reports being frustrated even
with fellow liberal whites:
“The thing that pisses me off the most isn't so much the history of racism in white America, but
the stubborn refusal of most white people, even a lot of otherwise-liberal white people, to
acknowledge it at all, much less to acknowledge that we still benefit from that legacy.”
-39-years-old, Male, Strong Democrat, Very liberal
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On a few occasions, commenters were unsure over how best to characterize their
emotions. Though the feelings they describe cohere with scholarly conceptions of ‘moral shame’,
the term appears to evade them, perhaps because they—like others--equate it with ‘guilt’:
“…There were a lot of questions about my feelings of guilt because I’m white and I’m not sure if
what I feel is guilt or just disappointment and frustration about our history and the role that white
people played in that history.”
-55-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal

Feelings of shame are often also implicit in expressions of ingroup-directed anger.
Indeed, and as was noted in Chapter 2, recent research finds a close relationship between the
two 182, with the latter conceived as following from the former. Theoretically, this is because
affiliating with a group that’s perceived as failing to uphold personally important moral values
engenders resentment towards (and, thereafter, a desire to confront and change) that group. Thus,
one commenter clarifies that he feels anger towards white Americans, rather than personal guilt:
“I don't feel guilty exactly by the actions of my fellow white Americans. I feel more anger and
sadness.”
-31-years-old, Male, Strong Democrat, Very liberal
Interestingly, whereas a number of (non-guilty) commenters seemingly or explicitly
associate guilt with direct or personal involvement in immoral actions, at least one commenter
reported feeling guilty not for something he did, but for the privileges he perceives himself as
enjoying at the expense of others:
“For some of the questions, you asked if I feel guilty for the way white Americans treat black
Americans. I feel more personal guilt about the benefit I receive from the institutionalized
racism in our country.”
-37-years-old, Male, Strong Democrat, Very liberal

182

For instance, Iyer et al. (2007) report a correlation of r=0.75 between collective shame and ingroup-directed
anger.
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As will be further discussed later, that the object of guilt is variable (with some focused
on immoral ingroup actions and others ingroup advantages) has important implications for how
guilt is measured in future research.
In other cases, though--particularly those referring to the historical and/or continued
mistreatment of racial minorities--what commenters report as feelings of guilt may actually be
expressions of moral shame:
“I do feel guilty as a white American about how Black Americans were treated in the past
and how they continue to be treated. Though I do not believe myself to be racist, I am from a
rural area with small-minded people. Diversity is not great here but even I am able to witness
racism in my small town.”
-37-years-old, Female, Lean Democrat, Moderate
“Participating in this survey did make me feel guilty about how people of other races have
been treated. I am married to a Hispanic man and we have four mixed children together. I
would hate for any of them to feel discriminated against. I live in a community of mostly
Hispanics and have grown up that way; it's what I'm used to. I can never understand how some
people could think they're better based on skin color.”
-31-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Moderate

And, at times, both moral shame and guilt show signs of being present. Indeed, recall an
earlier comment in which the author reported feeling “ashamed of existing and being white”.
Likewise, the commenter below writes that she feels, inter alia, ‘guilty’ and ‘self-hatred’:
“Felt guilty, scared, suspicious, afraid for my anonymity/safety, self-hatred”
-24-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal

What’s interesting here is that, for most ‘ashamed’ commenters, shame and anger is
focused on or directed at other whites. They themselves don’t feel morally deficient, but they
resent being associated with a group that is. However, for the commenters in question, feelings
of shame and anger are additionally self-directed. According to the theoretical model and
findings of Gausel and Brown (2012), this would suggest the simultaneous operation of guilt and
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shame. Specifically, this model holds that, in response to ingroup moral failure, guilt motivates
self-directed anger and a desire to change the self (i.e., due to feelings of moral self-inadequacy),
whereas shame motivates ingroup-directed anger and a desire to change one’s ingroup (i.e.,
owing to perceptions that the ingroup is morally deficient). When shame and guilt co-occur,
however, both the self and one’s ingroup become targets of anger and reform. I return to this
point in the discussion.
8.4.1.1.1.1 Responding to ingroup-critical
emotions
Recall that moral shame is theoretically expected to motivate a desire to morally distance
oneself from as well as to confront and reform an immoral ingroup. This typically entails
adopting and/or exhibiting a moral identity that is opposite the one ascribed to an ingroup. In this
sense, the racial ingroup is essentially recast as a moral outgroup—one that morally
‘enlightened’ whites desire to rehabilitate 183. For the participant below, who additionally notes
her attempts at educating ‘horrifically racist’ family members, this adoption of an oppositional
(or ‘anti-racist’) moral identity is a source of pride:
“My family is horrifically racist. I've tried and tried and tried to explain systemic racism but it
gets me nowhere and it's exhausting! I am so proud of myself, however, for making the
conscious decision to be different from them; that I refuse to hold those disgusting views.”
-28-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Very liberal
But for others, it can also be a kind of spiritual struggle—one that all whites ‘must undertake’ 184:
“I feel much shame living on the backs of my oppressive forebears. I myself was quite racist in
my younger years. I had to take a hard look at myself and realize I had been conditioned by our
hate-filled society. Had I not been able to admit I was racist I would never have been able to
183

However, recall one commenter’s hope that racism in the US will subside with the fall of the white majority. This
would seem to imply that not all feel that white people can be ‘reformed’; and that some (likely a small minority)
see demographic replacement or the weakening of white influence as the only path towards a racially just society.
Indeed, in explaining her support for increasing immigration, one ‘very liberal’ female commenter suggested that it
“would help break the hold on power by whites”.
184
The implication of course being that all white people are racist or racially biased.

396
overcome it. Sadly, due to it being so ingrained, I still on occasion catch myself making
judgements here and there based on race. It is a difficult process but one that all white
American citizens must undertake.”
-36-years-old, Male, Independent, Liberal
As would be expected by theory, whether out of a sense of personal moral inadequacy
and/or a need to morally distinguish themselves from other whites, ingroup-critical emotions
appear to inspire in some participants a desire for pro-social or pro-outgroup action:
“I had a lot of feelings of guilt and a desire to learn more about racial issues in the United States.
I know quite a bit of information but I feel like I haven't done anything worthwhile with that
information. I want to become more of an advocate in my community for all the political things I
care about.”
-29-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Very liberal
For the author below, these efforts include influencing future generations of white people
as well as the formation of a more ‘racially inclusive’ social circle:
“Until the tragic death of George Floyd I did not realize the extreme challenges that black people
faced in America. I have been learning about these challenges ever since. I feel that now that I
know, I have a responsibility to do what I can to learn about the history of, and current practices,
surrounding discrimination and racism. Additionally, I feel that, with the knowledge I have
gained, I am called to action. Right now, I am extending my friend circle to include more
BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, People of Color) people. I am also working on educating my kids
around this topic. They are our future. Hopefully, I can make a difference now and they can
continue to make positive gains in this area.”
-38-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Slightly liberal
And yet others report being unsure about what to do with their feelings of or wish they
were doing more:
“Answering questions about race makes me feel guilty for being the race that I am. The desire to
do more is there, but aside from giving money, it's hard to know what to do.”
-48-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Slightly liberal
“…also thought about how my white guilt was pretty useless unless it spurred me to action and
that I could be doing better in that regard.”
-50-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal
And still others are conflicted on or over the political solutions they should support:
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“I feel guilt for how white people have treated black Americans historically and today, but I
struggle with supporting certain ideas such as reparations because it has been over 150 years
since the last slaves were freed”
-23-years-old, Male, Weak Democrat, Very liberal
“It was hard to answer the questions. I’m not racist. I know that, but just how not racist am I?
I’m white, I know that makes me privileged, but should I be cast out to equalize or should
[disadvantaged racial groups] be raised up?”
-33-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Very liberal
8.4.2

The ‘Defensive’ (N=120)

Though a non-trivial subset of comments were ‘ingroup-critical’, an even larger share
(25%) can be broadly categorized as ‘defensive’ in nature 185. Entries in this category typically
rejected or took issue with group-based moral appraisals and collective assignments of blame,
particularly the notion that they should feel guilty or ashamed of their racial identities, or the idea
that white Americans are morally culpable for the disadvantage of blacks and other racial
minorities. The grounds on which they did generally correspond to several exonerative or
defensive strategies previously identified in the intergroup emotions literature. Many of these
strategies often overlap, but all are theorized as serving the function of repelling threats both to
one’s own moral identity and/or that of his/her ingroup.
8.4.2.1

Distancing strategies

A common strategy ingroup members use to resist appraisals of collective moral
responsibility, and thus feelings of shame and/or guilt, is to distance themselves from the
wrongdoers among them. To this end, one approach is to emphasize in-group heterogeneity—the
idea that an entire group of people cannot be judged or be held accountable for the misdeeds of a
subset of its members (Doosje et al. 1998). By perceiving outgroup-directed moral violations to

185

My use of the word ‘defensive’ is purely descriptive and should not be taken to mean that defensive responses
are normatively wrong.
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be the fault of an isolated and unrepresentative subgroup of individuals, ingroup members are
able to safeguard their moral self-concepts and absolve themselves of moral responsibility for the
victims. The comments below typify such an approach:
“On the questions about discrimination against blacks in the US. I always see these and feel like
"I" don't discriminate against anyone for color or religion and even "we" white people
don’t as a group. There is a subgroup of white people that are discriminatory and like all
things in the modern world and media, their voice is the one that gets amplified and shown.”
-35-years-old, Male, Lean Democrat, Very liberal
“I feel that there is racism still existing today BUT it cannot be blamed on people who were not
even alive in the past or on one particular ethnicity such as Caucasians. EVERYONE is or has
been bias/racist at one point in their life and while there are many people who are extremely
racist, you cannot blame it on every person of the same race they are from. People need to
stop looking at color, stop blaming, stop using the race card, and start worrying about how to
repair the damage that's been done to our world!”
-46-years-old, Female, Strong Republican, Conservative
“I don’t feel guilty for the acts of a few bad people.”
-60-years-old, Male, Weak Democrat, Slightly liberal
“I feel that indeed history is checkered with incidents but it doesn’t represent the majority of
people. I think there are aggravating factors in each incident. Native American issues history
since time immortal of conquering and conversion. I feel modern society has pockets of racism
but it isn't the norm.”
-38-years-old, Male, Lean Republican, Slightly conservative
“I'm sick and tired of being told that I'm racist and a white supremacist solely because I'm a
conservative white male. There are always going to be jackasses in society who are racist and
hate people solely because of the color of their skin. That will NEVER end. But by and large,
the vast majority of white Americans have no racist feelings towards blacks. Every other
nationality worked their way out of bad situations. Blacks need to do the same. Stop
complaining, stop claiming racism, and work. Be a role model. The world doesn't owe you a
damn thing because of the color of your skin. Just like it owes me nothing for the color of mine.”
-48-years-old, Male, Strong Republican, Conservative
Others contend that the assignment of moral responsibility to members of an entire race is
itself racist:
“I didn't feel that I was personally responsible for many of the aspects of racism caused by
others that share my race. I feel that perpetuating such an idea creates more division and is in
some ways racist in of its self.”
-21-years-old, Male, Strong Democrat, Slightly liberal
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In all of these cases it is apparent that racism is understood and viewed in the traditional
sense—as an interpersonal or behavioral phenomenon in which people oppress, discriminate
against or are hostile to others on the basis of immutable traits. As such, racism is a belief system
and mode of behavior that only some white people—as well as some people of all races—
adhere(d) to or practice(d). And, in virtue of this, it is wrong—and even racist—to morally
convict an entire group for sharing the phenotype of a subgroup of perpetrators.
A variation of this approach entails categorizing oneself and/or one’s ancestors as being
entirely unrelated to the historical group responsible for slavery and segregation (Knowles et al.
2014). In many of these cases, the author emphasizes his/her distinct ethnic or immigrant
background:
“I am the child of white immigrants from Eastern Europe. Being that, I really dislike being
lumped in with typical white Americans. I fail to see many similarities that activists insist I
have, or that I hold any responsibility for slavery or the current racial issues.”
-22-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Slightly liberal
“I consider myself Irish American as both sets of my Grandparents were from Ireland, so
talking about feeling guilt in regards the historic racism and treatment of Black people by
Whites, it feels wrong to be connected to that.”
-42-years-old, Male, Independent, Slightly liberal
“I am tired of reading about white people being so evil. My ancestors were German Jews and
Canadians and Working-class Brits. We never owned slaves and I think slavery was a horrible
chapter in world history”
-43-years-old, Female, Independent, Slightly conservative

Other commenters stress that their families immigrated to the US well after slavery was
practiced:
“As a person whose family moved here years after slavery was ended, and a family that was
disadvantaged for its immigrant status itself, I feel that there is no logical reason for us to feel
guilty for [the status of African Americans] when none of us had a role - direct or indirect- in
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their treatment. Additionally, I think that using slavery as the reason behind some complaints
about a person’s status today is grasping at straws.”
-29-years-old, Female, Lean Republican, Moderate
In some cases, such as in the comments below, this strategy can take the form of
downplaying or eschewing racial group memberships and identities altogether. For if one doesn’t
identify as ‘white’, there is no ingroup to be guilty or ashamed of:
“I am an individual. I do not strongly identify as being part of various groups. I feel no
personal guilt about racism because I do not feel like I belong to the same species, let alone
group as white racists.”
-60-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal
“I feel no guilt over the actions of white people, just as I feel not guilt over actions of French
people. Those people aren't me. I didn't do it. I'm not reaping any rewards. I don't know
why I should affiliate myself with anyone else in my mind, especially since I think 99.9% of
people are stupid and cruel.
-38-years-old, Male, Independent, Moderate
Another means by which group-based responsibility—and thus feelings of collective
shame and guilt--is resisted is through a strategy of temporal distancing (Peetz, Gunn, & Wilson,
2010). This response, which is reflected in the comments below, generally takes the form of
perceiving historical injustices as part of a bygone era that has at most waning relevance to the
lives of white and black Americans today:
“I do not believe we can hold the people of today responsible for the actions of people more
than 100 years ago. I believe white people DID treat blacks poorly back then. But I believe
the majority of that treatment has been stopped. I feel that people are responsible for their
own actions and cannot be expected to take responsibility for an entire group of people whom
they have never met.”
-44-years-old, Female, Strong Republican, Very conservative
“It is definitely a sad history of racism. At the same time, at least 2 generations have passed if not 3 where support and equality have been afforded. Immigrants come here from far
worse situations, and do well. They take the responsibility and initiative to overcome by all
means. Opportunity exists--it's there for the taking.”
-52-years-old, Male, Lean Republican, Conservative
Other commenters resent those they perceive as being stuck in the past:
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“I think that the people who still live in the past and think about racism all the time are the
problem. Get over it and move on. I didn't own slaves. My parents, grandparents, great
grandparents, and so on, didn't own slaves. Stop blaming us.”
-42-years-old, Male, Independent, Moderate
“I feel far too much emphasis is given to racial inequality and I am deeply offended by the
suggestion that whites of today are somehow responsible for slavery and should pay
reparations. No one alive today was a part of slavery. No one alive today was ever a slave or
slave owner. I personally did nothing and have nothing to be ashamed of concerning slavery and
therefore it is not my responsibility to pay for something I had no part in. It is my opinion that
everyone needs to move forward, leave the past in the past and stop dwelling on it so that
we can accomplish something worthwhile now.”
-54-years-old, Male, Strong Democrat, Liberal
In addition to temporal distancing, a number of commenters also insisted that neither they
nor their families benefit(ed) from the legacy and/or persistence of racial discrimination in the
US. As we saw, some commenters cite their families’ post-slavery immigrant backgrounds to
this effect. But still others alternatively or additionally emphasize their families’ and/or their own
personal financial hardships:
“I felt [the treatment article] was one sided. It stated whites have it better today due to racism.
My grandparents lived in poverty. Both my parents come from poverty, and I live at
poverty level. I didn't benefit from slavery. None of my ancestors held slaves. I wasn't raised
with racist views.”
-41-years-old, Female, Lean Democrat, Moderate
Another commenter emphasizes both her ancestors’ immiseration and their own
experiences of discrimination:
“I don't appreciate how this current movement is almost demonizing white people and making us
feel badly for how blacks have been treated. I am white and come from families who were too
poor to ever own slaves! My parents raised me to not be prejudiced against others for the color
of their skin yet they allowed me to learn about other cultures and form my own opinions. My
European ancestors were discriminated against in this country too but I don't notice people
from those backgrounds playing and victim and demanding special preferences and reparations.
And guess what? I'm poor too! I don't have a great job or educational background and no
one else pays my bills. If I don't take care of myself from paycheck to paycheck, I end up
homeless like anyone else. So I'm a bit weary of hearing how minorities thinking they have it so
bad when plenty of us whites are in poor social and economic circumstances also.”
-59-years-old, Female, Lean Republican, Moderate
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8.4.2.2

Changing the object of appraisal

Another defensive strategy identified in the literature is a shifting of the focus of negative
group-based moral appraisals from whites to blacks (Rotella & Richeson, 2013). In what some
would term ‘victim-blaming’, comments of this sort typically emphasize either blacks’
responsibility for their own condition or their own moral shortcomings and tendencies.
Embodying this theme, one commenter writes:
“Black people get everything handed to them and for the most part they are the criminals in this
country and they are lower on the economy because they are lazy. And I am tired of hearing
how bad slavery was. It was black people in Africa who sold the slaves. So black people were
responsible for slavery.”
-36-years-old, Male, Weak Republican, Conservative
In addition to asserting black people’s responsibility for their own disadvantage, another
commenter resents the fact that they are made to “sound like angels’, whereas white people are
demonized and suffer from black criminality:
“…I also notice how the proponents of this current movement make black people sound like
angels. What about the crimes they've committed on their own people, as well as other minority
groups and whites? What about that fact that during the slavery era, Africans sold their own
people into slavery? None of this gets mentioned and I think that is very biased and unfair. Tell
the whole story or don't tell it at all. Stop playing the victim and take responsibility for your own
life and circumstances like everyone else has to, including white people, have to do.”
-59-years-old, Female, Lean Republican, Moderate
Similarly, the commenters below shift the spotlight to black violence:
“I was incensed by the article I read. While I assume it is historically and factually accurate, it
didn't seem to want to mention that in the years since the massacre (and other similar incidents),
the trend swung sharply to the other side, to where now the looting, mobs, property destruction,
and overall person-to-person violence and killings are being committed by black people to black
people.”-47-years-old, Female, Strong Republican, Very conservative
“I was brought up to believe everyone is equal. I was not taught to discriminate. When I see
blacks destroy black business in downtown I find it difficult to feel bad for what has happened.
We all have responsibilities and we live to live up to them.”
-68-years-old, Female, Weak Republican, Conservative
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Rather than shifting the focus of appraisals to blacks, one commenter softens negative
appraisals of whites by pointing to the even greater racism of other racial groups:
“Yes, different races treat other different races differently. Whites are bad but no one compares
to racism like Asians, and yet we rarely see that story being told.”
-33-years-old, Female, Strong Republican, Moderate.
Still other commenters opt to shift attention away from anti-black discrimination to the
racial discrimination they perceive is practiced against whites:
“Slavery was terrible - people involved in that were mistreated terribly...but that is in the past. I
work for the Federal Government and being a minority is the greatest benefit you can have at
work. My wife works in an organization of approximately 500 people and they have put on paper
that they will only hire black people for open positions.”
-56-years-old, Male, Strong Republican, Conservative
“…I have worked in the government sector and I was told by my director of my department that
white is no longer a protected race. I feel like a minority. If we were to have a white only
television channel, or we were allowed to call them certain slang names, they would be
outraged.”
-51-years-old, Female, Weak Democrat, Moderate
A similar diversionary response, which is reflected in the comment below, is to note that
whites were also the victims of slavery:
“[The survey] is almost an attack on white people. I will not teach my children to be ashamed of
themselves or feel guilty for the color of their skin. There were many white slaves as well.
Irish slavery is not something discussed or even taught. We need to eliminate hate of all kind.
I think people need to get back to church and remember to love their neighbor as themselves.
Stop making race an issue in the present day.”
-46-years-old, Female, Strong Republican, Conservative
8.4.2.3

Downplaying the injury and/or its consequences

A final observed strategy, one that frequently overlaps with or incorporates the others
preceding it, is to downplay, minimize, or question the role of racism in the persistence of black
disadvantage (Branscombe & Miron, 2004) . Indeed, some of the entries of this sort bear a close
resemblance to several of the statements featured in the conventional 4-item ‘racial resentment’
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measure. For instance, the comments below note that other ethnic/racial groups were
discriminated against in the past, but socioeconomically persevered nonetheless:
“My grandparents came to this country as serfs suffering from centuries of Russian oppression.
They came here and were spat on by White Americans and discriminated against. All immigrant
groups have gone through hardships, yet their status is not as bad as Black Americans'. Curious,
is it not?”
-29-years-old, Male, Weak Republican, Slightly conservative
“I believe each individual, regardless of race, has the responsibility, and can find the
wherewithal, to be successful. Several groups came to the United States as immigrants, such as
the Irish and the Chinese, and found ways to better themselves, move upward in society and
become successful - even wealthy.”
-64-years-old, Female, Strong Democrat, Liberal

Another commenter, recalls the success he’s enjoyed in spite of early adversity, including
bullying he experienced at the hands of other blacks:
“I recalled my own experience as a small white boy being bullied, ridiculed, and beaten up by
black schoolmates and neighbors, and growing up in poverty, and despite all this graduating with
honors from two nationally recognized universities with a bachelor's and an advanced
professional degree.”
-33-years-old, Male, Lean Democrat, Slightly conservative
It bears repeating that the theoretically anticipated purpose of such entries is to call into
question the causal relevance of past and/or existing racial discrimination to the disparate group
outcomes of today. In pointing to other ethnic/racial groups that overcame or socioeconomically
excelled in spite of discrimination, the implication is that blacks’ relative disadvantage is not the
fault of white America, but the fault of blacks themselves. For nearly all comments of this sort,
the culprit is a lack of self-agency. For one participant, though, there are also genetic factors:
“I lived and worked in an area in [Florida] with a large black population. I worked as a home
health nurse in these areas. After spending a lot of time caring for and teaching blacks, I realized
that blacks and whites are not the same. We come from different genetic backgrounds and
things that are easily explained to white people would not sink in to black people no matter
how many ways I reworded something. Black people don't want to be different. If they did,
they have had every opportunity to do so.”
-34-years-old, Female, Strong Republican, Very conservative
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Whereas many commenters merely downplay the contemporary relevance racism, others
deny the existence of racism altogether:
“There is no racism in America. Those that work hard will succeed. There is no such thing as
white privilege.”
-55-years-old, Female, Strong Republican, Conservative
For a number of such individuals, assertions of its relevance are purely political,
particularly that of the ‘systemic’ variety:
“I believe racism is still alive because people with power want it to be. They want to divide
us. My answers to many would probably be viewed as racist. That’s ridiculous and the farthest
from the truth. However, I refuse to believe that black Americans are oppressed when we
had a black president. White Americans are becoming a minority.”
-32-years-old, Female, Strong Republican, Conservative
“Systemic racism is a made-up concept that is vaguely defined in order to be twisted for political
and social agendas.”
-19-years-old, Male, Strong Republican, Conservative
“I will probably sound crazy to whomever is reading but I honestly believe that all this talk of
systemic is racism and evil white police is far closer to modern Jim Crow than anything else.
What better way to control people than convincing them you are the only people who can save
them? Convincing them that they should live in constant fear of death from the people their taxes
pay to protect them? I don't believe it's true, but I believe a lot of people believe it is true and I
feel deeply sad for them that they live in constant anger and fear while shitty politicians and
corporations line their pockets off of it and ensure that they will be voted for by the people they
pander to and keep in mental bondage.”
-33-years-old, Female, Weak Republican, Slightly conservative
“Prior to 2020, systemic racism, critical race theory, every night riots, these things did not exist...
its purely political. The term divide and conquer... that is exactly what is happening to America.
Poverty doesn't only affect black or brown, it affects white people too.”
-37-years-old, Female, Strong Republican, Very conservative
Part of the last of the preceding entries speaks to the perceived importance of class, rather
than race, for understanding contemporary inequalities. Indeed, a number of respondents feel that
the emphasis on race is actually misplaced:
"I think it’s been over 150 years since the civil war ended, we need to stop blaming slavery for
all the woes and inequality of the African American community. If anything, there is a class
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struggle issue in this country not a race issue. Poor whites and poor blacks are both treated
like dirt, rich whites and rich blacks both keep down the lower class. It is not a race issue,
it’s a class issue.”
-30-years-old, Male, Lean Republican, Moderate
“Just like black or brown people can come from all over the globe, so it is with white people. I
have friends that appear white, but are mixed race. I have many friends who are [persons of
color] that have much privilege. I think the focus on ONLY race is misguided, and we
would benefit greater by using a multidimensional approach to trauma and privilege.”
-52-years-old, Female, Weak Republican, Conservative
Whatever one thinks of the merits of such class-based arguments, their theorized function
is little different from that of other defensive strategies, such as an emphasis on personal
responsibility and agency. That is, rightly or wrongly, they serve to deflect moral responsibility
away from the racial ingroup. For if all racial groups suffer from poverty, no single group can be
blamed for it.
Likewise, whites cannot be held to blame if black’s current disadvantage is the fault of
socially destructive liberal welfare policies:
“Blacks were advancing in society quickly even before the civil rights act. The Great Society
destroyed the black family to make blacks dependent on the government by design. People
need to stop blaming others and take the responsibility to improve their own lives.”-37-years-old,
Male, Strong Republican, Conservative
“I do blame the government for the issues of racism perceived by black Americans. The
government kept Black Americans down by encouraging them not to work, to stay loyal to
social programs, the encouragement of unmarried parents, etc. This is where the biggest
problems were bred for Black Americans. I am glad some are finally seeing this and are taking
their own lives to build as they wish, not on government dependence.”-59-years-old, Female,
Strong Republican, Very conservative
8.5

Quantifying the qualitative
8.5.1

Examining relationships between comment types and quantitative variables

To what extent do the written sentiments documented above correspond to the
quantitative measures of shame and guilt from the previous chapter? Do ‘ingroup-critical’
commenters score higher on measures of shame, guilt, and pro-black policy support than other
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and non-commenters? Are they more likely to rate whites less warmly than non-whites? Does the
opposite pattern hold for ‘defensive’ commenters? I briefly explore these questions by regressing
z-scored measures of shame, guilt, pro-black policy support, and racial ingroup vs. outgroup
warmth on a categorical variable that codes non-commenters as ‘0’, other-commenters as ‘1’,
‘ingroup-critical’ commenters as ‘2’, and ‘defensive’ commenters as ‘3’. The results 186 of this
analysis are presented in Figure 8.1 below wherein circular black and square grey markers
represent unadjusted and baseline-covariate-adjusted means, respectively.

Figure 8.1 Unadjusted and adjusted z-scores of key outcome variables by comment category

As suspected, ‘ingroup-critical’ (‘defensive’) commenters scored significantly higher
(lower) than all other categories moral shame, guilt, and pro-black policy support; and
significantly lower (higher) on relative warmth towards whites vs. non-whites. Though these
differences are moderated when adjusting for baseline control variables, they remain statistically
significant in all cases.

186

A table of predicted margins is provided in the appendix.
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8.5.2

Examining treatment effects on commenting rates

What influence, if any, did the guilt/shame treatment article have on comment type?
Given that its purpose was heighten feelings of group-based moral responsibility, shame, and
guilt, we would naturally expect it to lead to an increase in entries that express these feelings. At
the same time, we might also expect to observe a decrease in entries that reject or denounce
them. On the other hand, it could also be that the treatment article threatened or offended certain
respondents, who then may have been motivated to express counter-arguments that serve to
neutralize group-based moral identity threats. I explore these different possibilities in the
analyses below.
Before examining whether the treatment affected the tenor of written comments, I must
first establish whether it affected the decision to comment at all. Figure 8.2 below shows that,
overall, there were no statistically significant differences between the two study conditions in the
rate at which study participants submitted written comments. The unadjusted and covariateadjusted rates were 1.69 (p=0.531) and 1.3 (p=0.627) percentage points higher, respectively, in
the guilt/shame condition, but these differences are not distinguishable from chance. I next
interact the treatment dummy by ideology and party identification to determine whether the
treatment uniquely affected the commenting rates of the various political subgroups. Figure 8.3
graphs the covariate-adjusted effects of the treatment on percentage changes in the share of
commenters in each subgroup. They indicate that the share of conservatives and Republicans
leaving written comments was 10.6 (p=0.069) and 11.6 (p=0.035) percentage points higher in the
guilt/shame condition, differences that either approach or surpass p < 0.05 significance. In
contrast, between-condition changes among liberals (Δ=0.277, p=0.931) and Democrats (Δ=-
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1.62, p=0.605) were negligible and insignificant. Comments fell by 9.4 (p=0.237) points among
ideological moderates, but the actual change could very well be 0.

Figure 8.2 Percent of participants submitting written comments by study condition

Figure 8.3 Average treatment effect on percent submitting written comments by ideology and party
identification
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8.5.3

Examining treatment effects on comment types

The next analyses consider whether the frequency of ‘ingroup-critical’ and ‘defensive’
entries varies across the two study conditions. To this end, I fit two separate OLS models that
regress each comment type on the treatment dummy and pre-treatment covariates 187. Figure 8.4
graphs the results in terms of the percent of all comments that express or reject group-based
responsibility by study condition. Referring first to the left panel, we see that there were nearly
twice as many ‘ingroup-critical’ entries in the guilt/shame (25.02%) as the neutral condition
(15.13%)—a difference (ß=9.89, p=0.004) that is clearly distinguishable from zero. Likewise,
and shifting to the middle panel, the share of entries expressing group-based shame and/or guilt
was almost 3-times greater in the guilt/shame (9.93%) than the neutral (3.68%) condition—an
increase that is also statistically significant (ß=6.25, p=0.004).

Figure 8.4 Comment frequencies (%) by study condition

187

As in the previous chapter, I correct for between-condition imbalances by adjusting for ideology, party-ID, age,
sex, education, and census region.
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Turning now to the right panel, we see that the rate of ‘defensive’ comments was
roughly 3.7 points lower in the guilt/shame (26.60%) than the neutral condition (23.94%), but
this difference does not approach significance (p=0.319). Comparing within-condition rates
across comment categories, commenters in the neutral condition were close to twice as likely (p
< 0.001) to author defensive (26.60%) than ingroup-critical (15.13%) entries. This disparity
entirely closes and even reverses direction in the guilt/shame condition, where the share of
ingroup-critical entries (25.02%) is slightly but not significantly larger (p=0.575) than that of
‘defensive’ entries (22.94 %).
I next test whether the effects of the treatment on comment types are conditional on
political ideology and/or party-identification. The results of these tests are shown in Figure 8.5,
which plots the covariate-adjusted percentage changes in each comment type across the political
subgroups.

Figure 8.5 Average treatment effect on frequency (%) of comment type by ideology and party identification
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Starting with the ‘ingroup-critical’ models in the left panel, we see that the share of such
entries increased by 14.1 (p=0.008) and 13.5 (p=0.009) points among liberals (22.7%  36.4%)
and Democrats (22.9%  36.5%), respectively 188. Though increases in this response type are
also observed among conservatives (Δ=2.10, p=0.338) and Republicans (Δ=3.62, p=0.164), they
are at once not distinguishable from zero and also tend to be significantly smaller in size (liberals
vs. conservatives: p=0.037; Democrats vs. Republicans: p=0.091). The same pattern is found for
entries that express feelings of guilt and/or shame. Their share 189 increased by 9.3 (p=0.004) and
9.6 (p=0.004) points among liberals and Democrats, respectively. In contrast, and quite
revealingly, not a single conservative or Republican comment expressed feelings of guilt and/or
shame in either of the two conditions.
Finally, the percent 190 of ‘defensive’ entries fell by 8.5 (p=0.024) and 3.8 (p=0.319)
points among liberals and Democrats, and by 5 (p=0.594) and 5.9 (p=0.484) points among
conservatives and Republicans. Interestingly, they increased by 15.2 (p=0.203) points among
political moderates, though the 95% confidence interval (-8.2, 38.6) of this estimate is very wide
and includes zero.
8.6

Discussion
8.6.1

The ingroup-critical

This chapter sought to shed qualitative light on the thoughts and sentiments that informed
whites’ responses to quantitative measures of collective shame, guilt, and pro-black policy

188

The unadjusted margins jump from 22.7% to 36.4% among liberals, from 22.9% to 36.5% among Democrats,
from 0 to 1.64% among conservatives, and from 0 to 4% among Republicans.
189
For the guilt/shame entries, the margins jump from 4.3% to 13.2% among liberals and from 5.7% to 14.7%
among Democrats. Those for conservatives and Republicans remained at zero.
190
The unadjusted margins fall from 14.9% to 7.9% among liberals, from 14.6% to 10.9% among Democrats, from
50.9% to 45.9% among conservatives, and from 50.8% to 45.3% among Republicans. For moderates, ‘defensive’
entries jumped from 32.5% to 51.5%.
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support. In particular, it probed whether ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions were at
all apparent in participants’ written remarks. In the end, the findings of this analysis offered
additional support for both the reality of these phenomena and their influence on white racial
attitudes. Despite the fact that the open-response question was voluntary and very general (i.e., it
did not explicitly ask participants to discuss or explain their ingroup-related attitudes and
feelings), a sizable number entries manifested ingroup-critical moral appraisals, some of which
explicitly communicated feelings of shame, guilt, and/or ingroup-directed anger. A dominant
theme in these entries was the view that white misdeeds, past and/or present, were responsible
for the disadvantaged social positions of blacks and other ‘people of color’. Further, and
consistent with the literature on collective shame, a number of these entries engaged in negative
global moral appraisals of white Americans, some of which essentialized them as uniquely
racist, unsympathetic, and/or indifferent to the disadvantages of others 191.
Importantly, ‘ingroup-critical’ entries also afforded valuable insight into how participants
understood and related to shame and guilt, which has implications for their measurement. First,
whereas some commenters appeared to treat guilt and shame interchangeably, others clearly
distinguished their feelings of shame from those of guilt--conceiving the former as the
embarrassment that attends affiliating with a morally tainted group, and the latter as being tied to
personal involvement in or responsibility for immoral actions. However, at least one commenter
clarified that his feelings of guilt concern the benefits he derives from ‘institutional racism’ as
opposed to direct involvement in outgroup-directed wrongdoing. The discrepancy between this
commenter’s conception of guilt—i.e. unjustly benefiting from ingroup membership—and the

191

As will be discussed in the next (and final) chapter, this has implications for how researchers interpret the ‘low’
end of the racial resentment scale. It suggests that much like some of those at the ‘high’ end engage in negative
essentializations of blacks, there are those at the ‘low’ end that engage in negative essentializations of whites.
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previous may be an artifact of my measures of guilt. Specifically, given that 2 of the 3 guilt items
centered on ingroup behavior as opposed to ingroup advantage, respondents may have operated
on a mostly behavior-oriented understanding of guilt. Assuming advantage-oriented guilt is more
prevalent or descriptive of what the average white respondent feels, then my study is likely to
have underestimated levels of guilt. Future research should examine this possibility by
additionally fielding indicators of guilt that are advantage or status-focused.
Second, and in addition to the above, several cases were noted in which feelings of shame
and guilt ostensibly co-occurred, culminating in expressions of self-hatred and a more selffocused form of shame. These observations are consistent with Brown and Gausel’s (2012)
theoretical model, which links guilt to self-focused anger and appraisals of moral self-deficiency,
and shame to ingroup-focused anger and appraisals of ingroup moral deficiency. This model
suggests that, in the presence of both emotions, the focus of appraisals and emotions
encompasses the self as well as the ingroup. Such raises the possibility that varying foci (e.g.
self, ingroup) or presence of these emotions will have differential effects on racial attitudes and
pro-outgroup behavior. Future research should attempt to get at this by categorizing white
respondents in terms of the extent that both emotions present as well as in terms of their focus.
Third, the analysis also uncovered some evidence for the media’s theorized role as an
instigator of ingroup-critical emotions. At least one commenter referred to the embarrassment
and guilt she feels from the frequent circulation of videos of white bigotry. Other commenters
spoke more generally to the guilt or shame they feel ‘whenever they see’ white people
mistreating or acting prejudiced towards persons of color. Given that exposure to such incidents
is only rarely direct, this suggests that the media plays an important role in exposing whites to
instances of ingroup wrongdoing and, thereby, eliciting ingroup-critical moral appraisals. Future
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cross-sectional and panel research should examine whether levels of shame and guilt are
uniquely linked to the frequency of race-related news consumption.
Fourth, and consistent with the theorized pro-social effects of these emotions, several
commenters indicated that their feelings of guilt and/or shame inspire(d) a desire for engaging in
pro-social action, including political activism. Such hints at a potentially fruitful area for future
political science research. Indeed, to the best of my knowledge, the effects of ingroup-critical
emotions have yet to be considered in models of white political participation and behavior.
8.6.2

The defensive

Beyond getting into the minds of the ‘ingroup critical’, this chapter also offered insight
into the various cognitive strategies whites employ to defend against threats to their moral status.
Indeed, an even larger number of participants penned entries that were critical of or rejected the
notion that they and other whites were or should feel collectively responsible for the conditions
of blacks. These comments generally corresponded to—or included at least one of--three main
‘defensive’ responses previously identified in the intergroup emotions literature.
First, commenters attempted to distance themselves and/or their racial ingroup as a whole
from the slave owners or segregationists of the past and/or the racially prejudiced whites of
today. They did so by either a) emphasizing the marginality and unrepresentativeness of racially
prejudiced or discriminatory whites; b) asserting their ancestors’ or family’s lack of connection
to or involvement in historical injustices; and c) construing historical injustices as being a part of
a bygone era with little relevance or connection to the white Americans of today.
Second, commenters shifted the focus of negative moral appraisals from whites to blacks
and/or shifted attention to anti-white discrimination. In the first case, commenters noted
Africans’ role in the transatlantic slave trade and/or highlighted black laziness, criminality, and
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penchant for violence. In the second case, commenters typically pointed to the anti-white
discrimination of affirmative action policies and double standards in the legitimacy afforded to
expressions of racial identity.
Third and finally, ‘defensive’ commenters disputed the causal role of historical and/or
existing racial discrimination in the persistence of black disadvantage. Arguments to this effect
generally took the form of either a) highlighting the resilience and socioeconomic success of
other oppressed or discriminated ethnic/racial groups; b) blaming black disadvantage on
destructive liberal welfare policies; c) construing black disadvantage as a ‘class’ issue that
affects Americans of all racial backgrounds, and d) downplaying or denying the presence of
racism, particularly ‘systemic racism’, in American society.
Notably, many of these comments resemble sentiments that many scholars would
conceive of as ‘racial resentment’. However, at least in the current context, this ‘resentment’ is
best characterized as a response to the perceived assignment of collective blame and punishment
for black disadvantage. Future research should investigate whether this perception—i.e., that
whites are being unfairly blamed or collectively punished for black disadvantage—characterizes
racial resentment more broadly. As it’s possible that measures of racial resentment are mostly
capturing the acceptance or rejection of group-based moral responsibility for racial inequality
(which would also explain the high degree of overlap between these measures and those of
shame and guilt)
8.6.3

Quantitative analyses

After surveying the landscape of written entries, the analysis of this chapter proceeded to
examine the guilt/shame stimulus affected the prevalence of ‘ingroup-critical’ and ‘defensive’
comments, and also whether these comments were systematically related to quantitative
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measures of moral shame and guilt. Both of these questions were ultimately and generally
answered in the affirmative. First, the rate of ‘ingroup-critical’ comments—including the rate of
those expressing group-based shame and/or guilt--was significantly higher in the guilt/shame
than the neutral control condition. Further, and in the other direction, the rate of ‘defensive’
comments was found to be lower in the guilt/shame than in the neutral control condition, though
this difference was not distinguishable from zero. In both cases, the effects of the treatment on
comment rates were both stronger for and only reached significance among liberals and
Democrats. In other words, liberals and Democrats in the guilt/shame condition authored
significantly more ‘ingroup-critical’ and significantly (though only for liberals) fewer ‘defensive’
entries than their counterparts in the neutral stimulus group. Thus, the evidence suggests that the
treatment worked not only to increase scores on quantitative measures of shame and guilt (as we
saw in the previous chapter), but it also led to increases in their written. Finally, and related to
the previous point, ‘ingroup-critical’ commenters scored significantly higher than others on
measures of moral shame, guilt, and pro-black policy support than non-commenters and authors
of other/unrelated comments. The reverse pattern was found for ‘defensive’ commenters who, as
would be expected, scored significantly lower on these variables.
However, despite according with theoretical expectations, the meaningfulness and
validity of these findings is questionable in that the comment coding scheme was not tested for
reliability. Consequently, the coding decisions rested on the subjective assessments of the
researcher, which can be biased towards the attainment of theory-supporting results. As such, the
findings reported here must be treated with extreme caution. Future mixed-methods research
should attempt to resolve this issue by using an independent team of comment coders to assess
reliability.
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8.7

Conclusion
The findings of this chapter indicate that group-based ‘moral shame’ and ‘guilt’ are not

ersatz concepts imposed on scales that, in actuality, merely capture social desirability and
demand effects. Rather, they would appear to be genuine moral-affective phenomena that are
operative in and animate the racial policy orientations of at least some segments of white
America. At the same time, and rightly or wrongly, they are also moral appraisals and emotions
that many resist. In the concluding chapter that follows, I discuss the implications of this reality
for the political science’s understanding of white racial attitudes.
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9
9.1

CONCLUSION

Introduction
This concluding chapter reviews and discusses this dissertation’s main findings along

with their implications and limitations. It is structured in a way that allows skimmers and nonreaders of previous chapters to learn the important theoretical and empirical takeaways in a
single sitting. Specifically, and beginning with chapter 4, each section is devoted to either a
single chapter or a thematic pair of chapters. These sections are then split into four subsections.
The first of these subsections reviews the general research questions and objectives that
motivated a given study, while the remainder summarize its main findings, discuss their
theoretical importance, and spell out the limitations and outstanding questions that need to be
addressed in future research.
9.2

Chapter 4
9.2.1

Background

The question of the media’s influence on racial attitudes was of paramount importance to
this dissertation’s theory. For if ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions drive white racial
liberalism, what drives the former? The theorized time-dependency of group-based emotions—
i.e., the waxing and waning of their salience overtime—presupposes external triggers. In the
context of race, the most proximate triggers are thought to be race-related events or
developments, such as instances of racial bias or excessive force on the part of law enforcement,
racially-motivated hate crimes, and civil rights protests. However, because few whites (or people
in general) directly observe their occurrence, exposure to and thus awareness of such incidents
are necessarily indirect or only made possible through media reporting. The obvious implication
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here, tests of which occupied this dissertation’s first empirical chapter, is that white racial
attitudes respond to shifts in race-related media coverage. And not just any race-related media
coverage, but ‘racial equalitarian’ coverage that implicitly or explicitly implicates white
Americans in racial discrimination and the persistence of black disadvantage. For if white
Americans are to endorse compensatory race-conscious policies (e.g. affirmative action,
reparations) whose costs are largely borne by whites but whose benefits are enjoyed by others,
they must feel that their ingroup is morally responsible for the inferior social positions of blacks
and/or other non-white racial groups.
However, the reality of this implication—that white racial attitudes shift in response to
media coverage—is contested by earlier research. Firstly, racial attitudes are thought to form
early and remain generally stable throughout the lifespan. Second, owing to this general stability,
it is doubtful that the media can or does meaningfully shape public racial attitudes. Even if it has
the potential to do so in theory, its effect is thought to be fleeting, limited, and forced to compete
not only with the effects of oppositional messaging, but also even stronger and more enduring
agents of attitudinal influence (e.g. early socialization, peer groups, partisanship). Consequently,
where and if meaningful shifts in racial attitudes are observed, they are likely the result of newer
and more liberal generations of Americans replacing those older and more conservative—not the
result of any media stimulus.
All told, for this dissertation’s ingroup-critical moral emotions account of white racial
liberalism to have any promise, it first had to show that earlier scholarly assumptions were wrong
or at least overstated. More specifically, it had to show that (a) white racial attitudes
meaningfully and systematically vary across time (b) in response to media input.
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9.2.2

Main findings

To this end, chapter 4 began by examining various time series of white racial attitudes,
including perceptions of discrimination and white advantage, attributions of black disadvantage,
and support for race-conscious policies. All of these series showed considerable overtime
movement in the ‘racially liberal’ direction--particularly among white liberals and Democrats,
and particularly in the past decade. Next, these and dozens of other time series were combined to
form what is perhaps the longest and most comprehensive Stimsonian indexes of public racial
liberalism to date. Notably, in addition to separate indexes for white and non-white respondents,
indexes were also created for ideological and partisan subgroups. Interestingly, those of white
Democrats and liberals accounted for much more of the variance across constituent items than
was the case for the indexes of all other political subgroups. Nonetheless, all showed periodic but
substantial shifts in racial liberalism, with the largest and most recent increase being the ‘Great
Awokening’—a trend that began in 2014, a year marked by a series of high-profile police
shootings of black men and racial unrest in the city of Ferguson. Consistent with the ‘parallel
publics’ assumption, all of these series also tended to move in parallel—though there was also
some subtle and meaningful divergence. Specifically, whereas racial liberalism among white
Republicans, white conservatives, and non-white Democrats steadily declined from the late
1990s to roughly 2013, it held stable across this period among white Democrats and liberals.
Overtime variance in racial liberalism was also greatest among white Democrats and liberals,
while the year-to-year changes for these groups (vs. those for white Republicans and
conservatives) were more closely associated with those in aggregate white racial liberalism. This
suggests that, despite comprising a minority of whites, Democrats and liberals disproportionately
contribute to variation in aggregate white racial liberalism, which accords with the theory that
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their racial attitudes are more sensitive to shifts in the information environment than those of
Republicans and conservatives.
While the patterns in the Stimsonian racial liberalism series indicated that racial attitudes
do indeed vary significantly across time—and those of certain subgroups more than others--we
were still left with the question of what drives this variation. Though a number of other
theoretically relevant causal factors were also considered, subsequent analyses tested the
prediction that variation in racial liberalism followed variation in ‘racial equalitarian’ media
(REM) coverage, which was operationalized as the frequency of articles speaking to black-white
status differences in terms of past and/or present discrimination. First, tests of granger causality
indicated that REM granger-caused white racial liberalism, while no support was found for the
inverse relationship. Results for the white Democrat and liberal series were substantively similar
but more compelling in that REM significantly predicted subsequent levels of racial liberalism
for these groups regardless of lag length. In contrast, there was no unambiguous evidence that
REM meaningfully predicted subsequent levels of racial liberalism among white Republicans
and conservatives at any lag length.
The above findings generally held up in subsequent dynamic structural models, which
controlled for lagged racial liberalism, the annual frequency of all race-related articles,
generational replacement, non-racial policy liberalism, rates of degree attainment, civil rights
spending, and consumer sentiment. Net of these covariates, the effects of REM on white racial
liberalism remained statistically significant and fairly large (between 0.5-0.7 of a standard
deviation). In fact, controlling for the annual volume of race-related news articles actually
enhanced the effects of REM, which is evidence that racial liberalism is not merely responding to
the salience of race in media coverage in general, but rather to the salience of coverage that
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implicitly or explicitly implicates white Americans in racial discrimination and the persistence of
black disadvantage. At least in initial models, the effects of REM on racial liberalism were also
significantly stronger for white liberals and Democrats than conservatives and Republicans. But
curiously, after adjusting for the annual size of generational cohorts, REM’s effects on white
Republican and conservative racial liberalism—which did not clearly emerge as granger-causal
in earlier tests—turned significant and either rivaled or surpassed the size of the effects observed
for white Democrats and liberals. However, further analysis suggested that this was either a
statistical artifact and/or that the racial attitudes of white Republicans and conservatives only
became responsive to shifts in REM during the past decade (or, more precisely, during the Great
Awokening period). Specifically, whereas the effects of REM on the racial liberalism of white
Democrats and liberals were generally significant and stable across various time periods, those
for white Republicans and conservatives were negligible and statistically insignificant in all
periods prior to the Great Awokening.
9.2.3

Implications

The findings of chapter 4 suggest that both the assumed stability of racial attitudes and
the minimal influence of the media thereon are, at the very least, overstated. While racial
attitudes are not constantly shifting across time, they nonetheless show substantial periodic
movement; and this movement generally follows trends in racial equalitarian media coverage.
Put differently, the findings suggest that racial attitudes may be stable not because they are
necessarily intrinsically so, but due to a relative void of stability-upsetting stimuli in the
information environment over a given period of time. Thus, much as news media input shapes
and updates public perceptions and attitudes on other political issues, so too does it in the case of
race. And, considering that perceptions of both the extent and prevalence of discrimination
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against blacks and other non-white racial/ethnic groups—important predictors of racial policy
preferences-- can rarely be informed by first-hand observation (especially for whites), this is not
all that surprising.
As far as I am aware, on top of being one of the only existing studies to systematically
examine the relationship between racial attitudes and media trends, this study constitutes the first
substantive replication of Kellstedt (2000; 2003). However, it goes even further by also speaking
to trends in the racial attitudes of different political subgroups. Whereas Kellstedt justified his
use of a single aggregate index on the basis of the ‘parallel publics’ assumption, the current
findings indicate that this assumption, though valid overall, may hold less for white Democrats
and liberals than for others. Indeed, the racial liberalism series for these groups showed both the
greatest overtime variation and also the greatest divergence from aggregate opinion trends. Their
common racial liberalism factors also accounted for the highest shares of constituent item
variance. While underscoring the nuance that is lost (or the intra-group polarization obscured)
through aggregation, the reasons for this pattern of findings are unclear. One possible and very
plausible interpretation, which should be explored in future research, is that the racial attitudes of
white Democrats and liberals are more coherent or less internally conflicting than those of other
groups 192. This could be because the former are generally of higher cognitive and political
sophistication and/or their racial attitudes are less likely to be shaped by multiple or competing
value considerations 193 (Gomez & Wilson, 2006; Kellstedt et al. 2017). That the racial liberalism

192

Naturally, the more that constituent items covary or move together, the greater the variance explained by the
common racial liberalism factor. Conversely, the more responses across items are in disharmony, the lower the
common variance explained.
193
For instance, consider a liberal and conservative who both perceive there to be a lot of discrimination against
blacks. To the extent that the liberal is more likely to subscribe to the ‘need’ principle of distributive justice and
prioritize care-related moral considerations above all else, he/she will be less morally inhibited to support policies
like affirmative action. In contrast, while acknowledging discrimination against blacks, the conservative—who tends
to subscribe to the proportionality principle of justice—is likely to be much more reluctant to support affirmative
action on account of his/her merit-based conception of fairness. If so, we would expect that perceptions of anti-black
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factor of non-whites (including those of non-white Democrats and liberals) also accounted for a
comparatively low proportion of variance points to the former account. Future research can test
this by creating and examining racial liberalism indexes for different levels of political
sophistication and education.
This research also improved upon Kellstedt (2000; 2003) by examining whether the racial
attitudes of different subgroups are similarly responsive to shifts in the media environment.
While the findings on this question were less conclusive than desired, the balance of the evidence
suggested that increases in racial liberalism generally follow increases in REM among white
Democrats and liberals but less so among white Republicans and conservatives. This finding, if
true, may help to explain why racial attitude polarization among whites appears to be asymmetric
or disproportionally driven by those on the political left (Narayani et al., 2020). For if the racial
attitudes of white Democrats and liberals are more coherent and sensitive to information 194
related to racial inequality and injustice than their political opponents, they will naturally move
more quickly in the liberal direction than those of Republicans/conservatives can move in any
direction. At the same time, as the party traditionally seen as representing the interests of
America’s racial/ethnic minority groups, it’s likely that Democratic party elites engage in more
race-related messaging than their Republican counterparts. Hence, even if not personally
interested in the issue of race, white Democrats will naturally have more exposure to race-related
messaging. Future research on the dynamics of racial attitudes should attempt to measure and
model the frequency at which politicians from both parties engage in race-related messaging. Not
only will it help to determine the contribution of this messaging to variation in REM, but it may

discrimination will be more predictive of racial policy preferences among liberals than conservatives. This
proposition is actually very testable and should be probed in future research.
194
Both the motivation to consume such information and the ability to coherently integrate it into existing
knowledge and belief structures (i.e. cognitive sophistication) are likely to be important factors here.
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also help to account for why the racial attitudes of white Democrats and liberals appear to be
more responsive to shifts in REM.
9.2.4

Limitations

While making valuable contributions to the literature, the findings of the above study
come with a number of limitations that complicate their interpretation. First, my measure of
REM messaging was crude and facilely constructed. Ideally, each news article matching my
search parameters should have been manually inspected so as to confirm that they genuinely fit
my operationalization of REM. Unfortunately, with tens of thousands of articles to comb
through, and no research assistants to help, the completion of this task would not have been
feasible within a reasonable time frame. The upshot is that the validity of these measures rests on
the accuracy of the ProQuest search engine—or, more precisely, the assumption that it is
‘accurate enough’ in independently identifying articles whose substance is more or less faithful
to my empirical intentions. On one hand, the error introduced by the inclusion of non-REM
articles could result in underestimates of the REM scale’s true effects on racial liberalism.
However, assuming this is indeed the case, it would not impeach any of the relevant findings—if
anything, it would suggest that the effects of REM are likely to be even larger than what was
observed. On the other hand, if the non-REM articles included are systematically related to
trends in racial liberalism, the construct validity of the REM scale would be compromised. Under
this scenario, its effects on racial liberalism could no longer be reliably attributed to ‘racial
equalitarian’ messaging. Instead, they would reflect an ill-defined mixture of REM and nonREM messaging, which would not only beg the question of whether the theoretical distinction
matters in practice, but also of the importance of REM messaging as a driver of racial liberalism.
While controlling for the volume of all race-related articles somewhat addresses this issue, it
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does not necessarily preclude the possibility of the REM scale being contaminated by non-REM
content. Absolute closure on this question can only be obtained through a manual inspection of
all constituent articles—a project that will have to be left for future research. All of this being
said, there’s no reason to suspect that the articles returned by the ProQuest search engine defied
the inputted search parameters to any consequential degree. The scale correlated reasonably well
with Kellstedt’s own Newsweek-based measure of racial egalitarian media cues. That it also
performed as expected in the wake of the Floyd incident—findings that are reviewed below-gives some assurance that it is capturing what it is intended to capture.
A more basic limitation is the inability to control for all possible confounding variables.
The risk of confounding variables is arguably enhanced with the use of annual data. Tests of
granger causality can indicate whether variation in REM in a given year predicts levels of racial
liberalism in the next, but a lot variables apart from REM are operative in the span of a year that
may influence subsequent racial liberalism; and these unknown factors may not have been
accounted for in my models. What is more, even the factors already identified could have been
off the mark. For instance, perhaps the confounding variables that were adjusted for were not
reliably measured; in which case, their ability to account for the REM-racial liberalism
relationship would be diminished and, consequently, the predictive effects of REM would remain
misleadingly significant. Alternatively, or in addition, perhaps the effects of REM coverage
result from its relationship with another race-related media messaging variable that is more
central to or predictive of variation in racial liberalism. While I have no suggestions as to what
this variable could be, the point is that the findings here do not exclude its existence. Thus, in
addition to investigating other possible confounds and improving measures of those already
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identified, future researchers are encouraged to test and compare the impact of alternative racerelated media messaging variables.
Future research is also needed to assess whether or to what extent trends in racial
liberalism correspond with trends in immigration liberalism. While this study’s
operationalization of racial liberalism was limited to attitudes related to African Americans, a
case can be made that immigration attitudes are or have become, in essence, racial attitudes. As
such, it is important to know whether the trends observed in this chapter are unique to attitudes
implicating African Americans or whether they additionally encompass attitudes towards
immigration and policies that implicate other racial/ethnic groups.
Finally, while some attempt was made to get at this question, this study could not
adequately speak to whether non-white racial attitudes similarly respond to trends in REM. At
least part of the issue at hand likely owes itself to the shifting racial/ethnic composition of the
‘non-white’ category over the past 50 years. A consequence of this is that if this shift is not
reliable controlled for, and if the racial attitudes of non-black minority groups are more
conservative than their black counterparts, its influence is likely to confound or obscure any
relationship between REM and racial liberalism. To address this limitation, future researchers
interested in the dynamics of non-white racial attitudes are advised to create separate Stimsonian
indexes for respondents of different racial/ethnic backgrounds.
9.3

Chapter 5
9.3.1

Background

The findings of chapter 4 left several questions unresolved. First, if variation in REM
drives racial liberalism, what drives variation in REM? The annual time unit of the REM scale
affords little insight into the kinds of real-world events or developments that it responds to.
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Kellstedt (2000) similarly raises this question—which he ultimately leaves to future research-with respect to his measure of racial egalitarian media frames. Second, do different dimensions
of racial attitudes genuinely vary together? Or do the effects of REM drive variation in some
attitudinal dimensions (e.g. perceptions of discrimination) but not at all or less so in others (e.g.
support for pro-black policies)? Although the data presented in chapter 4 gave no reason to
suspect differential variation across attitudinal dimensions—e.g. the factor loadings of the racial
liberalism index’s constituent items did not differ by category--the composite racial liberalism
index cannot provide sufficient closure to these questions. Finally, are the racial attitudes of
white liberals and Democrats genuinely more responsive to REM input than their conservative
and Republican counterparts? While some of the results of the analyses of chapter 4 pointed in
this direction, the overall evidence was by no means dispositive or unambiguous.
9.3.2

Main findings

The above questions motivated the quasi-experimental study of Chapter 5, which
examined the effects of the killing of George Floyd on both REM coverage and various white
racial attitudes. Regarding the first question, this study found that the frequency of REM articles
spiked in the days immediately proceeding the Floyd incident and averaged a rate over
subsequent weeks that was roughly 6-times greater than that of the pre-Floyd period.
Accordingly, it can be confidently concluded that high-profile racialized police shootings and/or
subsequent protests for racial justice are among the real-world events that contribute to variation
in REM. With respect to the second question, the Floyd incident spurred small but significant
increases in a reverse-coded 3-item measure of white racial resentment, in the percent of whites
supporting cash reparations for blacks, and in the percent of whites holding unfavorable views of
whites. Further, these increases were significantly larger and only persisted among white
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Democrats and liberals. In contrast, effects on the attitudes of white Republicans and
conservatives were more modest and tended to fade or move back in the racially conservative
direction over subsequent weeks. For instance, whereas views of whites and blacks among white
Democrats and liberals were consistently unfavorable and favorable, respectively, across the
post-Floyd period, this pattern ultimately reversed among white Republicans and conservatives
such that these groups became more unfavorable to blacks and more favorable to whites as time
elapsed.
Importantly, with a very small number of exceptions, significant post-Floyd increases in
liberal responses were not observed in non-racial policy items, such as those relating to abortion
rights, gun control, and healthcare. This is strong evidence that the ‘Floyd effect’ was specific to
racial attitudes, which further supports the conclusion that this effect was causal and not a
coincidental biproduct of a general pre-existing shift in policy liberalism.
Supplementing the findings of Chapter 4, subsequent models found that, net of controls,
REM was significantly predictive of white racial resentment and support for reparations.
However, and consistent with expectations, further analysis established that this was only true for
white liberals and Democrats. Tying these findings together, the results of causal mediation
models suggested that the liberalizing effects of the Floyd incident on white responses the two
‘racial resentment’ items and support for reparations were partly to mostly channeled through
increases in REM. Once again, though, these indirect effects via REM reached significance for
white liberals and Democrats, but were insignificant and paltry among conservatives and
Republicans.
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9.3.3

Implications

While generally supplementing and bolstering the findings of chapter 4, the current study
made several important contributions of its own. First, it identified racialized incidents of
excessive police force as a source of variation in the frequency of ‘racial equalitarian’ news
media. Second, it is one the first studies to show that such incidents—and/or the media coverage
thereof—have the potential to cause rapid and meaningful shifts in racial attitudes. Indeed, while
their magnitude shouldn’t be overstated, shifts were observed even in attitudes generally
considered to be highly stable, such as ‘racial resentment’ and support for cash reparations. Once
again, this suggests that racial attitudes are less ‘fixed’ than previously assumed; and that
stability (or instability) therein is at least partly a function of the prevailing information
environment. It further suggests that the influence of the media with respect to race is not limited
to agenda-setting 195; that it can also move core attitudes on the causal importance of
discrimination for black disadvantage and the fairness of affording special race-based assistance.
At the same time, these findings afford insight into how different subgroups respond to
shifts in the information environment and, in doing so, offer some evidence consistent with
Zaller’s (1992) “two-message” model. Specifically, that the racial attitudes of white Republicans
and conservatives initially trended in the liberal direction before reversing and becoming more
conservative may speak to the influence of competing media messaging and/or selective
exposure. For instance, in the days and weeks immediately proceeding the Floyd incident, white
Republicans and conservatives are likely to have been predominantly exposed to sympathetic or
racially liberal media messaging. But as Floyd-related protests became marked by violence and
looting, the availability of more conservative messaging increased. Consequently, while white

195

Evidence consistent with a pure ‘agenda setting’ effect would be if movement was only observed in perceptions
of the extent of discrimination against blacks.
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liberals and Democrats continued to consume racially liberal messaging, Republican and
conservative counterparts were now largely consuming alternative and more critical narratives.
From a theoretical standpoint, the consumption of racially conservative messaging would serve
to shift the focus of negative group-based moral appraisals from whites to blacks, thereby
buffering or suppressing feelings of collective shame and/or guilt. But the broader implication
here is that periods of racial attitude stability may result not only from extended lulls in REM
coverage, but also from countervailing media messaging. Whereas the former is more likely to
characterize periods of stability for white liberals and Democrats, both factors are likely to be
relevant to stability among conservatives and Republicans. Towards testing this account, future
research on the dynamics of white racial attitudes should attempt to quantify the relative
availability of racial equalitarian vs. racially conservative media messaging overtime.
Finally, this study was the first to not only document increases in anti-white sentiment
among whites, but also to link them to a high-profile racial incident. This finding 196 is important
in that it suggests that, in addition to greater sympathy towards blacks, increases in white racial
liberalism also coincide with negative feelings towards whites. More generally, it speaks to this
dissertation’s argument that racial incidents are often—especially with the help of media
framing--interpreted in group-based terms, which thus explains how the actions of a single white
person (i.e., Derek Chauvin, the police officer responsible for the death of George Floyd) can
rebound upon appraisals of white people as a whole.

196
Kellstedt’s (2000; 2003) theory is much too general to predict such a finding. Yes, racial equalitarian media
primes egalitarian value considerations. But these considerations are hardly group-neutral, as they implicate the
fairness of racial group outcome differences. Accordingly, moral appraisals concern not only a group’s relative
disadvantage, but also its relation to another group’s advantage. Kellstedt thus overlooks the fact that increases in
pro-black policy support coincide, to some degree, with negative moral appraisals of whites.
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9.3.4

Limitations

The findings of this chapter come with two main limitations. First, it was not possible to
differentiate the effects of the Floyd incident itself from those of the protests that ensued in its
aftermath. Would the death of George Floyd still have sufficed to move attitudes absent the
subsequent eruption of protests? Or were these protests, in fact, necessary for generating and
sustaining the incident’s media salience and thus public awareness thereof? Obviously, these are
counterfactuals that can’t be tested. But the point is that, while this study was able to demonstrate
a causal effect, how much of it can be attributed to the Floyd incident in and of itself vs. the postFloyd protests is not clear. A second limitation is intrinsic to the study’s research questions.
Specifically, this study said nothing about the effects of the Floyd incident (and/or subsequent
protests) on the racial attitudes of non-white racial/ethnic minority groups. This is not because
this question is unimportant, but because white racial attitudes and their explanation are the focus
of this dissertation. That said, and as I reiterate and elaborate on later below, there is nothing in
this dissertation’s theory that precludes similar post-Floyd shifts in the racial attitudes of nonwhites. I leave it up to future research, though, to tackle this question.
9.4

Chapter 6
9.4.1

Background

Though far short of validating it altogether, the findings of Chapters 4 and 5 affirmed the
plausibility of this dissertation’s group-based emotions theory of white racial attitude change.
First, they established that white racial attitudes do, in fact, vary considerably if periodically over
time. Second, when taken together, they offer compelling evidence that the media—particularly
that which attributes racial inequities to past and/or present white misdeeds—is an important
source of this variation. Third, they show that the attitudinal effects of the media are not to
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limited to the perceived problem of racial discrimination, which would have suggested its role is
largely that of agenda setting. Instead, and as was most clearly established in Chapter 5, the
media also affects even putatively durable attitudes, such as racial resentment.
9.4.2

Main findings

The first series of analyses showed both moral shame and guilt to be strong predictors of
support for hierarchy-attenuating pro-black policies, which included race-based affirmative
action in employment, race-based government assistance, and monetary reparations for African
American descendants of slavery and victims of historical discrimination. Though each emotion
accounted for unique variation in these policy outcomes, their effects were generally shared,
reflecting the high degree of overlapping variance between them. Further, their unshared effects
were additive such that the two variables did not significantly interact but, when combined, their
influence was larger than either of them alone. Indeed, the combined the effects of moral shame
and guilt on pro-black policy support were larger than every other predictor that was considered,
including partisanship, racial resentment and both social dominance dimensions.
Subsequent models tested whether these effects extended to racialized policies—namely,
those related to immigration--that do not directly implicate black Americans. The expectation
was that moral shame, more than guilt, would be most predictive of these policies. And this is
because guilt is thought to motivate the repair of specific ingroup-perpetrated wrongs, whereas
moral shame focusses on an ingroup’s immoral character as a whole and is thought to motivate
the adoption of broader pro-social attitudes and behaviors that serve to morally distance a group
member therefrom. This expectation was generally borne out in the data. Moral shame, but not
guilt, emerged as a significant and strong predictor of support for increasing immigration levels,
particularly of ‘increased a lot’ responses. Once again, though, and despite possessing a higher
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share of unique outcome-predictive variance, the pro-immigration effects of moral shame
overlapped considerably with those of guilt. Their combined effects were again larger—if only
nominally so—than every other predictor, including racial resentment and the two social
dominance dimensions. Moral shame was also uniquely predictive of support for decriminalizing
illegal crossings along the southern border. In contrast, all of the variance in guilt that related to
this outcome were entirely shared with moral shame.
Several analyses also explored the effects of the two emotions on pro-outgroup/antiingroup tendencies. First, with the exception of the anti-dominance dimension of the SDO scale,
moral shame emerged as the strongest predictor of rating racial/ethnic minority groups relatively
more warmly than other whites. But more than just predicting relatively greater warmth towards
non-whites, it was also the strongest predictor of scoring whites in the ‘cool’ or negative region
of the feeling thermometer scale. In both cases, virtually all of guilt’s outcome-predictive
variance was shared with moral shame, whereas a larger portion of that of the latter’s was
unique. Second, moral shame significantly predicted admitting fewer European than nonEuropean immigrants, whereas the effects of guilt on this outcome were almost entirely
overlapping. Their combined effects were robust to all controls apart from racial resentment,
though it was later discovered that this was due to multicollinearity as opposed to the
relationship with moral shame being confounded by racial resentment. Third, an exploratory
analysis found moral shame and guilt to be important independent predictors of feeling ‘happy’
(vs. sad and neither sad nor happy) about whites becoming a racial minority. Once again, though,
virtually all of guilt’s outcome-predictive variance overlapped with that of shame’s. Finally,
though the extent that each was uniquely predictive did not square with earlier expectations,
moral shame and guilt were found to have the strongest positive influence on monetary donations
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to a racial justice and pro-immigration advocacy group. However, a subsequent bi-factor
prediction model suggested that the effects of both emotions were almost entirely the result of a
common general factor.
Although a sizeable share of the effects of moral shame and guilt on the outcomes studied
were independent of racial resentment, all three variables shared a high degree of outcomepredictive variance 197. As this has important implications for how the racial resentment scale is
interpreted, an attempt was made to statistically distinguish the variance of the three variables.
Results from tests of both general factor and bifactor models indicated that a clear majority of the
variance in racial resentment can be attributed to a common factor that it shares with moral
shame and guilt. In fact, the degree of shared variance is high enough that a case could be made
that the three variables essentially spring from the same construct. However, because a nontrivial (but still minority) share of the variance across its indicators was unique from the common
factor, it was concluded—albeit somewhat hesitantly—that racial resentment was strongly
associated with but nonetheless distinct from moral shame and guilt. Importantly, this conclusion
is actually consistent with this dissertation’s theory, which holds that racial resentment is mostly
a measure of attributions of black disadvantage and is thus an antecedent of moral shame and
guilt. This proposition was subsequently put to the test in factor analyses of the racial resentment
items and three measures designed to capture discrimination-oriented attributions of black
disadvantage. Results from an initial exploratory factor analysis showed that two of the racial
resentment items loaded either more or as strongly onto the ‘attributions’ factor. A general factor
model was ultimately fitted, the results of which suggested that all but a miniscule fraction of the
variance in the racial resentment and attribution factors was attributable to a common dimension.

197

As a secondary analysis would later show, this high-degree of shared variance explained why one or more of
these variables were at times reduced to insignificance when conventionally modeled together.
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Thus, in effect, they more or less measured the same construct. And, as was shown in later
analyses, this shared factor accounted for nearly all of the large liberal vs. conservative
difference in levels of moral shame and guilt.
9.4.3

Implications

The findings of chapter 6, some of which were replicated on nationally representative
samples of white Americans, constitute strong evidence that ingroup-critical moral appraisals
and emotions factor importantly into the racial (and immigration) policy attitudes of white
Americans. While certainly not the only variables of influence, it is fair to say that these policy
attitudes would be appreciably more conservative in a world in which collective guilt and shame
were non-existent. A strong case can even be made that the inclusion of one or both measures of
these emotions should be standard in political science models of white racial policy preferences
and ingroup vs. outgroup favoritism. In fact, their adoption is arguably preferable to that of the
standard racial resentment battery. Not only are their predictive effects comparable to if not
larger than those of racial resentment (as well as generally larger than those of either social
dominance dimension), but they are also far less susceptible to charges (e.g. Carmines,
Sniderman, & Easter, 2011) that they measure what they intend to explain (i.e., racial policy
attitudes) or that they conflate conservative principles with racial prejudice (e.g. Sniderman et al.
1991). While additional research comparing the effects of moral shame/guilt and racial
resentment is needed, political scientists should seriously consider measures of the former as
either a substitute for or a complement to the latter.
A more general implication, though, is that models of white racial policy attitudes that do
not consider ingroup-critical emotions are neglecting an important source of variation. But more
than that, they risk the development and/or adoption of theories of white racial policy
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preferences that are exclusively centered on negative outgroup-directed prejudices and
stereotypes. Indeed, the findings of this chapter underscore a central theoretical theme; namely,
that how whites feel about their ingroup is just as formative for their racial policy preferences as
their feelings towards non-white outgroups. They thus help to explain why whites at the ‘low’
end of the racial resentment scale show a tendency of being biased in favor of non-whites vs.
whites (e.g. Wright et al., 2021; Agadjanian et al. 2021). Specifically, given its intimate
association with racial resentment, and given that it emerged as the strongest predictor off being
warmer towards racial minorities and cooler towards whites, these relationships with favoritism
towards racial minorities are likely at least partly reflecting the hidden influence of moral
shame 198.
The findings also have implications for understanding white pro-immigration
orientations. That moral shame and/or guilt were strongly predictive of support for higher
immigration levels, decriminalizing illegal border entries, favoritism towards non-European
immigrants, and of feeling ‘happy’ about the decline of America’s white majority suggest that
much as concerns for ingroup social position can animate support for immigration restrictionism,
so too might concerns for an ingroup’s moral status be operative in support for immigration
liberalism. For instance, for whites ashamed of their group membership, supporting higher levels
of non-European immigration into the US may serve to both morally distinguish themselves
from ‘racist whites’ while also promising to reduce white influence (and thus racial inequality)
via demographic replacement. Future research should thus examine the relative importance or
prevalence of the latter as a motive for supporting liberal immigration policies. To be clear,
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Consistent with this, when moral shame was added to a model predicting ingroup vs. outgroup warmth, the
effects of racial resentment were reduced to insignificance.
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though, pro-immigration attitudes are subject to myriad motivations, many of which are not
group-based. But the point is that researchers should not automatically assume that proimmigration sentiment is guided by group-neutral or race-blind 199 humanitarianism. For the
findings here suggest that ingroup-critical moral appraisals inform the immigration attitudes of at
least some pro-immigration whites.
The findings of this chapter should also help to guide future political science studies of
the influence of ingroup-critical emotions on racial policy preferences. With very few
exceptions, nearly all existing studies consider only the influence of white guilt. And while white
guilt is certainly predictive of compensatory pro-black policies, moral shame was found to be a
strong if often overlapping competitor. That it both explains unique variation in pro-black policy
preferences and is also a better predictor of immigration preferences and ingroup vs. outgroup
warmth cautions against studies that exclusively consider the effects of guilt. Such studies are
likely to not only produce biased estimates of the effects of guilt, but they are also likely to
undersell the true impact that ingroup-critical emotions have on racial policy preferences. At the
same time, studies that include measures of collective moral shame are advised to partial out
variation reflective of group-image-related concerns, which are negatively predictive of prosocial attitudes and behaviors. Indeed, this study showed that the effects of moral shame become
even stronger when adjusting for image-related shame.
Finally, that racial resentment proved to be statistically indistinguishable from
discrimination-based attributions of black disadvantage arguably has implications for its validity
as a measure of anti-black prejudice. Although those that are genuinely prejudiced against blacks
are more likely to reject or contest discrimination-based attributions in favor of endogenous
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Newman and Malhotra (2019) make a similar point with respect to the public’s general preference for highskilled vs. low-skilled immigration, which they contend is not race-neutral.
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accounts, anti-black prejudice is not obviously a pre-requisite for doing so. Indeed, the causal
ambiguity surrounding black disadvantage—the often invisible or subtle nature of
discrimination 200, the nebulousness of ‘systemic racism’, the difficulty in accurately quantifying
the contribution of past and present discrimination to disparate outcomes without knowing what
those outcomes would have been in the absence of discrimination etc.—inevitably invites
disagreement among whites and others as to the reasons for its persistence. And, as Gomez and
Wilson (2006) show, this disagreement over attributions is also partly shaped by differing levels
of cognitive and political sophistication, with lower sophisticated individuals more inclined
towards individualist accounts of inequality. Accordingly, and to reformulate a similar criticism
advanced in Sniderman et al. (1991), to treat racial resentment as a valid measure of anti-black
animus is to implicitly delegitimize all ‘non-woke’ attributions of black-white inequalities. I
thus join with other researchers (e.g. Kam & Burge, 2017) in calling on those that use it to
measure anti-black prejudice to reconsider their interpretation or labeling of the scale.
Ultimately, though their overlap is acknowledged, researchers are encouraged to develop
alternative measures that do not so readily conflate racial equalitarian orientations (or lack
thereof) with racial animus.

9.4.4

Limitations

While questions of causality are at least partly addressed via the experimental study in
chapter 7, a major limitation in these findings is that, with the exception of generalized empathy
in the replication analysis, they do not control for outgroup-focused and/or group-neutral
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One of the important effects of highly publicized racial incidents, such as the death of George Floyd, is thus to
concretize racial bias and, thereby, increase the perceived plausibility of discrimination being the primary cause of
black disadvantage. This explains why white racial resentment is found to decline after such incidents, which
wouldn’t be the case if responses to the scale were fundamentally grounded in prejudice or its absence.
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emotions. For instance, though its likely to be highly correlated with collective shame and guilt,
this study did not measure or control for racial sympathy, which has also been identified as a
predictor of racial liberalism (Chudy, 2021). Future research should thus compare the relative
influence of different emotions with different foci (i.e., ingroup-focused, outgroup-focused) so as
to better assess their importance for explaining whites’ racial policy preferences. It should also
attempt to get at whether positive ingroup-focused emotions, such as pride, are antipodes of
moral shame and guilt or whether they are related but distinct constructs.
Additional research is also needed to confirm the statistical distinguishability of moral
shame and guilt. Whereas an initial exploratory factor analysis showed their respective
constituent indicators differentially loading onto separate factors, the results of subsequent
general and bifactor models were far from conclusive. Specifically, they indicated that all but a
tiny share of the variance in both moral shame and guilt was attributable to a common factor.
This raises the possibility that the two variables may be distinct in theory but synonymous in
practice. On the other hand, after residualizing them of their common variance, both moral
shame and guilt still explained unique variation in pro-black policy support and ingroup vs.
outgroup warmth, while only the former was predictive of immigration attitudes. This suggests
that the measures overlap but that they nonetheless retain unique predictive effects. Whatever the
case, the bottom line is that the question of statistical distinguishability could not be
unambiguously answered. Given its theoretical and methodological importance, it is the hope
that future research will provide better closure.
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9.5

Chapters 7 and 8
9.5.1

Background

The purpose of chapters 7 and 8 was to shore up this dissertation’s causal argument.
Specifically, though the findings of chapter 6 suggest that ingroup-critical emotions are heavily
implicated in white racial attitudes, they provide no evidence that this relationship is causal and
not the result of omitted variables. Additionally, though the findings of chapters 4 and 5 indicate
that REM coverage is an important driver of white racial liberalism, they do not show that
ingroup-critical emotions actually mediate this relationship.
9.5.2

Main findings

To address these shortcomings, chapter 7 conducted a survey experiment that randomly
assigned white participants to read either an REM-oriented or neutral stimulus article. In the end,
those assigned to read the REM-oriented article reported significantly higher levels of moral
shame and guilt than those who received the neutral stimulus. Further, they also were
significantly more supportive of various pro-black policies, admitted slightly but significantly
fewer immigrants from Europe vs. non-European countries, and tended to rate non-white
racial/ethnic minority groups significantly more warmly than fellow whites. Increases in general
support for higher immigration levels were also observed, but they only reached significance for
non-liberals, presumably because support among liberals was already very high. Intriguingly, a
later exploratory analysis found that the treatment led to a small increase in the share of
participants that reported feeling ‘happy’ about the decline of America’s white majority.
However, this effect just fell short of conventional levels of significance.
Overall, the treatment effects observed in this experimental study tended to be modest,
but their magnitude was on par with that of the attitudinal shifts observed in the natural context
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of the Floyd incident. Considering that the wording of several of the racial policy measures
explicitly raised considerations of unfairness against whites, it’s possible that effects would have
been even larger in the absence of competing policy primes. Future research can test this by
randomly assigning participants policy measures that either mention or do not mention the
potential for discrimination against whites. Finally, and quite surprisingly, no clear evidence was
found that the treatment effects systematically varied by political ideology or party identification.
What is more, a secondary analysis found no significant treatment effects on differences in
warmth towards Democrats vs. Republicans. While participants in the guilt/shame condition
rated Democrats slightly more warmly than Republicans than those in the neutral condition, this
(insignificant) effect was not conditioned by party self-identification. That is, even Republican
participants became marginally warmer towards Democrats and cooler towards Republicans.
This counterintuitive finding may suggest that ingroup-critical moral appraisals and emotions
transcend the partisan divide.
While the significant treatment effects on racial policy attitudes are noteworthy in their
own right, a critical test for this dissertation’s theory centers on whether they are mediated by
increases in moral shame and guilt. In the end, all of those tested showed evidence of at least
partial mediation. Specifically, moral shame and (if lesser so) guilt were found to mediate most
of the treatment’s positive effects on pro-black policy support and just under half of its negative
effects on European immigration admissions and warmth towards whites vs. non-whites. Though
exploratory, a final mediation analysis showed that just over half of the treatment’s total effect
on responses to the ‘white decline’ item was conveyed through moral shame.
Using the open-response entries voluntarily submitted by a considerable subset of
experimental subjects, supplemental qualitative and mixed-methods analyses followed in chapter
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8. The first of these analyses identified and surveyed two main comment themes of theoretical
interest. One thematic category was classified as ‘ingroup-critical’ and consisted of entries that
either engaged in negative essentializations of white Americans, faulted white people responsible
for the disadvantages of blacks and other racial/ethnic minority groups, and/or expressed feelings
of shame, guilt, and/or anger over their racial group memberships. A second thematic category
was classified as ‘defensive’ in nature. Entries of this sort generally repudiated negative
appraisals of whites, denied personal and/or collective responsibility for black disadvantage,
and/or downplayed or questioned the importance of discrimination for explaining its persistence.
Both comment categories were ultimately regressed on the treatment variable from chapter 7.
The results of these models showed that commenters in the guilt/shame stimulus condition were
significantly more likely than those in the neutral condition to author ‘ingroup-critical’ entries—
with this increase being significantly larger among white liberal and Democratic commenters
than among their conservative and Republican counterparts. In the other direction, the rate of
‘defensive’ entries was lower in the guilt/shame stimulus condition than in the neutral condition,
though this decrease was only significant for white liberal commenters. As would be expected, a
final series of models found that authors of ‘ingroup-critical’ and ‘defensive’ entries scored
significantly higher and lower, respectively, on quantitative measures of moral shame, guilt, and
pro-black policy support than other and non-commenters.
9.5.3

Implications

The findings of chapters 7 and 8 constitute clear evidence of the media’s potential for
effecting increases in racially liberal responses via the activation of ingroup-critical emotions. As
with those of earlier chapters, they suggest that racial attitudes are far less static than some
earlier literature has suggested. Indeed, a single brief news editorial sufficed to move policy
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attitudes that might otherwise be expected to be most the ‘fixed’, such as those towards
affirmative action and cash reparations. Instead, the findings are again consistent with an account
whereby white racial attitudes are pliable but liberal shifts therein are conditional on the
availability or salience of REM stimuli. This would entail that when the availability of REM
input is low, racial attitudes remain generally stable and only move gradually as a function of
natural societal-level changes (e.g. generational replacement). That even the attitudes of white
Republicans and conservatives saw movement in the liberal direction suggests not only that
ingroup-critical emotions transcend the partisan divide 201, but that the comparatively lower
overtime variation in these groups’ racial liberalism (Chapter 4) results more from selective
avoidance of or lack of engagement with REM stimuli than from being impervious to their
liberalizing influence. This could explain why racial liberalism increased among these groups
during the ‘Great Awokening’ period, when the frequency of REM coverage reached record
highs 202. Obtaining a deeper understanding of partisan and ideological differences in race-related
information exposure thus stands as an important objective for future research.
While contributing to the literature on the stability of racial attitudes, the findings also
have potentially important implications for research that studies the attitudinal impact of racial
justice movements. For instance, several recent quasi-experimental studies have linked Black
Lives Matter protests to increases in white racial liberalism (e.g. Sawyer & Gampa, 2018;
Mazumder, 2018) while chapter 6 of this dissertation reported similar findings with respect to the
death of George Floyd and subsequent mass protests. Ultimately, racial justice movements and
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Recall too that the treatment had no significant effect on how warmly participants rated Democrats and
Republicans. If anything, Republican participants became slightly warmer towards Democrats and cooler towards
Republicans.
202
In other words, it’s possible that the racial attitudes of white Republicans and conservatives only become
attentive and responsive at very high thresholds of REM. And this is because, relative to white liberals and
Republicans, these groups are less motivated to attend to (and are thus unaware of or ignore) such stimuli.
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protests can hardly be successful absent the sympathies of at least some segments of America’s
white majority, which makes white Americans important targets of activist influence. While
inevitably channeled through the media, the experimental findings here suggest that at least some
of this influence is achieved by sowing or elevating white feelings of collective shame and/or
guilt. In fact, as was briefly noted in chapter 2, the utility of manipulating white shame and guilt
for the attainment of political ends was explicitly recognized by none other than MLK. Thus,
models of anti-racist social movement influence could benefit from incorporating pathways that
speak to the effects of messaging on group-based moral emotions.
The findings of chapter 7 also potentially contribute to literature on the efficacy of
racialized policy appeals. Much of this literature has tended to focus on whites’ receptiveness to
implicitly or explicitly racist political messaging. Work on whites’ receptiveness to pro-minority
or liberal racial appeals is relatively in much shorter supply. While there is reason to suspect that
racially liberal political appeals will backfire among whites (e.g. English & Kalla, 2021)-resulting in lower support for the candidate or policy in question--there is some evidence that
they may actually have the opposite effect, at least among racially egalitarian whites (e.g. Arora,
2019). If (and a big one at that) the findings of chapter 7 are directly portable to the context of
political campaigns, they suggest that, to the extent that they successfully activate ingroupcritical emotions, candidates that engage in ‘racially equalitarian’ messaging will, at the very
least, incur no net ‘white’ penalty (given that no backlash was observed among non-liberal
whites), and may even benefit from such rhetoric. On the other hand, and consistent with the
findings of Hanania, Hawley, and Kaufman (2018), such messaging may at once incur an
electoral penalty while also boosting support for advocated racial policies. Of course, given that
the stimulus article was not manifestly partisan nor authored by a partisan candidate in the
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context of an election campaign, there are good reasons to doubt the findings’ portability. For
instance, it’s likely that party loyalties and animosities would have the upper hand in evaluations
of general election candidates. On the other hand, perhaps ‘racial equalitarian’ messaging would
resonate among fellow partisans at the primary election level. Whatever the case, these are all
important research questions in need of further investigation.
Though more tentatively, some of these chapters’ findings also add to the growing body
of work that probes dominant group members’ reactions to their demographic decline. Whereas
nearly of this work highlights members’ negative responses to reminders of their impending
minority status, the current research provides some evidence that those who are ashamed of their
ingroup’s moral status may actually embrace it. Specifically, on top of small increases in support
for higher immigration levels and preferences for non-European immigration, it found that the
guilt/shame treatment led to small increases in the share of respondents that report feeling
‘happy’ about the fall of America’s white majority. As it happens, in one of the open-response
entries showcased in chapter 8, one such ‘happy’ participant expressed hope that the decline of
the white majority would usher in a less racist society. While such sentiments may not be
reflective of the majority of white Americans, they exist at some level and may even be on the
rise 203. The broader point, though, is that no understanding or theory of dominant group
members’ reactions to their demographic decline will be complete without taking such
sentiments into account. It is thus the hope that future research will attempt to replicate the
findings reported here and give more attention to such dispositions than they have received.

203

While not the same question, in 2016, Pew Research Center started asking whether respondents think trends
towards a majority-minority America are good, bad, or neither good nor bad for the country. At this point, 7.3% of
white respondents, including 17.2% of white liberals, gave a ‘good’ response. By 2019, this response had reached
11.6% of all whites, including 31% of white liberals. Data for the most recent years have yet to be released.
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While much of the focus has been on chapter 7, the findings of chapter 8 are also
theoretically and empirically noteworthy. First, they linked the written expression of ingroupcritical moral appraisals and emotions to quantitative measures of moral shame and guilt, which
both offers some evidence of the latter’s validity while also affirming the reality of these
sentiments. Second, the qualitative review of ‘ingroup-critical’ entries found some support for
the theoretical distinction between moral shame and guilt. Though some authors seemed to treat
the two interchangeably, others associated guilt with personal involvement in or responsibility
for immoral ingroup actions and moral shame with the embarrassment they feel from being
affiliated with a morally tainted or ‘racist’ ingroup. This, once again, underscores why it is
important that researchers distinguish the two emotions and not treat collective guilt as the only
emotion of relevance.
9.5.4

Limitations

The findings of chapters 7 and 8 suffer from a number of limitations that will have to be
addressed in future research. First, that moral shame and guilt carried some to most of the
significant treatment effects does not necessarily mean that these variables are the only or even
the most important mediators. For instance, if racial sympathy were measured in lieu of moral
shame and guilt, it’s possible that it too would emerge as a significant mediator of the
treatment’s effects on policy outcomes. Which prosocial emotion is the strongest mediator can
thus only be determined by measuring others in addition to moral shame and guilt. Though all
prosocial moral emotions are likely be correlated to some degree, future research should focus on
assessing their relative causal importance.
Second, the experimental design only included post-treatment measures of racial
attitudes. While this was done to avoid inadvertently race-priming those in the neutral stimulus
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group, which could have compromised the efficacy of the treatment, it leaves unanswered the
question of whether the effects of the treatment are conditional on core antecedent variables,
such as the personal importance of white identity and orientations towards social hierarchies and
racial inequality. For instance, my theory would predict that the racial attitudes of those with
strong white identities and weak equalitarian orientations (or high on social dominance) would
be less likely to respond—or may instead respond in a negative fashion—to the guilt/shame
stimulus.
To get at this question, future research should consider fielding a 2-wave panel design
wherein measures of (for instance) social dominance, attributions of racial inequality (or ‘racial
resentment’), and racial identity importance are administered at wave 1 and the treatment and
post-treatment measures at wave 2. Such research could also help to get at whether attributions
of racial inequality mediate the relationship between ideology and expressions of moral shame
and guilt. Suggestive evidence of this was found in chapter 6, wherein a general ‘racial
resentment-attributions’ factor accounted for nearly all of the liberal-conservative differences in
these emotions. However, this finding was purely correlational, and it thus awaits replication on
non-observational data.
Third and somewhat related to the above, the findings were derived from an online
convenience sample that was younger, more educated, and more liberal than the general white
population. This not only undermines their external validity, but it also potentially explains why
treatment effects were generally positive and did not meaningfully vary across political
backgrounds. Indeed, this observation was somewhat at odds with the findings of chapter 6,
wherein the Floyd incident precipitated larger increases in racial liberalism among white liberals
and Democrats than conservatives and Republicans. Non-replication of these differential effects
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could be due to the subsamples of conservative and Republicans being underpowered and/or
more ideologically liberal and/or less partisan than their counterparts in the broader non-Prolific
population. Of course, and as was earlier suggested, it could also be that political orientation is
more determinative of whether or the extent that a person exposes him/herself to or avoids REM
stimuli (perhaps in favor of competing or ideologically-congruent messaging) than how he/she
reacts upon exposure thereunto. It’s also worth noting that the findings cohere with the
previously cited work of Cooley, Brown-Iannuzzi, and Cottrell (2019), who found that reading
about white privilege caused white participants to perceive more police racism and to blame
black victims of violent police encounters less regardless of political ideology. They are also
consonant with the recent work of Jardina, Kalmoe, and Gross (2021), who observed post-2016election declines in white identity importance—which is suggestive of the influence of moral
shame--even among Republicans and conservatives. The bottom line, though, is that these
findings are counterintuitive; and it’s unclear whether or to what extent they will replicate on a
sample that is more representative of the general white population. Thus, an important step for
future research is to attempt such a replication.
Fourth, the use of a two-condition experimental design allows only basic tests of the
causal mechanism that my theory proposes. For instance, if experimentally increasing ingroupcritical emotions leads to greater racial liberalism, it follows that experimentally decreasing or
neutralizing them should result in greater racial conservatism. Testing whether the latter holds
obviously requires the addition of a second ‘anti-guilt/shame’ treatment group, which should be
the object of future research. While an initial attempt at such a condition was made in the early
stages of data gathering, it was hastily and thus poorly designed; and the data therefrom was
ultimately deemed unusable (see the Appendix for a fuller explanation). In theory, and broadly
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speaking, an effective ‘anti-guilt/shame’ treatment should be one that either affirms the
legitimacy of or naturalizes racial inequalities (and thus the disparate social positions of whites
and blacks) and/or contests racial categorizations (e.g. by emphasizing ingroup heterogeneity)
and notions of group responsibility altogether. Accordingly, it is recommended that future
research first consult with the literature and pilot-test various stimuli that have the potential to
achieve these desired effects. In addition to the above, two-condition designs also make it
difficult to determine the specific aspects of a treatment that are responsible for its effects. For
instance, was my guilt/shame stimulus effective because it linked historical incidents of white
racism to the racial outcomes of today? Would it have been less effective had it not spoken to the
concept of white privilege? Did the article resonate with (or at least not turn off) conservative
participants because it highlighted an event in which blacks’ exercise of personal agency and
attempts at economic self-reliance were greeted with a white-perpetrated race riot? These kinds
of questions can only be answered with a multiple-condition design in which experimental
treatments vary in their inclusion of theoretically relevant features. Future research should
implement such a design in order to identify the elements of REM articles that are most relevant
to the triggering of ingroup-critical emotions. Beyond its theoretical importance, such research
could help inform the design of more efficient guilt/shame treatments.
Fifth, this research was unable to show that the treatment had any effect on costly prosocial behavior, which was operationalized in terms of monetary donations to anti-racist and proimmigration advocacy groups. If anything, the opposite was found such that the size of donations
among those in the guilt/shame condition was slightly (but not significantly) smaller than was the
case for those in the neutral condition. The reasons for this unexpected outcome are unclear. One
possible interpretation is that the effects of the treatment are limited to costless ‘virtue signaling’.
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That is, it may have compelled participants to ‘talk the talk’ (i.e., by expressing support for prooutgroup policies) so as to affirm their moral or anti-racist self-concepts. Once these selfconcepts were symbolically affirmed, though, participants may have felt absolved from ‘walking
the walk’ and engaging in a personally costly pro-social behavior. If so, this would have
important implications for current understandings of moral shame and guilt’s pro-social
influence. Future research can test this account by administering the donations measures
immediately proceeding the treatment so as to force participants to affirm themselves via costly
pro-social behavior. And yet it could also be that monetary donations are a poor and unreliable
measure of the latter—if only because participants are likely to be wary about the prospect of
sharing personal financial information with a stranger. It is thus important that future research
address this potential measurement bias by devising and testing alternative and less invasive
measures of costly pro-social behavior.
Sixth, this research did not conclusively resolve whether the effects of the treatment
meaningfully spilled-over to immigration attitudes. On one hand, those in the treatment group
were slightly more supportive of increasing immigration levels, allocated somewhat fewer
immigration admissions to European vs. non-European countries, and became slightly more
likely to report feeling ‘happy’ about whites’ declining majority status. On another hand, these
differences were modest and two of them only reached conventional levels of significance
among certain political subgroups. Though all were in the theoretically predicted direction,
additional research is needed to verify that these spill-over effects are genuine rather than the
product of chance. This future research should consider using a multi-item index to measure
immigration preferences, as the lone items fielded in the current study may not have been
sufficient for capturing between-condition changes therein. Further, it should also consider
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positioning these measures immediately after the treatment so as to determine whether the
smaller effects on immigration attitudes observed in the current study are due to
Finally, this study cannot speak to how the racial attitudes of non-whites respond to REM
stimuli. However, to reiterate a point made towards the end of chapter 4, nothing in this
dissertation’s theory precludes non-white attitudes from reacting similarly (i.e., shifting in the
racially liberal direction) to whites. It only holds that the group-based moral appraisals and
emotions that underly these reactions will be necessarily different for whites and non-whites.
And this is because whites are members of a historically dominant and morally ‘problematic’
racial group, whereas ‘people of color’ belong to groups that were historically victimized and
tend to be of lower-status. As such, non-whites are unlikely to feel collective shame and guilt in
response to REM messaging. Conceivably, and likely depending on their degree of ingroupidentification as well as the extent they perceive their groups’ relative social positions to be
unjust, they are instead more likely to feel white-focused anger or resentment and a sense of
collective victimhood. Whatever the case, future research should attempt to correct for this
dissertation’s exclusive white-focus by identifying and studying the group-based emotions that
are relevant to the racial attitudes of non-white Americans. Indeed, such work is critical to the
formulation of a more complete group-based emotions theory of racial attitude change.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A Introduction
Appendix A.1 Racial/ethnic differences in Democrats’ political participation

Figure A1.1 Percent of Democrats reporting engaging in each political activity by race/ethnicity
Note. Data are weighted.
Source: Cooperative Election Study

Appendix A Chapter 4
Appendix B.1 Racial Liberalism Indexes
Source

Item

ABC News

I am going to read you a
few statements and for each
I'd like you to tell me
whether you tend to agree
or disagree with it, or if
perhaps you have no
opinion about the
statement?...These days
police in most cities treat
Blacks as fairly as they treat
Whites

ABC News

(I am going to read you a
few statements and for each
I'd like you to tell me
whether you tend to agree
or disagree with it, or if

N

White
Dem.

White
Repub.

White
Lib.

White
Con.

4

0.967

0.902

---

---

3

0.884

-0.241

---

---
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perhaps you have no
opinion about the
statement?)...Discrimination
has unfairly held down
Blacks, but many of the
problems which Blacks in
this country have today are
brought on by Blacks
themselves

General Social
Survey

General Social
Survey

General Social
Survey

Some people think that
(Blacks/Negroes/AfricanAmericans) have been
discriminated against for so
long that the government
has a special obligation to
help improve their living
standards. Others believe
that the government should
not be giving special
treatment to
(Blacks/Negroes/AfricanAmericans).
A. Where would you place
yourself on this scale, or
haven't you made up your
mind on this?
Some people say that
because of past
discrimination, blacks
should be given preference
in hiring and promotion.
Others say that such
preference in hiring and
promotion of blacks is
wrong because it
discriminates against
whites. What about your
opinion -- are you for or
against preferential hiring
and promotion of blacks?
We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going to
name some of these
problems, and for each one
I'd like you to name some
of these problems, and for
each one I'd like you to tell
me whether you think we're
spending too much money
on it, too little money, or
about the right amount.
First . . . are we spending

23

0.811

0.201

0.809

0.607

13

0.977

0.182

0.954

-0.193

31

0.932

0.346

0.811

0.514
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General Social
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General Social
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Survey

too much, too little, or
about the right amount
on...Improving the
conditions of Blacks
We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going to
name some of these
problems, and for each one
I'd like you to tell me
whether you think we're
spending too much money
on it, too little money, or
about the right amount.
First, are we spending too
much, too little, or about the
right amount
on...Assistance to blacks
In general, do you favor or
oppose the busing of
(Negro/Black/AfricanAmerican) and white school
children from one school
district to another?
Suppose there is a
community-wide vote on
the general housing issue.
There are two possible laws
to vote on (READ
CATEGORIES A & B).
Which law would you vote
for?
On the average
(Negroes/Blacks/AfricanAmericans) have worse
jobs, income, and housing
than white people. Do you
think these differences are
mainly due to . .
.discrimination?
Here are some opinions
other people have expressed
in connection with
(Negro/Black)-white
relations. Which statement
on the card comes closest to
how you, yourself, feel?
The first one is . . .White
people have a right to keep
(Negroes/Blacks/AfricanAmericans) out of their
neighborhoods if they want
to, and
(Negroes/Blacks/African-

22

0.872

0.208

0.873

0.223

17

0.901

0.857

0.954

0.88

24

0.934

0.461

0.862

0.079

23

0.914

0.586

0.873

0.357

15

0.956

0.983

0.849

0.854
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Pew Research
Center

Pew Research
Center

Public Religion
Research Institute,
Gallup, PSRA/
Newsweek Poll

Public Religion
Research Institute

Public Religion
Research Institute,
ABC/Washington
Post, Associated
Press/Media
General Poll

CBS News/New
York Times

Americans) should respect
that right.
(Please choose the
statement that comes closer
to your own views--even if
neither is exactly
right.)...Racial
discrimination is the main
reason why many black
people can't get ahead these
days, blacks who can't get
ahead in this country are
mostly responsible for their
own condition
As I read some pairs of
statements, please tell me
whether the first statement
or the second statement
comes closer to your own
views -- even if neither is
exactly right.)...Our country
has made the changes
needed to give blacks equal
rights with whites, our
country needs to continue
making changes to give
blacks equal rights with
whites
A black person is more
likely than a white person to
receive the death penalty
for the same crime.
(Now, please read the
following statements on a
few different topics and say
if you agree or disagree
with each one....Completely
agree, mostly agree, mostly
disagree, completely
disagree)...Police officers
generally treat blacks and
other minorities the same as
whites
Now, read each statement
and please say if you
completely agree, mostly
agree, mostly disagree or
completely disagree with
each one.)...Blacks and
other minorities receive
equal treatment as whites in
the criminal justice system
In general, who do you
think has a better chance of
getting ahead in today's
society--white people, black

16

0.956

0.864

0.984

0.863

8

0.986

0.576

0.971

-0.067

6

0.971

0.845

0.959

0.987

4

0.118

-0.885

0.395

-0.831

10

0.581

0.849

0.676

0.662

9

0.618

0.71

0.241

0.549
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people, or do white people
and black people have
about an equal chance of
getting ahead?
ABC
News/Washington
Post Poll,
CNN/Kaiser Family
Foundation Poll,
Pew Research
Center

ANES

ANES

ANES

Associated PressNORC Poll

How big a problem is
racism in our society today?
Is it a big problem,
somewhat of a problem, a
small problem, or not a
problem at all?
Some people say that
because of past
discrimination blacks
should be given preference
in hiring and promotion.
Others say that such
preference in hiring and
promotion of blacks is
wrong because it gives
blacks advantages they
haven't earned. What about
your opinion-- are you for
or against preferential
hiring and promotion of
blacks?
Some people feel that the
government in Washington
should make every
possible effort to improve
the social and economic
position of blacks and other
minority groups. Others feel
that the government should
not make any special effort
to help minorities because
they should help
themselves. Where would
you place yourself on this
scale, or haven't you
thought much about it?
Should federal spending on
assistance/aid to blacks be
increased, decreased, or
stay
the same
In general, do you think the
police in most communities
are more likely to use
deadly force against a black
person, or more likely to
use it against a white
person, or don't you think
race affects police use of
deadly force?

7

0.911

0.608

0.973

-0.315

11

0.705

0.12

0.569

0.456

20

0.237

-0.502

0.144

0.203

7

-0.239

-0.098

0.467

0.51

5

0.98

0.924

0.856

0.921
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ANES
The Roper
Organization,
Marttila & Kiley,
Inc., Washington
Post/Kaiser/Harvard
Racial Attitudes
Survey, Princeton
Survey Research
Associates
International, Pew
Research Center,
CBS News Poll,
CNN Poll

Pew Research
Center

Pew Research
Center

Pew Research
Center, Public
Religion Research
Institute

ANES

ANES

ABC
News/Washington
Post, Media
General/Associated
Press, NBC/WSJ,

How much discrimination is
there in the United States
today against each of the
following groups? Blacks
(How much discrimination
do you think there is against
each of these groups in
society today--a lot, some,
only a little, or none at
all?)…Blacks/African
Americans

(Here is another series of
statements on some
different
topics.)...Discrimination
against blacks is rare today.
Do you completely agree,
mostly agree, mostly
disagree, or completely
disagree?
We should make every
possible effort to improve
the position of blacks and
other minorities, even if it
means giving them
preferential treatment
Just your impression, in the
United States today, is there
a lot of discrimination
against Blacks, or not?
Some people say that
Negroes should be allowed
to live in any part of
town they want to. How do
you feel? Should Negroes
be allowed to live
in any part of town they
want to, or not?
If Negroes are not getting
fair treatment in jobs and
housing, the
government should see to it
that they do'
(Agree/Disagree)
Do you think blacks and
other minorities should
receive preference in
college admissions to make

4

0.963

0.906

0.975

0.887

20

0.614

0.62

0.579

0.713

12

0.845

0.946

15

0.878

0.679

0.302

-0.079

7

0.948

0.505

0.969

0.607

6

-0.757

0.751

0.336

-0.816

3

0.999

0.949

---

---

4

0.87

0.198

0.719

0.951

0.521

0.954
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Public Religion
Research Institute
ABC
News/Washington
Post, Media
General/Associated
Press, NBC/WSJ
Pew Research
Center

ABC News

ABC/Washington
Post

ABC/Washington
Post

CBS News/New
York Times

CNN/Opinion
Research
Corporation

up for past inequalities, or
not?
Do you think blacks and
other minorities should
receive preference in hiring
to make up for past
inequalities, or not?
We have gone too far in
pushing equal rights in this
country (Agree/Disagree)
I am going to read you a
few statements and for each
I'd like you to tell me
whether you tend to agree
or disagree with it, or if
perhaps you have no
opinion about the
statement?...These days
police in most cities treat
Blacks as fairly as they treat
Whites
(For each of the following
statements please tell me
whether you tend to agree
or disagree with it, or if
perhaps you have no
opinion about the
statement.)... Black people
are not achieving equality
as fast as they could
because many whites don't
want them to get ahead
Because of past
discrimination, blacks who
need it
should get some help from
the government that White
people in similar economic
circumstances don't get.
(Agree/Disagree)
Do you believe that where
there has been job
discrimination against
blacks in the past,
preference in hiring or
promotion should be given
to blacks today?
Next, we'd like to know
how widespread you
believe the problem of
racism is against blacks
among police officers in
this country. Would you say
it is very common, fairly

4

0.676

-0.568

0.991

-0.961

15

0.423

0.078

0.877

-0.649

4

0.967

0.941

---

---

5

-0.711

-0.886

0.426

-0.972

4

0.204

-0.311

0.925

-0.023

9

-0.461

-0.458

-0.593

0.676

4

-0.342

0.874

-0.096

-0.22
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Pew Research
Center

CCES

Pew Research
Center

CBS News

General Social
Survey

Kaiser Family
Foundation, Pew
Research Center

CCES

Gallup, Associated
Press-NORC Center
Public Religion
Research Institute

common, fairly rare, or very
rare?
How much, if at all, do
white people benefit from
advantages in society that
black people do not have?
(A great deal/A fair
amount/Not much/Not at
all)
Racial problems in the U.S.
are rare, isolated situations.
(Agree/Disagree)
How much confidence do
you have in police officers
in your community...to treat
blacks and whites equally-a great deal, a fair amount,
just some, or very little
confidence? (A great deal/A
fair amount/Just some/Very
little
In general, do you think the
criminal justice system in
the United States is biased
in favor of blacks, or is it
biased against blacks, or
does it generally give
blacks fair treatment?
What do you think the
chances are these days that
a white person won''t get a
job or promotion while an
equally or less qualified
black person gets one
instead? Is this very likely,
somewhat likely, or not
very likely to happen these
days?
Is there too much, too little,
or about the right amount of
attention paid to race and
racial issues these days?
Do you agree or disagree
with the following
statements? White people
in the U.S. have certain
advantages because of the
color of their skin.
In your opinion, how well
do you think blacks are
treated in your community-the same as whites are, not
very well, or badly?
Now, as I read some
statements on a few

4

0.939

-0.792

0.955

-0.504

4

0.673

-0.931

-0.13

-0.765

3

0.816

-0.446

0.927

-0.578

9

0.862

-0.143

0.78

0.082

14

0.731

-0.824

0.728

-0.731

3

0.934

-0.108

0.856

-0.556

4

0.822

-0.665

0.279

-0.69

7

0.958

0.086

---

---

8

0.771

-0.266

0.831

0.631
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Gallup, CNN/ORC

Gallup, CNN/ORC

Gallup, CNN, Pew
Research Center

Public Religion
Research Institute

CBS News/New
York Times

CBS News/New
York Times,
Princeton Survey

different topics, please tell
me if you completely agree,
mostly agree, mostly
disagree or completely
disagree with each
one....Today discrimination
against whites has become
as big a problem as
discrimination against
blacks and other minorities
In general, do you think that
Black children have as good
a chance as white children
in your community to get a
good education, or don’t
you think they have as good
a chance?
In general, do you think that
Black people have as good
a chance as white people in
your community to get any
kind of job for which they
are qualified, or don’t you
think they have as good a
chance?
How serious a problem do
you think racial
discrimination against
blacks is in this country--a
very serious problem, a
somewhat serious problem,
not too serious, or not at all
serious?
(Now, please read the
following statements on a
few different topics and say
if you agree or disagree
with each one....Completely
agree, mostly agree, mostly
disagree, completely
disagree)...Over the past
couple of decades, the
government has paid too
much attention to the
problems of blacks and
other minorities
Do you think the
government in Washington
is paying too much, not
enough, or about the right
amount of attention to the
needs and problems of
blacks and other minorities?
In recent years, do you
think too much has been
made of the problems

14

0.401

-0.356

0.653

0.909

17

0.461

0.617

0.184

0.711

8

0.895

0.682

0.973

0.189

5

0.277

0.465

0.712

0.717

5

0.981

0.95

0.848

0.81

4

0.59

0.973

0.831

0.956

484
Research
Associates
International

Kaiser Family
Foundation

Kaiser Family
Foundation

ANES

ANES

ANES

ANES

General Social
Survey

facing black people, too
little has been made, or is it
about right?
Thinking specifically about
African Americans, do you
think the average African
American is better off,
worse off, or just as well off
as the average white person
in terms of...income? Is that
a lot better/worse off or just
a little?
Thinking specifically about
African Americans, do you
think the average African
American is better off,
worse off, or just as well off
as the average white person
in terms of...education? Is
that a lot better/worse off or
just a little?
Over the past few years
blacks have gotten less than
they deserve
(Agree/Disagree)
Irish, Italians, Jewish and
many other minorities
overcame prejudice
and worked their way up.
Blacks should to the same
without any
special favors
(Agree/Disagree)
Generations of slavery and
discrimination have created
conditions
that make it difficult for
blacks to work their way
out of the lower
class (Agree/Disagree)
It's really a matter of some
people not trying hard
enough; if blacks would
only try harder they could
be just as well off as whites.
(Agree/Disagree)
Irish, Italians, Jewish and
many other minorities
overcame prejudice
and worked their way up.
Blacks should to the same
without any
special favors
(Agree/Disagree)

3

0.987

0.971

0.996

0.84

3

0.96

0.953

0.991

0.871

17

0.839

0.866

0.849

0.888

18

0.918

0.522

0.871

0.645

16

0.709

0.712

0.627

0.848

17

0.877

0.489

0.808

0.583

13

0.977

0.173

0.915

0.004
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CCES

CCES

CCES

Public Religion
Research Institute

ABC News

Pew Research
Center

Pew Research
Center

USA Today, ABC
News/Washington
Post, Public
Religion Research
Institute, Pew
Research Center
Monmouth
University Polling
Institute

Irish, Italians, Jewish and
many other minorities
overcame prejudice
and worked their way up.
Blacks should to the same
without any
special favors
(Agree/Disagree)
Generations of slavery and
discrimination have created
conditions
that make it difficult for
blacks to work their way
out of the lower
class (Agree/Disagree)
It's really a matter of some
people not trying hard
enough; if blacks would
only try harder they could
be just as well off as whites.
(Agree/Disagree)
It's really a matter of some
people not trying hard
enough; if blacks would
only try harder they could
be just as well off as whites.
(Agree/Disagree)
If Blacks would try harder,
they could be just as well
off as Whites
(Agree/Disagree)
In the past few years there
hasn't been much real
improvement in the position
of black people in this
country (Agree/Disagree)
(How much of a problem do
you think each of the
following are in the country
today?... A very big
problem, a moderately big
problem, a small problem,
not a problem at all)...
Racism
Do you think recent killings
of black Americans by
police are isolated incidents
or part of a larger pattern in
the police's treatment of
black Americans?
Do you think that racial and
ethnic discrimination in the
United States is a problem
or not a problem? Is it a big

7

0.955

0.879

0.953

0.472

6

0.937

0.833

0.96

0.562

3

0.948

0.946

0.978

0.89

3

0.998

-0.58

0.997

-0.956

4

0.313

0.605

0.583

-0.272

15

0.638

0.671

-0.614

-0.66

3

0.752

-0.257

0.924

-0.987

4

0.912

0.879

0.888

0.148

3

0.917

0.645

0.833

0.508
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ABC/Washington
Post

ABC/Washington
Post, Kaiser Family
Foundation, Gallup

Gallup

Gallup

Gallup

Gallup

Gallup

problem or a small
problem?
Do you think black people
who live in your
community experience
racial discrimination, or
not? Do you think it
happens often, occasionally,
or rarely?
Do you think the federal
government should or
should not pay money to
black Americans whose
ancestors were slaves as
compensation for that
slavery?
In Brown vs. Board of
Education, the Supreme
Court ruled that racial
segregation in all public
schools is illegal. This
means that all children, no
matter what their race, must
be allowed to go to the
same schools. Do you
approve or disapprove of
this decision?
Do you think the_____
Administration is pushing
racial integration too fast, or
not fast enough?
Who do you think is more
to blame for the present
conditions in which blacks
find themselves--white
people or blacks
themselves?
Now again remembering
that government spending
has to be paid for out of our
taxes, let me mention some
other types of programs and
ask whether you think the
amount of tax money being
spent for each purpose
should be increased, kept at
the present level, reduced or
ended altogether? Programs
to help improve the
situation of black
Americans?
In your view, which of the
following is better--letting
students go to the local

4

-0.779

0.682

---

---

5

0.952

0.465

0.98

-0.379

7

0.992

0.931

---

---

7

-0.318

0.912

---

---

5

-0.291

-0.625

0.998

0.265

3

1

-0.94

---

---

3

0.177

-0.951

---

---
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Gallup

ANES

ANES

ANES

school in their community,
even if it means that most
of the students would be the
same race, or transferring
students to other schools to
create more integration,
even if it means that some
students would have to
travel out of their
communities to go to
school?
Do you believe that more
should be done--or that less
should be done--to integrate
schools throughout the
nations?
Some people say that the
government in Washington
should see to it that
white and black (19621966: colored; 1968,1970:
Negro) children go (19641970: are allowed to go) to
the same schools. Others
claim this is not
the government's business.
Do you think the
government in Washington
should... (see to it that white
and black children go
(1962-1970: are allowed to
go) to the same schools;
stay out of this area)
Some say that the civil
rights people have been
trying to push too fast.
Others feel they haven't
pushed fast enough. How
about you: Do you think
that civil rights leaders are
trying to push too fast, are
going too slowly, or are
they moving about the right
speed?
Some people think that
certain groups have too
much influence
in American life and
politics, while other people
feel that certain groups
don't have as much
influence as they deserve. I
am going to read you a list
of groups, for each one
please tell me whether that
group has too much

3

0.939

0.983

---

---

13

0.75

-0.613

0.699

0.457

13

0.745

0.913

0.396

0.496

4

0.939

0.694

0.96

0.775
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ANES

CCES

CBS News/New
York Times

ABC News

ANES

influence, just about the
right amount of influence or
too little influence.
What about blacks?
Would you say that blacks
have too much influence in
American
politics, just about the right
amount of influence in
American
politics, or too little
influence in American
politics?
Affirmative action
programs give preference to
racial minorities in
employment and college
admissions in order to
correct for past
discrimination. Do you
support or oppose
affirmative action?
Do you think the police in
most big cities are generally
tougher on whites than on
blacks, or tougher on blacks
than on whites, or do the
police treat them both the
same?
(I am going to read you a
few statements and for each
I'd like you to tell me
whether you tend to agree
or disagree with it, or if
perhaps you have no
opinion about the
statement?)...Discrimination
has unfairly held down
Blacks, but many of the
problems which Blacks in
this country have today are
brought on by Blacks
themselves
Would you say that whites
have [too much influence in
American politics, just
about the right amount of
influence in American
politics, or too little
influence
in American politics?

3

0.831

0.959

0.883

0.942

5

0.84

-0.62

0.556

-0.786

3

0.884

-0.806

0.999

0.827

3

0.884

-0.241

---

---

8

0.915

0.788

0.915

0.665
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Appendix B.2 Non-Racial Policy Liberalism Indexes
Source

Item

N

White

White
Dem.

White
Repub.

White
Lib.

White
Con.

ANES

Around election time
people talk about
different things that our
government in
Washington is doing or
should be doing. Now I
would like to talk to you
about some of the things
that our government
might do. Of course,
different things are
important to different
people, so we don’t
expect everyone to have
an opinion about all of
these. I would like you to
look at this card as I read
each question and tell me
how you feel about the
question. If you don’t
have an opinion, just tell
me that; if you do have
an opinion, choose one
of the other answers.]
(CARD WITH
RESPONSE CHOICES
SHOWN TO R: AGREE
STRONGLY/ AGREE
BUT NOT VERY
STRONGLY/ NOT
SURE, IT
DEPENDS/DISAGREE
BUT NOT VERY
STRONGLY/
DISAGREE VERY
STRONGLY). ‘The
government ought to
help people get doctors
and hospital care at low
cost.’ 1962: Now on a
different problem. ‘The
government ought to
help people get doctors
and hospital care at low
cost.’ Do you have an
opinion on this or not?
(IF YES:) Do you agree
that the government
should do this or do you
think the government
should not do it.

5

0.943

0.943

0.958

---

---
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1964,1968: Some say the
government in
Washington ought to
help people get doctors
and hospital care at low
cost; others say the
government should not
get into this. Have you
been interested enough
in this to favor one side
over the other? (IF YES)
What is your position?
1956-1960: (Same
introduction as in
VCF0805 [CARD WITH
RESPONSES
SHOWN]). ‘The
government in
Washington ought to see
to it that everybody who
wants to work can find a
job.’ 1964,1968: In
general, some people
feel that the government
in Washington should
see to it that every
person has a job and a
good standard of living.
Others think the
government should just
let each person get ahead
on his own.’ Have you
been interested enough
in this to favor one side
over the other. (IF YES:)
Do you think that the
government – 2002:
Some people feel the
government in
Washington should see
to it that every person
has A JOB AND A
GOOD STANDARD OF
LIVING. Others think
the government should
just LET EACH
PERSON GET AHEAD
ON THEIR OWN.
Which is closer to the
way you feel or haven’t
you thought much about
this?
Should federal spending
on food stamps be

6

0.979

0.967

0978

---

---

8

0.855

0.434

0.947

0.454

0.826

491
increased, decreased or
kept about the same?

Some people think the
government should
provide fewer services,
even in areas such as
health and education, in
order to reduce spending.
(2004: Suppose these
people are at one end of
a scale, at point 1.) Other
people feel that it is
important for the
government to provide
many more services even
if it means an increase in
spending. (2004:
Suppose these people are
at the other end, at point
7. And of course, some
other people have
opinions somewhere in
between, at points
2,3,4,5, or 6.) Where
would you place yourself
on this scale, or haven’t
you thought much about
this? (7-POINT SCALE
SHOWN TO R)
Some people feel that the
government in
Washington should see
to it that every person
has a job and a good
standard of living.
(1972- 1978,1996LATER: Suppose these
people are at one end of
a scale, at point 1).
Others think the
government should just
let each person get ahead
on his/their own. (19721978,1996: Suppose
these people are at the
other end, at point 7.
And, of course, some
other people have
opinions somewhere in
between, at pints 2,3,4,5
or 6.)
Where would you place
yourself on this scale, or

14

0.688

0.774

0.737

0.900

0.709

19

0.212

0.715

0.448

0.593

0.545
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haven’t you thought
much about this? (7POINT SCALE
SHOWN TO R)
There is much concern
about the rapid rise in
medical and hospital
costs. Some (1988,1994LATER: people) feel
there should be a
government insurance
plan which would cover
all medical and hospital
expenses (1984 AND
LATER: for everyone).
(1996,2004: Suppose
these people are at one
end of a scale, at point
1). Others feel that
(1988,1994-1996: all)
medical expenses should
be paid by individuals,
and through private
insurance (1984 AND
LATER: plans) like Blue
Cross (1984-1994: or
[1996:some] other
company paid plans).
(1996,2004: Suppose
these people are at the
other end, at point 7.
And of course, some
people have opinions
somewhere in between at
points 2,3,4,5 or 6.)
Where would you place
yourself on this scale, or
haven’t you thought
much about this? (7POINT SCALE
SHOWN TO R)
Next, I am going to ask
you to choose which of
two statements I read
comes closer to your
own opinion. You might
agree to some extent
with both, but we want
to know which one is
closer to your (2000:
own) views: ONE, the
less government the
better; or TWO, there are
more things that

14

0.704

0.874

0.849

0.750

0.817

7

0.973

-0.490

0.968

-0.413

0.908

493
government should be
doing
Next, I am going to ask
you to choose which of
two statements I read
comes closer to your
own opinion. You might
agree to some extent
with both, but we want
to know which one is
closer to your (2000:
own) views: ONE, the
main reason government
has become bigger over
the years is because it
has gotten involved in
things that people should
do for themselves; or
TWO, government has
become bigger because
the problems we face
have become bigger
Next, I am going to ask
you to choose which of
two statements I read
comes closer to your
own opinion. You might
agree to some extent
with both, but we want
to know which one is
closer to your (2000:
own) views: ONE, we
need a strong
government to handle
today’s complex
economic problems; or
TWO, the free market
can handle these
problems without
government being
involved
Should federal spending
on poor people/aid to the
poor/ aid to poor people
be increased, decreased
or kept about the same?
Should federal spending
on the childcare be
increased, decreased or
kept about the same?

7

0.915

-0.649

0.932

-0.398

0.926

7

0.911

-0.062

0.935

0.182

0.968

8

0.853

0.161

0.884

0.209

0.894

11

0.605

0.122

0.715

-0.079

0.706
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Should federal spending
on public schools be
increased, decreased or
kept about the same?
Should federal spending
on the
homeless/government
assistance to the
homeless/solving the
problem of the homeless
be increased, decreased
or kept about the same?
Should federal spending
on welfare programs be
increased, decreased or
kept about the same?
Should federal spending
on improving and
protecting the
environment (2000,2002:
environmental
protection;
2008,2012,2016:
protecting the
environment) be
increased, decreased, or
stay the same?

General Social
Survey

Some people think that
the government in
Washington ought to
reduce the income
differences between the
rich and the poor,
perhaps by raising the
taxes of wealthy families
or by giving income
assistance to the poor.
Others think that the
government should not
concern itself with
reducing this income
difference between the
rich and the poor. Here is
a card with a scale from
1 to 7. Think of a score
of 1 as meaning that the
government ought to
reduce the income
differences between rich
and poor, and a score of
7 meaning that the
government should not

12

0.785

0.567

0.805

0.321

0.724

4

0.988

0.958

0.986

0.805

0.940

9

0.607

0.796

0.624

0.870

0.576

12

0.920

0.674

0.951

0.342

0.937

24

0.643

0.739

0.827

0.655

0.739
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concern itself with
reducing income
differences. What score
between 1 and 7 comes
closest to the way you
feel? (CIRCLE ONE).
Listed below are various
areas of government
spending. Please indicate
whether you would like
to see more or less
government spending in
each area. Remember
that if you say "much
more," it might require a
tax increase to pay for it.
A. The environment.
Some people think that
the government in
Washington should do
everything possible to
improve the standard of
living of all poor
Americans; they are at
Point 1 on this card.
Other people think it is
not the government's
responsibility, and that
each person should take
care of himself; they are
at Point 5.
A. Where would you
place yourself on this
scale, or haven't you
have up your mind on
this?
Some people think that
the government in
Washington is trying to
do too many things that
should be left to
individuals and private
businesses. Others
disagree and think that
the government should
Do even
more to solve our
country's problems. Still
others have opinions
somewhere in between.
A. Where would you
place yourself on this
scale, or haven't you

5

0.964

0.971

0.943

0.921

0.989

23

0.701

0.664

0.833

0.694

0.804

23

0.687

0.636

0.850

0.696

0.764
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made up your mind on
this?
In general, some people
think that it is the
responsibility of the
government in
Washington to see to it
that people have help in
paying for doctors and
hospital bills. Others
think that these matters
are not the responsibility
of the federal
government and that
people should take care
of these things
themselves.
A. Where would you
place yourself on this
scale, or haven't you
made up your mind on
this?
Here are some things the
government might do for
the economy. Circle one
number for each action
to show whether you are
in favor of it or against
it.
A. Control of wages by
legislation.
We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going
to name some of these
problems, and for each
one I'd like you to name
some of these problems,
and for each one I'd like
you to tell me whether
you think we're spending
too much money on it,
too little money, or about
the right amount. First
(READ ITEM A) . . . are
we spending too much,
too little, or about the
right amount on
(ITEM)?
K. Welfare

23

0.852

0.735

0.925

0.766

0.892

3

-0.266

0.035

-0.307

0.455

0.388

31

0.780

0.899

0.777

0.839

0.785
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We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going
to name some of these
problems, and for each
one I'd like you to name
some of these problems,
and for each one I'd like
you to tell me whether
you think we're spending
too much money on it,
too little money, or about
the right amount. First
(READ ITEM A) . . . are
we spending too much,
too little, or about the
right amount on
(ITEM)?
B. Improving and
protecting the
environment
We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going
to name some of these
problems, and for each
one I'd like you to name
some of these problems,
and for each one I'd like
you to tell me whether
you think we're spending
too much money on it,
too little money, or about
the right amount. First
(READ ITEM A) . . . are
we spending too much,
too little, or about the
right amount on
(ITEM)?
G. Improving the
nation's education
system
We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going
to name some of these
problems, and for each
one I'd like you to name

31

0.919

0.859

0.951

0.817

0.937

31

0.529

0.844

0.432

0.640

0.706

22

0.167

-0.267

0.357

-0.033

0.593
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some of these problems,
and for each one I'd like
you to tell me whether
you think we're spending
too much money on it,
too little money, or about
the right amount. First
(READ ITEM A) . . . are
we spending too much,
too little, or about the
right amount on
(ITEM)?
L. Highways and bridges
We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going
to name some of these
problems, and for each
one I'd like you to name
some of these problems,
and for each one I'd like
you to tell me whether
you think we're spending
too much money on it,
too little money, or about
the right amount. First
(READ ITEM A) . . . are
we spending too much,
too little, or about the
right amount on
(ITEM)?
N. Mass Transportation
We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going
to name some of these
problems, and for each
one I'd like you to name
some of these problems,
and for each one I'd like
you to tell me whether
you think we're spending
too much money on it,
too little money, or about
the right amount. First
(READ ITEM A) . . . are
we spending too much,
too little, or about the
right amount on
(ITEM)?

22

-0.234

0.708

0.041

0.653

0.061

10

0.875

0.218

0.857

0.219

0.871
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P. Assistance for
childcare
We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going
to name some of these
problems, and for each
one I'd like you to tell
me whether you think
we're spending too much
money on it, too little
money, or about the right
amount. First (READ
ITEM A) . . . are we
spending too much, too
little, or about the right
amount on (ITEM)?
C. Health
We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going
to name some of these
problems, and for each
one I'd like you to tell
me whether you think
we're spending too much
money on it, too little
money, or about the right
amount. First (READ
ITEM A) . . . are we
spending too much, too
little, or about the right
amount on (ITEM)?
K. Assistance to the poor
We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going
to name some of these
problems, and for each
one I'd like you to name
some of these problems,
and for each one I'd like
you to tell me whether
you think we're spending
too much money on it,
too little money, or about
the right amount. First

22

0.918

0.073

0.916

0.149

0.899

22

0.647

0.732

0.673

0.571

0.675

31

0.823

0.413

0.901

0.510

0.866
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(READ ITEM A) . . . are
we spending too much,
too little, or about the
right amount on
(ITEM)?
C. Improving and
protecting the nation's
health
We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going
to name some of these
problems, and for each
one I'd like you to name
some of these problems,
and for each one I'd like
you to tell me whether
you think we're spending
too much money on it,
too little money, or about
the right amount. First
(READ ITEM A) . . . are
we spending too much,
too little, or about the
right amount on
(ITEM)?
O. Parks and recreation
We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going
to name some of these
problems, and for each
one I'd like you to name
some of these problems,
and for each one I'd like
you to tell me whether
you think we're spending
too much money on it,
too little money, or about
the right amount. First
(READ ITEM A) . . . are
we spending too much,
too little, or about the
right amount on
(ITEM)?
R. Developing
alternative energy
sources

22

0.363

0.779

0.633

0.105

0.614

5

0.547

0.060

0.217

0.568

0.416
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We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going
to name some of these
problems, and for each
one I'd like you to tell
me whether you think
we're spending too much
money on it, too little
money, or about the right
amount. First (READ
ITEM A) . . . are we
spending too much, too
little, or about the right
amount on (ITEM)?
B. The environment
We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going
to name some of these
problems, and for each
one I'd like you to name
some of these problems,
and for each one I'd like
you to tell me whether
you think we're spending
too much money on it,
too little money, or about
the right amount. First
(READ ITEM A) . . . are
we spending too much,
too little, or about the
right amount on
(ITEM)?
D. Solving the problems
of the big cities
We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going
to name some of these
problems, and for each
one I'd like you to tell
me whether you think
we're spending too much
money on it, too little
money, or about the right
amount. First (READ
ITEM A) . . . are we

22

0.912

0.732

0.942

0.495

0.923

31

0.687

0.766

0.710

0.647

0.675

22

0.372

0.601

0.506

0.455

0.530

502
spending too much, too
little, or about the right
amount on (ITEM)?
D. Assistance to big
cities

We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going
to name some of these
problems, and for each
one I'd like you to tell
me whether you think
we're spending too much
money on it, too little
money, or about the right
amount. First (READ
ITEM A) . . . are we
spending too much, too
little, or about the right
amount on (ITEM)?
G. Education
We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going
to name some of these
problems, and for each
one I'd like you to name
some of these problems,
and for each one I'd like
you to tell me whether
you think we're spending
too much money on it,
too little money, or about
the right amount. First
(READ ITEM A) . . . are
we spending too much,
too little, or about the
right amount on
(ITEM)?
F. Dealing with drug
addiction
We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going

22

0.581

0.449

0.649

0.493

0.762

31

0.550

0.126

0.581

0.005

0.589

22

0.729

-0.002

0.795

0.052

0.788
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to name some of these
problems, and for each
one I'd like you to tell
me whether you think
we're spending too much
money on it, too little
money, or about the right
amount. First (READ
ITEM A) . . . are we
spending too much, too
little, or about the right
amount on (ITEM)?
F. Drug rehabilitation
We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going
to name some of these
problems, and for each
one I'd like you to name
some of these problems,
and for each one I'd like
you to tell me whether
you think we're spending
too much money on it,
too little money, or about
the right amount. First
(READ ITEM A) . . . are
we spending too much,
too little, or about the
right amount on
(ITEM)?
A. Space exploration
program
We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going
to name some of these
problems, and for each
one I'd like you to tell
me whether you think
we're spending too much
money on it, too little
money, or about the right
amount. First (READ
ITEM A) . . . are we
spending too much, too
little, or about the right
amount on (ITEM)?
A. Space exploration

30

-0.117

0.650

-0.246

0.528

-0.236

22

-0.275

0.727

-0.408

0.492

-0.443
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We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going
to name some of these
problems, and for each
one I'd like you to name
some of these problems,
and for each one I'd like
you to tell me whether
you think we're spending
too much money on it,
too little money, or about
the right amount. First
(READ ITEM A) . . . are
we spending too much,
too little, or about the
right amount on
(ITEM)?
Q. Supporting scientific
research
We are faced with many
problems in this country,
none of which can be
solved easily or
inexpensively. I'm going
to name some of these
problems, and for each
one I'd like you to name
some of these problems,
and for each one I'd like
you to tell me whether
you think we're spending
too much money on it,
too little money, or about
the right amount. First
(READ ITEM A) . . . are
we spending too much,
too little, or about the
right amount on
(ITEM)?
M. Social Security
Here are some things the
government might do for
the economy. Circle one
number for each action
to show whether you are
in favor of it or against
it.
C. Cuts in government
spending.

9

0.480

0.677

0.553

0.740

0.612

22

0.402

0.669

0.245

0.655

0.286

5

0.010

0.849

-0.034

0.822

-0.449
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Listed below are various
areas of government
spending. Please indicate
whether you would like
to see more or less
government spending in
each area. Remember
that if you say "much
more," it might require a
tax increase to pay for it.
B. Health.
Listed below are various
areas of government
spending. Please indicate
whether you would like
to see more or less
government spending in
each area. Remember
that if you say "much
more," it might require a
tax increase to pay for it.
D. Education.
Listed below are various
areas of government
spending. Please indicate
whether you would like
to see more or less
government spending in
each area. Remember
that if you say "much
more," it might require a
tax increase to pay for it.
G. Unemployment
benefits.
Listed below are various
areas of government
spending. Please indicate
whether you would like
to see more or less
government spending in
each area. Remember
that if you say "much
more," it might require a
tax increase to pay for it.
H. Culture and the arts.
Here are some things the
government might do for
the economy. Circle one
number for each action
to show whether you are
in favor of it or against
it.

5

0.836

0.411

0.842

0.672

0.927

5

0.895

0.821

0.894

0.903

0.944

5

0.437

0.795

0.615

0.799

0.757

5

0.189

0.880

0.358

0.938

-0.140

5

0.887

0.751

0.783

0.797

0.588
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E. Less government
regulation of business.
Here are some things the
government might do for
the economy. Circle one
number for each action
to show whether you are
in favor of it or against
it.
B. Control of prices by
legislation.
On the whole, do you
think it should or should
not be the government's
responsibility to . . .
A. Provide a job for
everyone who wants one.
On the whole, do you
think it should or should
not be the government's
responsibility to . . .
B. Keep prices under
control.
On the whole, do you
think it should or should
not be the government's
responsibility to . . .
C. Provide health care
for the sick.
On the whole, do you
think it should or should
not be the government's
responsibility to . . .
D. Provide a decent
standard of living for the
old.
On the whole, do you
think it should or should
not be the government's
responsibility to . . .
E. Provide industry with
the help it needs to grow.
On the whole, do you
think it should or should
not be the government's
responsibility to . . .
F. Provide a decent

3

0.849

0.186

0.561

-0.420

0.998

8

0.769

0.091

0.716

0.266

0.825

5

0.785

-0.176

0.847

0.156

0.940

5

0.855

0.794

0.888

0.974

0.948

6

0.128

0.233

0.143

0.167

0.477

5

0.701

0.979

0.589

0.907

0.791

6

0.583

0.736

0.797

0.549

0.895
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standard of living for the
unemployed.
On the whole, do you
think it should or should
not be the government's
responsibility to . . .
G. Reduce income
differences between the
rich and poor.
On the whole, do you
think it should or should
not be the government's
responsibility to . . .
H. Give financial
assistance to college
students from lowincome families.
On the whole, do you
think it should or should
not be the government's
responsibility to . . .
I. Provide decent
housing for those who
can't afford it.
Do you agree or
disagree?
B. It is the responsibility
of the government to
reduce the differences in
income between people
with high incomes and
those with low incomes.
Generally, how would
you describe (Much too
high, Much too low)
taxes in America today...
We mean all taxes
together, including social
security, income tax,
sales tax, and all the rest.
A. First, for those with
high incomes, are taxes .
..

Pew Values
Survey

Government regulation
of business usually does
more harm than good
(Agree, Disagree)
The federal government
should run ONLY those

7

0.046

0.874

0.424

0.823

0.571

4

0.465

0.689

0.746

0.643

0.681

4

0.559

0.984

0.636

0.869

0.606

8

0.676

0.780

0.349

0.870

0.444

5

0.586

0.556

0.571

0.229

0.595

12

0.006

0.012

0.584

-0.920

0.841

11

-0.585

0.198

0.240

-0.557

0.784
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Democracy
Fund Voter
Study Group

Cooperative
Congressional
Election Study

things that cannot be run
at the local level (Agree,
Disagree)
The federal government
controls too much of our
daily lives
There needs to be stricter
laws and regulations to
protect the environment
It is the responsibility of
the government to take
care of people who can't
take care of
themselves
The government should
help more needy people
even if it means going
deeper in debt
The government should
guarantee every citizen
enough to eat and a place
to sleep
Do you think it is the
responsibility of the
federal government to
see to it that everyone
has health care
coverage?
How important are the
following issues to you?
The size of government.
Do you favor raising
taxes on families with
incomes over $200,000
per year?
In general, do you think
there is too much or too
little regulation of
business by the
government?
Do you think the health
care reform bill that
passed in 2010 should be
expanded, kept the same,
or repealed?
Do you support or
oppose each of the
following proposals?
Give the Environmental
Protection Agency
power to regulate
Carbon Dioxide
emissions

15

0.329

0.148

0.765

-0.909

0.928

9

0.888

0.888

0.806

0.529

0.972

13

0.843

0.661

0.805

0.841

0.993

14

0.909

0.861

0.903

0.239

0.983

14

0.793

0.908

0.757

0.085

0.997

4

0.952

0.817

-0.970

-0.489

-0.728

3

-0.622

0.060

0.027

-0.589

0.752

5

-0.666

-0.535

-0.834

-0.184

0.059

3

-0.498

0.221

-0.859

0.715

-0.540

4

0.970

0.938

0.210

0.968

-0.474

7

0.044

0.650

0.244

0.145

0.409
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Do you support or
oppose each of the
following proposals?
Require that each state
use a minimum amount
of renewable fuels
(wind, solar, and
hydroelectric) in the
generation of electricity
even if electricity prices
increase a little

7

0.761

0.918

0.582

0.789

0.776

7

0.983

0.970

0.904

0.949

0.790

44.95%

44.69%

50.71%

35.15%

52.43%

Do you support or
oppose each of the
following proposals?
Strengthen the
Environmental
Protection Agency
enforcement of the Clean
Air Act and Clean Water
Act even if it costs U.S.
jobs
1st Dimension:
% Variance
Explained

Appendix B.3 Alternative specifications for lagged dependent variable model of white
racial liberalism
White
(a)
Racial
Liberalism
(t-1)

(b)

(c)

(d)

0.716*** 0.655*** 0.601*** 0.615*** 0.458**
(0.102)
(0.156)
(0.150) (0.151) (0.126)

REM

0.242*
(0.096)

Race-Related Articles

---

White Proportion
of Population
White Proportion of
Democrats
Proportion
Boomer/Gen X
Proportion
Millenial/Gen-Z
Percent With College
Degree

(aa)

-----------

0.225** 0.451*** 0.422***
(0.074)
(0.127) (0.104)
-0.242** -0.278**
--(0.082) (0.088)
0.119
0.143
0.600
(0.175)
(0.174) (0.564)
-0.204
-0.203
-0.176
(0.236)
(0.231) (0.231)
0.294
----(0.444)
0.310
----(0.330)
---

---

---

(e)
0.438**
(0.131)

0.574*** 0.448***
(0.102)
(0.092)
-0.231** -0.139†
(0.082)
(0.078)
0.164
0.733
(0.623)
(0.719)
-0.046
0.254
(0.290)
(0.294)
-1.12
-0.351
(0.798)
(0.993)
-0.899
-0.405
(0.623)
(0.671)
1.93*
1.81*
(0.744)
(0.733)
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0.036
(0.137)
0.080
(0.057)
0.137*
(0.063)

Civil Rights Spending

---

---

---

---

---

Consumer Sentiment

---

---

---

---

---

Non-Racial
Public Policy Mood

---

---

---

---

---

Constant

0.052**
(0.061)

0.048
(0.065)

0.044†
(0.058)

0.045**
(0.062)

0.033
(0.054)

0.032
(0.054)

0.792

0.789

0.814

0.811

0.845

0.849

Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2

Appendix B.4 Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test results
At Level
1st Difference
2nd Difference
3rd Difference
5%
5%
Test
Test
Test
5% Critical Test 5% Critical
Lags
Critical
Critical
Value
Value
Statistic
Statistic
Statistic
Statistic
Value
Value
Sample
1
-1.025 -2.918 -5.413 -2.919
----Non----1
-2.917 -2.918
--------white
White
4
-0.417 -2.920 -3.210 -2.920
--------White
----3
0.300 -2.920 -3.823 -2.920
----Dem.
Non----white
1
-1.405 -2.918 -5.065 -2.919
----Dem.
7
-1.337 -2.923 -2.165 -2.923
-4.708
-2.923
----White
Repub.
1
-1.831 -2.918 -5.330 -2.919
--------White
----1
0.642 -2.938 -4.869 -2.941
----Lib.
White
----1
-1.655 -2.938 -4.313 -2.941
----Con.
9
2.194 -2.924
3.405
-2.924
-0.104
-2.924
-5.772
-2.924
REM
8
1.956 -2.923
4.419
-2.923
-1.741
-2.923
-4.656
-2.923
1
5.169 -2.917 -2.791 -2.917
-10.851
-2.918
Note. Lag-order determined by selection statistics. In cases where these indicators conflicted, more than one lagorder was tested. Null hypothesis assumes series non-stationarity. Test statistics in bold font exceed 5% critical
value, indicating trend-stationarity at the listed lag order.

Appendix B.5 Phillips-Perron unit-root test results
In Levels
1st Difference
2nd Difference
5%
5%
5%
Test
Test
Test
Lags
Critical
Critical
Critical
Statistic
Statistic
Statistic
Value
Value
Value
Sample
1
-0.950 -2.917 -7.811 -2.918
----Non1
-2.416 -2.917 -6.792 -2.918
----white
White
4
-0.824 -2.917 -8.501 -2.918
----White
3
0.592 -2.917 -7.716 -2.918
----Dem.
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Nonwhite
Dem.
White
Repub.
White
Lib.
White
Con.

1

-1.082

-2.917

-7.383

-2.918

---

---

7
1

-1.971
-1.878

-2.917
-2.917

-9.323
-9.400

-2.918
-2.918

-----

-----

1

0.474

-2.936

-7.024

-2.938

---

---

1

-1.872

-2.936

-6.532

-2.938

---

---

9
5.055 -2.916 -4.737 -2.917
----8
5.276 -2.916 -4.467 -2.917
----1
5.803 -2.916 -2.395 -2.917 -10.84 -2.918
Note. Lag-order determined by selection statistics. In cases of dissensus between statistics, more than one lag-order
was tested. Null hypothesis assumes series non-stationarity. Test statistics in bold font exceed 5% critical value,
indicating trend-stationarity at the listed lag order.
REM

Appendix B.6 Kwiatowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin stationarity test results
Lag
order
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

0.221
0.124
0.091
0.075
0.066
0.061
0.058
0.057
0.056
0.056
0.057

Nonwhite
0.380
0.209
0.154
0.127
0.113
0.103
0.097
0.094
0.093
0.093
0.094

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

0.105
0.104
0.103
0.105
0.103
0.099
0.101
0.102
0.101
0.101
0.103

0.074
0.063
0.063
0.067
0.073
0.077
0.077
0.078
0.081
0.085
0.090

0.085
0.091
0.112
0.110
0.102
0.102
0.105
0.104
0.100
0.101
0.104

0
1
2
3
4
5
6

---------------

---------------

---------------

Sample

White
0.215
0.125
0.094
0.077
0.068
0.062
0.059
0.057
0.056
0.057
0.057

At Level
White Non-white White
Dem.
Dem.
Repub.
0.351
0.579
1.14
0.201
0.317
0.598
0.15
0.229
0.412
0.124
0.186
0.318
0.109
0.160
0.262
0.099
0.143
0.225
0.095
0.130
0.198
0.092
0.121
0.179
0.090
0.114
0.164
0.089
0.108
0.153
0.091
0.104
0.144
First Difference
0.093
0.091
0.073
0.093
0.083
0.091
0.113
0.080
0.089
0.110
0.088
0.089
0.102
0.096
0.083
0.107
0.101
0.082
0.108
0.102
0.079
0.105
0.098
0.078
0.105
0.099
0.078
0.105
0.098
0.079
0.107
0.098
0.079
Second Difference
-------------------------------------------

White
Lib.
0.292
0.174
0.132
0.112
0.099
0.094
0.091
0.090
0.091
0.093
0.097

White
Con.
0.754
0.403
0.282
0.222
0.187
0.165
0.150
0.140
0.132
0.127
0.124

0.385
0.250
0.202
0.171
0.150
0.137
0.129
0.123
0.119
0.117
0.116

0.101
0.106
0.110
0.120
0.114
0.107
0.101
0.098
0.098
0.095
0.101

0.130
0.127
0.118
0.108
0.102
0.099
0.095
0.095
0.097
0.097
0.130

0.256
0.242
0.217
0.212
0.199
0.185
0.176
0.166
0.159
0.155
0.151

---------------

---------------

0.078
0.122
0.119
0.126
0.138
0.134
0.144

REM
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7
----------------0.141
8
----------------0.138
9
----------------0.141
10
----------------0.139
Note. Test statistics in bold font are smaller than the 5% critical value (0.146). Null hypothesis assumes trend
stationarity.

Appendix B.7 Clemente, Montanes, Reyes unit-root test results
At Level
1st Difference
2nd Difference
3rd Difference
Lags du1
du2
du1
du2
du1
du2
du1
du2
Sample
1
9.300 6.764
-0.996
2.169 -1.011
0.974
----Non1
1.286 -3.799
3.668
-3.706 -2.257
1.795
0.728
0.691
white
White
4
8.973 6.575
-1.382
2.271
0.965
-1.173
----White
3
9.571 8.442
-0.519
2.509 -0.922
1.118
----Dem.
Nonwhite
1
7.969 -2.574
1.358
-0.062
--------Dem.
7
White
13.383 -5.995
0.524
-1.103
--------Repub.
1
White
1
7.559 10.902 1.6745
2.550
0.053
0.006
----Lib.
White
1
5.794 -8.208
2.870
-1.924 -0.392
0.396
----Con.
9
----REM
8
3.405 9.157
0.857
2.095 -0.034
1.696
----1
----Note. 'du1’ and ‘du2’ refer to the first and second breakpoints. Test statistics in bold font are smaller than the 5%
critical value (0.146) for a given breakpoint. Null hypothesis assumes trend stationarity.
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Appendix C Chapter 5
Appendix C.1 Pre and post-Floyd trends in Twitter tweet frequency (top) and Google
search interest (bottom) for ‘LGBT’ and ‘People of color’/’PoC’

Note. Dashed red vertical line represents May 25 (the day of the incident)
Source: storywrangling.org, Google Trends
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Appendix C.2 White support for paying reparations to blacks by party identification

Source: ABC News (June 18, 1997; June 17-18, 2020), AP-NORC (September 20-23, 2019), CNN/Kaiser Family
Foundation (August 25-October 3, 2015), CNN/USA Today (February 8, 2002)

Appendix D Chapter 6
Appendix D.1 OLS model of pro-black policy support (complete results)
(a)
0.490***
Moral Shame
(0.045)
-0.161***
Image Shame
(0.034)
0.409***
Guilt
(0.051)
0.867***
Moral Shame + Guilt
(0.031)
Racial Resentment (r)

---

SDO-Egalitarianism

---

SDO-Anti-Dominance

---

Very liberal

---

Liberal

---

(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
0.297*** 0.179*** 0.372*** 0.168** 0.128**
(0.046)
(0.049) (0.044) (0.049) (0.048)
-0.095** -0.092** -0.144*** -0.097** -0.067*
(0.032)
(0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.030)
0.361*** 0.361*** 0.401*** 0.359*** 0.332***
(0.047)
(0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.042)
0.632*** 0.524*** 0.741*** 0.514*** 0.454***
(0.041)
(0.044) (0.037) (0.044) (0.043)
0.419***
0.411*** 0.351***
----(0.036)
(0.039) (0.040)
0.122*** 0.059†
0.044
----(0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
0.080** -0.029
-0.023
----(0.029) (0.030) (0.031)
-----------0.336***
-0.275***
------(0.062)
(0.060)
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Slightly liberal

---

Moderate

---

Slightly conservative

---

Conservative

---

Very conservative

---

Strong Democrat

---

Weak Democrat

---

Lean Democrat

---

Independent

---

Lean Republican

---

Weak Republican

---

Strong Republican

---

Less than High School

---

Some college

---

BA Degree

---

Graduate/Professional
degree

---

Age

---

Male

---

VIF Moral Shame

0.000
(0.022)
0.563
(-.0002)
3.33
(2.24)
3.48

VIF Image Shame

2.31

Constant
Adjusted R2
Mean VIF

-0.515***
----(0.077)
-0.685***
----(0.094)
-0.884
----(0.111)
-0.880***
----(0.119)
-0.866***
----(0.154)
------0.034
----(0.071)
0.121†
----(0.064)
0.085
----(0.089)
-0.049
----(0.116)
-0.006
----(0.109)
0.111
----(0.119)
-------0.107
----(0.062)
0.000
----(0.059)
0.143
----(0.072)
-0.069**
----(0.021)
0.038
----(0.021)
0.414
-0.009
0.002
(0.072)
(0.020) (0.022)
0.634
0.643
0.582
(.0004) (-.0017*) (.0005)
2.20
3.36
2.94
(2.03)
(2.69)
(2.32)
4.40
4.67
4.13
2.47
2.37
2.35
(2.45)
(2.33)
(2.31)
4.35
4.23
4.21

-0.391***
(0.074)
-0.478***
--(0.094)
-0.644***
--(0.111)
-0.637***
--(0.119)
-0.575***
--(0.156)
----0.052
--(0.067)
0.072
--(0.062)
0.116
--(0.082)
0.054
--(0.110)
0.118
--(0.105)
0.302*
--(0.123)
-----0.156**
--(0.059)
-0.055
--(0.057)
0.108
--(0.069)
-0.037
--(0.020)
0.035
--(0.020)
-0.008
0.307
(0.020) (0.070)
0.644
0.678
(-.002*) (.0015)
3.07
2.33 (2.19)
(2.63)
4.81
5.09
2.51
2.39
(2.50)
4.24
4.38
---

VIF Guilt
4.20
VIF Moral Shame +
2.24
3.45
3.72
2.96
3.83
4.24
Guilt
Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are standardized Beta coefficients with robust standard errors in
parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame
and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Adjusted R2 row correspond to changes in Adjusted R2
of models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows
indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted for the separate
indexes.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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Appendix D.2 Ordinal logit model of preferred immigration levels (complete results)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
2.92*** 2.03*** 1.68*** 2.14***
Moral Shame
(0.359)
(0.279) (0.234) (0.291)
0.588*** 0.664*** 0.668*** 0.629***
Image Shame
(0.060)
(0.070) (0.068) (0.065)
1.43**
1.28†
1.29†
1.42*
Guilt
(0.192)
(0.175) (0.166) (0.193)
4.03*** 2.45*** 2.10*** 2.92***
Moral Shame + Guilt
(0.421)
(0.311) (0.275) (0.352)
2.32***
Racial Resentment (r)
------(0.237)
1.13
SDO-Egalitarianism
------(0.111)
1.61***
SDO-Anti-Dominance
------(0.158)
Very liberal
--------0.501***
Liberal
------(0.096)
0.273***
Slightly liberal
------(0.063)
0.241***
Moderate
------(0.067)
0.292***
Slightly conservative
------(0.091)
0.164***
Conservative
------(0.068)
0.074***
Very conservative
------(0.048)
Strong Democrat
--------1.30
Weak Democrat
------(0.249)
1.39
Lean Democrat
------(0.299)
1.38
Independent
------(0.338)
1.45
Lean Republican
------(0.493)
0.611
Weak Republican
------(0.195)
0.837
Strong Republican
------(0.359)
High school or less
--------1.17
Some college
------(0.262)
1.21
BA Degree
------(0.263)
Graduate/Professional
1.72*
------Degree
(0.437)
0.985**
Age
------(0.005)

(e)
1.57**
(0.227)
0.679***
(0.070)
1.31*
(0.181)
1.99***
(0.269)
1.97***
(0.210)
1.03
(0.099)
1.37**
(0.137)
---------------------------------------

(f)
1.50**
(0.230)
0.702**
(0.074)
1.24
(0.172)
1.78***
(0.248)
1.66***
(0.185)
0.987
(0.095)
1.36**
(0.143)
--0.598**
(0.114)
0.370***
(0.087)
0.405**
(0.120)
0.510*
(0.174)
0.287**
(0.124)
0.134**
(0.090)
--1.31
(0.256)
1.26
(0.263)
1.36
(0.331)
1.66
(0.573)
0.737
(0.244)
1.24
(0.538)
--1.02
(0.232)
1.07
(0.238)
1.70*
(0.433)
0.987**
(0.005)

517

Male

---

Pseudo R2

0.086
(-.0048)
-3.38
(0.158)
-2.61
(0.122)
-1.98
(0.106)
-0.088
(0.073)
0.854
(0.079)
2.33
(0.110)
3.33
(2.24)
3.48
2.31
(2.24)
4.20

/cut1
/cut2
/cut3
/cut4
/cut5
/cut6
Mean VIF
VIF Moral Shame
VIF Image Shame

0.947
(0.124)
0.121
(-.0019)
-4.81
(0.355)
-3.98
(0.332)
-3.30
(0.327)
-1.27
(0.309)
-0.256
(0.306)
1.32
(0.310)
2.20
(1.95)
4.40
2.47
(2.34)
4.35

---

---

0.112
(-.0005)
-3.56
(0.168)
-2.76
(0.129)
-2.09
(0.107)
-0.064
(0.076)
0.934
(0.081)
2.46
(0.114)
3.36
(2.69)
4.67
2.37
(2.33)
4.23

0.104
(-.0012)
-3.52
(0.167)
-2.71
(0.127)
-2.04
(0.104)
-0.066
(0.075)
0.901
(0.080)
2.41
(0.113)
2.94
(2.30)
4.13
2.35
(2.31)
4.21

0.985
(0.130)
0.118
0.136
(-.0002) (-.0004)
-3.61
-4.61
(0.170) (0.363)
-2.80
-3.76
(0.130) (0.340)
-2.11
-3.05
(0.108) (0.335)
-0.056
-0.934
(0.077) (0.316)
0.949
0.107
(0.082) (0.313)
2.49
1.72
(0.115) (0.317)
3.07
2.33
(2.62)
(2.19)
4.81
5.09
2.39
2.51
(2.36)
(2.50)
4.24
4.38
---

VIF Guilt
VIF Moral Shame +
2.24
3.28
3.72
2.96
3.83
4.24
Guilt
Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cell
entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries
in parentheses in the Pseudo R2 row correspond to changes in Pseudo R2 of models where this combined index are
substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows indicate the VIF scores for models in which
the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Appendix D.3 Ordinal logit model of attitudes towards decriminalizing illegal border
crossings (complete results)
(a)
2.70***
(0.354)
0.798*
(0.078)
1.30*
(0.165)
3.46***
(0.396)

(b)
1.67***
(0.233)
0.960
(0.100)
1.18
(0.148)
1.88***
(0.239)

Racial Resentment (r)

---

---

SDO-Egalitarianism

---

---

---

SDO-Anti-Dominance

---

---

---

Very liberal

---

---

Liberal

---

--0.389***
(0.079)

1.25**
(0.096)
1.41***
(0.131)
---

---

---

Moral Shame
Image Shame
Guilt
Moral Shame + Guilt

(c)
1.49**
(0.216)
0.912
(0.093)
1.18
(0.154)
1.70***
(0.226)
2.49***
(0.258)

(d)
1.97***
(0.270)
0.848
(0.086)
1.29*
(0.163)
2.45***
(0.270)
---

(e)
(f)
1.39*
1.25
(0.201) (0.184)
0.915
1.00
(0.093) (0.106)
1.18
1.13
(0.147) (0.145)
1.60*** 1.38*
(0.207) (0.185)
2.19*** 1.68***
(0.236) (0.203)
1.17†
1.09
(0.109) (0.104)
1.18†
1.15
(0.112) (0.111)
----0.456***
--(0.092)
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Slightly liberal
Moderate
Slightly conservative
Conservative
Very conservative
Strong Democrat
Weak Democrat
Lean Democrat
Independent
Lean Republican
Weak Republican
Strong Republican
High school or less
Some college
BA Degree
Graduate/Professional
Degree
Age
Male
Pseudo R2
/cut1
/cut2
/cut3
/cut4
/cut5
/cut6
Mean VIF
VIF Moral Shame
VIF Image Shame
VIF Guilt

0.202***
(0.046)
0.157***
--(0.044)
0.106***
--(0.041)
0.195***
--(0.086)
0.091**
--(0.066)
----0.967
--(0.182)
1.73**
--(0.329)
1.29
--(0.331)
0.805
--(0.329)
0.434*
--(0.148)
0.907
--(0.477)
----1.32
--(0.260)
1.15
--(0.219)
1.48
--(0.353)
0.979***
--(0.005)
0.823
--(0.108)
0.086
0.121
(-.0048) (-.0019)
-3.38
-4.81
(0.158)
(0.355)
-2.61
-3.98
(0.122)
(0.332)
-1.98
-3.30
(0.106)
(0.327)
-0.088
-1.27
(0.073)
(0.309)
0.854
-0.256
(0.079)
(0.306)
2.33
1.32
(0.110)
(0.310)
3.33
2.20
(2.24)
(1.95)
3.48
4.40
2.31
2.47
(2.24)
(2.34)
4.20
4.35
---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

0.112
(-.0005)
-3.56
(0.168)
-2.76
(0.129)
-2.09
(0.107)
-0.064
(0.076)
0.934
(0.081)
2.46
(0.114)
3.36
(2.69)
4.67
2.37
(2.33)
4.23

0.104
(-.0012)
-3.52
(0.167)
-2.71
(0.127)
-2.04
(0.104)
-0.066
(0.075)
0.901
(0.080)
2.41
(0.113)
2.94
(2.30)
4.13
2.35
(2.31)
4.21

0.118
(-.0002)
-3.61
(0.170)
-2.80
(0.130)
-2.11
(0.108)
-0.056
(0.077)
0.949
(0.082)
2.49
(0.115)
3.07
(2.62)
4.81
2.39
(2.36)
4.24

0.267***
(0.062)
0.245***
(0.071)
0.164***
(0.065)
0.332*
(0.155)
0.157*
(0.114)
--0.949
(0.181)
1.55*
(0.299)
1.31
(0.327)
0.937
(0.389)
0.493*
(0.173)
1.28
(0.692)
--1.22
(0.238)
1.08
(0.206)
1.45
(0.344)
0.981***
(0.005)
0.841
(0.112)
0.136
(-.0004)
-4.61
(0.363)
-3.76
(0.340)
-3.05
(0.335)
-0.934
(0.316)
0.107
(0.313)
1.72
(0.317)
2.33
(2.19)
5.09
2.51
(2.50)
4.38
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VIF Moral Shame +
2.24
3.28
3.72
2.96
3.83
4.24
Guilt
Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cell
entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries
in parentheses in the Pseudo R2 row correspond to changes in Pseudo R2 of models where this combined index are
substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows indicate the VIF scores for models in which
the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Appendix D.4 OLS models of percent of immigration admissions allocated to nonEuropean countries (complete results)
(a)
(b)
(c)
6.04*** 2.66**
0.273
Moral Shame
(0.974) (0.963) (1.02)
-3.07*** -2.36** -1.77*
Image Shame
(0.799) (0.767) (0.748)
1.64
1.63
0.752
Guilt
(1.05)
(1.00) (0.989)
7.68*** 4.08***
1.01
Moral Shame + Guilt
(0.797) (0.956) (0.967)
7.87***
Racial Resentment (r)
----(0.757)
SDO-Egalitarianism

---

---

---

SDO-Anti-Dominance

---

---

---

Very liberal

---

---

Liberal

---

Slightly liberal

---

Moderate

---

Slightly conservative

---

Conservative

---

Very conservative

---

Strong Democrat

---

Weak Democrat

---

Lean Democrat

---

Independent

---

Lean Republican

---

Weak Republican

---

---3.00*
(1.39)
-3.58*
(1.80)
-4.62*
(2.10)
-8.69**
(2.72)
-4.43
(2.94)
-13.76**
(4.63)
--0.394
(1.62)
3.62*
(1.53)
2.13
(2.12)
0.128
(2.91)
-4.35†
(2.52)

(d)
2.84**
(0.971)
-2.03**
(0.753)
1.54
(1.00)
4.17***
(0.821)

(e)
-0.124
(0.991)
-1.34†
(0.733)
0.935
(0.973)
0.836
(0.936)
6.05***
--(0.816)
-0.513 -1.43*
(0.709) (0.694)
6.00*** 4.39***
(0.702) (0.700)
-----

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

(f)
-0.253
(0.966)
-1.48*
(0.733)
1.29
(0.966)
1.09
(0.966)
5.07***
(0.883)
-1.84**
(0.689)
4.54***
(0.743)
---1.12
(1.38)
-0.133
(1.80)
0.945
(2.08)
-3.17
(2.52)
2.08
(2.88)
-8.18†
(4.23)
--0.765
(1.53)
2.46†
(1.44)
2.08
(2.06)
1.29
(2.62)
-2.01
(2.33)
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Strong Republican

---

Less than High School

---

Some college

---

BA Degree

---

Graduate/Professional
degree

---

Age

---

Male

---

VIF Moral Shame

0.000
(0.022)
0.563
(-.0002)
3.33
(2.24)
3.48

VIF Image Shame

2.31

Constant
Adjusted R2
Mean VIF

-9.85**
-4.85†
------(3.00)
(2.76)
----------1.55
0.347
------(1.57)
(1.52)
3.43*
2.54†
------(1.58)
(1.52)
4.24*
4.33*
------(1.82)
(1.75)
-0.018
-0.003
------(0.039)
(0.038)
0.960
1.60
------(1.01)
(0.972)
0.414
-0.009
0.002
-0.008
0.307
(0.072) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.070)
0.634
0.643
0.582
0.644
0.678
(.0004) (-.0017*) (.0005) (-.002*) (.0015)
2.20
3.36
2.94
3.07
2.33 (2.19)
(2.03)
(2.69)
(2.32)
(2.63)
4.40
4.67
4.13
4.81
5.09
2.47
2.37
2.35
2.51
2.39
(2.45)
(2.33)
(2.31)
(2.50)
4.35
4.23
4.21
4.24
4.38

VIF Guilt
4.20
VIF Moral Shame +
2.24
3.45
3.72
2.96
3.83
4.24
Guilt
Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are standardized Beta coefficients with robust standard errors in
parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame
and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Adjusted R2 row correspond to changes in Adjusted R2
of models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows
indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Appendix D.5 OLS models non-white vs. white warmth (complete results)
(a)
(b)
11.96*** 8.30***
Moral Shame
(1.48)
(1.51)
-3.89**
-2.49*
Image Shame
(1.13)
(1.24)
1.91
1.50
Guilt
(1.55)
(1.41)
13.99*** 9.22***
Moral Shame + Guilt
(1.10)
(1.47)
Racial Resentment (r)

---

---

SDO-Egalitarianism

---

---

SDO-Anti-Dominance

---

---

Very liberal

---

Liberal

---

Slightly liberal

---

---7.58**
(2.27)
-10.08***
(2.77)

(c)
(d)
(e)
7.00*** 6.90*** 5.62***
(1.57)
(1.35)
(1.47)
-2.77* -2.44* -2.14†
(1.23)
(1.18)
(1.20)
1.15
1.71
1.45
(1.50)
(1.46)
(1.46)
7.46*** 8.18*** 6.48***
(1.51)
(1.25)
(1.44)
6.78***
2.62*
--(1.06)
(1.16)
0.854
0.174
--(1.02)
(1.06)
8.35*** 7.42***
--(0.995) (1.01)
---------

---

---

---

---

---

(f)
5.51***
(1.52)
-1.77
(1.22)
1.36
(1.40)
6.25***
(1.52)
1.78
(1.27)
0.055
(1.09)
6.71***
(1.05)
---5.00*
(2.26)
-5.81*
(2.80)
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-9.93**
-3.88
------(3.00)
(3.01)
-10.83**
-4.77
Slightly conservative
--------(4.06)
(3.91)
-8.47†
-1.14
Conservative
--------(4.64)
(4.39)
-7.49
-0.945
Very conservative
--------(7.25)
(6.39)
Strong Democrat
------------1.46
1.25
Weak Democrat
--------(2.31)
(2.31)
2.93
1.83
Lean Democrat
--------(2.45)
(2.43)
2.85
2.38
Independent
--------(3.13)
(3.07)
2.52
3.54
Lean Republican
--------(4.11)
(3.97)
-3.98
-1.59
Weak Republican
--------(4.15)
(3.91)
-10.87†
-5.97
Strong Republican
--------(5.70)
(5.02)
Less than High School
------------3.30
1.97
Some college
--------(2.30)
(2.26)
0.137
-0.347
BA Degree
--------(2.30)
(2.25)
Graduate/Professional
-1.42
-0.488
--------degree
(2.67)
(2.58)
-0.095†
-0.117*
Age
--------(0.053)
(0.051)
-4.09**
-3.04*
Male
--------(1.41)
(1.36)
0.000
0.414
-0.009
0.002
-0.008
0.307
Constant
(0.022) (0.072) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.070)
0.563
0.634
0.643
0.582
0.644
0.678
Adjusted R2
(-.0002) (.0004) (-.0017*) (.0005) (-.002*) (.0015)
3.33
2.20
3.36
2.94
3.07
Mean VIF
2.33 (2.19)
(2.24)
(2.03)
(2.69)
(2.32)
(2.63)
VIF Moral Shame
3.48
4.40
4.67
4.13
4.81
5.09
2.47
2.37
2.35
2.51
VIF Image Shame
2.31
2.39
(2.45)
(2.33)
(2.31)
(2.50)
VIF Guilt
4.20
4.35
4.23
4.21
4.24
4.38
VIF Moral Shame +
2.24
3.45
3.72
2.96
3.83
4.24
Guilt
Note. N=889 for all models. Cell entries are standardized Beta coefficients with robust standard errors in
parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame
and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Adjusted R2 row correspond to changes in Adjusted R2
of models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows
indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Moderate

---
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Appendix D.6 Logit models of ‘anti-white’ feeling thermometers (complete results)
(a)
6.36***
(1.82)
0.834
(0.132)
1.11
(0.293)
5.49***
(0.578)

(b)
5.13***
(1.68)
1.00
(0.174)
1.01
(0.275)
3.68***
(1.09)

(c)
3.83***
(1.24)
0.921
(0.151)
1.05
(0.277)
2.91***
(0.869)
1.69
(0.562)
1.32
(0.297)
1.13
(0.294)
---

(d)
3.94***
Moral Shame
(1.31)
1.05
Image Shame
(0.185)
0.993
Guilt
(0.237)
2.75**
Moral Shame + Guilt
(0.851)
1.47
Racial Resentment (r)
----(0.471)
1.30
SDO-Egalitarianism
----(0.312)
1.13
SDO-Anti-Dominance
----(0.320)
Very liberal
------5.53†
0.652
Liberal
----(0.169)
(0.201)
0.459†
0.596
Slightly liberal
----(0.205)
(0.268)
0.488
0.706
Moderate
----(0.288)
(0.408)
0.082**
0.127*
Slightly conservative
----(0.075)
(0.118)
Conservative
--empty
--empty
Very conservative
--empty
--empty
Strong Democrat
--------2.17*
2.15†
Weak Democrat
----(0.855)
(0.871)
1.42
1.31
Lean Democrat
----(0.475)
(0.444)
1.70
1.59
Independent
----(0.896)
(0.862)
2.22
2.78
Lean Republican
----(2.49)
(3.16)
1.26
1.85
Weak Republican
----(1.05)
(1.57)
Strong Republican
--empty
--empty
High school or less
--------1.51
1.54
Some college
----(0.694)
(0.711)
1.59
1.61
BA Degree
----(0.744)
(0.758)
Graduate/Professional
1.91
2.19
----Degree
(0.972)
(1.12)
0.960**
0.959**
Age
----(0.014)
(0.015)
0.977
0.962
Male
----(0.273)
(0.271)
0.040*** 0.130** 0.034*** 0.088***
Constant
(0.009)
(0.081) (0.008) (0.055)
Pseudo R2
0.086
0.121
0.112
0.104
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Mean VIF
VIF Moral Shame
VIF Image Shame

(-.0048)
3.33
(2.24)
3.48
2.31
(2.24)
4.20

(-.0019)
2.20
(1.95)
4.40
2.47
(2.34)
4.35

(-.0005)
3.36
(2.69)
4.67
2.37
(2.33)
4.23

(-.0012)
2.94
(2.30)
4.13
2.35
(2.31)
4.21

VIF Guilt
VIF Moral Shame +
2.24
3.28
3.72
2.96
Guilt
Note. N=889 for all models. Cell entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses. Shaded cell
entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries
in parentheses in the Pseudo R2 row correspond to changes in Pseudo R2 of models where this combined index are
substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows indicate the VIF scores for models in which
the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Appendix D.7 OLS models of monetary donations to racial justice and pro-immigration
advocacy groups (complete results)

Moral Shame
Image Shame
Guilt
Moral Shame
+ Guilt
Racial
Resentment
(r)
SDOEgalitarianism
SDODominance
Very liberal

Racial Justice Advocacy Group
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
0.898*** 0.857*** 0.869*** 0.869**
(0.218)
(0.243)
(0.256)
(0.261)
-0.310†
-0.274
-0.319†
-0.287
(0.181)
(0.186)
(0.184)
(0.187)
0.810**
0.722**
0.821**
0.741**
(0.242)
(0.244)
(0.242)
(0.244)
1.66***
1.51***
1.61***
1.52***
(0.169)
(0.216)
(0.229)
(0.239)
---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---0.590†
(0.349)
-0.622
(0.434)
-0.541
(0.493)
-0.746
(0.633)
-1.26*
(0.638)
-1.87*
(0.864)

Liberal

---

Slightly
liberal

---

Moderate

---

Slightly
conservative

---

Conservative

---

Very
conservative
Strong
Democrat

-----

---

-0.215
(0.197)

-0.277
(0.214)

0.202
(0.174)
0.118
(0.168)
---

0.151
(0.175)
0.190
(0.174)
---0.531
(0.352)
-0.553
(0.444)
-0.499
(0.512)
-0.700
(0.649)
-1.19†
(0.659)
-1.78*
(0.884)

---------------

---

Pro-Immigration Advocacy Group
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
0.559*
0.367
0.427†
0.356
(0.220)
(0.243)
(0.258)
(0.261)
-0.213
-0.109
-0.214
-0.128
(0.182)
(0.185)
(0.185)
(0.187)
0.937*** 0.797** 0.912*** 0.796***
(0.243)
(0.243)
(0.244)
(0.244)
1.42***
1.12***
1.30***
1.13***
(0.179)
(0.216)
(0.230)
(0.239)
---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---0.722*
(0.348)
-0.867*
(0.434)
-0.849†
(0.492)
-1.22†
(0.631)
-1.33*
(0.637)
-1.22
(0.862)

---------------

---

0.154
(0.198)

-0.044
(0.213)

0.220
(0.175)
-0.187
(0.169)
---

0.175
(0.175)
-0.121
(0.174)
---0.724*
(0.352)
-0.878*
(0.444)
-0.891†
(0.511)
-1.23†
(0.649)
-1.38*
(0.658)
-1.16
(0.884)

---------------

---
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Weak
Democrat
Lean
Democrat
Independent
Lean
Republican
Weak
Republican
Strong
Republican
High school
or less

---------------

Some college

---

BA Degree

---

Graduate/
Professional
Degree

---

Age

---

Male

---

Constant
Adjusted R2
Mean VIF

3.79***
(0.118)
0.139
(.0006)
3.32
(2.24)

0.210
(0.390)
0.300
(0.377)
-0.241
(0.514)
-0.242
(0.649)
0.350
(0.606)
1.40*
(0.647)
--0.052
(0.389)
0.087
(0.386)
0.313
(0.436)
0.001
(0.010)
0.296
(0.245)
3.90***
(0.526)
0.137
(.0009)
2.19
(1.94)

------------------------3.82***
(0.118)
0.139
(.001)
3.07
(2.61)

0.162
(0.390)
0.304
(0.377)
-0.277
(0.514)
-0.258
(0.651)
0.353
(0.609)
1.40*
(0.657)
--0.044
(0.389)
0.121
(0.387)
0.384
(0.437)
-0.002
(0.010)
0.333
(0.246)
3.94***
(0.537)
0.138
(.0006)
2.32
(2.18)

-------------------

0.106
(0.389)
0.360
(0.376)
-0.248
(0.513)
-0.286
(0.648)
-0.308
(0.604)
1.10†
(0.645)
---0.147
(0.388)
0.040
(0.386)

-------------------

0.084
(0.390)
0.369
(0.377)
-0.236
(0.514)
-0.258
(0.651)
-0.303
(0.608)
1.05
(0.656)
---0.140
(0.389)
0.046
(0.387)

---

0.603
(0.435)

---

0.602
(0.437)

---

-0.023*
(0.010)

---

-0.023*
(0.010)

---

0.042

---

0.029)

3.68***
(0.119)
0.114
(.0007)
3.32
(2.24)

4.97***
(0.525)
0.127
(.0004)
2.19
(1.94)

3.68***
(0.119)
0.114
(.0000)
3.07
(2.61)

4.98***
(0.536)
0.125
(.0005)
2.32
(2.18)

VIF Moral
3.47
4.38
4.80
5.08
3.47
4.38
4.80
5.08
Shame
VIF Image
2.30
2.47
2.39
2.51
2.30
2.47
2.39
2.51
Shame
(2.24)
(2.33)
(2.35)
(2.49)
(2.24)
(2.33)
(2.35)
(2.49)
VIF Guilt
4.19
4.34
4.23
4.36
4.19
4.34
4.23
4.36
VIF Moral
Shame +
2.24
3.27
3.82
4.23
2.24
3.27
3.82
4.23
Guilt
Note. N=890 for all models. Cell entries are unstandardized Beta coefficients with robust standard errors in
parentheses. Shaded cell entries show the coefficients and standard errors for the combined Moral Shame
and Guilt index. Shaded cell entries in parentheses in the Adjusted R2 row correspond to changes in Adjusted R2
of models where this combined index are substituted for the separate indexes. Shaded cell entries in the VIF rows
indicate the VIF scores for models in which the combined Moral Shame/Guilt Index is substituted.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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Appendix D.8 YouGov models of white support for increasing immigration (complete
results)
Increase immigration levels
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
5.03*** 3.31*** 2.39*** 2.24***
Moral Shame
(0.504) (0.420) (0.305) (0.322)
Racial
2.87*** 2.18***
----Resentment (r)
(0.351) (0.283)
0.814*
0.891
Authoritarianism
----(0.072) (0.083)
0.817* 0.844*
Empathy
----(0.065) (0.071)
Very liberal
--------0.719
0.773
Liberal
----(0.198)
(0.214)
0.467**
0.625†
Moderate
----(0.123)
(0.168)
0.311**
0.458*
Conservative
----(0.113)
(0.179)
Very
0.303*
0.463
----conservative
(0.144)
(0.234)
Strong Democrat
--------0.446**
0.462**
Weak Democrat
----(0.118)
(0.127)
0.853
0.703
Lean Democrat
----(0.209)
(0.176)
0.426**
0.464**
Independent
----(0.109)
(0.126)
0.249**
0.374*
Lean Republican
----(0.106)
(0.162)
Weak
0.349**
0.461*
----Republican
(0.124)
(0.169)
Strong
0.541
0.663
----Republican
(0.211)
(0.272)
No HS
--------0.803
0.835
HS graduate
----(0.278)
(0.281)
1.08
0.981
Some college
----(0.365)
(0.327)
1.33
1.09
4-year degree
----(0.482)
(0.390)
2.67*
2.24*
Post-grad
----(1.02)
(0.856)
1.89***
1.56**
Male
----(0.309)
(0.262)
0.987**
0.992†
Age
----(0.004)
(0.005)
0.223*** 1.04*** 0.222*** 0.685
Constant
(0.021)
(1.04) (0.022) (0.313)
Pseudo R2
0.268
0.349
0.343
0.377
N
1,471
Note. Cell entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses.
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†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Appendix D.9 YouGov models of white support for eliminating all restrictions on
immigration (complete results)

Moral Shame
Racial
Resentment (r)
Authoritarianism
Empathy
Very liberal
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
Very
conservative
Strong Democrat
Weak Democrat
Lean Democrat
Independent
Lean Republican
Weak
Republican
Strong
Republican
No HS
HS graduate
Some college
4-year degree
Post-grad
Male
Age

Increase immigration levels
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
3.22*** 2.29*** 2.02*** 1.82***
(0.242) (0.233) (0.217) (0.216)
1.98*** 1.59***
----(0.211) (0.188)
0.999
1.07
----(0.079) (0.092)
0.789** 0.812
----(0.059) (0.063)
--------0.426**
0.411**
----(0.115)
(0.116)
0.348***
0.365***
----(0.090)
(0.097)
0.216***
0.234***
----(0.071)
(0.079)
0.483†
0.559
----(0.189)
(0.225)
--------0.639†
0.659†
----(0.157)
(0.164)
0.559*
0.527*
----(0.141)
(0.137)
0.584*
0.625†
----(0.143)
(0.157)
0.407*
0.509†
----(0.151)
(0.193)
0.416**
0.470*
----(0.134)
(0.156)
0.423**
0.442**
----(0.130)
(0.137)
--------0.898
0.971
----(0.304)
(0.322)
0.690
0.709
----(0.234)
(0.237)
0.786
0.771
----(0.279)
(0.272)
0.686
0.669
----(0.258)
(0.249)
1.24
1.07
----(0.185)
(0.163)
0.967***
0.970***
----(0.004)
(0.004)
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0.284*** 7.80*** 0.299*** 6.65***
(0.021)
(3.62) (0.023) (3.06)
Pseudo R2
0.173
0.252
0.206
0.265
N
1,472
Note. Cell entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Constant

Appendix D.10 YouGov models of thinking that it is acceptable for people to illegally
immigrate to the US (complete results)

Moral Shame
Racial
Resentment (r)
Authoritarianism
Empathy
Very liberal
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
Very
conservative
Strong Democrat
Weak Democrat
Lean Democrat
Independent
Lean Republican
Weak
Republican
Strong
Republican
No HS
HS graduate
Some college
4-year degree
Post-grad

Increase immigration levels
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
3.74*** 2.53*** 2.02*** 1.88***
(0.327)
(0.287) (0.240) (0.248)
2.24*** 1.78***
----(0.259) (0.235)
0.731*** 0.752**
----(0.062) (0.073)
0.742*** 0.808*
----(0.062) (0.069)
--------0.488**
0.500*
----(0.130)
(0.136)
0.352***
0.463**
----(0.093)
(0.129)
0.328**
0.449*
----(0.119)
(0.176)
0.810
1.33
----(0.371)
(0.656)
--------0.731
0.791
----(0.192)
(0.211)
0.868
0.729
----(0.224)
(0.196)
0.426**
0.439**
----(0.116)
(0.128)
0.248**
0.368*
----(0.115)
(0.169)
0.230***
0.304**
----(0.094)
(0.125)
0.314**
0.359*
----(0.125)
(0.147)
--------0.545†
0.567
----(0.195)
(0.206)
0.573
0.517†
----(0.198)
(0.184)
0.472*
0.378*
----(0.174)
(0.143)
0.867
0.700
----(0.339)
(0.282)
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1.32†
1.11
--(0.212)
(0.185)
0.954***
0.957***
Age
----(0.005)
(0.005)
0.196*** 11.69 *** 0.191*** 8.23***
Constant
(0.017)
(0.021) (0.018) (4.11)
Pseudo R2
0.195
0.294
0.260
0.341
N
1,468
Note. Cell entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Male

---

Appendix D.11 YouGov models of non-white vs. white warmth and ‘anti-white’ feeling
thermometer scores (complete results)

Moral Shame
Racial
Resentment (r)
Authoritarianism
Compassion
Very liberal
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
Very
conservative
Strong Democrat
Weak Democrat
Lean Democrat
Independent
Lean Republican
Weak
Republican
Strong
Republican
No HS
HS graduate
Some college

Non-White vs. White Warmth (OLS)
‘Anti-White’ Score (Logit)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
8.10*** 5.91*** 3.43*** 3.64*** 5.51*** 4.17*** 3.24*** 3.65***
(0.614) (0.848) (0.897) (0.989) (1.59) (1.21) (1.08) (1.15)
4.04*** 3.46***
1.56†
1.23
--------(0.897) (0.958)
(0.373) (0.292)
-4.13*** -3.00***
0.764
0.842
--------(0.640) (0.665)
(0.132) (0.161)
1.91** 1.72**
1.20
1.24†
--------(0.615) (0.625)
(0.147) (0.156)
----------------7.77**
6.01*
0.453*
0.503*
--------(2.51)
(2.45)
(0.152)
(0.171)
15.07***
11.00***
0.429*
0.572
--------(2.57)
(2.54)
(0.162)
(0.228)
11.49***
6.99*
0.144**
0.226*
--------(2.96)
(2.93)
(0.102)
(0.162)
15.79***
11.07**
0.790
1.23
--------(3.73)
(3.67)
(0.483)
(0.776)
----------------4.70†
3.64
1.22
1.21
--------(2.54)
(2.45)
(0.496)
(0.488)
-2.79
-1.08
1.02
0.975
--------(2.26)
(2.24)
(0.373)
(0.367)
-0.822
-1.56
1.28
1.25
--------(2.17)
(2.11)
(0.524)
(0.532)
-2.19
-4.27†
1.12
1.40
--------(2.40)
(2.39)
(0.950)
(1.23)
2.89
0.687
0.165†
0.203
--------(2.69)
(2.68)
(0.165)
(0.203)
2.00
-0.315
1.16
1.37
--------(2.50)
(2.44)
(0.702)
(0.853)
-----------------0.656
0.127
1.95
1.82
--------(2.80)
(2.79)
(1.65)
(1.58)
-5.14†
-3.47
3.04
2.59
--------(2.81)
(2.79)
(2.48)
(2.20)
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4-year degree
Post-grad
Male
Age
Constant

-7.44*
-4.81
4.66†
3.83
------(3.00)
(3.00)
(3.83)
(3.26)
-6.34*
-3.42
2.71
2.14
--------(2.95)
(2.95)
(2.24)
(1.84)
1.74
1.65
1.10
1.15
--------(1.16)
(1.15)
(0.309)
(0.334)
0.060†
0.041
0.976**
0.976**
--------(0.033)
(0.033)
(0.008)
(0.008)
2.85*** -9.08*** 2.77*** -5.21 0.020*** 0.50** 0.019*** 0.038**
(0.595) (3.94) (0.604) (3.92) (0.006) (0.052) (0.006) (0.040)
---

Adjusted/
0.124
0.181
0.188
0.213
0.178
0.248
0.207
0.259
Pseudo R2
Note. N=1,461 in all models. Cell entries from the OLS models are unstandardized coefficients with robust
standard errors in parentheses. Cell entries in logit models are odds ratios with robust standard errors in
parentheses.
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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Appendix E Chapter 7
Appendix E.1 Pre-registration report
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Appendix E.2 Deviation from pre-registered design
The original experimental design was largely shaped by a desire to counteract potential
ceiling effects. Simply put, my concern was that participants’ baseline levels of guilt, shame, and
racial policy liberalism would be so high that any guilt/shame stimulus would fail to induce
detectable differences across study conditions. While this concern can be partly addressed by
fielding a high-powered sample, I also sought to address it by experimentally stimulating
outcome variation in the racially conservative direction. The idea was that if, on account of
ceiling effects, differences could not be detected between the control and guilt/shame condition,
they’d at least be detected between the latter and a condition designed to reduce baseline feelings
of shame and guilt. In practice, this entailed the addition of a second ‘anti-guilt/shame’
experimental condition. To elaborate, this condition was designed for the purpose of weakening
or countering pre-existing perceptions that disparities between whites and blacks reflect the
effects of historical and/or present racism and, therefore, that white Americans enjoy an
illegitimate racial advantage. Such beliefs bear on the legitimacy of ‘racial gaps’, which is
theorized to condition the expression of collective shame and guilt and, in turn, pro-outgroup
attitudes and policy preferences.
However, designing a stimulus capable of manipulating such beliefs was a struggle.
Indeed, and at least when it comes to pre-existing op-ed articles, there is far more ‘woke’ than
anti-woke content to choose from—and this is before one considers questions of effectiveness.
In the end, I opted to author an original article 204 that is generally based on the writings of
Thomas Sowell—a conservative black economist whose many works question the notion that
racial disparities necessarily reflect systemic mistreatment. To briefly summarize, this 1300-

204

The article can be accessed here: https://zachgoldberg.substack.com/p/4d865c4a-d404-4670-ad85-71dc5200efb4
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word article uses census and other data to make the point that a) large outcome disparities
between groups are the rule rather than the exception—even between US-born white Americans
of different European ancestry; b) when broad racial categories are disaggregated, it’s clear that
US-born Americans of many European ancestry groups (including those of British/English
ancestry) are actually far less socioeconomically privileged than many of their non-European
counterparts; c) disparities between groups are highly persistent across time, and both their size
and degree of persistence show no obvious connection to historical discrimination; d) there is no
clear correlation between historical discrimination/disadvantage and contemporary group
outcomes; a number of groups that faced historical disadvantages (e.g. Ashkenazi Jews, Chinese,
Japanese) tremendously out-perform those that did not (e.g. French Acadians, Dutch,
British/English). The article concludes by arguing that, due to the foregoing, there’s no
falsifiable basis on which to attribute outcome disparities between white and black Americans to
the effects of white racism. In other words, owing to the inevitability and pervasiveness of group
disparities even in the absence of discrimination, the claim that white Americans are responsible
for black disadvantage is effectively meaningless and must be taken on faith.
Unfortunately, and despite high hopes for the article’s effectiveness, a number of issues
came into relief when it was finally put into practice. The first is that the ‘anti-guilt/shame’
condition—to which the article was assigned—had a respondent attrition rate (9.4%) that was
significantly higher (p < 0.001) than what was observed in both the neutral (2.8%) and
guilt/shame conditions 205 (3.1%). As Zhou and Fishbach (2016) warn, attrition rates that

205
This issue came to my attention during one of my periodic checks of data quality. These checks were necessary
for identifying respondents that were either likely to be bots (based on Qualtric’s Recaptcha score) and/or those who
both failed the attention check and also completed the survey unrealistically quickly (i.e., 3 standard deviations
below the sample median completion time). They allowed me to reject the submissions of these respondents, thereby
freeing up participation slots for others.
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significantly vary across conditions threaten internal validity. They make it difficult to
distinguish treatment from selection effects, as those who opted out of the survey after receiving
the treatment may be qualitatively different from those that remained. A second issue relates to
the length and intelligibility of the anti-guilt/shame article. As depicted in the figure below,
relative to the stimuli of other conditions, participants graded the anti-guilt/shame article
significantly poorer in terms of being ‘clearly written’ and ‘easy to follow’. And, crucially, this
was the case irrespective of political orientation.

Figure E.2.1 Participant ratings of stimulus articles

A third issue is that because the anti-guilt/shame article speaks to the socioeconomic
success of non-European ancestry groups, it can be interpreted as being implicitly proimmigration. This is likely to be a problem when it comes to examining and interpreting its
effects on immigration attitudes, as it has the potential to increase immigration liberalism when
the goal is to reduce it.
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A final and more basic issue is that the guilt/shame and anti-guilt/shame articles are
hardly comparable. Each presents different types and volumes of content in a different fashion.
Whereas the anti-guilt/shame treatment is chockfull of infographic data and exclusively focusses
on the nature of racial disparities, the guilt/shame treatment is more a traditional op-ed article
that focusses on the history of American racism. Consequently, it cannot be necessarily assumed
that each engages the same sets of attitudes to the same or similar degree. If this assumption does
not hold, then any theoretical relationship between the two conditions is potentially
compromised, which has implications for how the effects of each are interpreted.
All told, while I maintain interest in testing an anti-guilt/shame treatment in future
research, the one adopted here was poorly designed. As such, any data and inferences derived
therefrom are likely to be of dubious validity. Additionally, given my finite resources, keeping
the condition comes with a high opportunity cost in that it entails having fewer respondents in
the neutral and guilt/shame groups. There’s also a more practical cost in that it frivolously
complicates or at least lengthens my analyses and write-up of the results 206. These sacrifices
would have been worthwhile had the anti-guilt/shame treatment not suffered the deficits
described above. But they are hard to justify otherwise, especially given my interest in
maximizing power in the other two conditions.
As such, and after consulting several academic advisors, I decided to discontinue the antiguilt/shame condition 207. This entailed first pausing the availability of the survey via Prolific

206
In any event, the anti-guilt/shame condition did not significantly differ from the neutral condition on any of the
outcome variables implicated in my hypotheses. While I considered combining the two, I opted against it on the
grounds that a) the two conditions are hardly comparable, and b) doing so potentially changes both the nature and
interpretation of differences with the guilt/shame condition.
207
At the time it was discontinued (on June 22) , the condition consisted of 229 participants.
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and, thereafter, deleting the condition from the Qualtric questionnaire’s random assignment
block. The survey was then re-opened on Prolific.
Lest the reader fear otherwise, it’s important to note that the decision to discontinue the
anti-guilt/shame condition in no way compromises the validity of the remaining two conditions.
And this is because it has no influence on which of the two participants are assigned to, which
remains totally random.
Appendix E.3 Public perceptions of group-based discrimination and
advantage/disadvantage

Figure E3.1 Public perceptions of the degree of discrimination against different social groups
Note. Data are weighted. N=7,280.
Source: ANES 2020 Time Series
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Figure E3.2 Percent of respondents perceiving ‘A lot’ or ‘A great deal’ of discrimination against different
social groups
Note. Data are weighted. N=7,280.
Source: ANES 2020 Time Series

Figure E3.3 Public perceptions of the disadvantages and advantages of belonging to different social groups
Note. Data are weighted. N=6,576.
Source: Pew Research Center American Trends Panel: Wave 43 (January-February, 2019).

